With the announcement by state media that its main nuclear facility has
resumed normal operations, North Korea’s atomic weapons program is back in the
public eye. The news, reported by the Korean Central News Agency on Tuesday,
dovetails with a report released in April by the Institute for Science and
International Security, which cited satellite imagery as evidence that the
facility’s plutonium reactor was back online.
The
Yongbyon nuclear complex was shuttered in 2007 as a result of international
denuclearization talks involving the United States, China, Russia, South Korea
and Japan. Then, in 2013, at a time of elevated tensions with the U.S. and
South Korea, Pyongyang declared its intention to restart the facility.
In a
typically bellicose statement on Tuesday, the head of the country’s atomic
energy agency warned that Pyongyang was ready to deploy nuclear weapons against
the U.S. at “any time” if it didn’t desist with its “reckless hostile policy.”
North
Korea definitively answered the question of whether it possesses atomic weapons
when it carried out its first nuclear test in 2006. But what remains far less
clear to this day is just how many such devices it may have.
Estimates
vary significantly: In April, The Wall Street Journal cited unnamed
Chinese experts as saying Pyongyang could already possess 20 warheads; the
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University has estimated
10-16 devices.
Jeffery
Lewis, the founder of Arms Control Wonk.com, told The
Diplomat that a dozen warheads is probably a safe bet.
“I just
estimate based on the amount of plutonium — call it a dozen weapons with a fair
amount of uncertainty,” he said.
Yet, that
estimate does not account for North Korea’s parallel uranium enrichment
program, which Lewis described as a “major unknown.”
Uranium
enrichment facilities are easier to conceal than plutonium-based reactors,
according to experts. With access to North Korea heavily restricted and the
full extent of its capabilities unknown, precise estimates are beyond reach.
In April,
nuclear proliferation expert Siegfried Hecker, who has visited Yongbyon
multiple times, outlined some of the challenges of gauging the reality.
“Developing
these estimates is not an exact science,” he told the Center for International
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. “There are huge uncertainties
in estimating the enrichment capacity that is likely present at covert sites.
One particular problem is the difficulty in assessing how much indigenous
capacity North Korea has to make the key materials and components for
centrifuges.”
By John Power
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