U.S. President-elect Donald Trump inherits a range
of solid policies toward Southeast Asia put in place by President Barack Obama
since 2008. Given the fluidity of the regional political and strategic
landscape, amid heightened major power competition, it would be a smart move
for the incoming U.S. administration to maintain at least a strong element of
Obama's approach -- especially concerning ties with the 10-member Association
of the Southeast Asian Nations.
Yet, Trump's campaign rhetoric suggested that he may roll back regional
engagement. The key test however will be the extent of U.S. engagement in
regular regional summits with ASEAN leaders and negotiations on a variety of
issues after Trump's Jan. 20 inauguration.
Obama painstakingly deepened Washington's ties with the region to an
unprecedented degree, visiting ASEAN countries seven times during his
presidency and meeting the organization's leaders 11 times, the greatest number
of direct meetings attended by any U.S. president. In addition, since 2010 his
administration has shown solidarity with the majority view in ASEAN over the
South China Sea and multiple sovereignty disputes between Beijing and ASEAN
member states.
As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton managed to transform the
sovereignty issue from a solely ASEAN-China dispute into one that has gained
significant international attention. As attention increased, tensions also
rose, driving the intensification of activities by claimants on all sides.
Washington's strategy of "rebalancing" to Asia was devised in part to
augment its economic and security presence in Southeast Asia.
As one of five traditional U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific, former
Philippine President Benigno Aquino unwaveringly sought Washington's support
during this period, rather than relying on ASEAN and its slow diplomatic
processes. Manila often viewed ASEAN as a paper tiger that dared not stand up
to China. After a standoff in 2012 between Chinese and Philippine naval vessels
around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, Washington and
Manila swiftly enhanced their security cooperation, increasing maritime
security.
As part of the rebalancing policy, the Obama administration pushed hard
for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement with 11 other Asia-Pacific
countries. After two years of intense negotiations, a deal including four ASEAN
countries -- Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam -- was successfully
concluded. But the TPP deal prompted other Asian countries, including China,
which was excluded from the TPP, to produce a competing trade arrangement known
as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. If the Trump administration
decides to dump the TPP, as Trump suggested in his election campaign, Asia will
pursue RCEP instead -- and the long-term credibility of the U.S. as a supporter
of freer trade will suffer immeasurably.
Close relations
As a newcomer, Trump should selectively maintain Obama initiatives in
the region, especially those related to upholding the regional and
international rule of law, and initiatives aimed at the advancement of
Southeast Asian youth and education. No other foreign leader has gone to this
extent to deepen ASEAN ties. A special summit in February at Sunnylands,
California reinforced these bonds, and the 17-point joint declaration between
U.S. and ASEAN leaders at the summit provides a guideline for the new
administration in further cooperation with ASEAN. At a time when the European
Union is focusing on Brexit, any deterioration in ties with ASEAN would damage
the U.S. economy and weaken its international influence.
It would be a big loss for America if Trump's foreign policy team
decides to bypass ASEAN and ignore Obama's achievements. It is worth noting
that in his ASEAN outreach strategy, the outgoing president was able to build
on the success of his predecessor, President George W. Bush. For instance, Obama
promoted links with at least 50,000 ASEAN youngsters under an exchange program,
the Young Southeast Asian Student Initiative.
The young people involved in this program -- on both sides of the
Pacific -- could serve as a pillar for future U.S.-ASEAN engagement, based on
America's democratic tradition and Obama's leadership style.
It would be easy for the U.S. to ignore ASEAN, given its distant
geographical position, its diversity and, most of all, the absence of common
positions between member states on global issues. The Trump administration's
international focus in coming years undoubtedly will be on the Middle East and
other hot spots, including China, Japan and South Korea. While tensions in the
South China Sea have calmed somewhat, the Korean Peninsula is still mired in
uncertainty due to North Korea's nuclear program.
From the regional standpoint, any U.S. policy shift in relation to
China, Japan and South Korea would immediately affect ASEAN 's economic growth
and integration. In the long term, though, U.S. influence in Southeast Asia
would be severely curtailed. Trade volume between ASEAN and U.S. is robust, but
is already much smaller than that between ASEAN and China. A shift away from
the U.S. alliance and toward China has already occurred in Manila, following
the election of President Rodrigo Duterte, and other traditional Southeast
Asian allies of Washington may feel they face similar choices, including
Malaysia and Thailand.
A major test of U.S. policy toward ASEAN will come at a meeting of ASEAN
foreign ministers in Manila in June 2017, when Trump's choice as the new U.S.
Secretary of State will have the opportunity to talk frankly and directly to
his or her Southeast Asian counterparts. Whether he or she does so, and what is
said, will matter greatly. There will be a further test later in the year, when
the Philippines -- which holds the rotating ASEAN chairmanship for 2017 -- will
chair an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of ASEAN-U. S. diplomatic
relations.
For the time being, Trump's attitude toward ASEAN is a mystery. If he
decides to forego a personal visit to the fifth U.S.-ASEAN summit, scheduled
for early November 2017, ASEAN will conclude that the U.S. no longer regards
the group as a valued strategic partner.
Kavi Chongkittavorn is a Bangkok-based commentator and a senior fellow
at the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University.
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