Rare earth ore, shown with a United States penny for size comparison
Japan and India agreed Saturday to promote at the private level joint development of rare earths, which are indispensable for automobiles and information technology products.
Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba and Indian Foreign Minister Shri S.M. Krishna also agreed to step up negotiations toward conclusion of an India-Japan nuclear agreement during a meeting at the Foreign Ministry's Iikura Guest House in Minato Ward, Tokyo, according to officials.
The bilateral agreement over rare earths joint development comes against the backdrop of an attempt to offset the predominance of China in the field, observers said.
Rare earth element
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
These rare-earth oxides are used as tracers to determine which parts of a drainage basin are eroding. Clockwise from top center: praseodymium, cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, samarium, and gadolinium.[1]
As defined by IUPAC, rare earth elements or rare earth metals are a set of seventeen chemical elements in the periodic table, specifically the fifteen lanthanides plus scandium and yttrium.[2] Scandium and yttrium are considered rare earth elements since they tend to occur in the same ore deposits as the lanthanides and exhibit similar chemical properties.
Despite their name, rare earth elements (with the exception of the radioactive promethium) are relatively plentiful in the Earth's crust, with cerium being the 25th most abundant element at 68 parts per million (similar to copper). However, because of their geochemical properties, rare earth elements are typically dispersed and not often found in concentrated and economically exploitable forms. The few economically exploitable deposits are known as rare earth minerals.[3] It was the very scarcity of these minerals (previously called "earths") that led to the term "rare earth". The first such mineral discovered was gadolinite, a compound of cerium, yttrium, iron, silicon and other elements. This mineral was extracted from a mine in the village of Ytterby in Sweden; many of the rare earth elements bear names derived from this location.
A brief stroll through Shinagawa Station in central Tokyo gives an eerie feeling of what the Japanese people are facing these days
It is as if thousands of pedestrians rushing home, all in dark business suits or dresses, are part of a Tim Burton movie set — with dimly lit walkways and dozens of blacked-out flat TV panels akin to mysterious dark windows protruding from the walls without any images. Some passers-by are dressed warmly as heaters are off at an early hour. Some vending machines at the station are unplugged — something unusual for this electronics-crazed nation, to save energy. So are neon-signs of karaoke studios and nightclubs nearby. After a few days of no-business, now restaurants, coffee and ramen shops are packed with salary men and ordinary clients.
Overheard conversations in a coffee shop revealed plans for the upcoming Golden Week — the first week of May when Japanese people traditionally take time off to rest or travel overseas, staying with families and away from their hectic lives. Without any doubt, the most eye-catching advertising travel package was an "Evacuation Tour"— playing on the public sentiment — for those who want a temporary escape abroad. Lots of Japanese are choosing to remain inside the country to show solidarity with their suffering compatriots up north. The people here are good at showing self-restraint as they know how to behave and react to common crisis.
In the past few weeks during the full cherry blossoms, local viewings at popular spots throughout the country were fewer than before, not to mention drinking sake along with its century-old ritual. Common folks do not want to be perceived as selfish or unaffected by the Great Eastern Japan earthquake. Several festivals in Kanto and surrounding areas have also been cancelled. This year the annual Thai festival at Yoyogi Park, one of the most popular events in Tokyo, has been postponed due to a similar sentiment. The overall mood is pretty sober. But that is the way here.
Welcome to the new Japan. Everywhere one goes inside Japan, there are two words — "gaman" and "gambare"— leitmotifs which one often hears and reads. The first means forbearance and the second the fighting spirit of the Japanese people. The combination of these two national characters defines Japan's uniqueness and the determination that has enabled it to cope with all diversities throughout history.
Japan will certainly rise again like a phoenix, as depicted by Japanese cartoonist, Osamu Tezuka, after the country suffered the first atomic bomb six decades ago.
Osamu's cartoon, especially the Atom Boy, captured Japan's internal strength and obligation, known as chikara and giri, and the desire to fight for good people and the world. Talking to a few friends, I find they have pitched their hope of Japan's future on the young Japanese, who are often targets of ridicule in the media because of their laid-back and high withdrawal from society. However, with the March 11 disaster and the aftermath of Fukushima's nuclear crisis, thousands of young people around the country have been mobilised to help out victims and affected communities.
The sense of volunteerism is rising among the young. If it can be sustained and nurtured, the country's overall rehabilitation and reconstruction will be further accelerated. In the country with a growing ageing population, the engaging young people, however few, are the pivotal force.
This crisis also demonstrates the importance of Japan's connections with the rest of the world. Giant automobile makers including Toyota, Honda and other smaller electronic companies have already scaled down their production overseas, especially in the West, due to disruption to international production chains. This has given rise to fresh hope that the newly developing economies such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand can benefit from these circumstances. Representatives from Japanese companies in the Tohoku region have been dispatched to these countries to look for replacements to supply the production chains. Asean could easily be transformed into a new growth centre with increasing investment and building production networks.
But, at the same time, Japan needs a new mind-set. It has to change its industrial rules and thinking as high-level transfers of technology and training are needed over a long-term period.
