Compared to its Asian neighbours, Indonesia was late to join
the so-called third wave of democratisation that began in southern Europe in
the 1970s. After the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime (1967-98) it
successfully conducted free and fair elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009, becoming
arguably the most politically free country in Southeast Asia.1 A
burgeoning civil society and a relatively open media have helped consolidate
democracy but tensions remain between Suharto’s legacy and the direction of
Indonesia’s democratic transition. In particular, Suharto-era oligarchs remain
dominant and the armed forces retain significant influence even though their
power appears to have declined and is less absolute than in much of Southeast
Asia. The pluralism of Indonesia’s national motto, Unity in Diversity, is also
being jeopardised by the failure to safeguard religious minorities against
attacks from hardline Islamists. Against this backdrop Indonesia will
administer its fourth round of post-Suharto elections in 2014, with legislative
polls in April, followed by direct presidential elections in July.
This year’s elections are a litmus test for Indonesia’s own
democratic transition, which could signal either a generational change in
government reinforcing democracy or the return of dictatorial or repressive
forces to office. Of the confirmed candidates for the presidential elections,
the voting public currently faces a stark choice between military protégés of
Suharto or oligarchs who made their fortunes under his authoritarian rule.
However, according to public opinion polls, the favourite to win the presidency
is the current Governor of Jakarta, Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, a non-establishment
figure with a wide popular base. Whilst a Jokowi presidency would represent a
clean break from the Suharto era, the party with which he is associated is
adamant that it will only select its presidential candidate after the April
legislative elections. Nevertheless, his populist and innovative approach to
running the largest city in Southeast Asia has raised hopes among the
electorate that Jokowi will also be able to reinvigorate the country’s stalled
reform drive at the national level. Indeed, Indonesia’s first two direct
presidential elections, in 2004 and 2009, were also won on a platform of
political reform and clean government by retired general Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, who will soon reach the end of his term limit. Pro-poor policies and
the prosecution of high-profile corruption cases during his first term
contributed heavily to his success in the parliamentary and presidential
elections of 2009.2
Yudhoyono’s legitimacy was also boosted by a resources and
consumer boom which delivered steady economic growth of nearly six per cent a
year during his decade in office. An expansion of the middle class accompanied
Indonesia overtaking Malaysia as the world’s biggest exporter of palm oil,
Thailand as the top exporter of rubber, and Australia as the largest exporter
of coal.3 High prices for these and other resource commodities,
largely fed by demand from China, increased the legitimacy of Yudhoyono
personally, enabling him to bring valuable stability to Indonesia amid global
economic turbulence. However, the president’s personal approval ratings dipped
during his second term as fuel subsidies were reduced and members of his own
party became snared in corruption scandals. The pro-poor policies introduced
prior to the 2009 parliamentary election were mostly temporary. Despite
improvements, Indonesia was still ranked 114 out of 177 countries by
Transparency International in its latest annual survey on corruption
perceptions.4 Disenchantment with the slow pace of reform,
disillusionment with money politics and the lacklustre performance of many
elected officials is widely expected to result in falling voter turnouts in
2014, especially if Jokowi is not nominated as a presidential candidate.
Foreign investors have also signalled their continuing frustration with a
graft-ridden legal system, opaque government policies and the country’s
creaking infrastructure.
Consolidating the gains made under Yudhoyono, a Jokowi
victory could indicate a shift away from Suharto-era vested interests to a
less-patrimonial style of politics and a new generation of leader. Regardless
of outcome, Indonesia’s elections are among the most significant of 2014 given
that it is the world’s third largest electoral democracy, an ongoing test case
for the transition from authoritarian rule and a prominent model for democratic
survival in multi-ethnic states. The significance of these factors is
compounded by Indonesian aspirations to play a leadership role both among
developing countries and in Southeast Asia, as the region’s biggest country and
economy. Given the continuing instability in Thailand, the recent unrest in
Cambodia and Myanmar’s delicate democratic transition, democratic consolidation
or reversal in Indonesia would carry symbolic weight at a regional level. This
article opens with a brief history of post-reformasi elections in Indonesia,
followed by an overview of the main parties and candidates with a short
analysis of political Islam. Thereafter it will consider the influence of the
media and the military upon Indonesia’s continuing democratic transition.
Post-Reformasi Elections in
Indonesia
Electoral reform in Indonesia marks the country’s biggest
departure from the Suharto era. Whilst parliamentary and presidential elections
did take place under Suharto’s so-called New Order they were heavily manipulated
by the regime to ensure success for the president’s own electoral vehicle Golongan
Karya, usually shortened to Golkar. Electoral rules in place between 1973
and 1998 permitted only two opposition parties to contest parliamentary
elections, thus forcing the merger of the main opposition parties. The four
largest Muslim parties became the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan, PPP), whilst five secular parties formed the Indonesian
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI). Criticism of
government policy by the PPP and the PDI was not allowed and government
approval was required for all campaign slogans. Every candidate from every
party was screened by the regime and fully half of all members of the national
parliament were directly appointed by Suharto. Only Golkar was allowed to
canvass support below the district level through local government officials and
regional military commanders, and all government employees were required to
support Golkar.5 This gave the party a huge advantage over its
rivals in mobilising across the archipelago, a situation that largely still
persists in the more remote areas of the country. Golkar’s record in the
post-Suharto reformasi era has been mixed. Whilst it has repeatedly attempted
to reduce the pace and depth of reform it has also made some important
contributions to Indonesia’s democratic transition since 1998. This apparent
paradox has prompted one observer to note, “Just like Indonesian politics in
general, Golkar too is an ambiguous amalgam of progressive reformism and
conservative status quo attitudes.” 6
Presidential elections were also held every five years
during the New Order but these merely rubber stamped Suharto’s re-selection.
This remained the case during the March 1998 presidential election which
unanimously selected him for another five year term which was due to end in
2003, by which time he was almost 82 years old. However, two months later
Suharto was forced to resign amidst a deep economic crisis, violent mass
protests and a loss of elite support. Vice president B.J. Habibie replaced his
mentor and, in order to boost his own legitimacy, hurriedly announced
parliamentary elections for the following year. By demonstrating his own
reformist credentials he hoped to secure a full term as president in his own
right. With the New Order restrictions lifted some 48 political parties
contested the 1999 parliamentary elections. The president was still to be
chosen by the upper house, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), following the elections. However, Habibie
withdrew his candidacy after his accountability report was rejected by the new
parliament and his party Golkar subsequently threw its support behind
Abdurrahman Wahid. Even though Wahid’s National Awakening Party (Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) only placed third in the legislative elections,
with less than 13 percent of the vote, he was also leader of the Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), a traditionalist Muslim body that is Indonesia’s largest civil
society organisation. Wahid also proved adept at building the necessary
alliances to become president, relegating Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose PDI-P (Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle) had
actually gained the most seats in the elections, to the position of vice
president.
