DTE 91-92, May 2012
In our special edition newsletter on
Papua published in November 2011, DTE drew attention to the long and sorry
history of top-down resource exploitation in Papua. Now, a whole raft of new
development plans are being pushed through, under the government’s nation-wide
effort to speed up development (MP3EI), launched last year. An additional layer
of plans specifically for Papua is being promoted by UP4B, a special unit to
speed up development in Papua. The government’s hope is that UP4B will succeed
where Special Autonomy has failed and undermine calls to address the unresolved
problem of Papua’s political status. However continuing state violence and
political oppression mean that under current conditions this mission looks very
unlikely to succeed.
MP3EI
The overall national-level plan to
speed up development in Indonesia is called MP3EI - Masterplan Percepatan
dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia – Masterplan for the Acceleration
and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development. This hefty document,
published by the Coordinating Ministry For Economic Affairs in Indonesian and
English in May 2011, sets out a three-stage plan for Indonesia to become a
developed country by 2025. The aim is to become the world’s 9th
biggest economy by then. The plan is based on accelerated economic growth,
heavy reliance on investment from the private sector and improving the
investment climate by amending or abolishing regulations that hold up projects.
Twenty two economic activities which
are considered as having high potential for growth are targeted for special
attention under eight main programmes: agriculture, mining, energy, industrial,
marine, tourism, telecommunication, and the development of strategic areas.
Among the 22 potential economic activities listed are bauxite, copper, nickel,
coal and oil & gas, timber, oil palm, cocoa, rubber, food agriculture,
tourism, steel, defence equipment and steel.
The plan divides the archipelago
into 6 main target ‘corridors’, each with a differing, but in many cases
overlapping economic focus. The corridors are:
- Sumatra as a ‘Centre for Production and Processing of Natural Resources and as Nation’s Energy Reserves’
- Java as a ‘Driver for National Industry and Service Provision’
- Kalimantan as a ‘Center for Production and Processing of National Mining and Energy Reserves’
- Sulawesi as a ‘Center for Production and Processing of National Agricultural, Plantation, Fishery, Oil & Gas, and Mining’
- Bali – Nusa Tenggara as a ‘Gateway for Tourism and National Food Support’
- Papua – Maluku as a ‘Center for Development of Food, Fisheries, Energy, and National Mining’
The aim is to achieve an annual GDP
growth rate of 12.7% generally and of 12.9% within the economic corridors, and
to reduce the dominance of Java in Indonesia’s economy. The additional power
supply needed to implement the plan is projected to reach 90,000 MW by 2025 and
the total investment value is identified at about IDR 4,012 trillion (USD 437
billion). The government will contribute around 10 percent of this cost in the
form of basic infrastructure provision, while the remaining amount is to come
from state owned enterprises, the private sector, and through public private
partnership (PPP).
MP3EI in Papua
Investment amounting to IDR 622
trillion is detailed for Papua-Maluku in MP3EI, with the bulk of this required
from the private sector. Seven economic centres are identified in the
Papua-Maluku corridor: Sofifi and Ambon in Maluku and North Maluku provinces;
and Sorong, Manokwari, Timika, Jayapura and Merauke in West Papua and Papua
provinces. The Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) project is
identified as one of the key economic activities, alongside copper (Timika),
nickel (Halmahera), oil and gas (Sorong and Bintuni Bay), and fisheries
(Morotai. N Maluku, and Ambon, Maluku).
Among the challenges identified by
MP3EI are low regional GDP levels (though the growth is higher than average);
large disparities within the region, low investment levels, less than optimal
productivity in the agricultural sector (due to limited irrigation facilities),
lack of infrastructure to support development, low population mobility, and (in
Papua especially) a low population density.
Cross-sector infrastructure required
to support the plans include the construction of a Trans-Papua road,
improvement and expansion of airports and ports, construction of coal-fired
power plants in Timika and Jayapura (as well one each in Maluku and North
Maluku), geothermal power plants in seven areas, and ICT support networks.
