Monday, June 29, 2015

Can China Save Greece - and the EU?


China’s premier is in Europe just as the Greek debt crisis comes to a head.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang is in Europe this week to attend a China-EU summit in Brussels, as well as paying official visits to both Belgium and France. This trip marks Li’s sixth visit to Europe in the past three years, and his first official visit to EU headquarters since he assumed office in March 2013.

Li met with Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, and Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission. Juncker and Tusk took office in November  and December 2014, respectively; it was Li’s first meeting with them. The festivities weren’t exactly what might have been hoped for, as lingering questions about a possible Greek exit from the eurozone cast a pall over the meeting.

The main deliverables focused on economics, as is typical for China-Europe summits. Li announced that China will play a role in Juncker’s investment plan, the European Fund for Strategic Investment, that calls for 315 billion euros ($353 billion) to be invested in strategic projects around Europe – including infrastructure projects, China’s main area of interest under the Silk Road Economic Belt framework. The two sides launched a “connectivity platform” which, according to Juncker, will “allow us to combine forces, uniting expertise and strength of our companies to develop high-quality infrastructure.” China and the EU will also explore an investment platform to facilitate cooperate on infrastructure and transportation projects. As Li pointed out, that meshes perfectly with China’s own Silk Road plans.

But the careful messaging was overshadowed by current events, something Li himself bemoaned a bit during the wrap-up press conference. Li arrived in Belgium the week before the EU faces a major test – a referendum in Greece that could led to that country’s withdrawal from the euro currency bloc. Greeks will be asked to vote on the plan offered by Greece’s creditors, which would provide further economic aid while mandating more austerity. EU politicians have warned that if Greeks vote down the bailout (as Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has urged, calling it “blackmail”) they are effectively voting to leave the eurozone – posing a threat to the coherency of the EU as a whole. Without an agreement, Greece is expected to default on a 1.5 billion euro ($1.6 billion) debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Tusk referenced the situation at the end of his press conference, saying “it is simply not true” that Greece’s government can strengthen its negotiation position should Greece vote “no” on the referendum.

With Greece and the eurozone on the edge of a catastrophe, the question of how China will respond looms large. As Mu Chunshan wrote for The Diplomat last year, China’s diplomacy with Europe (both the EU and individual European countries) is primarily driven by economics — meaning a “Grexit” is of particular concern to China-EU relations. The EU is China’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade between the two sides worth over $600 billion in 2014. An economic crisis in the EU – including a threat to the eurozone – could be a disaster for China’s already-slowing economy, especially as Beijing will only become more interested in Europe as its Silk Road project develops.

In a meeting with European Parliament President Martin Schulz, Li said that the debt crisis in Greece is of concern for China and the world, not just the EU. China “expects an adequate solution to the Greek debt issue,” Xinhua paraphrased Li as saying.

However, China, with its massive stockpile of foreign reserves, is also in a position to help Greece out – should it choose to do so. On Monday, even as Li and his counterparts began meetings in Europe, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said “China hopes to see that Greece will stay in the eurozone.” Still, Hua implied that China will not be active in helping find a solution: “[We] believe that the members of the eurozone are able and wise enough to solve the debt problem appropriately,” she said.

When Li was asked if China was willing to provide loans or other financial aid to help Greece during the press conference in Brussels, he responded by restating China’s preference for “a united Europe, and prosperous European Union, and a strong euro.” He continued: “As for the issue of Greek debt, in principle it is an internal affair of Europe. Having said that, whether Greece would stay within Europe is not only a question that concerns Europe but also concerns China and Europe… that is why China has made its own efforts to help Greece overcome the debt crisis.”

Li said, without specifying, that “China has taken real actions to respond to the concerns and requests from the Greek government” and that “China is ready to play a constructive role” in resolving the crisis.

It doesn’t sound like a formal loan is in the offing, but China could help in more indirect ways, particularly as Greece is a natural fit for China’s Silk Road plan. Last year, when Li stopped in Greece, China and Greece signed deals worth $5 billion, centering on a Chinese stake in the port of Piraeus. China’s interest in Greece is a counterpoint to falling levels of foreign investment from other countries, and could provide a much-needed lift for Greece’s economy. By for The Diplomat
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The Threat of Islamic Law in Malaysia


                                                              Pure poison


Political expediency may deliver up harsh punishments that nobody wants except politicians


The political debate in Malaysia appears to be trapped in menace as the specter of Kelantan’s barbaric hudud law, which advocates 7th-century punishments including amputation for theft and stoning to death for adultery, among others, continues to loom over the country.

