Thailand - The exile and the kingdom

Fixing Thailand’s broken politics requires the government, the opposition and the monarchy all to change

YET again, anarchy threatens Thailand. Rival crowds of pro- and anti-government protesters have gathered in Bangkok. The (far more numerous) antis have occupied government ministries, prompting the government to extend special security laws across the capital. The government has seen off a no-confidence motion in parliament but its future remains in doubt, in the face of challenges not just on the streets but also in the courts. Violence may return. Blame for the resurgence of the chaos that plagued Thailand in 2006-10 lies with the government, the opposition and the institution to which they both look for their legitimacy—the monarchy.

The government is led formally by Yingluck Shinawatra, the prime minister, but informally by her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, a wealthy tycoon. Deposed in a coup in 2006 and later convicted of abusing his power, Mr Thaksin runs the government by remote control from self-imposed exile in Dubai. Thailand’s social and business elites regard him as corrupt and high-handed, and are appalled by his populist economic policies. But, thanks in large measure to his popularity in the rural north and north-east, Mr Thaksin’s party (its latest incarnation is called Pheu Thai) keeps winning elections—in 2001 and 2005, and (through proxies) in 2007 and 2011.

Until recently Ms Yingluck’s government seemed to have reached an accommodation with the establishment. Then it pushed through the lower house of parliament a sweeping amnesty bill which would have let Mr Thaksin return home, while expunging thousands of other court cases. There was huge opposition to the bill, even among some of Mr Thaksin’s former fans, who thought it went too far. It was thrown out in the Senate. Retreating, Ms Yingluck promised not to revive it.

Encouraged, the opposition pushed its advantage. The partially appointed Senate tends to side with the opposition, so the government has been trying to change the constitution to make it fully elected. On November 20th the constitutional court backed the opposition’s view that the amendment was unconstitutional; it has yet to rule on whether those who voted for it broke Thailand’s strict lèse-majesté law.

Like some of its predecessors, the government may thus be finished off by the judiciary. But even after the amnesty fiasco, Ms Yingluck may well win a fresh election. And in the meantime, the two sides’ supporters slug it out on the streets, and Thailand totters.

Prince charmless

For this stalemate to end, three changes are needed. First, the opposition—led by the members of the main establishment political party, the Democrats—must abandon its undemocratic tactics. Its leaders want it both ways. They support parliamentary democracy when it produces the “right” result; when it does not, they resort to the streets, the courts or a phone call to army headquarters. That must stop.

Second, Thaksinite governments have to learn that they must use their electoral mandates not just to win the renewed votes of their supporters next time—still less to run government for Mr Thaksin’s ends—but for the good of the country. That includes confronting corruption, ditching crazy policies, such as a price-support scheme for rice, and promoting a better business climate.

Third, the monarchy must stop playing politics and accept the symbolic role the constitution accords it. Two looming events have helped make Thai politics so frenzied. One is the 86th birthday on December 5th of Thailand’s revered king for 67 years, Bhumibol Adulyadej. By tradition, harmony is supposed to prevail on that day. The king will probably be too frail to make his customary birthday speech. His unpopular son, the crown prince, is likely to succeed him. None of this is discussed in Thailand, for it would contravene the lèse-majesté (as this leader now does too).

This pernicious law blocks rational discourse about urgently needed reforms. Thailand’s constitution not only has undemocratic elements, but also gives the central government too much power. That has helped fuel a long-running bloody conflict in the Muslim south. It may yet help spark another, in the Thaksin-supporting north-east. The royal family should give its explicit support to constitutional reform—and first call for an end to lèse-majesté. ‘The Economist’

Not the First Australian Intervention

Indonesia’s response to the spying imbroglio last week — when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono recalled his ambassador and suspended security cooperation with Australia — reflects a political history of constant foreign intervention in Indonesian affairs that few Australians are aware of.

Indonesia emerged as a modern nation in the wake of World War II, when Japanese troops ousted the Dutch, who had subjugated and exploited the country for centuries. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Indonesia’s founding President Sukarno declared independence.
The new republic lay within the American-dominated South West Pacific Area and was soon handed to the British-dominated South East Asian Command. Allied soldiers arrived in Jakarta in September 1945 and began to occupy major Indonesian cities with the aim of returning Indonesia to its pre-war status as a Dutch colony.

Thousands died in the bombing of Surabaya. Dutch soldiers and administrators returned, led by Hubertus Johannes van Mook, who had run the Dutch East Indies government-in-exile from Brisbane during the war. Dutch POWs, released by Indonesia, were armed and sent back on rampages against Indonesian civilians and police. Australian troops participated in the occupation of the outer islands, including Bali, and were involved in massacres.

The British have since apologized for this cruel attempt to stifle the young nation’s struggle for freedom and sovereignty. Australia has not.

The Sukarno government also clashed with the British when the latter shaped its own former colonies in the region into another modern state. The north of the vast island of Kalimantan was annexed into the new state of Malaysia despite its cultural and historical ties to Indonesia and contested political status, and amid protests by the local population.

