Japan's Argument for Collective Self-Defense

 

LDP official Masahiko Komura makes the case for collective self-defense after meeting with US Defense Secretary Carter.

Masahiko Komura, vice president of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party and former foreign minister, visited Washington and met with U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter on Thursday. At their meeting, Carter praised Japan’s recent efforts to develop a new legal framework to better defend Japan in an increasingly uncertain East Asia. Komura explained to Carter that the Japanese government wants to be able to exercise the now constitutionally recognized right to collective defense to defend U.S. warships attacked in contingencies that have a security impact on Japan, such as a Korean peninsula crisis.

The new framework would also provide the legal basis for the revisions expected in the Bilateral Defense Guidelines. The Guidelines clarify the roles and expectations for U.S. military and Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) cooperation in a contingency. The Guidelines were last updated in 1997.

On Friday, Komura gave a speech at the U.S.-Japan Security Seminar 2015 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In his speech, he offered a concise history and clear defense of the Cabinet decision to reinterpret the Constitution last July. The Constitution is ultimately a contract with the people to defend their lives and happiness, Komura argued. Therefore, it is illogical for anything in the Constitution to constrict the government’s ability to defend the state’s very survival.

Komura then laid out the dilemma the Cabinet faced: in Japan’s current security environment, a single-minded focus on a literal interpretation of the Constitution may not be adequate to protect the lives of the people, but at the same time, the government must not overzealously pursue security in such a way as to violate the sanctity of the Constitution. The middle ground is to figure out the minimum degree to which Japan must be prepared to use force in order to successfully protect the Japanese people. Collective self-defense is a minimum condition that Japan must have to be able to defend itself and expect the cooperation of allies and partners in its defense, Komura concluded.

Collective self-defense is not limited to the U.S. either. Japan is willing to cooperate with any state to do the minimum needed to protect the people’s livelihood. How collective self-defense will be invoked in various crises will depend on the impact the situation has on Japan’s security.

The Constitution should not be used to protect “pacifism” at the expense of peace and people’s lives, Komura argued. For Japan’s peace and the world’s peace, Japan needs to be more ready to play a proactive role. The current security legislation is an effort to provide the legal basis for this reinterpretation so that there can be a “seamless” response to various scenarios ranging from “gray zone” contingencies to full-scale military clashes.

Japan’s legislature will be taking up this issues in the coming months. The regular Diet session may be extended beyond June 24 if extra time is needed to pass the security legislation. By Mina Pollmann for The Diplomat

Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore’s Future

 

Singapore is much better prepared for the post-Lee Kuan Yew era than many of its critics admit.

In the wake of the death of Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, many obituaries lauding Lee’s role in transforming the city-state also have argued that Singapore faces high hurdles to continuing Lee’s revolution. As Forbes’ Joel Kotkin writes, Lee’s achievements during his three decades as prime minister were extraordinary, but in Singapore today the “durability of his legacy is in question.”

Like many other commentators, Kotkin notes that Lee helped make Singapore one of the most attractive places in the world for foreign investment, but that investment started pouring in during the late 1960s, a time when China was closed to foreign investment and many other Asian nations also were unwelcoming to investors. “Once Asia had few places where advanced technology and services could be developed; now it has many. China alone has 13 cities larger than Singapore, many of them with breathtakingly modern infrastructure and far less expensive workforces,” Kotkin writes. He also notes that Lee Kuan Yew’s embrace of essentially technocratic government has left Singapore, in his view, a kind of soulless place in which earning an income is people’s highest goal, creating some kind of void. Indeed, Kotkin mentions a global Gallup survey which found that Singaporeans are pessimistic about whether their future will be better than Singapore’s past.

Other commentators, such as the Washington Post’s editorial board, have noted that decades of restrictions on social and political freedoms in Singapore’s past will have to be abandoned as countries around Singapore democratize; some Singaporeans worry that Singapore’s restrictions have made the country too cautious and hindered innovation.