A paper by the Malaysian Islamic Development Department, known as Jakim, that was discussed on The Malay Mail Online a few weeks ago has further aggravated the already tense situation by stating that the highly controversial law, if implemented at the national level, should apply to all citizens of Malaysia regardless of religion and in spite of the fact that hudud must never exist in the first place.

For the time being, hudud can still be avoided as it has not even become law in Kelantan yet, let alone on the federal level. Its recurrent appearance on the political stage, however, shows that it is merely the symptom of an underlying disease, rather than the absurd product of a few twisted minds that can be trivialized or even ignored.

This disease is never directly addressed by the nation’s highest officials who insist on putting a God for whose existence there can never be any proof at the center of their concerns instead of a populace that, unless one adheres to solipsism, is very real and increasingly isolated from the rest of the world due to the dangerous Islamic ideas of its leaders.

That Malaysia might eventually – and quite soon – collapse on a social, cultural and humanitarian level is not solely caused by the current threat of hudud. And dodging this legal madness alone will not prevent further disintegration in a country that is already plagued by deplorable chasms separating ethnicities, religions and political groups.

Malaysia has arrived at a critical point in its history and whether or not it can survive in the future will be a direct result of the decisions made by its highest officials today.

What might happen to a Malaysia with hudud during the next few decades is of course difficult to predict and would depend on a myriad of factors. Yet, attempts at drawing a picture of the future as it could develop is crucial in order to understand what is at stake for a nation that could be the beacon of understanding and humanitarianism within Southeast Asia, but has consistently failed to live up to this expectation.

This is a rough sketch of such a future.

The most likely development that has been in the making for decades is perhaps the secession of Sabah and Sarawak from the peninsular part of the country. Justified complaints that any implementation of hudud would violate the Malaysian constitution and therefore potentially nullify the historical agreement that bans the governments of the Bornean states from leaving the federation have spread during the current controversy.

That secession is considered a real threat by the elite around Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak was clearly expressed by the updated Sedition Act, which explicitly outlaws the promotion of independence for Sabah and Sarawak. From a humanitarian point of view, however, leaving Malaysia and forming an independent nation would probably be the only sensible decision for Bornean policymakers.

Independence would open the gates for a degree of open-mindedness and social inclusiveness that the current political mainstream and obsession with Islam in Putrajaya renders completely impossible. Although Islamic tendencies will remain to be a problem – particularly in Sabah – the newly founded nation would have the potential to become the freest country in Southeast Asia and rise to be a catalyst for positive change in the region. In particular, it would further isolate the religious dictatorship of Brunei whose sultan seems determined to reinvent his country as a humanitarian wasteland.

The comparatively small population of Malaysia’s eastern states might result in a challenging economic situation for a nascent nation. It would therefore be paramount to openly welcome immigrants and nationalize them quickly. Particularly if hudud should ever hit Malaysia on the federal level, an influx of ethnically non-Malay migrants from the peninsular states can almost be guaranteed. Many of them might arrive without any regrets at all as they would be leaving behind a homeland that has never really wanted them in the first place.

Political expediency may deliver up harsh punishments that nobody wants except politicians

 

Ethnically Malay citizens of the western states might consider Borneo as well; and furthermore find another safe haven in Indonesia, particularly if the current Indonesian president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo can lead the country farther away from its oppressive past and strengthen its economy. The virtual lack of a language barrier paired with the option to live a moderate form of Islam that is becoming increasingly discouraged in Malaysia or drop the religion altogether could attract many.

No matter where exactly its individual citizens would attempt to build a better future, huge parts of the economic and intellectual elite would leave Malaysia. In an analogous manner, international investment would move out under hudud because neighboring countries in the region would offer equal or even better opportunities minus the legal barbarism. Sadly, it is probably this last concern that will prevent hudud on the national level because money tends to speak more directly to the hearts of the powerful in Putrajaya than human suffering.