An undeclared war (the “Confrontation”) began, and Australian troops participated. Covert operations into Indonesian Kalimantan began in 1964 under the code name Operation Claret. Attempts to assassinate Sukarno failed.

In 1965, Indonesia witnessed one of the greatest genocides of the 20th century, as army general Suharto led a military coup against the left-leaning but essentially nationalist and non-aligned Sukarno government. Up to one million innocent Indonesian civilians were butchered over the following year at a rate of 1,500 people per day, to the applause of Western powers including Australia.

The pretext was a fake coup attempt, falsely attributed to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The deep involvement of British and American intelligence in staging this bloody military coup, similar to the Pinochet takeover of Chile, is beyond reasonable doubt.

The victors were soon able to convene in Switzerland to divide the spoils — Indonesia’s enormous wealth in natural resources — thanks to foreign investment legislation introduced by the military dictatorship. Countless blogs in Indonesia ensure this history is more widely known there than it is in Australia.

The lack of an apology for such consistent unneighborly behavior may seem astonishing in the context of the “Asian Century” and needs to be understood as a direct consequence of the ongoing nature of these operations.

In West Papua, for example, the Indonesian military continues to provide the means of violent coercion required to facilitate vast foreign-owned mining and other ventures not set up primarily to benefit Indonesia, but for which Indonesia’s military will one day be asked to take the political blame.

Continuity, as well as profound ambivalence, is evident in the personal histories of members of today’s Indonesian elite. Looking back to the military coup, for example, we discover that on Nov. 19, 1965:

“…the Australian Embassy in Jakarta proudly reported on an “action”; a massacre, led by an Australian-trained officer. Colonel Sarwo Edhie was a 1964 graduate from an 18-month course at the Australian Army Staff College at Queenscliff, near Melbourne.”

President Yudhoyono is married to his daughter.

What then is the meaning of the current spying scandal?

Why would Australian agencies spy on Sarwo Edhie’s daughter?

Why, for that matter, should Australia spy on Yudhoyono, who has earned himself a bad name in Indonesia precisely for selling out to the interests of Western investors andgovernments? 

Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party and coalition partner the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) have been devastated recently by the discovery of corruption involving Australian cattle imports.

Yudhoyono may be hoping that the political theatrics might help to restore his nationalist credentials sufficiently to enable him to serve as kingmaker in the next year’s presidential election. But given that Edward Snowden was the source of the leak, it seems more likely to have been an afterthought.

Rather, the ambiguities in the relationships are such that Australian distrust is easy enough to understand. It is not that Indonesia is actually a threat to Australia. In more than 20 years of research, I have never seen the slightest indication of hostile Indonesian ambitions toward Australia. Instead, the potential threat is that this local elite might turn around, become genuinely nationalistic, and bring the feeding frenzy to an end.

Feelings among the Indonesian elite — even those who have collaborated with Australia in the past — are deeply ambivalent. On his deathbed, Yudhoyono’s father-in-law is said to have repented of his role as a key engineer of the killings. Some of Yudhoyono’s own relatives in the East Javanese city of Blitar suffered in the violence Sarwo Edhie had helped to orchestrate.
Similar patterns emerge when we look at other dynasties, such as the very prominent family of current presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto. Again, we see repeated reversals in Indonesian powerbrokers’ relationships with the Dutch and subsequent foreign powers, oscillating between collaboration and strong opposition.

These ambiguities are now becoming explosive for two reasons. First, Indonesia is a rising power and this is slowly dawning on the national psyche. A new assertiveness can be seen occasionally in political posturing, and there is a new sense in Indonesia of Australia as a small and recalcitrant neighbor that does not want to see the writing on the wall.

Some members of the Indonesian elite also realize Australia is itself a victim of colonial history, and is disadvantaged in the Asian Century by a set of traditional alliances that are difficult to re-negotiate.

Second, after the fall of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, Indonesians are increasingly becoming aware of their nation’s sad post-colonial history. Even the truth about 1965 — long buried by the Suharto regime — is now being openly discussed and acknowledged.

Considering Australia’s position as a white settler nation in Southeast Asia and being newcomers to the neighborhood, Australians need to consider urgently whether they should loudly and formally distance themselves from this imperial legacy.

Thomas Reuter is ARC Future Fellow at the University of Melbourne.

Time For Justice In Timor

The respected East Timorese human rights organisation La’o Hamutuk is demanding that the Indonesian government finally be held accountable for their bloody 24-year occupation of East Timor

This month, to mark the 22-year anniversary of the notorious Santa Cruz massacre — when Indonesian soldiers murdered over 200 peaceful student protesters in cold blood — La’o Hamutuk and a collective of Timorese human rights organisations issued a joint declaration demanding that all Indonesians involved in crimes during the occupation be brought to justice. (Amnesty’s 2011 statement on the 20-year anniversary gives the clearest overview of events and numbers of those who died at Santa Cruz.)

Celestino Gusmão and Mariano Ferreira, activists with La’o Hamutuk, draw a direct correlation with current human rights abuses in West Papua. They told New Matilda that people in Timor-Leste are still suffering today because of the atrocities committed by the Indonesian military.

