Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Terror Threat: Why Singaporeans Should Care

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Terror Threat: Why Singaporeans Should Care: The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) recently published the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2019, stating that the terror ...

Terror Threat: Why Singaporeans Should Care

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) recently published the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2019, stating that the terror threat level remains high.

The first part of the report highlights the persistence of extremist ideology, the resilience of terrorist groups in South-east Asia, the involvement of Singaporeans in conflict zones, and the radicalisation of Singaporeans and foreigners living in Singapore as the drivers of the threat.

Yet the report is unlikely to elicit much concern among Singaporeans. Indeed, the report also found only a small number of Singaporeans think a terror attack here is imminent.

After all, Singapore has not experienced any actual terrorist attacks and security agencies can be relied on to be operationally prepared even if there are no known terrorist plots.

Years of constant public vigilance may also lead to alert fatigue especially in the backdrop of emergent security threats — cyberattacks and online disinformation (fake news).

However, we should peruse the MHA report with other recent developments in mind.

The Jan 27 bomb attack in a southern Philippines church which killed 20 people and the multiple suicide bombings in Surabaya in May last year underscored the close proximity of terrorism to Singapore.

Earlier this month, Parliament passed the Payment Services Act in part to prevent terrorist groups from exploiting the digital economy to move their financial resources at the expense of Singaporeans’ interests.

Cyber-terrorism is a veritable threat as the Islamic State-linked “Caliphate Cyber Shield” had on Jan 7 pledged to target digital data and financial systems.

The purported death of Singaporean militant Abu Hud Zain in Mindanao in December 2018 suggests that Singapore continues to be an important node for regional terrorist groups.

The refusal of Indonesian Abu Bakar Bashir — who is the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) — to pledge loyalty to his country may be a fresh signal to terrorists in South-east Asia to be steadfast in upholding their virulent ideology and violent methods despite tribulations.

Extremist ideology, which forms the pathway that radicalises individuals into committing terrorist attacks, remains undiminished.

Recently, MHA issued restriction orders under the Internal Security Act against radical religious teacher Murad Mohd Said and his student.

They were propagating ideas that demonise and promote harm to people of different beliefs. Furthermore, by demonising pluralism, their ideas can create communal distrust and fuel Islamophobia in Singapore.

While security agencies can act swiftly against radical ideologues in real life, countering online radicalisation continues to be a more challenging task.

Efforts by governments and social media companies to take down online extremist propaganda, as well as the use of military means to neutralise the producers of propaganda who operate from conflict zones, have their limitations.

Pro-Islamic State groups, for example, are reportedly preventing their propaganda on social media from being monitored and taken down by using creative tactics such as hijacking twitter hashtags and shifting to hidden forums in the Dark Web.

Therefore, it is important that Singaporeans build up their digital literacy and critical thinking skills as psychological firewalls against extremist propaganda, which essentially is a form of online disinformation.

While radicalisation is often seen as a security issue for the government to solve, it is above all a social issue for Singaporeans. It entraps vulnerable individuals to head down a destructive path in life and leave detrimental effects on their families and friends.

RADICALISED FOREIGNERS

The report also highlights the issue of radicalised foreigners — living and working in Singapore — as a cause for concern.

Readers should look at this issue from a balanced perspective and not allow emotions and biases to pigeonhole all foreigners as a source of security problems. The biases are real as there is a global trend of xenophobic undercurrents in which foreigners are unfairly blamed for myriad social and economic problems.

Concerns over terrorism must not lead to distrust and discriminate foreigners who like Singaporeans are generally peaceful and part of the Singapore society.

Terrorism should not be a reason, for example, to deprive domestic workers of their basic human rights such as free time to rest and socialise either offline or online.

Terrorism affects Singaporeans and foreigners equally. A terrorist attack in a public place here would cause harm to both Singaporeans and foreigners.

Terrorism is, therefore, a common threat to people of all nationalities and backgrounds. As Singapore is a globalised society, this common threat can be mitigated if Singaporeans and foreigners work together to protect each other from terrorist attacks and radicalisation.

The second part of the report, which explains the importance of programmes such as SGSecure to raise community preparedness, also highlights the complacency of Singaporeans and the need for them to do more for their security.

An important finding of the National Security Awareness Survey is that only 60 per cent of Singaporeans recognised Singapore as a terrorist target but only 20 per cent felt the threat as imminent.

Hence, while 60 per cent of Singaporeans are aware of the terrorist threat, only 20 per cent are really prepared for it.