What would a Malaysia look like in which the numbers of ethnic minorities, intellectuals and wealthy citizens will be seriously reduced? It would be a country in which only the most radical elements remain, a breeding ground for Islamism that might eventually become potent enough to topple the current pseudo-democratic government that created it. Malaysia’s future could turn into a partial re-enactment of the sad fate of some Middle Eastern nations that were on a promising path in the middle of the last century, but then were violently pushed back into darkness by religious fanatics.

Of course this is a very gloomy prognostication and perhaps a quite extreme version of what the future might bring. Yet, certain elements of this development can already be felt in Malaysia today.

Apart from the obvious necessity to never allow hudud or anything related to become even a tiny section of the law, the inevitable change that Malaysia needs goes right to the core. Islam must be dethroned as official religion of the federation. And it must not be replaced with any other religion.

When the Jakim paper mentioned above poses the question how “citizens of a country that exalts Islam as religion of the state assume that it is their human rights to not be placed under the influence of Shariah laws,” it inadvertently exemplifies the problem. Integrity, happiness and opportunity to live a fulfilling life are withheld from Malaysia’s citizens under the current circumstances and therefore the very foundation of the nation is flawed.

The assumption that the state is obliged to do anything for the institution of Islam is based on a constitution that has become the source of racism and religious intolerance on the highest political levels. Such a constitution – and in fact every constitution – needs to be challenged. It needs to prove anew at any point in history that it can create the best possible living conditions for the citizens affected by it and thereby the best possible society.

It is not politics that needs to bend over backwards in order to please an ancient way of oppression that has lost touch with reality. It is religious institutions that have to show that they are not outpaced by humanitarian progress.

Malaysia’s elite can no longer ignore the truth that Islam needs to be challenged, needs to be reformed and in its current form will cause the country to fall apart. If politicians care more about the wellbeing of their citizens than their own political power, there is no other conclusion.

Malaysia has already been pushed dangerously far towards the abyss of religious fanaticism. It is now time for those in charge to talk human rights instead of hudud.

By Markus Russin

The author, who has lived in Indonesia and Malaysia for the last year and a half, will commence as a graduate student in International Studies at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies of Waseda University in Tokyo.
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BALI – Latest Updates...Om Swastiastu ...



Leading the news this week: A UK tourist has died after falling from a 2nd floor balcony at a Kuta hotel. A 7-year-old Indian tourist has been found dead at the bottom of a hotel pool in Kuta. Police have arrested a housekeeping supervisor at from a boutique hotel on Jalan Drupadi in Seminyak, caught on camera stealing money from a guest’s room. A Bali lawyer has called for a corruption investigation of the management of Bali’s Garuda Wisnu Kencana Park (GWK). And, the former regent of Klungkung gets sentenced to 12 years in prison for corruption committed during his terms of office.

In other news: Bali establishes “rabies centers” to help stop the rise in rabies cases. The former Deputy-minister of Tourism Sapta Nirwandar has been questioned by anti-corruption officials regarding malfeasance by former minister Jero Wacik. A peace agreement of sorts has been signed between the Sky Garden Discothèque and its former security staff. Water Police in West Nusa Tenggara are promising stricter control of fast ferries operating from Bali to the Gili Islands and West Lombok. And, Bali’s blind community unites to stage a protest over the poor and dangerous condition of the Island’s sidewalks.

The Government is promising to allow foreigners the right to own apartments costing a minimum of Rp. 5 billion.

Bali’s governor restates his opposition to a thermal power project in the Bedugul area of Bali. Meanwhile, Governor Pastika launches his published biography.

In a breathtaking finish, Australian Matthew Giles wins by a single stroke the Bali national Golf Tournament at Nusa Dua.

The Australian Federal Police are cooperating with Bali police to fight terrorism and the sexual abuse of children by Australian tourists,

Bali has hosted a record-setting practice gathering of Yoga and meditation enthusiasts on the International Day of Yoga.

Indonesia’s Minister of Tourism say national tourism will grow by 2 million visitors each year.

Be sure to save the list of Indonesian national holidays in 2016 included in this week’s edition.

Traveling around Bali we take note of a change in a family planning statue in West Bali and share information on the Island’s oldest mosque located in Klungkung.

Hotel News: A debate has broken out in North Bali over the Hotel Pop Singaraja’s very short setback of only 13.5 meter setback from the ocean’s shore.