“We have clear examples of the consequences of impunity — in West Papua and other places in Indonesia, almost every day, people are murdered, tortured, raped or ‘disappeared’. In Timor, the Indonesian occupation also murdered and ‘disappeared’ many people," says Gusmão.

"These bad memories are still alive in the survivors’ minds, while criminals are still free to move around. Without justice it is even harder for us to forget or accept the horror that we lived through.”

The joint declaration condemns Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão for publicly embracing the infamous retired Indonesian Military Commander Wiranto in 2004 and developing warm diplomatic relations with Indonesia:

“Military perpetrators do not fear criminal accountability … In Timor-Leste, our leaders follow only what the big men want, not what the law directs."

Indonesian atrocities during its occupation of East Timor are well documented. The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) estimates that 102,800 people were murdered or disappeared, with 84,200 dying from starvation or illness. Many more were raped, tortured or displaced.

Apart from a handful of dedicated international activists, the world largely turned a blind eye to Indonesia’s reign of terror until the Santa Cruz massacre, which was covertly filmed by several Western journalists, was exposed in 1991.

In addition to the joint declaration, La’o Hamutuk continue to needle the Indonesians, recently publishing an open letter requesting they release the whereabouts of the bodies of Timorese resistance fighters killed during the occupation. La’o Hamutuk say this is essential to both wider reconciliation and the healing of the families of those who were killed:

“During the resistance many of our soldiers were brutally murdered or captured and tortured. The families of the missing soldiers and the others that disappeared during the occupation want the bodies of their loved ones returned so they can give them a proper burial."

Echoing calls in the joint declaration, the letter also demands that the international community take its share of responsibility for enabling human rights abuses by supporting the Indonesian occupation.

“We want the governments of the UK, US and Australia and the international companies that benefited from the illegal Indonesian occupation to take responsibility for their complicity. They have an obligation to help us because they supported the occupation. We want them to support the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate human rights abuses by the Indonesian military. This will establish the truth and will have the legal capacity to ensure Timorese people obtain fair reparations from the perpetrators and from the major nations that benefited from Indonesian occupation, as CAVR recommends.”

In many ways, East Timor today can be viewed as a success story. Since independence in 2002, infrastructure has been developed, children educated and real efforts made to deal with corruption. The Gusmão government hopes that a sustainable financial future might be possible, if substantial oil and gas reserves are used correctly.

However, according to La’o Hamutuk, the many wounds inflicted by the Indonesians must be healed before the country can really move on.

“The government is only thinking about developing the economy, not dealing with the past,” says Ferreira. “But genuine accountability will help to bring greater democracy and justice to the people of Timor-Leste.”

Dr Gordon Peake is the author of Beloved Land, which was published in September and tells the many different stories of East Timor. He says that reconciliation is a not a straightforward issue. “Timor’s situation can’t be found in a peace-building handbook,” he told New Matilda.

He suggests that the East Timorese government is merely being practical in its dealings with Indonesia, acting to secure the future of the country.

“The government are being Class A pragmatists. Indonesia could put Timor in its pocket, if it wanted to — Dili would close down if Indonesia stopped supplying goods and products.”

Alongside these discussions of reconciliation, Peake suggests that more attention needs to be paid to conflict-related mental health in East Timor. A 2000 study in The Lancet found that more than one fifth of East Timorese had witnessed the murder of a relative or friend, he writes in Beloved Land. A University of Auckland study found that 5 per cent of people had post-traumatic stress disorder, with 12 per cent exhibiting signs of psychosis. “It’s amazing that the statistics are as low as they are,” he said.

It may not be easy to bring those involved in human rights abuses to justice. Thirteen years on, many of those involved, both Indonesians and Timorese, now live in relative peace and obscurity, while the families of their victims continue to suffer. La’o Hamutuk insists that the past needs to be dealt with before the future can be assured.

“Everyone in Timor has been a victim of the illegal Indonesian occupation,” Ferreira says. “Justice is needed to satisfy all the people that lost their beloved ones and justice is the only credible way to deal with criminals and respect those who died.” ‘newmatilda.com’ By Amy Ripley

Spy scandal 'punishment' out of proportion to crime

IF the rules of diplomacy were not so rigid, Tony Abbott must wish he could pen a brutally honest reply to his Indonesian counterpart Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono over this week's spy scandal

He might be tempted to point out the gulf between what Indonesia said and what it did when it came to spying on Australia. He might be tempted to suggest that no country could safely claim the high moral ground when it came to eavesdropping on the secrets of the other. And he might remind the President of the rich tradition of countries digesting embarrassing spy scandals without derailing broader relations. In the spirit of honesty, Abbott also might admit that Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (now called the Australian Signals Directorate) went a step too far when it tried to tap the phone of the President's wife but that this issue was hardly worth a retaliation that put lives at risk.

- See more at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/spy-scandal-punishment-out-of-proportion-to-crime/story-fn59nm2j-1226766427664#sthash.mQgJX8co.dpuf