Wahid made a bright start as president in 1999, bringing a
much more pluralistic approach to the office. He opened up democratic space in
West Papua, began peace talks with the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka, GAM) and lifted the New Order restrictions on Chinese cultural
expression. These attempts at peacebuilding, alongside efforts to reform the
military, provoked resistance from the political elite and Wahid became mired
in a corruption scandal. This provided the pretext for the MPR to impeach him
on charges of graft and incompetence in July 1999, and Megawati assumed the
presidency. Having convincingly won the 1999 parliamentary elections, Megawati’s
elevation represented a triumph for democracy. Her party was widely perceived
as the main opposition in the late New Order period, and Megawati herself is
the daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia’s founding president who was ousted by
Suharto in 1967. Despite bringing a measure of political stability to
Indonesia, however, her conservative administration came to be seen as listless
and lacklustre. In particular, Megawati showed little appetite for military
reform, was perceived as soft on regional terrorism and appeared unwilling to
tackle corruption. Nevertheless, important constitutional reforms were
instituted during her stewardship, including the establishment of the
Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK)
and the Constitutional Court, and the introduction of direct local elections.
These institutions would be developed further during her successor’s
presidency. In contrast to his predecessors Habibie, Wahid and Megawati,
Yudhoyono vowed to lead the anti-corruption drive personally, and reaped the
rewards at the ballot box.7
The next round of national elections took place in 2004,
contested by 24 political parties, and constitutional reform meant that the
parliament would now be fully elected, with no reserved seats for the military.
The president was now also directly elected in separate polls after the new
parliament had been formed. The elections of both 1999 and 2004 were conducted
relatively cleanly, leading democracy advocacy group Freedom House to
categorise Indonesia as a ‘free’ country in 2005 after adjusting its status to
‘partly free’ following Suharto’s fall. Meanwhile, Freedom House, which
publishes annual reports that analyse the extent of civil liberties and
political rights throughout the world, downgraded the status of Thailand and
Philippines from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ in 2006 and 2007 respectively,
underscoring Indonesia’s progress in a regional context.8 It is also
worth noting that Indonesia’s elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009 were concluded
mostly peacefully, again in contrast to the experience of Thailand and the
Philippines in the same period.
Further highlighting how free and fair Indonesian national
elections have become is the fact that in the first direct presidential
elections of 2004 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was able to defeat incumbent
Megawati. She enjoyed the support of the largest party in parliament but
Yudhoyono was able to convert his personal popularity with voters into victory.
Indeed, ruling governments lost both the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections,
and Yudhoyono’s triumph in 2009 marked the first time since 1998 that a sitting
president has been re-elected to the highest office. Yudhoyono initially gained
a reputation as a progressive military reformer in the late Suharto period, and
had enhanced his standing with cabinet posts under Wahid and Megawati. His high
personal approval ratings as president also enabled his relatively new
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD) to become the largest party in
parliament in 2009, overtaking Golkar and PDP-P. This clearly demonstrates
that, unlike regional neighbours Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia, Indonesia
has an electoral system that has not been unduly manipulated to favour the
ruling party.9 At the same time, the emergence of new parties such
as Yudhoyono’s PD has not led to the collapse of other major parties, unlike in
Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan where parties often disappear
after contesting one or two elections.10 The five largest parties
from Indonesia’s 1999 legislative elections were still represented in
parliament after the 2009 elections (see table below), although the number of
minor parties has ebbed and flowed. Some 38 national parties contested the 2009
legislative election but new rules have trimmed their number to 12 for this
year’s April elections.
Another distinguishing feature of party politics in
Indonesia which has likely contributed to this stabilisation has been the fact
that political parties do not usually engage in robust ideological debates with
one another. Whilst the lack of substantive issue-oriented political debate
raises doubts about the quality of Indonesia’s democratic transition, it has
enabled the country to avoid the political polarisation that has paralysed
party politics in Thailand and elsewhere. Instead Indonesian politics have
become increasingly personalistic since the introduction of direct presidential
elections in 2004, and the implementation of similarly direct elections for
provincial governors, mayors and district heads in 2005.11 This lack
of ideological polarisation has enabled all governments since Wahid’s first
cabinet of 1999 to be multi-party coalitions where power sharing appears to be
the dominant mantra. Yudhoyono continued this trend in 2004 when naming his
first United Indonesia Cabinet in which only the PDI-P of the established
political parties was not represented. Thus, in the 2009 legislative elections
these other parties were unable to effectively challenge Yudhoyono’s PD on
policy differences. The president repeated this strategy for his second United
Indonesia Cabinet, formed at the beginning of his second term, in which again
the PDI-P was the only major party not represented.12
Parties and Candidates
Electoral rules first applied in 2004 specify that a
political party, or a coalition of parties, must secure a minimum of 25 percent
of the vote or 20 percent of the seats in the April legislative elections to
select a candidate to contest the July presidential elections. To win the
presidency therefore, a candidate must be skilled at building alliances with
other parties. Whilst the Constitutional Court recently ruled that this
threshold is unconstitutional, electoral changes will not come into force until
the 2019 polls. The Court also decided that the present requirement for voters
to first elect parliament followed by a president is also unconstitutional;
meaning that from 2019 simultaneous polls will be held. It is
anticipated that this ruling may increase the number of candidates seeking to
attain the highest office since until now presidential hopefuls have needed to
secure the backing of large political parties.In the three elections since 1999
the largest political parties have been Golkar, Suharto’s former election
vehicle, and the PDI-P, widely seen as the main opposition in the late Suharto
period. The PDI-P won 33.74 percent of the vote in the 1999 legislative
elections, with Golkar second on 20.46 percent. However, both parties have been
in decline, with Golkar losing the strength it derived from the New Order’s
military and bureaucratic apparatus and the PDI-P failing to develop its
reputation as the standard bearer of populist, secular nationalism. Since its
founding in 2001 a new electoral force in Indonesian politics has emerged, that
of Yudhoyono’s election vehicle PD. In addition to Golkar and the PDI-P,
support for other established political parties has also declined, especially
the PKB of former president Wahid and the venerable PPP (third and fourth respectively
in the 1999 elections). Following the template successfully implemented by
Yudhoyono’s PD, two other election vehicles for Suharto-era generals have also
emerged since 2004. They are Gerindra (Partai
Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement Party) under the
leadership of Prabowo Subianto and Wiranto’s Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani
Rakyat, Partai Hanura or People’s Conscience Party). These new
parties have contributed to an increasing fragmentation in the party system and
their longevity is questionable without their charismatic leaders.13
Indeed, Yudhoyono’s PD is widely predicted to see its share of the vote slashed
in the April parliamentary elections with its founder no longer on the ballot.
