Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Johannes Nugroho: The Fictional War Between Indone...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Johannes Nugroho: The Fictional War Between Indone...: 'Rockefeller and the Demise of Ibu Pertiwi' is a history-based fictional account of how Australia and Indonesia come to blows...

Johannes Nugroho: The Fictional War Between Indonesia and Australia

'Rockefeller and the Demise of Ibu Pertiwi' is a history-based fictional account of how Australia and Indonesia come to blows over the question of a UN-sponsored referendum in West Papua and Papua. (Photo courtesy of Johannes Nugroho)

"The US Embassy had officially informed the Indonesian government … an unspecified number of B-2 bombers flew from Darwin over to Ujung Pandang where the Indonesian Air Forced based Hawk 19s and F-16s …," "… the HMAS Stephenson launched two of its 20 Mark 48 ADCAP torpedoes directly into Kampung Mas Port, where the Indonesian warship KRI Yos Sudarso was anchored."

The dire-sounding passages come from Kerry B. Collison's latest political thriller "Rockefeller and the Demise of Ibu Pertiwi," a history-based fictional account of how Australia and Indonesia come to blows over the question of a UN-sponsored referendum in West Papua and Papua, which will determine whether the two provinces remain in the unitary state of Indonesia or secede to form an independent country.

While the main storyline revolves around West Papuan activism, its leaders, Indonesian politics and international geopolitics, the book ─ like any good TV show today ─ incorporates a few sub-plots, one of which is the 1961 mysterious disappearance of Michael C. Rockefeller, heir to the family’s fortune, of the southern coast of Papua, hence the title.

The Rockefeller theme offers the reader escapade into historical sleuthing as the book seeks to explain an event that remains a mystery of our time, simultaneously weaving it into the West Papuan narrative seamlessly. Collison's choice of subplot is interesting, given that there are a fair few conspiracy theories surrounding Rockefeller's presence in Papua and the subsequent gold and copper mining at Grasberg by the American mining giant Freeport McMoran.

On a personal level, the book follows the lives of characters like Bennie Tabuni, the de facto leader of the West Papua's government in exile, his name echoing that of Benny Wenda; Jules Heynneman, the half-Dutch Papuan who was raised alongside Bennie by the Tabunis. There is also Alice Heynneman, officially Jules' daughter but in fact the offspring of Bennie, whose character matures as the story unfolds.

On the Indonesian side, the country is governed by the democratically elected President Abdul Moewardi, whose libertarian political outlook on West Papua is reminiscent of Indonesia's fourth President Abdurrahman Wahid's, better known as Gus Dur. Abdul's daughter is married to Indonesian Military chief Gen. Sumantri, who harbors political ambitions for himself and his son — mercurial and egocentric Col. Didi Sumantri, who may have been partially inspired by the figure of Prabowo Subianto.

In the meantime, Collison has Australia under the leadership of Prime Minister John Gorton, a somewhat uninspiring figure who then surprises us with his decisiveness and a touch of ruthlessness, qualities which remind us of the former Prime Minister John Howard.

What is noteworthy, the author presents us with less colorful and more predictable characters on the Australian side. In doing so, he inadvertently highlights the difference between Indonesian and Australian democracies, the former still dependent on strong figures who dare cross boundaries that are taboo in more developed democracies.

Even though the storyline outlined in the book is undoubtedly fictional, it is by no means improbable. In an age where political and economic projections are constantly made, Collison's well-crafted scenarios do not strike as outlandish, given the right circumstances. As an ex intelligence officer and a former diplomat, he no doubt has the credentials and experience as both an insider as well as an observer.

Immensely readable, the book also makes us cognizant of the infinitely more complex geopolitical realities of today than those, for instance, when Timor Leste embarked on its path to independence. It takes into account the rise of China as a regional hegemon and an active player in international politics. China's new found assertiveness, Collison ably shows, also impacts and complicates the old alliances between Anglosphere nations such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and New Zealand.

The book is also full of subtle warnings for Indonesia. It exposes the weaknesses in the country's dogged and "non-negotiable" stance on the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia ("NKRI Harga Mati") when geopolitical realities experience fluxes in real life. It also shows that the hyper-nationalism taught to all Indonesians from an early age could ultimately do disservice to the future of the nation.

More importantly, it shows us the irony of Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua, given that Indonesia was once a victim of colonialism. The atrocities committed by Indonesian military against local West Papuans and the exploitation of their natural resources are a potent reminder that, as in the case of East Timor, the West Papuan "problem" is too far gone for Jakarta to wish away.

Papuan "separatism" is no doubt one of the most current vexing questions in Indonesian international diplomacy. The recent questions at the United Nations General Assembly particularly by several Pacific nations, New Zealand and EU countries about the continued human rights transgressions in West Papua were another wake-up call for Jakarta that the "noise" may get louder in the future.

Kerry B. Collison's Rockefeller and the Demise of Ibu Pertiwi is essentially an essay on how not to conduct international diplomacy on a thorny issue like West Papua. He is no stranger to Indonesian themes, having previously written a number of histo-fictional novels on Indonesia such as "Indonesian Gold" and "The Asian Trilogy: Jakarta, Merdeka Square" and "The Timor Man."