Looking Ahead:


 

 

Om Çanti Çanti Çanti Om ...

J.M. Daniels,
Editor Bali Update
Bali Discovery Tours
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Sunday, June 28, 2015

Pirates in South-East Asia - Malacca buccaneers


 


Step aside, Somalia: South-East Asia is the new piracy capital of the world


EIGHT men armed with pistols and machetes boarded the Orkim Harmony, a tanker, in the early evening of June 11th. Carrying 6,000 tonnes of petrol—worth more than $5m at market prices—the ship was nearing the end of a voyage around the southern tip of Malaysia, from Malacca on the country’s west coast to Kuantan Port on its eastern one. The pirates restrained the crew and scrubbed three letters from the hull, crudely disguising the vessel with a new name, Kim Harmon. Then they headed north towards Cambodia, in search of a friendly port in which to siphon off her liquid cargo. When the ship was finally spotted seven days later, the hijackers warned away security forces by threatening to harm the hostages, then slipped away in a life boat with whatever loot they could grab. The crew escaped injury except for the cook, who was airlifted to hospital after being shot in the thigh.


The attack on the Orkim Harmony was the latest in a spate of hijackings in South-East Asian seas, where the narrow straits separating Singapore and Malaysia from Indonesia provide passage for about one-third of the world’s shipping. Fifteen hijackings took place in 2014, up from only a handful the year before, according to the International Maritime Bureau; there have been nine in the past six months alone. These incidents are the most alarming symptom of a regional uptick in piracy, ranging from petty thefts in ports to more daring heists at sea. With the once-perilous waters around Somalia now calmed by an international effort, South-East Asia has regained an old reputation as the region worst-afflicted by piracy in the world.

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Friday, June 26, 2015

The Koreas, Bastion of Cold War Realism



A reluctant but pragmatic defense of neorealism in Northeast Asia.

Nuclear crises, propaganda and espionage, a clash of ideologies – the Korean peninsula is in a world where the Cold War lingers. This persistence is the result of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the apparent neorealist policies employed by North Korea. Despite the problems with neorealism and its appropriately dwindling popularity, it remains a useful lens through which to understand the conflict on the peninsula, and the defensive realist reactions on the part of China and South Korea.

Rather than asserting that realism or its offshoots are the ultimate International Relations grand theories, I suggest that neorealism remains a crucial aspect of IR security theory. The offensive realist behavior of the DPRK and the defensive realist policies of China and the South Korea serve to illustrate the unfortunate but continued significance of neorealism within international relations.

Neorealism, defined by Kenneth Waltz in 1959, holds that states are unitary rational agents acting in their perceived self-interest within a system wherein each state seeks to ensure its perpetuation and maintain a balance of power. Structure is the defining feature of the theory, with states the main actors competing within an anarchic system to maintain their power and stability. The modern East Asian regional complex has security dynamics very similar to those that prevailed in the Cold War during the second half of the 20th century. Because the Korean War concluded with an armistice agreement and not a peace treaty, the Cold War on the peninsula has effectively continued, producing a subsequent nuclear proliferation; the crisis has only escalated since the DPRK announced in May 2009 that it would no longer abide by the armistice. As during the Cold War, foreign relations in the region are based on allegedly rational cost-benefit analyses of war and executing the appropriate policies. The focus of North-East Asian states has been on classic security dilemma proliferation and maintaining a balance of power to avoid war.

Just as during the 20th century Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the objective of each actor is not to engage in war and suffer its costs and consequences; rather each state is more interested in preventing war and maintaining regional stability and their spheres of hegemony. This loosely follows the balance of power security model, which holds that: all states are power-seeking; states ultimately seek hegemony over their system; and that other states in the system will attempt to block those bids for hegemony. However, the regional system of East Asia is different from the Cold War bipolarity; instead, it has a multi-polar dynamic, in which China, South Korea, and the U.S. compete for regional hegemony. Actors optimally try to have good relations with the other players or minimally try to avoid hostile relations; and actors try to prevent threateningly close cooperation between the other actors. This logic is reflected in the defensive realist policies of China and South Korea, while North Korea has taken a more offensive power-seeking approach.

