Wednesday, August 24, 2011

Bali Hit By Crime Spree





Denpasar. Police in Bali have warned of a worrying spike in crimes targeting foreigners on the resort island, following the stabbing of a British tourist early on Wednesday.

John Keith Winson, 59, was stabbed during a break-in at his rented villa in South Kuta. It was the fourth burglary in the area in the past two months in which a foreigner was the victim.

On Aug. 9, burglars stole about $53,000 in cash and personal belongings from the home of a Japanese man.

In Sanur, police are investigating a similar burglary, just two days before the Ubud case, in which Australian Elizabeth Burnett, 56, lost Rp 12.6 million in cash and several documents.

The traditional increase in crime in the lead-up to Idul Fitri is also targeting domestic tourists, police say.

On Aug. 15, Johan, a visitor from Batam, was robbed by a man posing as the driver of an ojek, or motorcycle taxi. He lost his cellphone, laptop and Rp 1.6 million in cash in the incident.

A day earlier, burglars armed with machetes broke into the holiday villa of Yanti Yoswanda at Brawa Beach and made off with items worth Rp 40 million.

Police are also on the hunt for a gang believed to have simultaneously broken into safes at four locations last Thursday.

Tuesday, August 23, 2011

Jakarta's Tough on Terrorists But Not Other Radicals




















When criminal court judges are fearful of dishing out tough punishment or, worse, allow a certain empathy for the accused to colour their judgment, it is important to look higher up the chain for the underlying reason.

In the case of the leaders of the mob who murdered three members of the Ahmadiyah sect last February, it comes down to the way the Government treats Islamic terrorists differently from other religious radicals who may not bomb but terrorize all the same.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration clearly sees the terrorists as a direct challenge to the state, ignoring the more insidious threat mainstream extremists pose to the Constitution and the rule of law.

As a result, while Indonesia gets deserved praise for the success of its anti-terrorism campaign, its much-vaunted reputation for moderation and religious tolerance has paradoxically undergone a significant erosion at the same time.

There may well be a connection. Anxious not to appear as if it is at war with Islam, the government is consciously leaning the other way when it comes to other hardline groups who flirt with the law.

In its latest report, the United States- based Pew Research Centre groups Indonesia with Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Somalia, Nigeria and Bangladesh as countries where social hostilities and government restrictions involving religion are the highest in the world.

The ludicrously light three- to six-month jail terms handed out to the 12 defendants accused of killing the three Ahmadis in the western Java province of Banten is the worst example yet of how the tyranny of the majority has been allowed to prosper.

The sentences were even less than the seven months demanded by prosecutors and fell well below the maximum penalty of 12 years, with a teenage boy receiving just three months for using a stone to beat to death one of the helpless victims.

It was obvious from the start of the trial that prosecutors and judges alike were cowed by the hundreds of hardliners who showed up for each court session in what was once the heartland of Darul Islam, the movement that fought for an Islamic state in the 1950s.

Prosecutors even told the court that despite a horrifying, secretly filmed video of the incident, the victims' refusal to flee the house where they had futilely tried to hold off the mob contributed to the violence and justified a reduced sentence.

Rather than acting as a deterrent, the sentences will almost certainly encourage further persecution of an Islamic sect, widely regarded as heretic, whose numbers range from the government figure of 50,000 to 80,000 to its own estimate of 400,000.

Sadly, the government finds itself in a cleft stick, realising that if it bans the sect it will not only be breaching the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion, but also officially declaring open season on its adherents.

Already under pressure in Muslim- dominated neighbourhoods, where churches can be built only with the approval of the majority of the local populace, Christians fear the increased intimidation will not end there. They have good cause to worry.

Four days after the Banten court handed down its verdict, mobs burned down three supposedly 'illegal' churches in Sumatra's Riau province, the latest of 200 such attacks in the past five years and the 17th this year.

Last February, three churches were destroyed in Central Java, in protest over a court's decision not to sentence a Christian man to death for defaming Islam. He had already received a five-year prison term, the maximum allowed under law.

The government's timid attitude is also reflected in the lack of law enforcement that only exacerbates religious tensions. As in Banten, police more often than not stand idly by when thuggish groups like the Islamic Defenders Front go on the rampage.