In exploring less than ideal scenarios between two neighbors like Indonesia and Australia, the author may well be suggesting that we can basically do better to foster trust between ourselves, and the futility in suppressing the yearning for freedom and human dignity.

Johannes Nugroho is a writer from Surabaya. He can be contacted at johannes@nonacris.com and on Twitter @Johannes_nos.

 

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: The Politics Of Surgical Strikes -The hyped jingoi...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: The Politics Of Surgical Strikes -The hyped jingoi...: Indian Army soldiers. Photo Credit: US DoD, SGT Mike MacLeod, Wikipedia Commons. Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd) is right when he talks about ...

The Politics Of Surgical Strikes -The hyped jingoistic ‘surgical’ action did nothing to deter Pakistani ‘misadventure’

Indian Army soldiers. Photo Credit: US DoD, SGT Mike MacLeod, Wikipedia Commons.

Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd) is right when he talks about needless hype over operations like the surgical strikes. Note, of course, that he is not arguing that such strikes are wrong, but that the accompanying hype, often aimed at playing to the political gallery, undermines their military value.

There is, of course, the larger question as to the very nature of the so-called surgical strikes of September 29, 2016, that had been launched to avenge the Uri militant strike of September 18. Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Ranbir Singh who, as DGMO, announced the strikes, responded to Hooda by saying  that the strikes were a successful tactical operation that  had conveyed a message to  Pakistan.

Lt Gen Ranbir Singh’s statement is not borne out by facts. Pakistan did not stop its ‘misadventures’ as he quaintly put it. Almost two months later,  on November 29, Jaish militants attacked an Army base in Nagrota and in the ensuing shootout 10 soldiers, including three officers were killed.

The Nagrota strike was far more serious than the Uri one. Unlike Uri, which is very close to the LoC and more vulnerable, Nagrota is somewhat inland. More important, it is the headquarters of the huge 16 Corps and should thus have had a much higher level of protection.

But by far the more damaging was the fact that the Indian Army did not react to this provocation. If the surgical strikes after Uri were meant to deter further Pakistani ‘misadventure’, the only way it would work as a strategy, would be if the Army hit Pakistan hard every time it launched an attack.

The next year, 2017, there were several attacks across the LoC attributed to Pakistani jihadis and forces. In one, an Indian patrol was attacked in Krishna Ghati sector of the Poonch district, killing two soldiers. In December, a Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) came half a kilometre into Indian territory and killed four soldiers, including a Major.

Early this year, there was another Jaish attack on the Sunjuwan camp housing soldiers and their families, a few kilometres to the east of Jammu City. As many as 11 soldiers and a civilian were killed and 20 injured.  Yet, there was no reaction comparable to the surgical strikes. So it is evident that  the strikes did not deter Pakistan.

You can draw many conclusions from this. One is that the Indian policy of surgical strikes was flawed to start with. Perhaps publicising it the way it was done was not a good idea. Or, the Army had not thought through its strategy because if it was aimed at sending a signal that India would no longer sit back and tolerate attacks such as the ones on Pathankot and Uri,  the Army needed to demonstrably hit back at Pakistan every time jihadis or BAT attacks took place.

Clearly, there are hazards in the latter policy. If demonstrable strikes take place, the two countries could get locked into an escalatory cycle which could eventually lead to war. That neither side wants this is evident from the fact that their cross-LoC activity remains limited. Even episodes of cross-border bombardment that occasionally take place on the LoC or the border in Jammu, usually end in a ceasefire. That is why, it is important to keep a tight control on the escalatory framework. The way of doing this earlier was to keep the retaliatory cycles secret and not let them enter the political or electoral cycles in either country because hype tends to be the hand-maiden of politics. That the strikes were politicised is no secret. Whether it is in the speeches of BJP leaders or the posters that came up, the strikes were widely featured in the Uttar Pradesh state Assembly elections of 2016.

At the end of the day, there is the challenge of deterring Pakistan. It is one thing to deter it from the point of view of nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional conflict, and quite another to make it cease and desist from sending groups of militants in the name of ‘political support’ to the Kashmiri militancy.

India has not yet found the formula of dealing with them. The so-called surgical strikes were mooted as the solution, but they have clearly not worked.

Having initiated a policy, it was important for the Army to follow through with that policy, which it did not, because the main purpose of the strikes was to make a political statement which was aimed at the UP elections. The Indian challenge was neatly side-stepped by Islamabad which simply denied that such strikes took place and did not feel compelled to respond to the Indian action in word or deed.

New Delhi certainly has the option of using military retaliation every time the Pakistanis act. The politicians do not mind basking in the glory of the strikes because they took out a few terrorist launching pads for no loss of life. But escalation, even a larger skirmish, always has the possibility of going awry and putting pressure on the government to enhance the level of violence when things don’t go according to plan. We cannot be sure just how Islamabad will react and we should not exaggerate our capabilities with regard to Pakistan. In such matters, sober realism is the best approach, and this would tell us that we need a different menu of options when it comes to bringing down and eliminating the violence in Jammu & Kashmir.

