Indonesia’s recently inaugurated president, Joko
Widodo (Jokowi), announced his cabinet this week. Jokowi’s policy platform
espoused broad philosophies but was short on detail. His cabinet appointments
provide the clearest indication to date of his policies and priorities in what
in all likelihood will be a decade in power.
The
appointments will cement his political alliances and satisfy his powerful
backer, former president Megawati. But it will disappoint his reformist
supporters who, attracted to his earlier commitment to appoint a ‘cabinet of
professionals’, were looking for signs of an energetic administration prepared
to tackle the country’s many daunting development challenges. It is a cabinet
of managers, business people, and — perhaps inevitably — a surprising number of
political appointees.
First, the good news.
The cabinet scores relatively well on personal
integrity. Jokowi cleverly referred his draft list to the national
anti-corruption commission (KPK), and eight names were dropped. Jokowi was
relieved that the KPK in effect blacklisted several unattractive political
appointees from the draft.
Second, like the president himself, the cabinet is
a decisive break with the past. It is younger, and has more women than any
previous Indonesian cabinet. It is essentially a secular cabinet, in this the
country with the largest number of adherents to Islam. There are also excellent
appointments in some key portfolios, notably Finance, Foreign Affairs, and
Basic Education and Culture.
At least 14 of the 34-member cabinet are clear
political appointments. Starting with Megawati’s daughter, Puan, the majority
of these people — though not all — owe their position more to their party
affiliation than their talent. Another eight ministers come with senior
business experience, often in Indonesia’s sprawling state enterprise sector. The
‘technocratic’ appointments, of able non-party professionals, that have been a
feature of all Indonesian cabinets since the mid 1960s are greatly reduced.
This managerial approach may be no bad thing. It is
consistent with Jokowi’s approach to local government, and also that of his
vice president, Jusuf Kalla. But it may well signal a more inward-looking
Indonesia, consistent with the strong nationalist rhetoric that featured in the
presidential and parliamentary campaigns.
In the economics team, the able new Finance
Minister, Professor Bambang Brodjonegoro, a deputy minister in the previous
government, will have his work cut out for him, especially given looming budget
problems. His coordinating economics minister can be expected to focus more on
housekeeping than reform. The trade minister is an accomplished businessman,
yet firmly in the nationalist cum protectionist camp, just as Indonesia is set
to join the ‘seamless Southeast Asian economy’ promised by the ASEAN Economic
Community. The state enterprises minister, a Megawati loyalist and trade
minister in her earlier administration, cannot be expected to undertake the
much-needed reform this sector urgently requires. The agriculture, industry,
labour and planning ministers are relatively unknown figures, and are likely to
keep a low profile.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the new
cabinet needs time to settle in. This has been a heady year for Indonesia. A
political outsider with limited financial means, but a demonstrated record of
integrity and effective governance at the local level, was elected peacefully
and convincingly. In his earlier life as a mayor and a governor, Jokowi has
exhibited a remarkable ability to get things done. But now the euphoria
generated during the election campaigns has had to meet the political reality
of constructing a ‘rainbow cabinet’, representing all the disparate elements in
the Jokowi camp.
Indonesia is an immensely complicated country to
govern. Jokowi has attempted to induce some parties from the fiercely obstructionist
‘red and white’ opposition coalition to join his governing coalition. But he
still does not possess a majority in the Parliament. In any case, national
governments in Indonesia have limited room to manoeuvre. They have to deal with
more than 500 increasingly assertive sub-national governments. A good deal of
the national budget is effectively pre-committed through various expenditure
mandates. And Jakarta has to rely on a sluggish, unreformed bureaucracy to
implement its policies.
The next major test for Jokowi will be how he
delivers on his 100-day agenda, in pushing through budgetary reform, getting
infrastructure moving again, and simplifying the complex regulatory regime.
This week’s cabinet appointments suggest that we should not expect as many of
the ‘quick wins’ that his reformist supporters were hoping for.
Hal Hill is
Professor of Economics at the Australian National University. Budy Resosudarmo
is Head of the Indonesia Project at the Australian National University.
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