Indonesia has long been held up as a shining example of religious tolerance and a nation where democracy and Islam co-exist in harmony. In that, it is rightfully held to much higher standards.

One Jakarta-based security firm told its clients recently that if Indonesia maintains its current trajectory, "the trend will transcend the realm of religion and affect other factors, such as the overall state of security and the business and investment climate".

"At worst," it warned, "it could lead to increased acts of terrorism and possibly a re-occurrence of the sectarian violence that nearly tore Indonesia asunder during the early post-Suharto period over a decade ago."
By John McBeth Reprinted courtesy of Straits Times Indonesia.

Did Malaysia's Anwar Say too Much?



He says accuser acknowledged readying himself for sex












Deep into Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim’s hour-long attack Monday on the Malaysian court that is trying him for sodomy, a sentence appeared that seems extremely awkward for both prosecution and defense.

Anwar was brought up on the charges by his accuser, former aide Mohamad Saiful Bukhairy Azlan, in July of 2008, five months after the opposition Pakatan Rakyat coalition that he heads scored a historic victory in national elections, for the first time breaking the Barisan Nasional’s historic 50-year two-thirds majority in Parliament. It is the second time he has been in the dock on sodomy charges. The first was in 1998, when he was convicted in a trial that has been widely condemned as engineered to end his threat as an opposition leader. He served six years before he was pardoned on the sexual perversion charges.

Anwar said in his prepared statement that after Saiful went to Anwar’s condo in an exclusive area of Kuala Lumpur, he admitted that “he had brought along lubricant and had himself voluntarily and without hesitation applied it” to get ready to go ahead with the sexual act.

That sentence would tend to invalidate any assumption that the then-60-year-old Anwar suddenly forced himself on the 24-year-old aide. If, as Anwar says, Saiful brought the lubricant with him, it would certainly indicate that Saiful knew what he was getting into when he went to Anwar’s condo that night.

This in turn is hardly helpful for Anwar, who is on trial for his political life in the High Court in Kuala Lumpur over the allegations, because Saiful’s statement has the ring of truth to it. If you are going to make up a story about being forced into a sex act, you would hardly acknowledge that you voluntarily lubricated your own anus.

Saiful’s defense is that he was afraid of what Anwar might do to him if he didn’t submit. Anwar supposedly had the power to hire people do damage to him if he refused.

But that hardly seems realistic. Saiful has also admitted in court that in the days prior to the alleged rape, he met with then-Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, Najib’s wife Rosmah Mansor, and Rosmah’s close friend, former top athlete Mumtaz Jaafar, the executive chairperson of the National Athlete Welfare Foundation, an organization to which Rosmah is the patroness.

Saiful also acknowledged meeting with Rodwan Mohd Yusof, who was the investigating officer in Anwar’s discredited first trial for sodomy in 1998 and was accused of fabricating the evidence that put Anwar in prison for six years. He also met with Khairil Anas Jusof, an aide to Najib, and spoke on the telephone with Musa Hassan, now the head of the Malaysian police who led the investigating team in the first sodomy case.

How was a former student whom Anwar described in his statement as “just a university dropout working part time helping out my chief of staff,” able to gain access to Najib, his staff members, his wife, one of the country’s former top athletes and other officials if he didn’t have anything important to talk about?

It is hard to believe that after meeting with several of Malaysia’s top law enforcement and government figures before his journey back to Anwar’s condo – some with every intention to drive Anwar out of politics and back to jail – Saiful wouldn’t feel protected against everything Anwar could throw at him in the way of violence or threats, especially if he told the police he was in danger of being sodomized.

If he didn’t tell them he was in danger, why didn’t he? If he did tell them, why didn’t the police then instruct him to stay away from the condo for his own sexual safety, since he was engaged to be married?

It is not so hard to believe they would have sent him back to the condo with instructions to get Anwar to do something that would be actionable in court. Did they?

In his statement, Anwar said that Najib, Rosmah, Musa Hassan and Rodhwan have said they were not prepared to be interviewed over their alleged role in the affair. The defense, he said, must now resort to having subpoenas issued for their presence. It remains to be seen if they will be questioned. But that single sentence about Saiful and the lubricant certainly raises some questions that seem necessary to answer.