This article originally appeared in The Tribune.

By Observer Research Foundation By Manoj Joshi

 

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Hard times ahead for a politically divided Timor-L...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Hard times ahead for a politically divided Timor-L...:   Timor-Leste started the year in political chaos and ended it with a return to the confrontational politics of the past. Cooperation...

Hard times ahead for a politically divided Timor-Leste

 

Timor-Leste started the year in political chaos and ended it with a return to the confrontational politics of the past. Cooperation between the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), which had together run the country since 2015 under a ‘government of national unity’, was shattered following the July 2017 elections.

The aftermath of the elections saw Timor-Leste enter 2018 with a majority opposition alliance, which blocked the minority Fretilin government’s budget and called on President Francisco ‘Lu-Olo’ Guterres to install it in office. Guterres — who is also President of Fretilin and was elected with key cross-party support in the final months of the government of national unity — refused. Instead, he called fresh elections for May 2018.

 

The 2018 elections returned the opposition Alliance of Change for Progress (AMP) coalition — comprised of the CRNT, the People’s Liberation Party and the Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan (or KHUNTO) — as the new government. But following allegations of corruption against eight proposed ministers, Guterres refused to swear them in.

Three other proposed ministers refused to be sworn in as a show of support for their colleagues, leaving Timor-Leste without ministers of finance, health and natural resources, among others. Guterres also refused to enact the government’s proposed 2019 budget. The government in turn refused to approve a visit by Guterres to the Vatican, saying that domestic matters took precedence.

Guterres’ rejection of the budget reflected his concern over Timor-Leste’s financial sustainability and opposition to the government’s use of central bank funds to further its ambitious Tasi Mane development project. The government required an unavailable two-thirds majority to overrule the President’s veto.

The government intended to establish a liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plant on Timor-Leste’s Tasi Mane south coast to kick-start a petrochemical industry that could provide jobs and income into the country’s future. But the Greater Sunrise joint venture partners, who hold the rights to develop the energy reserves, rejected the proposal as unfeasible. A major issue was the plan to build a 150-kilometre undersea pipeline, which would have had to cross the deep-sea Timor Trough.

The Timor-Leste government spent US$350 million in October 2018 to purchase ConocoPhillips’ 30 per cent stake in Greater Sunrise. And in late November, an agreement was reached for the government to buy Royal Dutch Shell’s 26.56 per cent stake for US$300 million, bringing the government’s total holding in the project to 56.56 per cent.

Yet Timor-Leste’s 2005 Petroleum Activities Law restricts the state to a maximum of 20 per cent equity in the project. Timor-Leste may need to sell some of its stake to a new partner, possibly from China or South Korea.

The remaining Greater Sunrise partners, Woodside Petroleum and Osaka Gas, oppose the idea of a south coast processing facility. If the plan is to proceed, this could leave the roughly US$5 billion cost of development to the Timor-Leste government, or to new partners.

The government’s purchase of a stake in Greater Sunrise followed the establishment of a permanent maritime boundary between Australia and Timor-Leste in March 2018. The agreement allocated 70 per cent of the revenue from Greater Sunrise to Timor-Leste if the LNG is processed there, or 80 per cent if it is processed at an offshore facility.

Processing the LNG onshore is a key ambition of government Special Representative Xanana Gusmao, who was the country’s first president and second prime minister. As Timor-Leste’s key political figure, Gusmao coordinated opposition to the former Fretilin government and brought together the parties of the 2018 AMP government.

The governments that Gusmao led or effectively controlled since 2007 have withdrawn well beyond sustainable amounts from the country’s US$17 billion sovereign wealth fund — the Petroleum Fund. Successive budgets have spent between two and three times the sustainable limit, meaning the government has drawn on capital as well as interest from the fund.

Income into the fund is reducing as oil fields in the Timor Sea dry up, with the last field expected to close by 2022. The Petroleum Fund currently pays for 95 per cent of all state activities, which in turn supports more than 70 per cent of all economic activity. Yet at current rates of government spending, the Petroleum Fund will be fully depleted before the end of the 2020s. This outlook has led to — and in turn, is exacerbated by — the government’s push to gamble on investing in Greater Sunrise and the Tasi Mane project.

The high cost of this development set against a limited financial reserve and its questionable prospects of success have motivated Fretilin and the incumbent Guterres to be more financially cautious. Meanwhile, historical disputes between Gusmao and the three parties he was able to bring into alliance against Fretilin continue to mark their relations, only compounded by increasingly stark differences in their approach to how best secure Timor-Leste’s challenged future.

Damien Kingsbury is Personal Chair and Professor of International Politics at Deakin University.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2018 in review and the year ahead.

 

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Will Israel leave Australia’s back door open for ...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Will Israel leave Australia’s back door open for ...: Australia should be careful to ensure defence cooperation with Israel does not leave a back door open for Chinese infiltration. The h...