Therefore, it was no surprise that Asean has used every opportunity to display its sympathy and gratitude to Japan. As the Asean chair, Indonesia initiated a special meeting between Asean and Japanese foreign ministers early in April to show solidarity with Japan. Asean members also rank high among more than 130 countries and over 50 international organisations that have sent both money and relief supplies. As of April 21, people throughout Thailand have collected a total of 1,659 million yen or US$80 million worth of cash donations, which is the region's highest.
The outpouring of global sympathy and assistance has given a big boost to Japan's effort to rehabilitate the world's third largest economy.
Riding on such a positive sentiment, Tokyo has discreetly asked Asean once again to support Japan's permanent seat at the UN Security Council as part of the ongoing UN reform effort. This time around, the grouping's support has assumed greater significance to prevent Japan from adopting an inward-looking attitude or isolating itself. In months to come, Asean has to ponder the best way to respond to Tokyo without upsetting the delicate balance with New Delhi, another contender, and Beijing, which has not spelled out its position clearly. Due to fiscal constraints, this year Japan's official development aid is expected to be reduced by 20 per cent across the board, not to mention other contributions to international relief operations. With lesser assistance globally, the Japanese government fears its role and influence in international politics will be further diminished. Providing generous yen loans and assistance were a hallmark of Japan's soft power before the March crisis. By Kavi Chongkittavorn for The Nation, Bangkok
North Korea's belligerence, China's new assertiveness may require a new security arrangement
Is it time to junk the security architecture of Northeast Asia, which has been in place for nearly 60 years, with a new and genuinely mutual "triple alliance" between Japan, South Korea and the United States? The three nations have been making tentative but unmistakable steps in that direction.
Last month, for the first time, South Korea sent military observers to take part in joint US-Japan military exercises held at several places off Japan's coast. Earlier, members of Japan's Self Defense Forces observed similar exercises between the South Korean and US navies held in response to the sinking of a Korean naval corvette.
Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs, has called on the two Asian nations to take things farther by hosting three-nation exercises in the future with the US. Japan's hawkish foreign minister Seiji Maehara has said that his nation's military ties with South Korea will slowly increase in response to provocations from North Korea.
The first concrete steps were taken in early July when Tokyo and Seoul negotiated their first military agreement following talks between the two nation's defense ministers. The accords covered mutual cooperation and assistance in gathering intelligence, especially on North Korea, and sharing supplies on peacekeeping missions abroad.
These steps are far, far from being a mutual defense alliance, but they show the direction things are moving and how concerned the three potential "allies" are about the provocations by North Korea last year, including November's murderous shelling of an offshore island, not to mention North's growing nuclear arsenal. Add to that, growing concerns about the expanding and modernizing Chinese navy.
But one might ask: are not South Korea and Japan already allies of the US? The answer would be yes and no. Washington has formal security arrangements with both countries on a bilateral basis, but a closer look shows that the two arrangements are very different, reflecting the security situations as they have developed since the end of World War II.
The Treaty of Mutual Defense between South Korea and the US was signed in 1953 only a few months after the end of the Korean War when the northern invasion was fresh in everybody's minds. It is a true alliance in that both sides promise to come to the aid of the other in the event of an attack.
The US still bases approximately 28,000 troops and other military assets in Korea. An American four-star general heads the Combined Forces Command and would, in an attack, assume direct command of both the American and Korean forces (this is set to change in 2012 after which a Korean general would be placed in charge.)
Since 2005 the official mission of American forces based in Korea has changed. The forces are no longer there just to serve as a "trip-wire" in the event of a North Korean invasion (in other words, ensuring American help as they would be in the thick of fighting from the beginning). Under a policy known as "strategic flexibility," they could be deployed outside of Korea to meet other contingencies – such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
The so-called alliance with Japan is not really an alliance at all. It is basically a deal: the U.S promises to defend Japan if attacked, with nuclear weapons if necessary (the so-called nuclear umbrella). In return Japan grants American forces bases on its territory to use pretty much as Washington sees fit in advancing US national interests.
One could see how this works this last fall when the aircraft carrier George Washington and its escorts, based at Yokosuka near Tokyo, deployed in the Yellow Sea for joint exercises with South Korea, showing that, unlike Japan's indigenous "Self-Defense" forces, the American forces are not deployed strictly to defend Japan.
On the other hand, Japan has no treaty obligation to help the US defend itself. Thus should North Korea launch a ballistic missile over Japan toward the US, as it has done twice in the recent past, the Japanese would not be obliged to try to shoot it down. Indeed, it would be technically illegal under its constitution.
This scenario is not just a theory. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates himself has warned that North Korea could possess a ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska in the next five years. It is not clear whether the North has the technical ability to fashion nuclear warheads on them as opposed to exploding bombs in simple underground tests.
Japan's pacifistic constitution (written by post-WWII American occupiers) has been interpreted to preclude "collective defense." That means the document would have to be amended or reinterpreted in for Japan to enter into a full-fledged alliance with either South Korea, the US or both.