The DPRK Strategy

Offensive realism is the strategy being pursued by the DPRK, keeping John Mearsheimer’s brand of realism relevant in contemporary IR theory. This theory dictates that states seek to maximize power through increased military capability, as can be seen with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. While it remains unknown whether or not the DPRK is seeking hegemonic status in the region as an orthodox reading of offensive realist policy would suggest, it is certain that its newfound nuclear capability is the North’s only effective foreign policy tool; without nuclear weapons, North Korea would receive very little attention, which is an international embarrassment given its grave yet largely ignored human rights crises. Yet just as realism suggests, proliferation and security are central to the foreign policy of the region.

The DPRK has acted as a classical realist state in building up its nuclear arms in response to its perceived security threats. Contrary to the popular stance taken by the Western media, the perceived security threat of the U.S. is not all baseless paranoia.

The Korean War, and the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in defense of South Korea, understandably pushed Kim Il-sung to pursue nuclear technology early on, and after China’s denial to share its nuclear secrets after its test in 1964 an indigenous DPRK program was pursued. The fear of a U.S. confrontation was exacerbated in the late 1960s as the U.S. placed nuclear weapons on ROK soil, and there was concern in Pyongyang that North Korea’s larger communist allies would no longer provide support as it observed the Cuban missile crisis, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the Russo-Sino split. North Korea’s security environment deteriorated with the end of the Cold War: It lost funding from the U.S.SR, South Korea flourished economically and militarily, China focused on its own economics and reached out to South Korea, and Russia recognized the ROK. Without being able to lean on the Soviets or their own declining conventional weapons program, nuclear weapons offered the most security and were therefore a logical option. Finally, with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan Iraq and the instance on regime change in Iraq, Pyongyang worried that it might be the next focus of American foreign policy and so built up its nuclear deterrent.

While the perceived security threat is the main motive behind nuclearization, domestic politics and international norms also provide motivations: The focus on external threats distracts from daily grievances and gives the Kim regime power and legitimacy, and the international symbolism of nuclearization gives the DPRK a highly effective diplomatic bargaining chip, along with the international status of a modern state.

The DPRK has not yet developed enrichment capabilities to enrich uranium on an industrial scale, and so is a limited nuclear power in the practical sense. Based on evidence from its May 2009 test, North Korea has approximately enough plutonium for four to eight primitive nuclear weapons; it is also safe to assume that they can only be launched over relatively short distances. Yet, this is enough to aggravate the international community and to concern its neighbors. With its small and militarily useless nuclear arsenal, North Korea has proven that a nuclear program does not need to be large or sophisticated to be politically effective.

Defensive Realism

Defensive realism shares the structural tenets of offensive realism; both emphasize the importance of balancing behavior in a chaotic international system. Yet defensive realism proposes that the unrestrained pursuit of power is counterbalancing and therefore not desirable. The PRC and ROK have reacted to North Korea’s offensive realism with defensive realist foreign policy aimed at balancing the DPRK’s aggressive behavior and calling for restraint. It must be noted that their policy motives also include suspicions about Japan, the U.S., and each other, as well as a wide range of domestic considerations, but that non-proliferation is the driving motive behind the PRC and ROK’s regional foreign policy.

The most pressing concern from the region is a conflict between Pyongyang and Seoul or Tokyo; the desire to avoid such a clash is what drives relations between North Korea and its neighbors. Second to this is avoiding the potential disasters of regime change or collapse: These include a refugee crisis for China and South Korea; an economic crisis for Seoul should it absorb the North in an attempt at reunification; an economic crisis for China as the unstable region experiences capital flight; and the unpleasant realities of dealing with a humanitarian crisis should the human rights abuses occurring in the North be stopped and rectified. Finally, the region is interested in preventing North Korea from expediting nuclear crises around the world by exporting nuclear technology. All parties realize that between the options of engagement, disengagement, and containment, the former is the most appealing because it allows for the greatest potential to control, or at least influence, Pyongyang. This cost-benefit analysis is the framework around which defensive realist policy is formed in both China and South Korea.

China is ultimately concerned with the denuclearization of North Korea. DPRK test facilities are close to the Chinese border and threaten Chinese security should an accident occur, and could already be having a negative ecological impact. More pressingly (as “hard” security concerns always trump “soft,” environmental concerns regardless of the consequential long-term ecological insecurity), the PRC does not want an expanded North Korean nuclear program that might prompt the ROK and Japan to develop nuclear weapons should they lose confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Further, the implications of accepting a DPRK nuclear program for the future of non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) do not bode well for global security, especially given the possibility of North Korean nuclear exports to non-state actors. Finally, China does not want North Korea to continue to nuclearize because it threatens China’s nuclear monopoly in the region. This follows classical realist security logic: China seeks balance and is most secure when it is the only nuclear power in the region, and therefore opposes attempts at nuclearization by other states.