While the Mamberamo region, targeted
for agro-industrial development in the 1990s, is not one of the focus areas,
MP3EI does point to the region’s high potential for electricity generation. It
suggests that the government starts feasibility studies of development
activities to make it easier to market the region to potential investors. [1]
MIFEE
One of MP3EI’s focus projects is the
Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) project in southern Papua – a
giant scheme that is clearing land and destroying the traditional livelihoods
of indigenous Malind and other groups in southern Papua.[2]
According to MP3EI, MIFEE will cover
an area of 1.2 million hectares, and consist of 10 clusters of Agricultural
Production Centers (KSPP).[3]
The short-term development priority (2011-2014) is to develop clusters I to IV,
covering an area of 228,023 Ha, in Greater Merauke, Kali Kumb, Yeinan, and
Bian. In the medium term (2015 to 2019), areas of agricultural production
centers for food crops, horticulture, animal husbandry, plantation, and
aquaculture will be developed in Okaba, Ilwayab, Tubang, and Tabonji. Longer
term (2020 to 2030), a central production area for food crops, horticulture,
animal husbandry, fisheries and plantations will be developed in Nakias and
Selil. Crops will include rice, corn, soybeans, sorghum, wheat, vegetables and
fruits. Livestock for animal husbandry will include chickens, cattle, goats and
rabbits. Sugar cane, rubber and oil palm are identified as the non-food crops
to be planted under the scheme.
Among the infrastructure plans
associated with MIFEE, are port development, water infrastructure and swamp
reclamation, roads and bridges, organic fertiliser plants as well as an
ammonia-urea project in Tangguh (see also box, below); and biomass electricity
generation in Merauke and Tanah Miring.
Copper, oil and gas
MP3EI sets out the case for
increasing the production of copper, oil and gas in Papua, as well as for
capturing more value through downstream processing. Three new copper smelters
are to be built in Indonesia, one of them in Timika, where the
giant Freeport-Rio Tinto copper and gold mine is located, to add to the
one existing smelter in Gresik, East Java. The development of a copper
industrial park in Timika is planned, along with power plants, improved roads
and ports and amended regulations to support development. More exploration of
oil and gas will be promoted, with improved access for investors. This includes
implementing ‘a single window or one-stop-service in the area of exploration
permits and production, so that cross-cutting issues (overlapping land and
environmental impacts) can be resolved quickly and in an integrated manner’.
In Bintuni Bay, site of the huge
BP-operated Tangguh gas project, supporting infrastructure in MP3EI includes
transmission pipelines and the development of a distribution network (see also
box, below for connections to MIFEE).
What about people, environment and
climate change?
Social and environmental sustainability
is hardly mentioned in this plan. While there is an assumption that economic
development will bring benefits to the Indonesian population as a whole, there
is no clear sense that there must be safeguards for local communities whose
lands and resources will be used for the long list of development projects.
This could well be a reflection of the way MP3EI was drafted – by government
and business, with no participation by civil society or other stakeholders.
Towards the end of MP3EI, there is a
section on laws and regulations that need amending in order to speed up
development. Here there is some recognition of the problems surrounding land,
overlapping land use claims and indigenous peoples’ customary land. At the top
of this list, is “Review Law and Government Regulations related to the
application of communal land (tanah ulayat) as an investment component
which will enable the land owners to gain higher economic benefits.” The review
is to be done by National Land Agency, Ministry of Forestry, and Ministry of
Home Affairs, with a target date of 2011. The document also states that
regional spatial plans need to be finalized by 2011 as a basis for overcoming
potential land use conflict in forests, plantations, and mining areas.
While these do acknowledge the
problems to some extent, their resolution is apparently intended to smooth the
way for more investment by ensuring that stakeholders, including customary land
rights holders, stand to benefit more than previously. So, the development
model remains investment-centred – prioritising the needs of business -
rather than people-centred, which would prioritise the needs of communities to
achieve effective, socially and environmentally sustainable development. A
people-centred approach would recognise the need for indigenous peoples to
exercise their right to Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) before
proceeding with any investment, but there is no reference to FPIC in MP3EI.
The business imperative is painfully
evident in MP3EI’s description of the MIFEE project. Here, the plan states that
there is a need to accelerate the process of releasing designated forest land
into food estates areas and to ‘socialise’ to the local community about the
implementation and benefits of the MIFEE program for the welfare of the
community. This kind of language demonstrates that there has been very little
progress since the Suharto era when communities were similarly informed about
the benefits of having their lands appropriated for timber concessions, mining
projects and transmigration sites. As is evident from what is happening on the
ground in the MIFEE project area, failure to respect the internationally
guaranteed rights of the affected indigenous peoples has led to coercion and
manipulative practices to obtain certification that indigenous peoples have
relinquished their land; increased inter-ethnic conflict and violence; and the
clearance of the forests on which the Malind and other indigenous communities
depend on for their subsistence.[4]
(See box for more information sources on MIFEE.)