The absence of actual attacks and known terrorist plots makes it an uphill task to convince more Singaporeans to be constantly aware of the threat. Nonetheless, public education efforts should continue apace to prevent the threat awareness level from slidng below 60 per cent.

Moving forward, more can be done to try new ways to persuade Singaporeans who are aware of the terrorist threat to also recognise that the threat is imminent.

This essentially entails raising the level of preparedness (20 per cent) to match the level of awareness (60 per cent).

In this regard, MHA announced during the SGSecure Community Conference on Jan 26 that it will be upscaling outreach efforts. The goal however should not be to attain perfection but sufficiency in the level of community preparedness.

If we cannot persuade all Singaporeans to be prepared, we should ensure that there are enough Singaporeans who are prepared to help one another during a terrorist threat.

*Muhammad Faizal Abdul Rahman is a Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security, a unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. He previously worked in the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Singapore Police Force and the National Security Coordination Secretariat. This article was published at TodayOnline

 

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Implications Of Indonesia’s New Military Base In T...

Kerry B. Collison Asia News: Implications Of Indonesia’s New Military Base In T...:   Though Indonesia is not a claimant in the South China Sea, Jakarta and Beijing have entered into skirmishes in the Natuna area. ...

Implications Of Indonesia’s New Military Base In The South China Sea

 

Though Indonesia is not a claimant in the South China Sea, Jakarta and Beijing have entered into skirmishes in the Natuna area.

By Premesha Saha

 

A new military base was inaugurated by the Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander, Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto on 18 December 2018 in Natuna Besar, a disputed territory between Indonesia and China in the South China Sea. The two countries have conflicting interests and rights on this island, which is the largest in the southern peripheral of the South China Sea.

Though Indonesia is not a claimant in the South China Sea, but Jakarta and Beijing have entered into skirmishes involving fishing vessels in the disputed Natuna area for long. In March 2016, a special task force of the Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries had captured a Chinese fishing boat within Indonesia’s 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the Natuna islands, northwest of Borneo.

Indonesia has always been ‘sensitive’ about its sovereignty claims and rights. The government of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and especially Fisheries Minister, Susi Pudjiastuti have taken stern steps in protecting the rights of the Indonesian fishermen by sinking and burning illegal fishing boats in Indonesian waters.

Besides these the Indonesian President has in many cases, for instance during his visit to Japan after he took office asserted that, “China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea have no legal basis under international law.”

President Widodo after the frequent incidents of Chinese fishing boats illegally entering the Indonesian waters had visited the Natunas on a naval warship and held a meeting with a few of his cabinet ministers on the warship. In mid- July 2017, the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs launched a new map renaming the part of the disputed sea, which falls within Indonesia’s EEZ as North Natuna Sea (Laut Natuna Uttara).

The Jokowi government has undoubtedly started to focus on the Natunas after the recurring incidents on illegal fishing involving Chinese fishing boats in the waters around the Natunas. It was during this time in 2016, that the budget for the establishment of a military base in the Natunas was approved by the Indonesian Parliament.

During the inauguration of the base, Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto had said, “the outpost is designed to work as a deterrent against any potential security threats, particularly on border areas,” according to military spokesman Colonel Sus Taibur Rahman.

While security analysts are dubbing this as Indonesia’s attempt to send a strong message to China, like Collin Coh of RSIS Singapore have mentioned that “the plan for a military hub in the Natuna Islands had been in the making for years. The March 2016 incident with China gave more impetus to the plan.” Indonesian scholars like Evan Laksmana have highlighted that the new base is “not just about deterring China.” Additionally, given the ongoing deliberations within the ASEAN on the drafting of a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea disputes, what impact will this newly built military base on the Natunas have on these discussions, given that Indonesia is a forerunner in these negotiations also remains to be seen.

Indonesia’s rationale behind this new base needs to be analysed in the wider context of the emerging dynamics of the Indo-Pacific concept. On a close observation of how Indonesia’s policies have evolved under the current government in the strategic, diplomatic as well as in the defence realm, stark changes can be noticed. Illegal fishing has always been a matter of concern for Indonesia, but never has such hardline measures been implemented.

During his campaign period, President Jokowi had laid out his desire for Indonesia to emerge as a regional maritime power in the Indo-Pacific region. This military base can be seen as a part of Indonesia’s attempt to emerge as a noticeable maritime player in the Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia’s naval modernization have been taking place at a good pace with increase in defence budget allocation as well as through acquiring new ships to replace Indonesia’s ageing naval fleet. The Indonesian Ministry of Defence had plans of upgrading the Natuna base since 2009, after the initiation of the ‘Minimum Essential Forces’ doctrine. The Natuna unit would host composite battalions from the Army and Marines as well as numerous advanced platforms — from submarines, UAVs, and warships to fighter jets and various missile systems — and other supporting infrastructure.

