Too often, maritime cooperation between
Australia and Indonesia has reflected Australia’s dubious political obsession
with ‘boat people’. That has led the two countries to concentrate on
non-traditional security issues, particularly people smuggling, as well as
illegal fishing and marine pollution. But, in the light of three interrelated
trends in the regional strategic environment, both countries should move beyond
these priorities and expand their naval defence cooperation
First, as the Australian government recognised in its white
paper, Australia in the Asian Century, the world’s economy is gravitating
toward Asia. This gives more strategic weight to the region and as a result
many Asian countries, including Australia and Indonesia, are modernising their
militaries with a priority on maritime capabilities. While military
modernisation is a legitimate consequence of Asian countries’ economic rise, it
could provoke misunderstanding and miscalculation if it is not undertaken
cautiously.
Second, in response to this trend, the United States has
engaged in ‘rebalancing’ to maintain regional stability, emphasising
Australia’s role as a US ally. Aside from the US Marines deployed in Darwin,
the United States will deploy its navy and air force on rotation in Western
Australia and the Northern Territory. Some countries are still suspicious of an
increased US military presence, especially China. Beijing could respond to the
United States by, for example, conducting surveillance activities within the
exclusive economic zone of countries that host US military forces, like
Australia. This kind of activity would require Chinese submarines to expand
into the Indian Ocean through the Indonesian archipelago.
Third, this means Indonesian archipelagic waters could
become saturated with foreign maritime forces, particularly along maritime
chokepoints like the Sunda and Lombok Straits. Owing to their greater depth and
less concentrated commercial shipping traffic than the Malacca Strait, the
Sunda and Lombok Straits offer an attractive transit alternative for maritime
forces. These maritime areas, however, form the backyards of Australia and
Indonesia. For these countries, a collision between opposing submarines or
ships could result in politically and militarily destabilising consequences
and, not least, create an environmental disaster.
In response to these trends, Australia and
Indonesia should deepen naval defence cooperation, especially along their
shared maritime boundary.
At the strategic level, both governments
should form a maritime strategic discussion forum to complement the existing
meetings of foreign and defence ministers. To start with, both countries could
hold more substantive and frank discussions, which would lead to genuine
‘strategic trust’. These discussions would examine the potential implications
of Australia’s role in US military rebalancing for Indonesia’s national
security, as well as China’s potential military responses to the US ‘pivot’.
More importantly, Indonesia and Australia
should consult each other about how to respond to these trends. For example,
there should be a consultation about whether and how the two nations could be
militarily involved in regional flashpoints such as the territorial disputes in
the South and East China Seas.
At the operational and tactical levels, both countries may
translate their strategic initiatives into joint operational arrangements. For
example, a joint maritime surveillance system could improve mutual situational
awareness. This system would include a joint operational command and control
centre, which could coordinate intelligence from ships, aircraft and radar
systems to generate a common picture of important areas to Australia and
Indonesia. Australia’s future acquisitions of high-end surveillance platforms,
such as the Triton drones and P-8A Poseidon aircraft, could support Indonesia’s
awareness of the waters to its south.
Joint maritime warfare training and exercises could
contribute to better cooperation in a combat environment, specifically in
undersea warfare. Indonesia could also participate in the US–Australia
bilateral security arrangements, such as trilateral naval exercises in the
Indian Ocean. As Indonesia and Australia also plan to field a large submarine fleet,
they should discuss the possibility of bilateral submarine search and rescue
cooperation. Finally, the two nations should contemplate planning their
maritime doctrines together.
If these steps are followed, Indonesia and Australia will
enjoy smooth operational and tactical collaboration between their maritime
forces during joint deployments.
But the success of this partnership is not assured. If it
were announced many would protest, arguing that Indonesia had abandoned its
‘free and active’ foreign policy by joining a coalition to contain China’s
military rise. Like Australia, Indonesia might well reject choosing between the
United States and China. But Indonesia and Australia may find it difficult to
maintain this balance. The question will be whether these middle powers can
keep the great powers from quarrelling.
Indonesia’s central position along the Indo-Pacific rim
makes it very important to both China and the United States. By partnering with
Canberra, Jakarta could at least have a cushioning buffer down under from the
potential flashpoints to its north.
Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is a Senior Analyst with the
Maritime Security Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), the Nanyang Technological University.
He was a researcher at the Centre for East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS),
University of Indonesia.
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