On the issue of climate change,
MP3EI displays a similar lack of interest as it does on social impacts. The
government’s National Action Plan for Greenhouse Gases (RAN-GRK) is one of
several planning and regulatory elements set out as part of the integral
national development planning process to which MP3EI belongs, but there are no
indications of how the ambitious plans for mining, oil and gas extraction, and
heavy industry will affect greenhouse gas emission levels. Similarly, there is
no information about the impact of forest clearance needed for plantations and
agriculture on CO2 emissions. Climate change is described briefly as
one of the challenges that Indonesia faces, but is otherwise more or less
ignored in the document. The section on timber, which is a key activity for the
Kalimantan corridor, focuses on development of planted forests for the
production of logs and other timber, rattan and bamboo products, while
mentioning that natural forests will be used for non-timber purposes, including
REDD,[5]
however the emphasis is clearly on upping the production of logs, plywood and
other products to exploit the “...huge potential area for development of timber
industry by expanding untapped economic value of production forests…”.[6]
UP4B
UP4B, (Unit Percepatan
Pembangunan Provinsi Papua dan Provinsi Papua Barat) the Papua and West
Papua Economic Acceleration Unit, was officially set up in September 2011
through Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No 66. It is led by Bambang
Darmono, a former military commander in Aceh, and answers directly to the
President.
UP4B’s mandate runs from 2011 to
2014, and its tasks include ensuring that its ‘Action Plan to Accelerate
Development in Papua and West Papua’ is implemented. Perpres 66 states
that development acceleration is to be done through social-economic, and
socio-political & socio–cultural policies, the latter including building
“constructive communication” between government and people of Papua and West
Papua provinces. This communication, in turn, is done through “mapping and
managing the source of problems in politics, law enforcement and human rights.”
The language here is an indication of UP4B’s mission to open up for discussion
the sources of political unrest among Papuans, though the scope of any such
discussion (for example whether it can include the call for a referendum on
Papua’s future political status) is not set out.
According to the document’s
introduction, the Rapid Action Plan (selected from the Full Action Plan[7]),
with its ‘quick wins’ programme, is aimed at increasing employment and driving
the growth of new economic activities which have the potential to speed up
regional economic growth. These activities should be on a scale which fits with
the environmental carrying capacity, and should consolidate the roles of
government, state-owned companies and the private sector. They are divided into
7 categories:
- food security (pig farming in the Central Highlands Area, Papua province and cattle in Bomberai and Kebar districts, West Papua province);
- Tackling Poverty (increase the small and medium enterprise (SME) capital for farming, plantations, forestry, fisheries, livestock and cottage industries through government initiatives);
- Developing cottage industries (sago processing);
- Improving education (free education through high school, to reach all districts and villages in both Papua and West Papua provinces);
- Improving health services (free health service, to reach all districts, as above);
- Basic Infrastructure development (renewable energy provision – micro-hydro and solar; coal-fired power plants in Jayapura and Mimika (34 MW); cement works in Timika and Manokwari. The Timika works is to be funded by mining company Freeport as part of its CSR programme).
- Affirmative action for indigenous Papuans (quotas for outstanding students to attend top universities outside Papua; quotas for armed forces and police membership, quotas for places in the military and police academies; quotas for places in midwivery and nursing training institutes; establish a civil service training centre in Sorong, and teacher training institutes in Papua and West Papua provinces).
Community participation is limited
to giving inputs to annual plans and participating in implementing the Action
Plan, as well as monitoring and supervision.
The plan follows the strategic
regions identified in the MP3EI in the ‘Papua-Maluku corridor’. It states that
MP3EI’s focus on the economy, and particularly investment, will be synergised
with the UP4B Action Plan with its emphasis on socio-economic, and
socio-political & -cultural development policy. The Rapid Action Plan
contains a long list of projects to be carried out in 2011/2012 but does not
list the regulations or policy changes that it says are necessary to support
investment in the two provinces. Instead, Perpres 66 states merely that
UP4B will build capacity for regional governments to craft regional regulations.