Far from being integrated into a single command as in Korea (or Europe under NATO), the Americans in Japan and the Japanese armed forces might as well have inhabited different planets for most of the past 50 years. It is only recently that the two countries have gradually moved to integrate their forces and hold exercises together.
There are obvious barriers in Japan allying itself with South Korea, not the least being lingering memories Koreans have of Japan's long occupation of the Korean peninsula. The two countries also dispute ownership of a small group of rocky islets in the Sea of Japan (East Sea to Koreans) called the Dokdo by Koreas and Takeshima by the Japanese.
The Japanese too are puzzled and vaguely threatened by South Korea's apparent desire to build a "blue-water" navy. In 2007 South Korea commissioned its largest warship, a helicopter amphibious assault ship with the pregnant name of Dokdo. What use are these amphibious ships in defending against a northern invasion, they wonder? (The Koreans say they are useful in peace-keeping and disaster relief).
Shortly after assuming office last June Japan's Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, issued a formal Japanese apology on the 100th anniversary of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, which may help ease Korean suspicions. It may be his most useful foreign policy initiative since taking office to date.
The American-backed defense and security architecture of Northeast Asia is now more than 50 years old and was conceived in a different time for different contingencies. Then the main threat, obviously, was the Soviet Union and a fear of a conventional invasion by North Korea.
The threat from Russia has receded while worries over China's rapidly modernizing military have accelerated, especially in the past year. Meanwhile, North Korea has acquired the ability to build atomic bombs and is working on the means to deliver them. Asia Sentinel
Last week Japan’s minister of finance declared that he and his colleagues wanted a discussion with China about the latter’s purchases of Japanese bonds, to “examine its intention” — diplomat-speak for “Stop it right now.” The news made me want to bang my head against the wall in frustration.
You see, senior American policy figures have repeatedly balked at doing anything about Chinese currency manipulation, at least in part out of fear that the Chinese would stop buying our bonds. Yet in the current environment, Chinese purchases of our bonds don’t help us — they hurt us. The Japanese understand that. Why don’t we?
Some background: If discussion of Chinese currency policy seems confusing, it’s only because many people don’t want to face up to the stark, simple reality — namely, that China is deliberately keeping its currency artificially weak.
The consequences of this policy are also stark and simple: in effect, China is taxing imports while subsidizing exports, feeding a huge trade surplus. You may see claims that China’s trade surplus has nothing to do with its currency policy; if so, that would be a first in world economic history. An undervalued currency always promotes trade surpluses, and China is no different.
And in a depressed world economy, any country running an artificial trade surplus is depriving other nations of much-needed sales and jobs. Again, anyone who asserts otherwise is claiming that China is somehow exempt from the economic logic that has always applied to everyone else.
So what should we be doing? U.S. officials have tried to reason with their Chinese counterparts, arguing that a stronger currency would be in China’s own interest. They’re right about that: an undervalued currency promotes inflation, erodes the real wages of Chinese workers and squanders Chinese resources. But while currency manipulation is bad for China as a whole, it’s good for politically influential Chinese companies — many of them state-owned. And so the currency manipulation goes on.
Time and again, U.S. officials have announced progress on the currency issue; each time, it turns out that they’ve been had. Back in June, Timothy Geithner, the Treasury secretary, praised China’s announcement that it would move to a more flexible exchange rate. Since then, the renminbi has risen a grand total of 1, that’s right, 1 percent against the dollar — with much of the rise taking place in just the past few days, ahead of planned Congressional hearings on the currency issue. And since the dollar has fallen against other major currencies, China’s artificial cost advantage has actually increased.
Clearly, nothing will happen until or unless the United States shows that it’s willing to do what it normally does when another country subsidizes its exports: impose a temporary tariff that offsets the subsidy. So why has such action never been on the table?
One answer, as I’ve already suggested, is fear of what would happen if the Chinese stopped buying American bonds. But this fear is completely misplaced: in a world awash with excess savings, we don’t need China’s money — especially because the Federal Reserve could and should buy up any bonds the Chinese sell.
It’s true that the dollar would fall if China decided to dump some American holdings. But this would actually help the U.S. economy, making our exports more competitive. Ask the Japanese, who want China to stop buying their bonds because those purchases are driving up the yen.
Aside from unjustified financial fears, there’s a more sinister cause of U.S. passivity: business fear of Chinese retaliation.
Consider a related issue: the clearly illegal subsidies China provides to its clean-energy industry. These subsidies should have led to a formal complaint from American businesses; in fact, the only organization willing to file a complaint was the steelworkers union. Why? As The Times reported, “multinational companies and trade associations in the clean energy business, as in many other industries, have been wary of filing trade cases, fearing Chinese officials’ reputation for retaliating against joint ventures in their country and potentially denying market access to any company that takes sides against China.”
Similar intimidation has surely helped discourage action on the currency front. So this is a good time to remember that what’s good for multinational companies is often bad for America, especially its workers.
So here’s the question: Will U.S. policy makers let themselves be spooked by financial phantoms and bullied by business intimidation? Will they continue to do nothing in the face of policies that benefit Chinese special interests at the expense of both Chinese and American workers? Or will they finally, finally act? Stay tuned.
Paul Krugman The New York Times