China is also concerned about the possible collapse of a nuclearized DPRK and the potential security consequences. From a Chinese perspective, a U.S. intervention in North Korea (a likely outcome of regime collapse) would be even less appealing than a more nuclearized DPRK. Haunted by the detriment of the Korean War and bound by the 1961 Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, China seeks to avoid military conflict on the peninsula at all costs. China also has an interest in maintaining the status quo because North Korea acts as a physical buffer by which, under different circumstances, an adversary could launch an invasion of China; Beijing remembers the Japanese invasion in the 1930s and 1940s, and the Korean War during which enemy troops were threatening China’s border. North Korea could possibly be forced to abandon its nuclear aspirations if the PRC were to impose harsh economic sanctions, but China fears that doing so would result in internal collapse of the DPRK regime.

South Korea has taken a similar defensive realist policy as China. Even following the failure of the Sunshine Policy, due in large part to the DPRK’s refusal to cooperate, the ROK has been eager to maintain peaceful if strained relations. This is mostly because South Korea has no interest in a military confrontation of any kind with the North. A conventional military conflict would certainly result in a victory for the ROK, especially with the help of the U.S. (and possibly Japan), but would devastate Seoul, which sits only 40 km from the demarcation line. Accordingly, South Korea has a sufficient deterrent under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, maintaining its defensive realist position of itself themselves without military aggression.

South Korea, like China, doesn’t want the regime in the North to collapse because it would presage a massive wave of migration. South Korea is hesitant to even discuss the possibility of managing a collapsed North Korea for fear that it would invite unwanted intervention, forever thwarting hopes for reunification. The ROK and China also share apprehensions about the potential fate of North Korea’s stockpile of nuclear weapons and technology should the North collapse.

The PRC government’s legitimacy is premised on continued economic growth; therefore the state’s economic interests are also its security interests, and China’s economic interests are deeply tied to stability in Korea. A conflict on the peninsula would damage Chinese production, foreign direct investment, liquidity, and trade, and it would aversely influence the huge Sino-South Korean trade relationship by diverting economic resources into North Korea. The PRC, with pressure from the U.S., agreed to United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions condemning North Korea along with mild economic sanctions against Pyongyang, but even the most scathing of these have been relatively benign.

In its cautious position, China also affirms that the DPRK has the right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy after it returns to the NPT, and maintains that there is no solution available other than continued dialogue between the concerned parties. The PRC is also allied with the DPRK for political reasons, but their historic communist connection has been tested by what Beijing views as Pyongyang’s insolence and incendiary rhetoric: the fraternal relationship is tense as the big brother finds the younger one’s international temper tantrums a treat to the security and prosperity of the region.

Like China, the legitimacy of the ROK government is partially based on economic growth, and the security of the state depends to some extent on continued economic prosperity. Unsurprisingly, the North was adamantly opposed to the Sunshine Policy’s principle of reciprocity though it continued the opportunistic exploitation of it. North Korea desperately needs the economic aid and wants assurance that North-South relations include aid and assured security. South Korean economic concerns have escalated with the increased North-South animosity of the Lee administration, culminating in the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan in the Yellow Sea and again highlighting the security issues of the region.

China and South Korea have a shared security interest in preventing war on the Korean peninsula and avoiding a DPRK regime change, employing similar policies based on realist thinking. While North Korea behaves in an offensive realist manner as it nuclearizes in an attempt to accumulate and display power, the PRC and ROK have responded with defensive realist policies aimed at maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula with the intention of avoiding undesired conflict. This case study provides evidence that classical realism remains a fundamental aspect of IR and security theory, and has not declined since the end of the Cold War; states continue to act in their perceived self-interest with an emphasis on state security and power relations. The ongoing nuclear crisis also holds significant implications for the future of global non-proliferation and global security as rogue states and non-state actors acquire nuclear technology.

Morgan Potts is an assistant editor at Sino-NK, and a production editor at the British Association for Korean Studies.

