There would be
greater confidence in the future if Aung San Suu Kyi, despite her colossal
charisma, could demonstrate a clearer competence to run a country.
Journalistic
folk myth has it that in 1975 the highly reputed Far Eastern Economic Review
predicted that by the year 2000, two countries would lead in Asia – the
Philippines and Burma.
The
rest, as they say, is history – and so much for the predictive powers of journalists.
The Philippines to this day continues to disappoint,
though there have recently been a few years of encouraging growth. But no
prediction could have been more sombrely wrong than that for Burma – or Myanmar
as we now call it.
So the assembly on February 1 of a democratically elected
parliament for the first time since the overthrow of U Nu in 1962 is profoundly
important, not just for the 53 million long-suffering people of Myanmar, but
for Asia as a whole.
After numerous “false dawns” – in particular the savagely
suppressed 1988 national uprising – Myanmar might just be on the cusp of
rejoining the rest of the normal world after half a century of sanctions and
pariah status. Hopes have risen steadily since the release of Aung San Suu Kyi
in 2010 and partial elections in 2012, through to the full national elections
in November which saw her National League for Democracy sweep the board.
The coming two months are pivotal because the military
that have for half a century ruled over Myanmar are at last being put to the
test: are they truly willing to relax the control that has enriched them, but
driven the country into the dirt? Or will the reality of losing power, and of
the newly elected parliamentarians under “The Lady” taking decision-making
control, prompt an 11th hour retreat back into authoritarian military rule?
For most observers, it seems improbable that the military
can recoil at this late stage. But it is fascinating that the possibility of a
major setback is still being seriously discussed fully five years after Thein
Sein released “The Lady” from house arrest and began the process of
liberalisation, and after peacefully concluded national elections two months
ago.
Why can such doubt still remain? First, large numbers in
the country’s military leadership retain Kleptocratic control of many key
industries and industrial franchises. Myanmar is one of the world’s most
resource-rich countries – ranging from marine resources off its shores to
minerals, rubies and jade, and to forests full of some of the best hardwood in
the world – but much of this resource wealth today enriches the families of the
military elite. Without “defector” amnesties and other comforting gestures, the
potential for backlash remains.
Second, the military retains significant real power
despite the electoral success of the National League for Democracy. For
example, they automatically retain 25 per cent of the seats in parliament, have
reserved the power to run the security and home affairs ministries, and control
the country’s “administrative spine” right down to township level. Even if The
Lady’s party passionately wanted to sweep military-connected people out of
office, the huge “technocratic deficit” that exists in a country that has been
cut off from the outside world for most of the past half century would make
this impossible. The country is going to remain chronically short of
technocratically equipped people for decades to come.
There would be greater confidence in the future if Aung
San Suu Kyi – despite her colossal charisma – could demonstrate a clearer
competence to run a country. When in 1976 Mao Zedong finally recognised that he
had run China into the ground, and was left with no choice but to change course
in order to rebuild a wrecked and starving economy, he was able (undoubtedly
through gritted teeth) to pull Deng Xiaoping back from house arrest in Nanchang
to manage the challenge. China’s revival from those dark days of politically
correct mass starvation is inconceivable without the monumental intellect and
political astuteness of Deng. But where is Myanmar’s Deng? The Lady has the
charisma and the charm, but where is the competence to turn a country that in
many ways is as badly wrecked as China was in 1976?
There would also be greater confidence if the 70-year-old
Lady had stronger links back into the country’s impatient millennial
generation. In spite of the huge affection people have for her, there is less
enthusiasm about the ageing kitchen cabinet she consults and confides in. There
are real questions about the strength of the party leadership’s links with the
young, who are impatient to see rapid change for the better. Poor performance
in office could quickly provide the military with excuses to step back into
power.
Peaceful management of the transition from February 1 to
April 1, when a new president, and the ministerial team will take office, is
thus going to be critical not just for Myanmar’s people, but for the thousands
internationally who have been poised to re-enter the country as investors.
After a surge of international investment after The
Lady’s release – FDI jumped in 2010 to almost US$20 billion, compared with less
than US$1 billion a year over the previous decade – foreign investor interest
has slowed to a walk, averaging around US$4 billion a year over the past four
years. If the transition to civilian rule suns smoothly through to April Fool’s
Day, then it is fair to expect that investment may surge. Huge infrastructure
needs exist, and many international investors and investment institutions are
poised to move.
It is perhaps the current uncertainties that explain why
China’s “One Belt One Road” policy stays so peculiarly silent on Myanmar. China
is already by far the largest investor in Myanmar and the route from Kunming
down to the Indian Ocean is a screamingly obvious component of Xi Jinping’s
“silk road” vision. Perhaps the silence is a diplomatic one, since so much
Chinese investment is linked to outgoing military influences. Perhaps it also
defers to Myanmar’s own anxieties about foreign – including Chinese –
interference inside the country.
At this point, I don’t think anyone is going to make the Far
Eastern Economic Review’s mistake over prospects for Myanmar. Even with a
smooth transition to April 1, the country has far to travel. But we can be more
optimistic today about Myanmar and its people than we have been over the past
five decades. I just wish I could see their equivalent of Deng Xiaoping.
David Dodwell is
executive director of the Hong Kong-Apec Trading Policy Group Photo: Reuters
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