The murder of an opposition
figure in Moscow has its parallels in Central Asia.
The brazen killing on February 27 of Boris Nemtsov, the longtime critic
of the Putin regime and one of the leading figures in the Russian
opposition, has sent shockwaves through the former Soviet republics. Russia’s
domestic politics are still closely followed in the CIS states, particularly in
those where Russian broadcasting stations and news media are readily available.
Nemtsov’s assassination is yet another indication of the political direction
the Russian leadership has taken after the Kremlin’s military adventure in
Ukraine, which itself has been revealing of the extent of Putin’s ambition.
Of
course, Russian meddling in the internal affairs of post-Soviet states is
hardly a novelty. The Kremlin’s strategy in its “sphere of influence” only adds
to the current regional divides in Central Asia. Take the Kyrgyz Republic,
where Russian intelligence has been visibly active.
Kyrgyzstan had a turbulent decade, during which it also hosted a U.S.-NATO
airbase on the outskirts of Bishkek. During its years of domestic instability,
a series of high
profile killings of journalists and political figures occurred. The most
appalling assassinations took place during the rule of the runaway President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who these days resides in the city of Minsk under the
protection of Belarus strongman Alexander Lukashenko. Immediately after the
Kyrgyz coup, Vladimir Putin denied any
involvement in the ousting of the regime. Nonetheless, Moscow’s “Kyrgyz
project” was in motion during
the Bakiyev presidency and after his overthrow in 2010 under new governments.
In a
striking resemblance to Ukraine, the Russian leadership is wary of political
developments in Kyrgyzstan because of the Kremlin’s fading influence in the
region. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan tend to be the most distrustful of
Russia’s regional initiatives. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s unorthodox approach to
its northern neighbor is understandable: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has
raised concerns in Kazakhstan about the prospects of a “Russian spring” in its
border territories.
That
leaves the two weakest Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which
rely on Russia for political and economic support. From time to time the Tajik
regime does remind the Kremlin of
its duty to ”respect” its friendly ally. In contrast, under the
leadership of the current ruler Almazbek Atambayev, Kyrgyzstan is the one
regional state that has declared its loyalty to Moscow. Once dubbed an “island
of democracy,” Kyrgyzstan is now rolling back its human rights record.
Similarly, in the last three years the Kyrgyz state has been following in
Russia’s legislative footsteps when it comes to basic rights. Meanwhile,
domestic tension in Kyrgyzstan is mounting over Atambayev’s policies, which
last year took the country’s corruption index to Russian levels.
Political
assassinations in Kyrgyzstan have rocked the Central Asian nation in the past
and cannot be ruled out in the future. Just weeks ago, a Kyrgyz mob boss
was found dead with
a fake Russian passport in the trunk of a car in Minsk. He was also on the
designated list of the U.S.
Treasury Department. It is unclear whether this death is related to broader
political developments in Kyrgyzstan. But in an unusual statement, the Kyrgyz
President blamed the Bakiyev family for the mobster’s death and demanded that
Lukashenko extradite Bakiyev and his family back to Kyrgyzstan. Apart from the
high-level exchange between Belarus and Kyrgyzstan over this episode, it should
be noted that for a small state like the Kyrgyz Republic, the killing of a
widely known gangster will have an impact on the country’s clan based politics.
But that shouldn’t come as a surprise given the strong links between state
institutions and organized crime in the country’s modern history.
Consequently,
Ukraine’s experience is an extension of the Kremlin’s heavy-handed policies in
its near abroad. The murder of a Russian politician in Moscow – and more
broadly, the Kremlin’s policy towards opposition figures – has parallels in the
former Soviet states as well. Certainly, it does in Kyrgyzstan.
Ryskeldi
Satke is a contributing writer-analyst with research institutions and news
organizations in Central Asia, Turkey and the U.S. Contact e-mail: rsatke at
gmail.com
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