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Conflict continues
The violent suppression of
political dissent has continued since the Third Papuan Peoples’ Congress was
held in Abepura last October (see DTE 89-90).
Indonesian troops have been conducting several ‘sweeping’ operations, in the
Central Highlands. According to the UK based organisation, Tapol, whole
communities have been attacked and homes destroyed, along with churches,
traditional meeting centres and public buildings. “Such assaults, purportedly
aimed at eliminating the poorly-armed Papuan resistance, have forced villages
to flee their homes in search of security in nearby forests where they are
cut off from their livelihoods and face the possibility of starvation and
disease.”
While no-one has been held
accountable for the killings that followed the Third Congress, five Papuan
leaders who were arrested following the Congress have now been tried, found
guilty of treason and sentenced to three years in prison. [18]
According to Dr Neles Tebay,
Coordinator of the Papua Peace Network, more human rights violations are
likely continue in future because thousands of additional troops have been
deployed in West Papua and the root cause of the Papua conflict has not yet
been addressed. In a November statement to the European Parliament, Dr
Tebay said Indonesia considers that West Papua is an integral part of its
territory and uses the eradication of separatist movement in West Papua to
justify all forms of state violence and human rights abuses committed against
Papuans. “On the other hand, many indigenous Papuans see their ancestral land
of West Papua is occupied by Indonesian military. They feel that they have
been and are still being colonized by Indonesia. Therefore they have been
raising their resistance against a colonial power on their ancestral land.”
He welcomed President SBY’s public
commitment to engage in dialogue with the Papuans, and called for European
support for an open dialogue with the Indonesian government to settle the
Papua conflict peacefully.[19]
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The verdict so far
Some components of the UP4B Action
Plan (eg the health and education service improvements), if they are
well-implemented, could have positive benefits for Papuans. But it appears
likely that these will be outweighed by UP4B’s close adherence to the basic
economic development model set out in MP3EI – a continuation of the
large-scale, capital intensive natural resources projects and ambitious
infrastructure schemes that have inflicted so much damage on indigenous Papuan
communities until now.
UP4B has not generally been well
received in Papua itself. Hostile reactions were reported by the press at
meetings held to promote UP4B in Jayapura and Manokwari in December and
January; a demonstration by Papuan students in Makassar, Sulawesi, was held to
reject UP4B in February; and in March 2012, there were reports of arrests in
FakFak at a protest to reject the initiative.[8]
At the December meeting, Hakim
Pahabol of the National Committee for West Papua (KNPB) said that the basic
problem in Papua was politics, not welfare. “We want a referendum. Nothing
else.”[9]
Even those reported as being in favour of UP4B, expressed scepticism about its
implementation. Yusak Reba, a lecturer at Cendrawasih University, said UP4B
needed to meet people’s expectations or the “crisis of confidence between Papua
and Jakarta” would be aggravated. He said he was still hopeful the programme
could bring benefits for Papuans, but warned that the UP4B lacked
implementation power, leaving regional administrations and the central
government fully responsible for bringing about positive change.[10]
These comments show that UP4B is
unlikely to get far in its mission to solve Papua’s underlying problems or end
violence and human rights abuses (see box). At best it will help Papuans fare
slightly better under grossly unfair conditions. But if its prime purpose is to
smooth the way for more damaging top-down resource exploitation, UP4B is not
likely to make things better for Papuans, but far worse.
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South Korea’s LG plans
petrochemical plant in Bintuni Bay
A South Korean–Indonesian joint
venture will develop a USD3 billion petrochemical plant in Tangguh, Bintuni
Bay, West Papua, according to media reports. President SBY signed an initial
agreement during a visit to South Korea, for the development by LG
International Corp and PT Duta Firza. Firlie Gandinduto of Duta Firza
said in March that construction would start in mid-2014.[11]
Bintuni Bay is the site of the
controversial Tangguh LNG installation, operated by UK-based energy
multinational, BP. Earlier in the month, Bisnis Indonesia quoted a
senior official at Jakarta’s Ministry of Industry as saying that BP was
interested in building an integrated petrochemical complex using gas from the
Tangguh fields.[12] BP subsequently clarified that it
was not interested, but would continue to focus on LNG and Tangguh
development, as well as exploration and production.[13]
Another official at the same
ministry said the plan to develop the complex needed certainty of gas supply.