 
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Under Fire: NGOs Face Increasing Hostility

 

Long accustomed to occupying the moral high ground, NGOs are coming in for increasing criticism.

In recent decades the ubiquitous NGO has taken up the banner for charities and worthy causes. From the environment and human rights to health, education and animal welfare, nongovernment organizations have championed the dispossessed, winning legions of fans.

But in recent years pockets of NGO Land – as some call it – have lost their shine.

Too militant, too strident, and too sanctimonious are among common complaints leveled at NGOs – whether in Australia or in Southeast Asia and beyond — amid allegations of blatant lying and a victory at any cost mentality.

It was a point noted by academic and veteran correspondent Karl Wilson, from the Asian Centre for Journalism in The Philippines, who spent time working with a prominent human rights group.

He said they were not shy on self-promotion or in molding headline grabbing causes with fundraising potential.

“A toothless bloke fishing in Indonesia whose livelihood is threatened by global warming is not as attractive as a bikini clad chick on the Great Barrier Reef, snorkeling,” he said. “Working with them showed me how the other side works and how agendas are pushed and pushed hard.”

Arbiters of Bad Behavior

Greenpeace, which has annual revenue of around $350 million, has come under sustained attack for the highly questionable methods it has employed.

In Australia, it was caught using photographs from a devastated reef in The Philippines as part of its campaign to have the Great Barrier Reef listed as endangered by UNESCO at next week’s annual meeting of the World Heritage Committee in Bonn.

Later, the environmental campaigners were accused of running a massive disinformation campaign in regards to the reef, driven by its broader agenda to have coal mining banned.

This includes misleading advertising on the London underground and on YouTube, one featuring a mother and child claims: “Half the Reef is already gone.’’ This is nonsense.

Interestingly, few people were prepared to speak publicly about Greenpeace. Some would only comment on condition of anonymity, a journalistic protocol normally reserved for whistleblowers who live in fear of dictators and despotic governments and certainly not eco-friendly activists.

“We like Greenpeace, they make us look sane,” one seasoned environmentalist said.

Another long-term observer said that Greenpeace was unethical in publishing photographs taken from somewhere else and using misleading numbers, adding that it was a questionable decision to combine the future of the Great Barrier Reef with the entire coal industry.

“No government, globally, could find a single solution for that issue,” he said, adding Greenpeace must tackle India if it is serious about orchestrating a ban on coal exports, but this was unlikely.

“The Indians would immediately counter such an approach by flagging their right to development.”

Last year the Indian government singled out Greenpeace as a “threat to national economic security.”

Almost two decades ago, this journalist was on assignment with Greenpeace environmentalists and scientists working with endangered pink dolphins in the Pearl River Delta, straddled by Hong Kong and Macau.

Back then they claimed the dolphin population was devastated and were adamant they faced extinction within five years. Nothing could be done. Today there are about 2,000 pink dolphins living in the estuaries.

On Australian radio, Greenpeace has also drawn fierce criticism after admitting it employed a range of tactics that “absolutely” includes breaking the law when necessary, earning unlikely comparisons with the nation’s bikie gangs who thrive on their self-anointed outlaw status.

But Greenpeace is not the only NGO in trouble. Far from it. Even the hallowed Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) is under attack.

One politician wants Australia’s head of state, Queen Elizabeth II, to withdraw her royal seal after the RSPCA extended its reach from caring for domesticated animals like cats and dogs to the horse racing industry and live cattle exports.

“It’s like the live meat trade,” Wilson said in regards to unrealistic NGO demands.

“The government can’t monitor everyone outside of Australia. And the industry agrees there are some who don’t kill animals humanely, although I still can’t quite get my head around a humane way of killing something. But it is a legitimate business and it employs people.”

This behavior could cost NGOs dearly. The Abbott government is mulling the removal of the tax deductible status on gifts and donations enjoyed by environmental groups.

“We’ve got 100 to 150 groups that seem to have their purpose at stopping industrial development, not just mining, some of those developments include tourism developments or agricultural developments but engaging in what I would view as a political debate, not the environmental debate,” Queensland Liberal National Party senator Matthew Canavan told local radio.

Further afield

Greenpeace has a long history of pushing the limits. In Peru it was forced to apologize and faced criminal charges for a publicity stunt that went wrong and damaged the world famous Nazca Lines.

