A major military and diplomatic shift is occurring in Asia. It is
pushing China to reconsider its strategic priorities and this is causing a
domino effect in regional politics.
The change is spawning a maze of new alliances. To prevent everything from
unraveling, the US and China must find a new common ground that enables
collaboration on the world's biggest quagmires - Central Asia and Middle East.
This is necessary for peace in both the Middle East and the Pacific region.
The pivot to Asia and the collapse of the
old Asian order
In the next plenary session of the Chinese parliament in March, the National
People's Congress will complete the launch of two commissions the party set up
at the plenum last November - one on reforms and another on national security.
The latter is not simply a new administrative organ, but purports to be an
important change in China's grand strategy.
So far, China's security environment has been plagued by a lack of coordinated
control and strategy [1] in the face of a potentially very insecure
geopolitical situation. [2] China's biggest strategic weaknesses - its vague,
disputed sea borders and location surrounded by countries closer politically to
the US - might have been one of the reasons behind America's "pivot to
Asia".
The pivot is the ultimate reason for the new Chinese National Security
Commission and the new grand strategy. The pivot also stems from the failure of
Beijing to seize opening offers made by US President Barack Obama in 2009. [3]
Before that, China did not need a grand strategy: its sheer size made it
formidable enough to intimidate its smaller neighbors through conventional
warfare. They were scared of being overcome by the human wave of the Chinese
population. In a way, China was too big to be defeated, since its defeat could
cause bigger troubles than a Chinese victory.
Against bigger threats of a nuclear attack, China kept a minimal yet effective
nuclear force of ballistic missiles. This was based on a simple strategic
realization: you don't need to threaten the annihilation of your enemy to keep
him at bay, it is enough that a credible threat of even a limited nuclear
attack is in place. There is no need to spend too much money building a huge
nuclear arsenal when just a few missiles will do the job.
It was an effective and thrifty defense strategy. Because the general security
atmosphere around China was guaranteed by the US, Beijing could simply forget
about broader security issues. The US Navy patrolled the international sea
lanes, and the general political and security arrangement around Chinese
borders was maintained by the US. This arrangement was not hostile to China,
but conversely was quite friendly nor conducive to Chinese integration into a
system of international trade and investment led by the US.
In this regard, China's former security arrangement made good sense. It aligned
with some basic principles of defense which can be summed up in Edward
Luttwak's classic assessment of the grand strategy of the Roman Empire. [4] He
warns that a common fallacy in some analyses is:
...
to evaluate defensive systems in absolute terms. If a defense can be
penetrated, it is said to be "useless"; and only an impenetrable
defense is conceded to be of value. This appraisal is highly misleading: its
equivalent, for the offense, would be to regard as useless any offensive system
that cannot prevail against all forms of resistance, under all circumstances.
Defensive systems should instead be evaluated in relative forms: their cost in
resources should be compared to their military "output". Further, the
value of defensive systems must be assessed in terms of the type of threat they
are intended to counter. One system may be most effective against "low
intensity" threats (infiltration, hit and run raids, etc) another against maximal
threat of invasion. Each should be evaluated accordingly, for the defensive
systems are normally intended to provide a finite barrier only against a
particular kind of threat, while absorbing, deflecting, or at least filtering
other threats greater or lesser in intensity than those against which the
system is designed.
Changing strategies in a changing environment
The new environment had made China's old strategy obsolete. It calls for a deep
reassessment of resources, as is evident with the establishment of the new
national security commission.
On command and control, things could be simpler. For instance, the various
departments in charge of maritime security (the People's Liberation Army Navy,
the fishery, the border control, the customs authorities and the like) can be
brought under one command and possibly somehow merged into one structure.
But China has other, bigger constraints. China is weak in conventional war, [5]
and it has better capability in strategic defense - missiles but also cyber-attacks,
the new horizon for threats.
However, this kind of response is geared toward the pre-pivot political
environment. Basically, the strategy is prepared to respond only to extreme
threats with absolute answers, such as a massive cyber-attack or a nuclear
missile strike. But these scenarios are extreme and very unlikely - not the
least because they would amount to suicide attacks. Once attacked, the US or
any other country in the world would respond and that would be the end of China
as we know it.
Ruling out for the sake of argument the possibility of a dramatic escalation -
which is always possible if not likely when a great power is involved,
especially if armed with weapons of mass destruction - let's consider the
scenario of a limited conventional war.