People’s Representative Assembly (DPR) election results
(vote percentage)14
|
|
2009
|
2004
|
1999
|
|
PD
|
20.85%
|
7.45%
|
N/A
|
|
Golkar
|
14.45%
|
21.58%
|
22.46%
|
|
PDI-P
|
14.03%
|
18.53%
|
33.74%
|
|
PKS
|
7.88%
|
7.34%
|
1.36%
|
|
PAN
|
6.01%
|
6.44%
|
7.12%
|
|
PPP
|
5.32%
|
8.15%
|
10.71%
|
|
PKB
|
4.94%
|
10.57%
|
12.62%
|
|
Gerindra
|
4.46%
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Hanura
|
3.77%
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
The favourite to win the 2014 presidential election is
Jokowi, the current Governor of Jakarta who has yet to be officially nominated
as a candidate. An opinion poll conducted in mid-January by Kompas, Indonesia’s
largest daily newspaper, found that he would win 43.5 percent of the vote,
whilst another poll by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), an influential Jakarta think tank, predicted he would win 34.7 percent.
It is widely assumed that Jokowi will be selected by Megawati’s PDI-P, whom he
represented in the Jakarta gubernatorial elections, and its failure to
officially nominate him has angered some PDI-P members. There has been
speculation that the party’s matriarch would like one last run at the
presidency for herself, in which case Jokowi could be her running mate.
Megawati herself has placed a distant fifth in most presidential surveys,
having lost the previous two presidential elections to Yudhoyono. Jokowi has
frequently appeared in public with Megawati, whether to either promote his
candidacy or reflect some of the governor’s personal popularity onto his
party’s leader. Regardless, Megawati has announced that the party will
only nominate its presidential candidate after the April parliamentary
elections, although this could be a strategic mistake.
If Jokowi is confirmed as its presidential candidate before
the April elections, most polls suggest the PDI-P would likely make significant
gains in parliament, and overall voter turnout would also increase.15
Jokowi’s candidacy seems likely to draw in many young voters who otherwise
would not participate in the elections, and the party needs to secure as many
seats in parliament as possible to avoid being forced into a coalition. As
Yudhoyono discovered, coalition governments reduce a president’s room for
manoeuvre, a situation that could be replicated under a Jokowi-led coalition.
However, Megawati could be anxious about losing her family’s control of the
party to Jokowi if she backs him for this year’s presidential elections. Before
Jokowi’s rise to prominence, Megawati had apparently been grooming her son
Prananda Prabowo for leadership of the party, whilst Megawati’s late husband
Taufik Kiemas had been backing their daughter Puan Maharani for the role.16
Under a Jokowi presidency Megawati could instead become a powerful kingmaker -
akin to India’s Sonia Gandhi - but even without Jokowi the PDI-P is calculating
that it could still win the most votes through being the main opposition to
Yudhoyono’s unpopular government. Were he not to be selected by the PDI-P it is
likely that Jokowi would be approached by other parties to be a vice
presidential candidate.
Jokowi first established a reputation for clean and
innovative governance when mayor of Solo in Central Java. His achievements
there included revitalising public spaces, easing traffic congestion, improving
health care delivery, promoting investment and rebranding the city as a
Javanese cultural center to rival nearby Yogyakarta. He was re-elected mayor
with over 90 percent of the vote. Since becoming governor of Jakarta he has
made a name for himself nationally, gaining a reputation for transparency in
the midst of a corrupt political system by attempting to replicate his success
in Solo. For instance, his deputy uploads recordings of meetings on YouTube and
the pair publishes their own salary details online. A reputation for clean
governance served Yudhoyono very well at the ballot box until it began to
unravel in his second term. Unlike Yudhoyono however, Jokowi appears humble and
approachable on his regular walkabouts to meet local residents, an approach he
pioneered in Solo. These unscheduled tours often take in the city’s most
deprived areas and sometimes involve uninvited appearances at local government
offices. Such a hands-on style is a major reason for his high approval ratings
both in Jakarta and further afield. In particular, Jokowi’s informal style
appeals to young voters who are eligible to vote in national elections for the
first time.
As governor Jokowi has attempted to tackle Jakarta’s
startling social disparities by instituting several pro-poor policies. Soon
after his election in October 2012 he introduced smartcards to provide free
access to health care and education for needy residents. The Jakarta Health
Card (Kartu Jakarta Sehat, KJS) programme entitles cardholders to free
health services at all community health centers and some hospitals across the
city. The governor had a target to enroll half of Jakarta’s residents in the
scheme by the end of 2013. Likewise, the Jakarta Smart Card (Kartu Jakarta
Pintar, KJP) enables students from underprivileged families who hold the
card to Rp240,000 (US $21) each month in financial aid to pay for educational
materials, stationary, uniforms, transport and even food.17 Jokowi’s
administration has also established affordable housing for some Jakarta
residents, and boldly increased the minimum wage by 44 percent for 2013.18
These social initiatives have been made possible by an increase in tax revenues
generated by the capital’s booming trade and service sector, and by the fact
that between 2007 and 2012 Jakarta actually ran a budget surplus of 15-20
percent.19 The governor has also improved revenue raising ability by
widening the scope of e-government and online transactions. This has enabled
his administration to improve the tax take and reduce opportunities for bribery
without increasing taxes, as bureaucrats now have fewer direct dealings with
business people. Jokowi has also attempted to tackle Jakarta’s chronic gridlock
by reviving long-stalled plans to install a mass transit rail network, funded
by loans from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and has been
upgrading bus services in the meantime. Polls suggest that most Jakarta
residents want him to see out his first term as governor, which ends in 2017.20
Jokowi’s victory in the Jakarta gubernatorial elections
against the incumbent Fauzi Bowo, who was backed by Yudhoyono, was perceived as
a victory for a new generation of politician over an older, more patrimonial
style of politics. Indeed, 52 year-old Jokowi is the only presidential
challenger to have arisen from the reformasi democratic era, and unlike many
Indonesian politicians does not hail from a privileged background. His policies
aimed at Jakarta’s poorest residents also represent a break with the past. As a
newcomer to the national political arena Jokowi would face new challenges as
president, however. In particular, he would have to deal with the financial
backers that fund an expensive presidential campaign and a military that might
try to claw back some of its political power. Moreover, there is the question
of whether he would be able to push through his own policies or would merely be
a proxy for PDI-P leader Megawati, during whose conservative presidency there
was little appetite for reform. In opposition, the party vociferously opposed
the Yudhoyono government’s plans to decease fuel subsidies, and in March 2014
unveiled a party platform critical of foreign investment.