Based on ministry information, the first phase of development would need a
minimum gas supply of 382 million standard cubic feet per day, and would be
used to supply two urea plants with a capacity of 3,500 tonnes per day and
two ammonia plants with a capacity of 2,000 tonnes per day, plus a methanol
plant. The official said companies from Germany, South Korea and Japan were
interested in producing methanol and derivatives at Tangguh, while
Indonesia’s PT Pupuk Sriwijaya (Pusri) intended to build ammonia and urea
plants.[14]
Whether Bintuni Bay will see the
development of a petrochemical cluster remains to be seen; there are no plans
along these lines in the MP3EI masterplan issued last year. But plans to
develop ammonia and urea production facilities at Tangguh do appear in both
MP3EI, where they are linked to the fertiliser supply needs for the MIFEE
project,[15] and in the UP4B Action Plan.
According to the UP4B, the target date to start construction of an
ammonia-urea project is 2011 with completion by 2015 requiring an investment
of IDR 20,850 billion, to be carried out by state-owned PT Pusri.[16] Further developments planned for
Bintuni include road improvement, gas transmission pipelines and distribution
networks.
Tangguh as magnet
There is no doubt that BP’s
Tangguh LNG operation has acted as a major draw for further development plans
in and around Bintuni Bay. These are very likely to prompt an influx of
migrant workers from other parts of Papua and from other parts of the
archipelago.
It is worth remembering that
during the planning phase of Tangguh, BP argued that it had devised
strategies to prevent a mass influx of people into the area. It was soon
evident that these efforts were already being undermined even before gas
production started, as migrants from outside Papua moved in.
Now, with many more projects in
the pipeline for Bintuni, and with the company’s own plans to expand gas
production at Tangguh, BP’s strategies become even less credible. And
it is even more clear that companies like BP should stop playing down their
pivotal role in attracting other industries into the areas where they
operate.[17]
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More MIFEE info
An Agribusiness Attack in West
Papua: Unravelling the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate is a new independent report on MIFEE online at: http://awasmifee.potager.org.
Ironic Survival is a film about the MIFEE project by ‘Papuan Voices’, an
empowerment and film production project. See http://www.engagemedia.org/papuanvoices.
A new “No to MIFEE” facebook
campaign page has been set up at http://www.facebook.com/pages/NO-to-MIFEE/369111889765905.
SORAK: (Suara Orang Kampung - Voice of Villagers) is a forum for
the villagers of southern Papua (Merauke, Mappi, and Boven Digul areas) to
talk directly about their problems and aspirations, including plantation
developments. English and Indonesian versions. http://blog.insist.or.id/sorak/archives/1854.
FPP, AMAN, Sawit Watch and other
groups have sent a follow-up request to the UN Committee on the
Elimination or Racial Discrimination (CERD) on the MIFEE case. See
February 2012 letter at http://www.forestpeoples.org/.
DTE’s new MIFEE campaign page.
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[1] The UP4B
Rapid Action Plan includes a feasibility study for a hydro-dam project to be
carried out by the government’s Agency for the Assessment and
Application of Technology, from 2011-2013. For more information about previous
plans for Mamberamo see DTE 89-90, November 2011
and DTE 50, August 2001.
[2] See MIFEE campaign page. A recent investigation by Tempo
gives further insights into how this scheme is impoverishing local people. See http://eng.tempointeraktif.com/arsip/2012/04/11/INT/mbm.20120411.INT24559.id.php#
[4] The situation
at MIFEE has been relatively well-documented during the past two years – see MIFEE campaign page.
[5] Reducing
Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation – schemes to conserve
carbon by protecting forests (see Redd
page for more information.
[7] The full
Action Plan (2011-2014 is in Annex II to Presidential Regulation 65, of
September 2011, on Accelerating Development in Papua and West Papua Provinces)
while a rapid implementation action plan for the 2011-2012 period is in Annex
I.
[17] See DTE 89-90, November 2011
for a recent update on Tangguh. For more about BP’s strategy on limiting
in-migration see DTE 65, May 2005 and BP's own webpage on
in-migration at Tangguh at http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9004769&contentId=7008850
[19] Statement
to the European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights, ‘Public Hearing on
Human rights situation in South East Asia with special focus on West Papua’, 29
November 2011.
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