In the Philippines, a former Greenpeace director upset his old employer by denouncing a campaign depicting genetically modified foods as morally unacceptable.

He believed the technology was safe and could help alleviate hunger in the developing world.

Similar accusations have been leveled against ActionAid in Africa.

“It’s becoming more and more a fear mongering organization, basing its campaigns in populist exaggerations and blatant lies, and disregarding science, pure and simple, either it be in the coral reef or genetically modified foods,” another Greenpeace critic added.

In countries like China – where attitudes to the environment and human rights are like a red rag to an NGO bull – and in Cambodia – where more than 4,000 NGOs sprouted in the aftermath of war – groups like New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Greenpeace, are incensed by new NGO laws which they say will curtail their activities.

Those laws have also been opposed by the many NGOs that do good work in-country and want the drafts amended and clarified in regards to potential offenses which they say are open to interpretation and abuse.

But the desire to legislate received a fillip from wayward rights groups, in particular Somaly Mam, who earned worldwide headlines after allegations she fabricated sex trafficking reports that had won her anti-trafficking NGO the support of Hollywood celebrities and the money and fame that comes with them.

“It is inevitable that some of those organizations will be well managed and effective, and others less so,” said Craig Etcheson, Visiting Scholar at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in the United States.

But at a cultural level the relationship between government and NGO goes much deeper and beyond the legalities. NGOs, particularly foreign-based groups, are often perceived as arrogant and patronizing while masquerading as saints to avoid criticism.

In Thailand, the national police chief Pol Gen Somyot Poompunmuang perhaps best summed-up that antagonism in Southeast Asia when he complained about opposition from civil society groups on the most recent proposals to legalize casinos.

“NGOs are not my father!” – he declared.

Politicization of the Moral High Ground

Etcheson said the humanitarian situation in countries like Cambodia had changed as they no longer suffered the same vulnerabilities as 30 years ago, when incapable governments desperately needed NGOs to deliver basic services to their people.

“Many international NGO’s now focus on politically sensitive issues such as human rights, rule of law and corruption, carrying out investigations and issuing reports that the government often finds troublesome,” he said.

“And, of course, there will also be the occasional organization which turns out to be fraudulent or otherwise engaged in outright illegal activity. Those rare bad actors tarnish the image of all the rest who are honestly attempting to do good works.”

This has lead to an erosion of legitimacy among some NGOs, which have grown accustomed to the moral high ground, and increased tensions with governments who want to diminish the standing NGOs enjoy in the community. Importantly mainstream audiences – who want something done about global warming, endangered species saved, and food security ensured – are being left behind.

Adam Cathro, a former journalist and currently the Media Relations Manager for Plan International Australia, echoed Etcheson’s sentiments and said NGOs were becoming more outspoken but there was room for improvement.

“NGOs were always looking to do things better,” he said. “I think that’s a good thing, because the point of that advocacy is to influence governments and societies to change in ways that benefit the people we’re trying to support in the long-term.

“But advocacy comes in lots of different shapes and forms and not everyone is going to agree with every position adopted by every NGO,” he added. “I would say that if an NGO feels it has no need to improve, then it probably needs to improve more than most.”

Luke Hunt

 

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Hong Kong could have remained British



Readers interested in Asian history will know that in 1841 China ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British in perpetuity, through the Treaty of Nanking after the First Opium War.


In 1898 the New Territories, the essential "hinterland" of the colony, were leased to Britain for 99 years and of course handed back to China in 1997, together with Kowloon and Hong Kong Island.

Fewer people are aware that Britain had an opportunity to buy the New Territories from China in 1938. During the Sino-Japanese War, Hong Kong became China's most significant lifeline, with tonnes of military supplies passing through its port. With reverses on the battlefield, the Chinese government proposed the sale of the New Territories to Britain for 20 million pounds to help finance its war effort against Japan. Hong Kong Governor Sir Geoffry Northcote was keen on the idea, but the Colonial Office in London decided against it due to complex considerations involving the Chinese communists, the Japanese, Russia and Germany. The plan finally died in March 1939, when a loan of 10 million pounds was extended to the Chinese government instead.

One wonders how things would stand today if Britain had in fact made that purchase.

John L Sheppard

 

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