But these worries are overblown. For one, Singapore’s political environment has opened significantly in the past decade; the country’s politics are no longer comparable to the situation in the Lee Kuan Yew era. In the most recent national elections, the opposition won a group-member constituency, and garnered about forty percent of the popular vote, its highest total in four decades. The growth of social media and the Internet in Singapore has fostered much more vibrant political debate, and reduced the influence of state-owned media outlets, which dominated discourse in the past. Even Lee Kuan Yew’s own son, current Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, has accepted that the country’s politics are changing and becoming more competitive. “It’s a different generation, a different society, and politics will be different,” Lee Hsien Loong told the Washington Post in an interview two years ago. “We have to work in a more open way.”

Singaporeans’ pessimism also is not a high obstacle to growth and innovation. Many of the countries in the Gallup poll whose citizens have similar levels of pessimism—Germany, Finland—actually have done quite well economically, and continue to prosper. In these countries, sustained economic success has created high expectations—expectations that can be tough to fulfill. By contrast, some of the countries where people are most optimistic about the future—the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone—are places where the past was so desperate that citizens may assume the future simply couldn’t be worse. In other words, pessimism doesn’t really seem to have much to do with actual or future economic conditions.

In addition, the rule of law that Lee helped create in Singapore—the country regularly is ranked by Transparency International as the least corrupt in Asia—continues to give it an advantage in attracting investment. It offers this advantage even in an era in which China, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and even Myanmar have arisen as destinations for foreign investors. Thailand and Malaysia, regional competitors to Singapore, actually appear to be heading backward in terms of the rule of law, a major reason why investors are, for instance, fleeing Thailand. (According to a recent report by Reuters, Thailand’s manufacturing sector has shrunk for twenty-two consecutive months.) China, meanwhile, has in recent years become increasingly unpredictable for foreign investors. Nationalist sentiment, the increasing personalization of power around President Xi Jinping, and a host of proposed new restrictions on foreign investment have caused foreign investors to become more cautious about pouring into the country. Vietnam and India, for all their advantages, remain places where investment is hindered by regulation, opaque administration, and non-tariff barriers.

What’s more, Singapore is becoming more innovative as the country moves up the value-added chain, the social and political environment loosens up, and some of Singapore’s best talent stays home. Bloomberg’s annual index of the world’s most innovative countries ranks Singapore in the top five in the world in terms of manufacturing innovation, and as the eighth most innovative country in the world overall. In the Bloomberg index, Singapore places ahead of other rich economies including the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, and only two spots behind the United States. The country certainly faces challenges—income inequality, population density on such a small island, immigration—but it is more prepared for the future than many of the naysayers admit. By Joshua Kurlantzick for The Diplomat

Will India Lease Another Russian Nuclear Submarine?

 

India may lease another nuclear submarine from Russia.

In December 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to India, traditionally a major consumer of Russia-made military equipment. In New Delhi, Putin met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the two pledged to deepen their defense ties. During that visit, Russia’s trade minister, Denis Manturov, hinted that Moscow would eagerly lease a nuclear submarine to India if there was interest:  “If India decides to have more contracts to lease nuclear submarines, we are ready to supply,” he noted. India currently operates one Akula-II-class nuclear submarine, the INS Chakra, leased in 2011 from Russia for a 10 year period. The lease weighs in at $970 million, representing a considerable portion of India’s cumulative spending on Russian equipment.

The Russian minister’s comments were not entirely out of left field: Indian defense ministry officials had told the press that the Indian Navy would acquire another nuclear submarine from Russia. After December, information surrounding a potential second submarine lease died down — until this week. The Russia and India Repor noted last week that a Russian shipbuilding industry source noted that “Russia is ready to lease a second Project 971 Shchuka-B submarine to India for a period of ten years.” The report continues:

The submarine will be customized by the Amur shipyards. Modernization and testing of the submarine and training of the Indian crew will take three years. The Kashalot will be transferred to the Indian Navy in 2018, the source noted.