There are plans in place to form a third command, which is the Eastern Command. After the completion of the Natuna unit, tri-service integrated units in Saumlaki, Morotai, Biak, and Merauke will be established for the TNI to have a greater focus on the eastern flank, which is the Pacific Ocean, where powers like China and the US are very active. According to Indonesian analyst, Evan Laksmana, “The Natuna unit will also pave the way for the other integrated units set to be developed in eastern Indonesia, close to the Timor Sea, Arafura Sea, Celebes Sea, and the Pacific Ocean.” In the past, defence policies in Indonesia had a ‘continental overtone’, concentrated more on internal security challenges and to a certain extent on the non-traditional security threats in the Strait of Malacca. The ‘eastern balancing’ is a very recent development.

Below is a map showing the plans for the establishment of Third Infantry Division in South Sulawesi, the Navy’s third Armada and Marine Force in Western Papua and the Air Force’s Third Operational Command in Papua as well.

Source: Evan Laksmana

Table 1: Indonesia Naval Force Evolution

Type and Description	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2013	2015	2020	2025	2030
KekuatanPemukul / Striking Force
Submarines	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	5	12	12
Frigates/Destroyers	12	13	13	9	7	6	6	10	13	16
Corvettes	3	7	19	19	23	23	26	21	11	11
Missile Craft	4	4	4	4	4	7	14	29	44	44
Mine Warfare	6	4	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	10
KekuatanPatroli / Patrolling Force
Patrol, Offshore	8	9	11	14	14	14	12	12	12	12
Patrol, Inshore	14	13	11	13	30	30	30	30	30	30
KekuatanPendukung / Supporting Force
Amphibious	12	13	21	22	24	24	26	28	28	28
Logistics	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3
Support	8	7	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Survey	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Training	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Military Sealift Command / KOLINLAMIL
Inter-Island Sealift	9	7	9	10	10	6	6	6	6	6
Naval Aviation
Naval Aviation	65	57	73	106	112	112	112	112	—	—
Fixed Wing	38	35	51	66	70	70	70	70	—	—
Helicopter	27	22	22	40	42	42	42	42	—	—

Source: Global Security

Table 2: Real (1990-2013) and Projected Naval force based on Green Water Navy 2024 Scenario

Source: Global Security

The development of the Natuna base can be seen within the wider gambit of Indonesia’s ‘eastern balancing.’ With the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ concept gaining a lot of traction, President Jokowi’s vision of Indonesia emerging as a ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ in the Indo-Pacific is also finally beginning to take shape. Indonesia can be seen as also taking a lead in the ASEAN debates of forming an Indo-Pacific concept where the ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led mechanisms would form the focal point. The importance of Indonesia taking the lead in the ASEAN has always been pointed out by the other ASEAN member countries. Former Foreign Minister of Singapore, George Yeo had mentioned at a conference, Singapore Perspectives, organised by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) on 28 January 2019, “Without Indonesia, it’s very hard for ASEAN to coalesce a common position.”

Indonesia no longer just wants to make its presence felt in the Indo-Pacific region in the diplomatic circles and the multilateral foras, but through the revamping of its naval forces, commands, bases and its ‘eastern balancing’ wants to be more than just a ‘middle power’ in this dynamic region.

While delivering her speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 11 January 2018, entitled, “Partner for Peace, Security and Prosperity” Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi proposed the Indonesian concept of the Indo-Pacific (Konsep Arsitektur Indo-Pasifik). She noted, “together with ASEAN, Indonesia will continue to contribute in advancing strong positive cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, instead of a cooperation based on suspicion or worse, perception of threat. Indonesia would work with countries in the region to develop an Indo- Pacific cooperation umbrella aimed at building cooperation that was meant to be free, open, inclusive and comprehensive.”

Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the Shangrila Dialogue on 1 June 2018, for the first time laid out India’s version of the Indo-Pacific concept. Both the concepts have a similar policy undertone. He mentioned, “Indo-Pacific stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it. Southeast Asia is at its centre and, ASEAN has been and will be central to its future.”

The South China Sea connects India to most of its major partners in the East and a significant part of India’s overseas trade flows in this direction. ASEAN alone accounts for over 20 per cent of that trade. India and Indonesia have a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement and both have a similar vision of maritime cooperation, peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, with Indonesia’s newly adopted ‘eastern balancing’ strategy, India-Indonesia relations in the Indo-Pacific can attain greater trajectories.

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.