China has very narrow capabilities even in limited conventional war - and a
defeat in a conventional clash would certainly cause massive a domestic
political backlash that could put the rule of the Communist Party in jeopardy.
Victory in a limited conventional war is also dangerous. It would isolate China
by showing the world that the idea of the "China threat" is not
illusory but real, and that China must be brought down. However, from a very
strict military point of view, when cornered it is better to win an engagement
than lose it. Of course this leaves open the issue of the meaning of
"being cornered".
While keeping in mind that no war would be good for China, the frictions around
the Senkaku Islands and in the South China Sea raise the question of whether
China is prepared for a limited conflict.
In a limited conventional war, the Chinese precedents are mixed. China clearly
won against India in 1962. In Korea in the 1950s, it was draw, and that was
only achieved because Beijing was willing to sacrifice thousands to US machine
guns in its notorious human waves. It is very unlikely that China could now
repeat that performance. With Vietnam in 1979, when Beijing tried to punish
Hanoi for its invasion of Cambodia, it did not go very well - despite some
intelligence assistance from America and Thailand.
Now the situation is unclear, but on paper things are no better than in the
past.
Surely the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan is politically non-existent -
especially now that bilateral ties are improving. It is simply not worth
considering, and the Chinese have long stopped taking it seriously as an
option.
But on other fronts, the chances are not so impossibly remote. China is likely
to fare badly against Japan, a country that is better prepared and better armed
in a sea clash. China could do well against Vietnam, against whom China won a
sea skirmish in 1988. But back then, the US was on Beijing's side, and since
that is no longer the case, it is unclear what could happen now.
The prospects are also unclear in regard to the weakest of China's antagonists
in the region, the Philippines, which could fight in the sea closer to its
shores and thus with better air support than the Chinese, who would be much
farther from their own air strips.
This very cursory assessment is in striking contrast with the capabilities of
other countries with the economic might of China. Their defenses could easily
win in a limited conflict against smaller countries, but they are unable to
project a total threat. Only China, Russia, and America can do that. Yet of the
trio, the other two have capability to easily defeat a smaller enemy in a
conventional war, while China might not. How China can bridge the gap? The
acquisition of weapons may not be enough without actual combat training and
experience. New weaponry could give the Chinese
army a false sense of security that would be shattered in an actual fight. In
1894, China was in theory much stronger than Japan, with more modern warships,
and yet it lost the war. The basic mistake then was arrogance and
miscalculation of what really mattered on the battleground. Many signs indicate
that the current Chinese army may also be overestimating itself and
underestimating others. This can be seen as one more reason for China to keep
out of war and for China's adversaries to try to either force or lure China in.
In the cobweb of Bismarckian Asia
While from the military side signals are worrisome and confused, on the broad
political front there is a new atmosphere. This may far be more important
because in China, political considerations always prevail over the military.
China is drawing a new Bismarckian map of Asia with of contradicting pacts and
allegiances. At the end of the 19th century, the prime minister of Prussia and
first chancellor of the German Empire, Otto Bismarck, built a cobweb of
treaties in Europe, where all countries pledged allegiance both to or against
Germany. This network was basically the reason for a very long period of peace
in the continent that lasted from 1870 to 1914. Something similar now seems
afoot in Asia.
South Korea and Taiwan are close US allies but sided against Japan and with
China over the Senkaku Islands, reverting to Cold War allegiances. Vietnam is
locked in a bitter clash with China over parts of the South China Sea, and it has
offered one of its strategic ports, Haiphong, to the US Navy. Yet political and
economic ties with China continue to thrive, with Chinese investment in Vietnam
spiking.
Just a few days ago, Xinhua wrote:
In
an interview with Xinhua, Do Tien Sam, editor in chief of the China Research
Journal published by the Institute for Chinese Studies in Vietnam Academy of
Social Science, said that the political determination of the two countries'
leaders to maintain stable and healthy bilateral relations has helped increase
the confidence of Chinese private investors to boost their investment in
Vietnam in 2013.