The specific submarine to be leased is the K-322 Kashalot, an Akula-II-class submarine (Akula is the NATO reporting name for the Shchuka) with a surface displacement of 8,140 tons, submerged speed of 30 knots, and maximum operating depth of 520 meters. The Kashalot additionally requires a crew of 73 sailors and uses a 190 mW nuclear reactor for propulsion. The Kashalot features eight torpedo tubes in total, with four bays designed for 630 mm torpedoes and the remainder designed for 533 mm torpedoes (optimized for Russian-made Type 65 and Type 53 torpedoes).

In a separate report earlier last week from Russia’s state-run TASS news agency, a “high-placed source in the system of Russia’s military and technical cooperation with foreign countries” notes that ”In January this year, the Indian side suggested transferring the second project 971 multipurpose nuclear submarine Kashalot for lease.” He adds that ”the Russian side is studying the issue.” ”The procedure will most likely be similar to the procedure, which was used for transferring the first submarine called Nerpa to the Indian side,” TASS‘ source adds.

In addition to the INS Chakra, India is currently conducting sea trials for an additional nuclear submarine, the indigenously developed INS Arihant. India has an additional three submarines planned as part of the Arihant-class. The major distinction between India’s Akula-class and Arihant-class is that the latter is an SSBN and a critical part of ensuring a robust nuclear triad for New Delhi. The INS Chakra and the K-322 Kashalot are attack submarines, intended for anti-surface combat, sea-denial, and coastal defense purposes.

India’s submarine procurement plans were defined primarily by a thirty-year plan, conceived of in the late-1990s, which envisages a modernized submarine force consisting of submarines acquired in equal parts from the West and Russia, complemented by an indigenous design.

By Ankit Panda for The Diplomat

China Slams Philippines For South China Sea ‘Hypocrisy’

 

Beijing turns the tables on Manila for resuming works in the South China Sea.

China slammed the Philippines for its hypocrisy on the South China Sea after Manila said that it would resume repair and reconstruction works there, news outlets reported Friday.

While the Philippines had halted such activities last year and suggested other countries do so as well because it was concerned about potential effects on its ongoing legal case against China, Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario had said Thursday that it would resume some activities. The move came amid massive Chinese land reclamation efforts there which Philippine officials say is designed to bolster Beijing’s territorial claims and alter the status quo before any legal verdict is even reached by the arbitral tribunal at The Hague.

But on Friday, China used del Rosario’s comments as an opportunity to turn the tables on the Philippines. According to Reuters, foreign policy spokesman Hua Chunying said China was now “seriously concerned” by Manila’s decision to resume works in the South China Sea, which was both an infringement of Beijing’s sovereignty and hypocritical.

“On the one hand the Philippines makes unreasonable criticism about China’s normal building activities on its own isles, and on the other announces it will resume repairs on an airport, runway and other illegal constructions on China’s Spratly Islands, which it illegally occupies,” Hua said.

“This is not only a series infringement of China’s sovereignty, but it also exposes the Philippines’ hypocrisy,” she noted at a news briefing. She also called on the Philippines to withdraw from the islands.

Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario had emphasized Thursday in his remarks that the Philippines would only be proceeding on repair and maintenance in the South China Sea, and such works – which would include repairs on an airstrip – would not violate the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea because it did not alter the status quo dramatically.

“We are taking the position that we can proceed with the repair and maintenance,” del Rosario said according to Reuters.

This was in stark contrast to China’s massive land reclamation activities, which del Rosario said aimed to change the status quo and enforce its infamous nine-dash line claim to control almost the whole South China Sea.

“China is accelerating its expansionist agenda and changing the status quo to actualize its nine-dash line claim and to control nearly the entire South China Sea before…the handing down of a decision of the arbitral tribunal on the Philippine submission,” he said. By Prashanth Parameswaran for The Diplomat

 

 

Mearsheimer’s War With China-The provocative political scientist foresees tense relations between the U.S. and China.

The provocative political scientist foresees tense relations between the U.S. and China.

In the new edition of his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John J. Mearsheimer lives up to his reputation as a provocative political scientist. In a substantial new chapter on China, Mearsheimer extends his previous argument that the United States and China are about to engage in a “security competition” that is likely to end in war.