Trailing second behind Jokowi in most presidential polls has
been former Special Forces Commander Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra, campaigning
on a platform of pro-poor and pro-agriculture protectionist policies. The
Kompas mid-January poll predicted he would win 11.1 percent of the presidential
vote if he participated. Unable to secure the backing of Golkar as its
presidential candidate, Prabowo and his wealthy tycoon brother Hashim
Djojohadikusum founded Gerindra specifically
to contest the 2009 presidential elections. In a campaign notable for the
party’s lavish spending on television advertising, it garnered 4.5 percent of
the vote in the 2009 parliamentary elections and could not build the necessary
alliances to field Prabowo as a presidential candidate. Instead, Prabowo ran as
running mate to the PDI-P’s Megawati, and the pair won 27 percent of the vote
in losing to incumbent Yudhoyono, who secured 61 percent. For the 2014
elections Prabowo’s brother, who also financed Gerindra’s 2009 campaign, has
contracted a leading New York advertising agency to improve his sibling’s
electability.
Prabowo is the son of Sumitro, an influential economist who
held cabinet posts under both Sukarno and Suharto, and was a controversial
figure during the late Suharto period. His rapid rise up the military hierarchy
was seen as closely linked to his marriage to Suharto’s second daughter Siti
Hediati Hariyadi. Having held command posts in both East Timor and West Papua
he has been implicated in several cases of human rights abuse, and also played
an incendiary role in the riots and demonstrations that accompanied the fall of
his then father-in-law in 1998. Prabowo was widely believed to be agitating to
become Suharto’s successor, firstly by capturing the post of Armed Forces
Commander held by General Wiranto. Troops under Prabowo’s command acted as
agent provocateurs in kidnapping and disappearing student activists and stoking
the 1998 riots, apparently in order to portray Wiranto as weak for not dealing
more forcefully with the protests. However, Suharto’s successor B.J. Habibie
faced down Prabowo’s demand to be appointed Armed Forces Commander and Wiranto
kept his post. Prabowo subsequently spent a period of exile in Jordan, before
returning to Indonesia to join his brother’s resource extraction business and
begin his political career.
It has been widely forecast that Gerindra would be unlikely
to secure more than 10 percent of the vote in this year’s parliamentary
elections, meaning that an alliance with the Yudhoyono’s PD would be necessary
for Prabowo to have a run at the presidency. If such an alliance does not
materialise Gerindra might instead have to persuade some smaller Muslim parties
to support its leader’s candidacy, especially since Prabowo was strongly
associated with so-called ‘Green’ Muslim factions in the armed forces in the
mid-1990s.21 Yet that strategy appears hamstrung by the continuing
electoral weakness of Muslim-based parties in Indonesia and possibly by the
fact that Prabowo remains single after divorcing Suharto’s daughter in 1998.
Prabowo’s brother and chief campaign financier is also a devout Christian. The
PPP is predicted to secure at least five percent of the vote, to make it the
largest Muslim-based party in the next parliament, but its chairman Suryadharma
Ali seems to have implacable personal differences with Prabowo which would
seemingly preclude the PPP backing Gerindra. Two other such parties, the PKB
and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), are both thought capable of
winning up to four percent of the vote and Gerindra has recently been in
discussions with PAN chairman Hatta Rajasa to be Prabowo’s running mate.22
Gerindra might also secure an alliance with the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), but pollsters believe that it will also struggle
to obtain more than five percent. The National Democrat Party (Nasdem)
and the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan
Indonesia, PKPI) are two new parties that are expected to win less than two
percent, rendering them of marginal significance in forging presidential
election alliances.
Prabowo’s former military nemesis Wiranto also established
his own electoral vehicle Hanura to contest the 2009 elections. Although
Wiranto faces many of the same challenges as Prabowo in securing alliances he
is not as divisive a candidate. In the late Suharto years he was part of the
so-called ‘red and white’ secular nationalist faction of the military elite
which opposed Prabowo’s ‘green’ Islamic faction.23 As Armed Forces
Commander from February 1998 to October 1999, Wiranto was a central player in
the early reformasi period, in which he resisted hardliners such as Prabowo by
refusing to impose military rule. Instead he played something of a restraining
role during the post-Suharto transition, and subsequently supported the
reduction of the military’s reserved seats in parliament and the separation of
the police from the armed forces. However, Wiranto (along with five
other generals) was also indicted by the UN-backed Special Crimes Unit in East
Timor for crimes against humanity for failing to stop the razing of East Timor
by the Indonesian military and its militias, after that territory’s vote for
independence in 1999. He entered politics as Golkar’s candidate in the
2004 presidential elections, placing third in the contest behind Yudhoyono and
Megawati with 22.19 percent of the votes. In the 2009 elections he campaigned
unsuccessfully for the vice presidency as running mate to Golkar chairman Jusuf
Kalla. Wiranto has placed fourth in most polls for this year’s presidential
elections, and like Prabowo will need to form strategic alliances with other
parties to participate in this year’s presidential contest.
The current Golkar chairman and presidential candidate is
prominent businessman Aburizal Bakrie, another controversial figure since he
and his brothers control the huge Bakrie Group founded by their father. Among
the conglomerate’s many subsidiaries is oil and gas company Lapindo whose
drilling triggered a huge mudflow in 2006 that displaced thousands of residents
in Sidoarjo, East Java, destroying surrounding homes and farmland. Indonesia’s
National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) held the company responsible
for the man-made disaster that it deemed a human rights violation. In 2013 Bumi
Resources, another Bakrie asset and the largest thermal coal exporter in Asia,
was involved in an unsavoury public row with the Rothschild banking dynasty
over control of the firm. The Golkar chairman has been upbeat that neither of
these scandals will damage his electability but there has been some disquiet
within the party over his candidacy.24
Golkar is widely forecast to gain 12 to 15 percent of the
vote in the parliamentary elections but the party has yet to secure a
presidential election victory in the post-Suharto era, and Bakrie is currently
the third favourite to win this year’s contest. The Golkar chairman has been a
political insider since the Suharto era, having served as President of the
ASEAN business forum (1991-1995), President of the Indonesian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (1994-2004), Coordinating Minister for Economy (2004-2005)
and Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare (2005-2009). Although Golkar
retains its New Order logistical advantages over other parties in more remote
parts of the archipelago, it could suffer from breakaway parties Gerindra and
Hanura drawing away some of its votes, and the advancing age of many of its
leaders who started their political careers under Suharto.
Meanwhile, Yudhoyono’s PD has yet to select a presidential
candidate. Without its patron on the ballot, support for the party is predicted
to drop below 10 percent of the vote in 2014, underscoring how important a
leader’s personal charisma is for a party’s election prospects. As a
consequence, there have been discussions within the PD that if its share of the
vote is smaller than Golkar’s, then Yudhoyono will back Golkar if his
brother-in-law, Pramono Edhie Wibowo, is selected as Golkar’s vice presidential
candidate. Under the present system a presidential candidate typically
nominates a running mate after the legislative elections in order to broker
alliances to meet the electoral threshold to run for president. Moreover, this
enables smaller parties to field candidates in the presidential elections. Most
notably this was the case in 2004 when Yudhoyono selected Golkar chairman Jusuf
Kalla as his running mate after Golkar had secured the most seats in
parliament. This strategy gave Yudhoyono a much stronger power base in
parliament since his own party had secured only 55 seats (from 7.45 percent of
the vote), compared to Golkar’s 128 seats (from 21.58 percent of the vote).