Quoting statistics from Vietnam's Ministry of Planning and Investment, Sam said
that China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam increased sharply in
2013, with 89 newly licensed projects and putting more capital into existing 11
projects, bringing the total investment in 2013 to over 2.3 billion US dollars,
a remarkable increase from 371 million US dollars in 2012. [6]
In India, the nationalist prime
ministerial candidate Narendra Modi is expected to take an anti-Chinese
position, but he was also blacklisted by the US for his role in the 2002
anti-Muslim violence in his home state of Gujarat. In fact, Modi has started an
anti-China campaign but Beijing is playing it down. [7]
On this matter, intelligence collaboration with Japan and Vietnam (ostensibly
against China) is increasing, but Chinese company Huawei has also
controversially gained access to the Indian market while it is in effect banned
from the US because of alleged military and intelligence links. Moreover, in
recent days China has offered to finance up to 30% of an Indian infrastructure
plan, something that could bind the countries even closer. [8] And yet China is
still very close to Pakistan, India's arch-enemy.
The same pattern can be found all over Asia. But economic ties between China
and Japan are not plummeting even as official diplomatic rhetoric grows more
shrill.
It is true, as Gordon Chang writes, that, "in 2013, trade volume between
China and Japan dropped 5.1% from the year before. That followed a 3.9% fall in
2012. To put these figures into context, China's total trade was up 6.2% in
2012 and 7.6% last year while Japan's volume increased 1.0% in 2012 but was
down 7.8% in 2013." [9]
But firstly this is not a dramatic fall, and secondly China is thinking of
countermeasures to make up for the cooling political and trade ties. China is
issuing 10 times more tourist visas to Japanese visitors than a year ago [10]
to show that Beijing's beef is not with the Japanese people but only with Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe.
At the same time, Japan is considering passing some kind of Taiwan act, putting
relations between Tokyo and Taipei on sounder footing, to try to improve ties
and draw Taipei closer to Tokyo on the Senkaku issue, [11] and Japan is
denouncing Beijing's political plots to isolate Tokyo on the Senkaku issue.
[12]
A similar play is underway in the triangle between China, Russia, and Japan, with
Moscow trying to improve ties on both sides but keep Beijing and Tokyo
separate. And the Kremlin is doing the same with Beijing and New Delhi.
The geography of these links is getting more complex by the day, spawning a
cobweb of political and economic relations that military conflicts can break
only with a special effort. In fact, political interests in the region are
converging, as all the major players - the US, China, and Japan - are for
instance taking the same line against the possibility of a military coup in
politically troubled Thailand.
Politics is no longer a zero-sum game here; conversely new political activism
from any party is pushing new political activity by everybody. New bilateral
ties between countries in the region seem to kindle a wildfire of measures and
countermeasures by almost every subject, where the result is a positive gain of
political ties, not a freeze in any part of this very complicated chessboard.
Politics seems to imitate international commerce - more trade by two parties
creates more trade with many other parties not involved in the original
exchange. It is a very new phenomenon and so far is hard to fathom.
The maze of double and triple ties is growing, and in a few years it could get
extremely complicated. In fact, it could get so complicated that - as happened
in Germany the late 1880s, when the country went without its spin-master,
Bismarck - all could begin to dangerously unravel. We are very far from this
happening, as the web of allegiances is just beginning to be spun, but perhaps
it is worth thinking ahead because these are all long processes that are
difficult to turn back once started.
Towards the West: A new Silk Road
The web of intertwined allegiances stops negative forces from getting out of
control and sets up important check mechanisms, but it does not channel
economic and political forces in a new and positive direction. Friction and
suspicions between China and the US, the two main players in this drama, are
held back but are not creating a positive political outcome.
So far, the only area where the Chinese and Americans are collaborating
positively is on North Korea. However, even there frustrations abound. Some
Americans, not involved in the matter, are discouraged and annoyed by the lack
of progress with Pyongyang. The new leader, the young Kim Jong-eun, is giving
everybody plenty of reasons to be irritated. Perhaps this situation should not be
considered in absolute terms, but in comparison to what happened by intervening
in Afghanistan and Iraq or by supporting jasmine revolutions in Egypt, Libya,
and Syria. North Korea then appears under control, a contained plague that is
not influencing neighboring countries. China, South Korea, and Japan carry on
thriving, while the Middle East and Central Asia are mired in problems that
could take decades to solve.
The American diplomats who have been navigating these very difficult waters,
against adverse tides coming from home and abroad, deserve the Nobel Peace
Prize for keeping peace in the
peninsula for so many years while the world elsewhere went up in flames. Can
their approach be adapted to the situation elsewhere, such as in Central Asia
or the Middle East? And could it this time include an American offer to involve
China in the peace and development process in the region? America political
activist Bill Mundell is also advocating a new US policy in agreement with
China in Central Asia.