 

Mearsheimer believes that China’s “best way to survive under international anarchy” is to achieve regional hegemony in Asia “the way the United States dominates the Western hemisphere.” To accomplish this goal, China will first “seek to maximize the power gap with its neighbors, especially larger countries like India, Japan, and Russia” and thus gain military dominance in the region. Furthermore, Mearsheimer holds that China is likely to attempt to “push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region,” in part by driving the U.S. Navy out of the ocean between China’s coast and  the first island chain. A major reason Mearsheimer makes this dire prediction is that he believes China’s hegemony over the region would offer China great benefits, including the ability to favorably resolve ongoing disputes over territory and natural resources; to secure its interests in Africa and the Middle East and its control over critical sea lanes; and even the opportunity to undermine the United States’ own regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

Mearsheimer believes that containment is the United States’ only way to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. (He dismisses preventative war because China possesses a nuclear deterrent, nixes policies to inhibit China’s economic growth on the grounds that they would hurt the United States’ own economy, and notes that attempting to topple China-friendly regimes and fomenting rebellion within China is likely to fail.) Containment would entail forming “a balancing coalition” with China’s neighbors, which would require the United States’ active coordination and military backing. To many it seems  that the United States has indeed begun to form such a coalition.

However, Mearsheimer does not expect that containment will prevent current tensions between the United States and China from eventually escalating into a direct conflict. One reason for his claim is that China’s weak neighbors have a strong incentive to provoke crises now, before China becomes even stronger. Mearsheimer points out this makes the United States potentially vulnerable to becoming embroiled in conflicts that its weak allies might well instigate with China, forcing the U.S. to engage in war to protect them. (The United States’ treatment of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a part of Japan covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is one telling example.) Mearsheimer notes that European countries had no such perverse incentives when the United States contained the USSR during the Cold War.

Both countries’ strong nationalism, Mearsheimer believes, heightens the likelihood that the United States and China view each other as threatening. The often-provocative Mearsheimer dismisses the thesis that “Confucian pacifism” or economic interdependence will reduce the “chance that these two countries will shoot at each other.” In short, Mearsheimer asks whether war is likely and concludes that he expects, in the longer term, that the United States and China will engage in “an intense security competition with considerable potential for war” and, more flatly, that China’s rise “will not be peaceful.”

In the process, Mearsheimer ignores that if one follows the kind of real politik analysis for which he is famous – that is, an analysis that looks at security rather than at sentiments, beliefs, and loyalties – a rather different conclusion emerges. First, the United States and China both have enormously pressing domestic problems. China’s slowing economic growth and the United States’ slow economic growth make it impossible for either country to – without neglecting these domestic demands – invest many taxpayer dollars in their military. Second, a military confrontation is very likely to be exceedingly costly for both sides. China cannot reasonably expect to war with the United States without suffering serious, lasting damage – at best. Third, the United States did not fare particularly well in four of its last five wars, as Henry Kissinger delicately pointed out, and it has a hard time dealing even with ISIS, which has at most 35,000 fighters and lacks a navy, air force, nuclear weapons, or significant cyber capabilities. Fourth and most importantly, the United States and China share many important shared and complementary interests. These include slowing nuclear proliferation, curbing Islamic extremism, protecting the environment, preventing climate change, and fostering economic growth and stability.

Moreover, the two countries have very little “real” reason to confront each other. China can secure access to the energy and raw materials essential to its economic well-being, without any harm coming to the United States – unless the two countries turn every change to the status quo into a crisis of prestige. And China has shown, so far largely through land disputes, that it can settle differences with its neighbors peacefully. The main value of Mearsheimer’s provocative thesis is that it alerts those of us on both sides of the power divide to redouble our efforts to prevent his dire predictions from coming true. 

Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations and a University Professor at The George Washington University.

 

Joko Talks the Talk, Must Walk the Walk

 

Since President Joko Widodo took office and announced his administration’s priorities last year, many wondered if Indonesia still took its foreign relations seriously. But as Joko is under pressure to show some tangible successes — in terms of jobs, income and prosperity — Indonesian foreign policy is becoming more pragmatic. Economic diplomacy — getting foreign businesses to invest in the country while stimulating exports — is becoming the new mantra.

