Thousands of moslems participate in a protest at Jalan
Merdeka Timur, Jakarta, Friday, October 14, 2016. The marched to the city hall
to push the criminal procedding against The city Governor Basuki Tjahaja
Purnama, or Ahok, due to alleged blasphemy. (JP/Seto Wardhana)
Ever since Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok”
Tjahja Purnama announced he would seek reelection, a torrent of both support
and protests has dominated national debate.
The rising popularity of Ahok seems
intriguing and threatening to other candidates, given the fact that he is a
non-Muslim Chinese-Indonesian. Nevertheless, his identity and personal traits
has also incited hatred against Chinese-Indonesians and non-Muslims, manifested
in a number of marches involving hard-line Islamic groups, calling him a kafir
(infidel) and urging Muslims to not vote for him.
Since he is well known for his honesty and
strong personality, his public commentaries often invoke negative sentiment
from religious conservative groups. When he replaced now President Joko
‘Jokowi’ Widodo as governor in 2014, the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) held
massive demonstrations in front of City Hall, demanding that Ahok step down
from his post. Besides religious hard-liners,
activists have also questioned his commitment to human rights because of the
evictions of the poor from informal settlements.
In June, Ahok told public schools to stop
making hijabs compulsory for female Muslim students. He emphasized
that the substance of religiosity could not be defined through enforcing
religious attire, since he said he had witnessed a girl taking off her hijab
once having left school. Hence, it is essential for them to wear it with
respect as religious virtues, rather than wearing it in school just because of
rules. However, opponents were already emotional because he also used the word
“napkin” to illustrate children who treated hijabs disrespectfully. His words were
interpreted as a blasphemy, forbidding female students to follow the virtues of
being Muslim girls.
The push for legal action against his
alleged blasphemy continued in October. Thousands of members of hard-line
Islamic groups marched through the city from Istiqlal Mosque in Central
Jakarta, demanding that legal action be taken against Ahok. He reportedly told
people in Thousand Islands regency not to be deceived by the Quran’s Surah
al-Maidah: 51. Protestors dressed in white attire yelled, “We want a Muslim
governor” and “Kafir!” Although he has apologized for his statement,
the Islamic hard-liners have called on Muslims to take part in a second
demonstration set to be held on Nov. 4, to push for legal action against Ahok.
Whether as a campaign tool to defeat him
in the upcoming gubernatorial election, attacks against particular religions
(and ethnicities) by conflating it with infidelity signals an unexpected shift
in democratic Indonesia.
During the repressive New Order regime,
then president Soeharto repressed dissenting ideas and groups by relying
upon a Sukarno-era presidential
decree, the 1963 Subversion Law to curb communism. Soon after
it came into power, the New Order began to use the decree to ban the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) and Darul Islam, which strived to enact an Islamic
state. Under this authoritarian era, Islamic political groups hence were suppressed.
In Masculinity, Sexuality and Islam ( 2015 ), scholar Kathryn Robinson
demonstrates that the state’s fear of potential influence from the Iranian
revolution led Soeharto to prohibit political organizing around Islamic-derived
ideologies and slogans in 1985. In similar vein, in 1982, a policy was enacted
to ban the wearing of hijabs in public educational settings. Only in 1991 was
the ban lifted.
Discussions around ethnicity, religion and
race (SARA) relations were also policed and banned during this era, as they
were deemed sensitive. This helped Soeharto consolidate his power and
subsequently curb separatist and interethnic conflicts. Despite his/her
ethnicity and religiosity, everyone perceived themselves as Indonesian.
However, in Religion, Politics and Gender in Indonesia ( 2010 ),
researcher Sonja van Wienchelen points out that due to the worsening
relationships with the military, Soeharto approached and reconciled with
Islamic organizations. These dramatic changes resulted in the expansion of
Muslim programs on TV and increased funding for Islamic schools. Although the
state still controlled Islamic politics, the realignment of the state and
Islamic groups has enabled the latter to enter the political arena and exert
its power in the democratic era.
The collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998
signified Indonesia’s transition to democracy. The previously suppressed groups
proliferated. Freedom of expression and media has also been guaranteed by the
democratic moves. Prohibitions on SARA are not enacted strongly anymore and
have even slowly faded. Islamic fundamentalist politics emerged openly and
exerted their power through “moral-based” regulations or sharia.
Decentralization or regional autonomy has further eased steps to
gaining more political power. Aceh, for example, has become a special province
implementing sharia. It is also interesting to observe that there has been
increased piety among Indonesians through the use of religious symbols. Islamic
television programs and missionary endeavors have also mushroomed.
Further, religious vigilantes and
conservative groups are getting more powerful in spreading moral panic, raiding
activities deemed immoral and being actively involved in politics, calling on
people to not vote for non-Muslim leaders. In the last presidential election,
Jokowi’s religiosity was even questioned.
These remarkable shifts are central to
examining the unexpected outcomes of democratization in Indonesia. While
freedom of expression is now guaranteed, hate speech has gotten out of control.
Some would argue that Indonesia’s democracy is still nascent and hence needs
more time to become more mature and substantive. Nevertheless, whatever the
case, it is important to be continuously reminded that bigots are everywhere,
and we should choose leaders based on their programs, track record and
commitment, instead of religion and ethnicity.
The
writer, Hendri
Yulius who
obtained his Master’s in public policy from the National University of
Singapore, is the writer of Coming Out and a lecturer of gender and sexuality
studies. He is currently pursuing his Masters by Research in Gender
and Cultural Studies in The University of Sydney
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