However, this prompted speculation as to whether it was Yudhoyono or Kalla who
was actually the most powerful man in government. Yudhoyono’s personal popularity
was boosted by his announcement of several timely fuel price reductions
following the collapse of international oil prices after August 2008. A net oil
importer since late 2004, this policy resulted in a stunning parliamentary
election success for Yudhoyono’s PD, allowing its patron the luxury of
disregarding party considerations when choosing a running mate. For the 2009
presidential campaign Yudhoyono selected a non-party figure instead, former
central bank governor Boediono, although this subsequently weakened his
standing vis-a-vis parliament.
Political Islam
Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, with
around 88 percent of its 240 million population identifying as Muslims. Unlike
in neighbouring Malaysia, however, political Islam has not become a dominant
electoral force. Whilst Islamic-based parties secured a combined 39.33 percent
of the vote in the 1955 elections, Suharto’s authoritarian rule subsequently
restricted the political mobilisation of Islamist forces (see table below). Generally
lacking the charismatic leaders of secular parties, Islamic-based parties have
been unable to take advantage of the greater political opportunities since
1998, and continue to split the Islamic vote amongst them. In a bid to increase
their electability, all of Indonesia’s Islamic parties jettisoned their
campaigns for Sharia law and adopted more pluralistic party platforms. This
stands in marked contrast to their counterparts contesting the 1955 election,
all of which advocated an Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia)
with Islam at the centre of a revised constitution.
This shift seems to reflect the triumph of the inclusive
principles on which Indonesia was founded, principles to which Indonesia’s
secular nationalist parties successfully appeal. Whilst Islam is the sole state
religion in Malaysia, it is only one of six recognised monotheistic religions
in the more inclusive Indonesian constitution.25 Moreover,
Islamisation in Malaysia has largely been designed and implemented by political
elites in Kuala Lumpur, partly as a strategy to marginalise ethno-religious
minorities, whereas in Indonesia it has been driven by civil society groups
with only sporadic support from the state.26 Islamic parties have
been represented in all of Indonesia’s coalition governments since 1999 but
their electoral prospects have been hit by recent corruption scandals. In 2013
the former leader of the PKS was jailed for 16 years for corruption, and
now the Corruption Eradication Commission is investigating two separate cases
that threaten to implicate the leaderships of the PPP and the smaller Crescent
Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). Although there is
awareness that corruption affects all political parties it is particularly
damaging for Islamic parties since they position themselves on the moral high
ground above their secular rivals. Therefore, these graft allegations will
likely impact the electoral chances of all Islamic-based parties.27
Surveys predict that the combined vote of the five parties which appeal to
Islamic voters - PPP, PKS, PBB, PAN and PKB - would total only around 21
percent, less than they collectively won in the 2009 election, with each
struggling to gain more than five percent.28
The decline in the electoral appeal of the Islamic parties
since 2004 has been accompanied by an increase in religious intolerance and the
rise of the fundamentalist vigilante group Islamic Defenders Front (Front
Pembela Islam, FPI). Formed in the reformasi era of 1998 when restrictions
on political assembly and free speech were lifted, the FPI positions itself as
a moral police force trying to enforce strict compliance with Sharia law in
Indonesia. It has become notorious for its sweeps of nightclubs, bars,
brothels, gambling dens and even street vendors, particularly during the month
of Ramadan, actions which have been popular with some conservative Muslims.
The FPI is strongest in Jakarta and West Java, where it has
forced the closure of many churches and fatally attacked members of the
Ahmadiyah community, a minority Islamic sect. However, during the last five
years it has spread across Indonesia and clashed with ethnic and religious
minorities in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan, typically when the FPI tries to
prevent minority religions from establishing (temporary or permanent) places of
worship. The FPI has also become well known in the mainstream media for the
protests that forced the cancellation of Lady Gaga’s Jakarta concert in 2012,
and the jailing of the editor of Indonesia’s Playboy Magazine on charges of
public indecency in 2010.
The FPI finances itself by extorting bars and nightclubs
across Jakarta and West Java, and it is also rumoured to receive financial
support from political parties, the police and military. In 2011 leaked
American diplomatic cables surfaced on WikiLeaks which alleged that the
Indonesian security forces have been sponsoring the FPI to pressure the
political establishment. The Indonesian military similarly used Islamic
hardliners to help massacre hundreds of thousands of alleged Communists in
1965-66, and since then Islamic militia have been deployed by the security
forces in conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, Sulawesi and Maluku. There is
also speculation that the FPI might play a similar role for mainstream Islamic
organisations, including NU and Muhammadiyah, who have conspicuously failed to denounce
the FPI’s violent actions.29
Despite using mass demonstrations, threats and violence to
intimidate its targets, the FPI has so far avoided being labelled a terrorist
group because the Yudhoyono government has been afraid of losing the support of
Muslim voters. Indeed, the judiciary and the police have also been very
reluctant to crack down on the organisation, and some Islamic parties have even
publicly supported the FPI. Most cases against FPI members never make it to
court, and when convictions are made lenient sentences are the norm. Whilst the
DPR has debated banning the organisation, both politicians and judges do not
want to be seen as un-Islamic by attacking the FPI. Both NU and Muhammadiyah,
Indonesia’s two largest civil society organisations, have also previously
rejected calls to ban the group. The FPI even targets expressions of
traditional Indonesian culture, and its rise indicates a mainstream political
shift to the right, in which conservative Islam appears to have become too
significant a constituency for political parties to antagonise.
This failure to prosecute the FPI has prompted the United
Nations, the European Union and members of the U.S. Congress to criticise
Indonesia over its lack of protection for the religious minorities which
constitute more than 12 percent of its population. The FPI insists it is
exercising its democratic right to freedom of expression but its actions
undermine both the country’s ongoing democratic transition and the inclusive
principles on which Indonesia was founded. Much stronger law enforcement is
necessary to tackle religious harassment and protect the country’s pluralist
foundations. The state’s reluctance to reign in the FPI represents a major
failing of Yudhoyono’s two terms in office and sets a dangerous precedent for
future governments.