Joko’s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, managed to put Indonesia on the regional map as a leader and peace broker by actively engaging in many international issues, from disputes in the South China Sea to Myanmar’s democratization. His foreign policy, however, was often criticized as being more concerned with image-making than with tangible results.

During his trip to Japan and China, Joko has managed to utilize his predecessor’s achievements to woo both Chinese and Japanese investment. Using Indonesia’s strong image as Southeast Asia’s leading nation, while being fully aware of Sino-Japan rivalry, Joko subtly handled thorny security and political issues important to the regional powers.

As if to remind his hosts of Indonesia’s relevance, Joko said shortly before arriving in China that Beijing’s claim to almost the entire South China Sea had no basis in international law, but added that Jakarta wanted to remain an honest broker.

And guess what? Joko has brought home billions of dollars in committed investment. His trip to Japan and China has put Indonesia back onto the regional geopolitical map.

From now on, however, Joko must actively seek to solve regional disputes, to back up the statements he made. If he doesn’t, his words will be seen as cheap talk, and that is the last thing Indonesia — and the region — need. Jakarta Globe

 

Russia, Australia and Holland yesterday said they would apply to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Russia, Australia and Holland yesterday said they would apply to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, while Beijing also appeared to open the door to Taiwanese membership, days before Tuesday's deadline for founding members.

Beijing opens door to Taiwanese involvement in US$100-billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as string of countries say they will apply

The news followed an announcement by the finance ministry that Britain and Switzerland had been formally accepted as founding members of the new fund, which has a capital target of US$100 billion.

Some 30 countries had now been formally accepted as founding members with even more under consideration and applications still coming in, the finance ministry said.

Moscow had been conspicuously quiet over whether it would join up, even after eight European countries, led by Britain, made clear their intentions to join, prompting speculation over the indecision of Beijing's global strategic partner. Whether Taiwan, which Beijing perceives as a renegade province, could join and in what capacity, has also been the subject of speculation.

Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov expressed Moscow's intent to join the AIIB when he addressed the China-sponsored Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan, reported the Russian TV network RT.

The announcement leaves South Africa as the only country from the Brics developing economies yet to express an interest in joining the bank.

Brazil, one of China's top trading partners, declared an interest in joining on Friday; India was accepted as a founding member months ago.

Nations will still be able to join the AIIB following the deadline, but only as common members, the ministry said.

In a meeting with mainland President Xi Jinping before the opening of the Boao conference, Taiwan's former vice president Vincent Siew told Xi the island hoped to join the bank.

A press release by the Taipei-based Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation, of which Siew is the honorary chairman, said the meeting lasted for about half an hour, but did not mention Xi's response.

Zhang Zhijun , director of the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, was quoted by Taipei's Central News Agency as saying that Beijing was willing to listen to Taiwan's views on whether it could join the bank and in what capacity.

"We are delighted to hear any opinions and suggestions from Taiwan about this, but so far we have yet to officially receive any application from Taiwan," he was quoted as saying.

Zhang, who was in the meeting with Xi and Siew, said there was a chance for Taiwan to join, but did not elaborate.

As the AIIB requires statehood to join, it has so far been unclear how either Taiwan or Hong Kong could join, even though both have expressed a wish to.

Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying attended a group meeting with Xi yesterday, but said it was only a courtesy greeting. Hong Kong said earlier it would lobby to join the bank.

Meanwhile, Toshihiro Nikai, a senior member of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, met Xi for a photo session at the Boao forum, amid a slight easing of tensions between the two sides, Kyoto reported.

Nikai was the first Japanese political figure to have met Xi since Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held his first talks with Xi in November.

Japan, an ally of the US, has yet to say whether it wants to join the AIIB, which some see as a competitor to the US-dominated World Bank and Asian Development Bank.

Washington had previously asked its European allies not to join the AIIB.

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post