The region is strategic for China, far more than the Senkakus or the South
China Sea. From here, China buys most of its energy imports, from here come the
subversive fundamentalist inspirations fanning independence movements in its
restive western region of Xinjiang, and here China (and India) could reopen a
land route to Europe, modern heir of the old Silk Road, which could bypass the
disputed South China Sea.
The new land route could initiate a new frontier of domestic growth in China by
drawing population to the west rather than only to the coastal east; moreover
it could provide a new shore and direction of development to many land-locked
provinces and regions in China. In fact, as it happened with the Silk Road of
ancient times, the two extremes of the road, China and Western Europe,
benefited from the long process, but the greatest beneficiaries of the road of
exchanges were the local, regional economies where goods were first traded.
This could become extremely necessary in the future as China's western cities
from north to south are becoming overcrowded and very difficult to run, caught
in the vice of pollution and traffic that necessarily come along with efforts
to provide growth (ie support industries), security, good air, and comfort. The
advantage of coastal cities, which are now preferred because they are close to
export harbors, could be gauged against internal cities close to train stations
connecting exports to Europe and the Middle East.
So far, China has been reluctant to get its feet really wet in Central Asia and
the Middle East for fear of getting bogged down, as has been happening with the
US, and also for fear of antagonizing America in an area that for decades has
been its own preserve.
However, the US may now need strategic help in the region, which is out of
control, with growing regional rivalries for instance between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. China's involvement in the region may not work miracles, and in fact
could create many new troubles for Beijing. Still, these new troubles may be
worth more than the present troubles of overcrowding on its eastern coast.
Besides the strategic forces pushing China toward the western region, the
largest dividend of Chinese involvement in Central Asia would be to build a
growing positive collaboration with America and possibly also India and Russia.
It could be a great new game whose final prize is to reduce the heat on
tensions now boiling the area.
The end result, as with North Korea, could conservatively be simply to keep the
situation under control or limit its negative spinoffs. It would be a long-term
plan, thought of in terms of decades, as Beijing likes. If anything more comes
out of it, it should be considered a boon.
It would hard for China to navigate alone in these troubled waters, and Beijing
could learn more from Washington in the Middle East and Central Asia. At the
same time, for America there could be little downside in bringing China
diplomatically into the region. If Beijing's intervention improves the
situation, the merit is also Washington's for initiating the movement; but if
there is no improvement, Beijing could be bogged down, as Washington has been
for 20 years.
Similarly, for Beijing, there is even less of a downside. If it helps improve
the situation in the region, fine; if it gets mired in local issues in the
Middle East and Central Asia, at least it will have improved ties with America
(of paramount importance to China), and it will have created new westward
development trends domestically and relieved demographic pressures in
overcrowded eastern coastal regions.
Moreover, the complexities of the region could create a deep political and
diplomatic dependence on America, as Beijing, especially at the beginning, will
hardly be able to play with all the elements of the complex local political and
religious equation, and thus it will have to learn the policy of a new balance
of power necessary for navigating the region - and the world.
Notes:
1. See "Too many cooks spoil foreign-policy stew",
Asia Times Online, Jan 7, 2011.
2. See "The China 'threat' as a blessing",
Asia Times Online, Apr 13, 2011. Based on a La Stampa article of June 4, 2007.
3. See "Copenhagen miscalculation", Asia Times
Online, Dec 23, 2009 and Beijing should let sleeping Nobel dogs lie, Oct 14, 2010
4. Luttwak, Edward. Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. 1976. p. 61.
5. Easton, Ian. "China's Deceptively Weak (and Dangerous) Military,"
The Diplomat, Jan 31, 2014
6. See "Interview: More Chinese investment boosts China-Vietnam
trade ties", Xinhua, Jan 16, 2014
7. See "China plays down Indian opposition leader's border
remarks", Reuters, Feb 24
8. See "China offers to finance 30 per cent of India’s
infrastructure development plan", Economic Times, Feb 20, 2014
9. "The Chinese And Japanese Economies Are Delinking:
Prelude To Conflict?", Forbes, Feb 16, 2014
10. See "Increase in tourism can help heal Sino-Japan
rift", SCMP, Feb15, 2014
11. See "To Counter Beijing, Japan Moves Closer to Taiwan",
The Diplomat, Feb 20, 2014
12. See China seeks support of other countries in dispute against
Japan, Asahi.com, Feb 24, 2014.
Francesco Sisci is a
columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore. Courtesy Joyo News