Media Influence
Another notable aspect of Indonesia’s democratic transition
has been the changing role of the media. Soon after Suharto resigned in May
1998 the government relaxed previously strict censorship rules leading to a
rapid expansion in print media, television channels and radio stations. One of
President Wahid’s first acts on taking office in 1999 was to abolish the
Ministry of Information, further consolidating media freedom. In the following
decade the number of newspapers and magazines tripled, the amount of national
television networks doubled and around 200 local television networks appeared
across the country. Between 1998 and 2008 the number of households with at
least one television increased almost threefold.30 Internet usage
also increased dramatically and by June 2013 Indonesia had almost 64 million
active Facebook users, the fourth largest number behind the United States,
Brazil and India.31 The country also has around 30 million Twitter
users and in 2012 Jakarta became ‘the world’s most active Twitter city’, ahead
of Tokyo, London and New York.32 Jokowi’s skillful use of social
media enhances his appeal among young voters, 67 million of whom are eligible
to participate for the first-time in this year’s national elections.33
Research indicates that 90 percent of Indonesians between the ages of 15 and 19
regularly go online, 80 percent of the country’s internet users are under 35
years-old and around 90 percent of all internet traffic goes to social
networking sites.34
According to Freedom House, “Indonesia’s media environment
continues to rank among the most vibrant and open in the region”.35
Indeed, the media frequently takes the state to task on issues such as
corruption, environmental degradation and violence against religious
minorities, and there is a growing awareness among politicians and bureaucrats
that media reports of wrongdoing can break a career. Moreover, it has been
argued that the explosion of social media in Indonesia has fostered a climate
in which popular online trends can positively influence the political agenda
and deliver actual policy results.36 On the other hand, this
developing watchdog ability is countered by spurious defamation lawsuits filed
by powerful individuals, who have been able to bribe corrupt judges and law
enforcement officials to stifle media scrutiny of their affairs.
Often referred to as the fourth pillar of democracy, after
the judiciary, legislative and the executive, the media plays a key role in
holding the other pillars accountable. This is especially the case in a country
such as Indonesia in which the integrity of the first three pillars is
questionable. However, the increasing influence of the mass media in Indonesia,
in particular television, has been linked to the growing tendency of wealthy
entrepreneurs to seek high office. Of the 12 political parties on the ballot papers
in this year’s elections three have media moguls in leadership roles. Golkar
chairman Aburizal Bakrie owns two television stations, TVOne and ANTV.
Likewise, Hanura’s vice presidential candidate Hary Tanoesoedibjo is the owner
of Media Nusantara Citra Group which runs three national terrestrial stations -
RCTI, Global TV and MNC TV - among the 20 that it controls. Surya Paloh,
chairman of the new NasDem Party, runs news channel MetroTV whilst Dahlan
Iskan, owner of the Jawa Pos Group, is widely tipped to be the PD’s candidate
to succeed Yudhoyono. As a consequence, there are concerns that the development
of the Indonesian media’s watchdog role will be stunted.
This is significant since a recent survey has found that
most Indonesians rely heavily on television coverage of political parties when
deciding who to vote for.37 Indeed, television remains the country’s
primary news source. Research conducted in 2012 with Indonesians over the age
of 10 revealed that 91.7 percent watch television, compared to 18.57 percent
who listen to radio and 17.66 percent who read newspapers and magazines.38
Biased television coverage of the political scene has already been noted in the
run up to this year’s elections.39 In December 2013 the Indonesian
Broadcasting Commission (KPI) admonished six television channels owned by
Aburizal Bakrie, Hary Tanoesoedibjo and Surya Paloh for excessive and partial
coverage of their owners’ election bids. The Bakrie family’s TV One and ANTV
were deemed to have run 430 Aburizal Bakrie and Golkar promotional videos in
October 2013 alone. Likewise, Hary Tanoesoedibjo’s MNC TV, RCTI and Global TV
stations were all criticised for broadcasting programmes championing the
candidacy of its owner and his Hanura party chairman Wiranto. Meanwhile, Metro
TV received censure for excessive coverage of the NasDem Party and its party
chairman Surya Paloh, who happens to own the station.40
Even in a mature democracy such as Italy, experience shows
that having a media mogul as head of government tends to compromise coverage of
the leader and his
administration. With Silvio
Berlusconi as prime minister, the Freedom of the Press Global Survey of 2004
downgraded the status of the Italian media from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ in
light of his influence.41 Berlusconi was able to silence critics and
reduce coverage of his many scandals due to his control of a large section of
the Italian media, including state television. Likewise, in Thailand the prime
ministership of Thaksin Shinawatra was dogged by allegations of a conflict of
interest as Thaksin used his media empire to manipulate reporting of his
activities.42 In Indonesia the increasing influence of the mass
media, especially television, has already been linked to the greater
personalisation of politics. Although Indonesia’s lively media has developed
into one of the most free in Asia, the Freedom of the Press Global Survey of
2013 ranks it as only ‘partly free’ due to restrictive laws, such as one
prohibiting blasphemy, and harassment of journalists.43 The preponderance
of vaguely worded laws on the books in Indonesia would make fertile ground for
a media tycoon looking to roll back press freedom if elected to executive
office. This is of particular concern since the political and economic
dominance of Indonesia oligarchs is already well served by a corrupt legal
system and the relative organisational weakness of civil society.44
The Spectre of the Military
Whilst the military has lost much of its power since the
Suharto era, the presence of New Order generals Prabowo and Wiranto on the
ballot papers inevitably raises the question of what influence it will have
over future governments. Unlike in Thailand and the Philippines, the political
influence of the military has further declined since 2004. Much of the credit
for this turnaround must go to Yudhoyono himself. In 2004 the armed forces lost
its 38 reserved seats in the national parliament and also its 10 percent share
of all seats in local law making bodies. Likewise, the military’s influence in
the regions was further eroded by the democratisation and decentralisation
reforms instituted after 1999, as the power of successful businessmen, local
officials and civilian activists rose. As a result, in 2010 only the provincial
governors of Central Java, Central Sulawesi and West Papua were former military
men, whilst the other 29 governors had civilian backgrounds. This contrasts
with the Suharto era, in which military officers (usually retired) comprised
some 80 percent of provincial governors in the early 1970s and around 40
percent in the late 80s.45
The military also lost key cabinet and institutional posts
under Yudhoyono. The Ministry of Home Affairs with its control of police powers
had been a bastion of its political power since the 1960s, but in 2009 a career
civil servant was appointed to head up the crucial ministry, whose tentacles
reach right across the archipelago. Whilst Yudhoyono’s 2009 cabinet did include
four retired military officers, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal
and Security Affairs was the only major portfolio on offer. The military
influence in the Constitutional Court (founded in 2003) has also been reduced,
and it has lost control over the State Intelligence Agency (Badan Inteligen
Negara, BIN), which briefs the president on major political issues. For the
first time, a former police chief was selected to head the agency in 2009, thus
reducing work opportunities in BIN for military officers.46
Nevertheless, Yudhoyono’s record of military reform has been
mixed, allowing the military to retain some of its long held privileges and
influence. Most noteworthy is that the president has reduced the pace of
institutional reform, in particular defending the military’s territorial
command structure, which ensures its presence in almost every corner of the
archipelago down to the village level. This command structure was heavily
implicated in human rights abuses during the Suharto period and its aftermath,
investigations which Yudhoyono has also blocked. His party has also fielded
many more retired officers as candidates in national and regional elections
than either Golkar or the PDI-P. For instance, in the 2009 parliamentary
elections, 6 percent of PD MPs came from a military background, compared to a
national average of 2 percent.47 Whilst Indonesia has had a
succession of civilian defence ministers in the post-Suharto era, Yudhoyono has
also continued to appoint active military officers to most senior staff
positions in the ministry.48 Moreover, the appointment of Djoko
Suyanto, a class mate of Yudhoyono’s at the Indonesian military academy, to the
post of Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs
continued a long running tradition that this cabinet position be held by a
former armed forces commander, Djoko having been appointed commander in 2006.
This ministry is also staffed by active military officers with the power to
direct other government departments and with direct access to the president.49
In much the same way as Suharto before him, Yudhoyono has taken
a very personal approach to controlling the military, and it is doubtful
whether a leader from a civilian background could have had the same success.
Central to this strategy has been the appointment of his peers from the
military academy’s class of 1973, such as Djoko and Sutanto as the head of BIN,
to senior positions. Like Suharto, he has also promoted his former subordinates
and family members through the ranks to ensure control over the military.50
Whilst such nepotism has drawn criticism, it has significantly reduced the
military’s appetite for independent action. However, with Yudhoyono’s term in
office set to expire, there is concern that hardline officers will attempt to
claw back some of the military’s political clout. For instance, in a speech
last October Lieutenant General Gatot Nurmantyo, head of Kostrad the army’s
strategic command, was critical of Indonesia’s democracy and questioned the
wisdom of free elections.51 Such public statements demonstrate the
growing assertiveness of conservative generals in challenging the military’s
removal from politics, following their success in stifling military reform at
the beginning of Yudhoyono’s second term.52
Nurmantyo’s comments are significant because of his rapid
rise up the military hierarchy; having previously been governor of the military
academy, East Java regional commander and leader of the army’s training
command.53 Whilst passed over by Yudhoyono for the post of army
commander, it is possible that Nurmantyo could rise further under a more sympathetic
president. Moreover, growing voter apathy might enable hardliners like
Nurmantyo to reverse some of the gains Indonesia has made in reforming
military-civil relations. A popular leader such as Jokowi with a clear mandate
to continue reform may well be necessary to prevent some of these gains being
eroded. However, he represents Megawati’s PDI-P, which has long been cautious
on military reform, mindful of the fact that the military was partially
responsible for her elevation from vice president to president in 2001. More
recently, Prabowo ran as Megawati’s running mate in the 2009 presidential
elections. Intriguingly, there are also signs that some Indonesians are growing
nostalgic for the stability of the authoritarian Suharto period, with stickers
and T-shirts of the Smiling General becoming increasingly visible in Jakarta.54
In addition to Golkar, Suharto protégés Wiranto and Prabowo are hoping to
translate this nostalgia into votes at the ballot box.
Conclusion
When the Suharto era finally ended, the prognosis for
Indonesia becoming a stable democracy was not good. A rapid return to military
rule, continued stagnation or a violent Balkanisation into several smaller
states were among the gloomy predictions. Yet in the following decade it has
become arguably the freest country in Southeast Asia, despite some serious
structural issues and a continued, if weakened, legacy of military rule.
Post-Suharto improvements in both political freedom and civil liberties mean
that Indonesia is now also one of the freest Muslim-majority states. As the country’s
first directly elected president, Yudhoyono enjoyed an almost unprecedented
degree of legitimacy. During his two terms in office democracy has been
consolidated, politics stabilised and the military influence’s reduced. As a
former general, Yudhoyono was able to use his personal networks within the
security forces to curtail the influence of certain anti-democratic actors.
However, most of these gains were made during his first term in office
(2004-09), and since 2009 hardliners within the armed forces have been able to
block further military reform. Despite sustained economic growth fed by
resource exports, Indonesian voters who wholeheartedly embraced Yudhoyono’s
vision of an efficient and clean state at the ballot box in 2004 and 2009 have
been disappointed by the corruption scandals and slowing pace of reform during
his second term.
Although his popularity was boosted by timely oil price
reductions before his second election win, Yudhoyono’s victories demonstrated
that reform resonates with Indonesian voters. Among the major challenges facing
the country’s next president are reducing poverty and income inequality,
tackling endemic corruption, reforming the state’s labyrinthine bureaucracy,
upgrading the country’s creaking infrastructure and safeguarding the rights of
religious minorities. Current Jakarta governor Jokowi has shown a commitment to
clean government and a concern for the poverty-stricken unrivalled by both his
predecessors and other presidential hopefuls, and he is the only potential presidential
candidate to have arisen from the post-Suharto democratic era. Likewise,
pro-poor policies contributed heavily to Yudhoyono’s 2009 success. A Jokowi
victory would signal a generational change away from politicians who were
either military protégés of Suharto or oligarchs who owed their fortunes to
him, all of whom can count on backing from the military, the bureaucracy and/or
big business. Given that parliament has previously opposed efforts by the
Corruption Eradication Commission, the next president will need to forcefully
back the agency in order to impove the country’s investment climate amid
slowing economic growth. Whilst successful as mayor of Solo and governor of
Jakarta, Jokowi will find the challenge much bigger at the national level where
he will need to balance the demands of coalition partners and the financial
backers of any election campaign. Indeed, corruption tends to increase in the
run up to elections as parties and candidates seek political funding.55
However, it is also possible that his wide popular base might revolutionise
campaign funding in Indonesia with his many supporters making small donations
that total a significant amount. Even though it is widely assumed that he will
become the PDI-P’s presidential candidate, how much freedom he would have to
dictate party policy is unknown. Likewise, Megawati could be concerned that her
family will lose control of the party to him in future. The PDI-P has long
stood for an inclusive secular nationalism that recalls Indonesia’s founding
under Sukarno. During the PDI-P’s only previous presidency, under Sukarno’s
daughter Megawati, there was little appetite for political or military reform.
Jokowi aside, surveying the list of confirmed candidates for
the 2014 presidential elections does not inspire great confidence for improved
governance and further democratic consolidation. As a reaction to Yudhoyono’s
perceived indecisiveness, a candidate who appears strong and resolute could
garner a greater share of the votes this year. Prabowo and Wiranto, Suharto-era
generals both linked to human rights abuses, are among the confirmed
presidential candidates, and their respective election vehicles have so far
received the most campaign donations.56 Both are well placed to tap
into growing nostalgia for Suharto’s strong rule. Such sentiment indicates that
despite the progress Indonesia has made its democratic gains are not
irreversible and major challenges remain in improving the quality of
governance, particularly in applying the rule of law to the political and
economic elite. Even Yudhoyono, who enjoyed high personal approval ratings and
led a political party with the most seats in parliament, found improving
governance increasingly difficult in his second term. Moreover, a fundamental
question is whether a leader from a civilian background, without Yudhoyono’s
military networks to draw on, can continue to hold the armed forces in check,
especially at a time when military hardliners seem to be growing in confidence.
In addition, recent trends indicate a creeping economic nationalism.57
New trade and industry laws passed in February 2014 seek to insulate domestic
firms from international competition and follow similar (partially retracted)
measures enacted in 2013 that restricted imports of horticultural products.58
Prabowo, second favourite to win the presidential election, has called for
further protectionist measures, such as banning rice imports and gas exports,
and is considered wary of foreign investment and market forces. The PDI-P too
has unveiled a party platform that is critical of foreign investment.
Party politics in Indonesia, as in Thailand and the
Philippines, has become increasingly personalistic and presidential in which
the charisma of the leader eclipses a party’s policies. In both Thailand and
the Philippines this coincided with a resurgence of military influence, which
has yet to occur in Indonesia. Instead, voter apathy has gradually taken hold
after the euphoria and high turnout of the 1999 elections. Those who either did
not vote or spoiled their ballot papers accounted for some 23.3 percent of the
electorate in 2004 and 39.1 percent in 2009. This percentage is widely forecast
to rise again in 2014, especially if Jokowi is not among the candidates.59
Nevertheless, democracy in Indonesia will most probably continue, but the
possibility of it being undermined and subverted as in Thailand and the
Philippines, cannot be discounted if the presidency is captured by a
Suharto-era oligarch or former general. Further democratic consolidation will
likely require a resounding victory by a reform-minded presidential candidate
capable of implementing such a programme.
David Adam Stott is an
associate professor at the University of Kitakyushu, Japan and an Asia-Pacific
Journal associate. His work centers on the political economy of conflict in
Southeast Asia, Japan’s relations with the region, and natural resource issues
in the Asia-Pacific.
Recommended citation: David Adam Stott, "Indonesia’s
Elections of 2014: Democratic Consolidation or Reversal?," The
Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.12, Issue 10, No. 2, March 10, 2014.
Notes
1 According to Freedom House country rankings for 2011, 2012 and
2013. Indonesia was the only state in Southeast Asia to be ranked ‘free’ in
terms of both political rights and civil liberties. East Timor, the region’s
next highest ranked country, was adjudged only ‘partly free’ for each of those
three years.
2 His government spent approximately US$2 billion between
June 2008 and April 2009 on compensation payments for increased fuel prices,
micro-credit programs and schooling allowances. See Marcus Mietzner (2009), ‘Indonesia’s 2009 Elections:
Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party System’, Lowy
Institute for International Affairs.
3 International Monetary Fund (2012), Indonesia: Staff
Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation
4 See the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2013.
Corruption prosecutions actually increased in 2013, however.
5 Ehito Kimura (2012), Political Change and Territoriality
in Indonesia: Provincial Proliferation, Routledge, London
6 Dirk Tomsa (2008), Party Politics and Democratization in
Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era, London, Routledge, p.190
7 Since its founding in 2003, the Corruption Eradication
Committee (KPK) has prosecuted 72 members of parliament, eight government
ministers, six central bankers, four judges and dozens of CEOs, achieving a 100
percent conviction rate.
8 Marcus Mietzner & Edward Aspinall (2010). ‘Problems of
Democratisation in Indonesia: An Overview’, in Edward Aspinall & Marcus
Mietzner (ed.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections,
Institutions and Society, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS),
Singapore, p.4
9 ibid, p.8
10 ibid, p.10
11 ibid, p.12
12 Newcomers Gerindra and Hanura were not represented either
although Yudhoyono was later keen to bring them in when conducting a reshuffle.
13 Dirk Tomsa (2010), ‘The Indonesian Party System after the
2009 Elections: Towards Stability?’ in Edward Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner
(ed.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, pp. 141-159.
17 Although not school fees, which are covered by a separate
programme.
21 Andreas Ufen (2009), ‘Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia
and Malaysia Compared’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol.
47, No. 3, pp. 308-333
23 Ufen 2009.
The Jakarta Post, April 23, 2012 and John McBeth, ‘Golkar Wavering Over Its Candidate’, The
Straits Times, January 29, 2013
25 The others are Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism,
Hinduism and Confucianism.
26 Ufen 2009.
28 The PPP, PKS and PBB are explicitly Islamic in their
charter whilst the PAN and PKB are regarded as appealing to Muslim voters.
30 Ariel Heryanto (2010), ‘Entertainment, Domestication, and
Dispersal: Street Politics as Popular Culture’, in Edward Aspinall & Marcus
Mietzner (ed.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, p. 192.
31 Mariel Grazella, ‘Facebook Users Rise To 64m In Indonesia’, The
Jakarta Post, June 18, 2013. These figures do not take into
account the number of Facebook users in China, where it is officially blocked.
32 Research conducted by Semiocast, a social media analytics
company, cited in George Steptoe, ‘Sharing Is Caring’, Southeast Asia Globe,
November 12, 2013.
33 Jokowi had 1.3 million Twitter followers at the time of
writing.
34 Research by Yahoo! and TNS cited in Steptoe (2013).
36 This is the view of Enda Nasution, the ‘father of
Indonesian bloggers’. For example, #SaveKPK hashtag, critical of
Yudhoyono’s inaction over police harassment of the KPK, reached 9.4 million
internet users and forced the president to intervene. Cited in Steptoe (2013).
37 The survey was conducted in December 2013, involving 1,200
respondents from all of Indonesia’s 33 provinces, with a margin of error of
2.83 percent. See The Jakarta Post, ‘Voters Rely On TV News, Not Campaign Ads:
Indonesia Survey’, January 15, 2014
40 ibid
42 Kelvin Rowley, ‘The Downfall Of Thaksin Shinawatra’s
CEO-State’, APSNet Policy Forum, November 9, 2006. Thaksin sold his
family’s media and telecoms empire to Singapore's Temasek in 2006.
44 Jeffrey A. Winters (2013), ‘Wealth, Power, and Contemporary
Indonesian Politics’, Indonesia Vol. 96, pp. 11-33
45 Marcus Mietzner (2011), ‘The Political Marginalization of
the Military in Indonesia: Democratic Consolidation, Leadership, and
Institutional Reform’, in Marcus Mietzner (ed.), The Political
Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership,
Routledge, London and New York, p.128
46 ibid, p. 132-135
47 ibid, p. 142
48 ibid, p. 144
49 ibid
50 ibid, p. 145
54 These depict a smiling Suharto asking in Javanese: “How're
things? They were better in my time, no?” See Zakir Hussain, ‘Growing Nostalgia In Indonesia For Life
Under Suharto’, The Straits Times, January 29, 2014
57 Such was the pattern during the New Order when economic
liberalisation polices were wound back as resource-driven growth slowed.
58 Vikram Nehru (2013), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin
of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 139-166
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