A US diplomatic cable on the WikiLeaks website that was published in Asia Sentinel on Jan. 20, 2011, related that “Singapore's intelligence services and Lee Kuan Yew have told the Australian Office of National Assessments (ONA) that opposition leader Anwar ‘did indeed commit the acts for which he is currently indicted,’ citing unshared technical intelligence. ONA assessed, and their Singapore counterparts concurred, ‘it was a set up job -- and he probably knew that, but walked into it anyway.’"

It is hard not to come to the same conclusion.
Asia Sentinel

Monday, August 22, 2011

Biden's China Visit: Supplicant to Beijing?





Vague agendas, US weakness on display



What was the point of Vice-President Joseph Biden’s just ended visit to China? It is surely not enough to point vaguely to the supposed goodwill generated by formulaic visits between leaders.

Given the number of such exercises in superficial global bonhomie, one would expect the world to be in a better shape than it is. It is one thing from a US perspective to have high-profile state visits such as President Obama’s to China or to have working visits by officials such Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. But the Biden visit appears to have had only the vaguest of agendas and if anything put US weakness on display at a time when China is boasting its global importance.

Ostensibly Biden was on a “get to know you” visit, in particular to “build a relationship” with fellow vice-president Xi Jinping, who is expected to succeed Hu Jintao as president and party boss next year. Biden was lyrical: “Foreign policy is more than just formal visits; it’s establishing personal relationships and trust. And it is my fond hope that our personal relationship will continue to grow”.

Even in the west, the importance of personal rapport between leaders is often exaggerated. For a western leader to imagine that Chinese policies, the product of a highly structured political system, are susceptible to such personal relationships is an illusion.

Of course there may have been some especially important information that Biden carried to Beijing and as yet remains a secret. But judging by the public display and official reports the US appeared mostly as a supplicant playing to China’s sense of self-importance. Biden overloaded his speeches with references to China’s present as well as past achievements and its importance to the whole world today, using language which seemed over the top even for ceremonial occasions. Do US vice-presidents use similar language when visiting other major nations?

There is also something troubling in the way some have been playing up the ethnicity of the new US ambassador to Beijing, Gary Locke, who took up the post just days before Biden arrived. Locke has excellent credentials but ethnicity should not be one of them – much though it appeals to ethnically conscious Chinese.

The US appearing as supplicant is not good diplomacy. As the International Herald Tribune headlined it: “Biden asks for Beijing’s help on economy” – this just a few days after the US was being repeatedly bashed by Beijing for its budget deficits and accused by the head of China’s own rating agency, Dagong, of already having defaulted on its debt by depreciating its currency.

For sure, Beijing has for now toned down its comments and Biden has asked China to do more to balance the global economy by further currency appreciation and stoking domestic demand. But those have been US themes for almost a decade and had only limited impact. Buying US debt to maintain its own competitiveness by keeping the Yuan undervalued remains a cornerstone of China’s policies.

Meanwhile for Chinese consumption the US has been playing up the recent deficit deal reached by Congress even though the administration – and the Federal Reserve too – believe it will have negative consequences for the US economy. Indeed the whole tenor of the visit as seen in much of the US media as well has been the need for the US to reassure China, its main creditor. This is illogical. If the US wants to see the yuan appreciate it should welcome China ceasing to buy Treasury bonds. The image of the US as supplicant increases China’s pride and makes it more likely to take a firm stand on other issues Biden discussed: Taiwan arms sales, North Korea and Iran.

The US appears already to have given in to Beijing on arms sales. Taiwan sources say that their request to buy 66 new F-16s has been denied and they will only be offered an upgrade of old planes. If so, it is unclear what Washington received in return beyond more, probably empty, promises of pressure on Pyongyang. Recent US willingness to strengthen its Asian alliances in the face of China’s military might and forward policies in the South and East China seas has been well received in most of the region. But the Taiwan decision, if confirmed, coinciding with the tenor of Biden’s visit scarcely indicates that the US has the self-confidence in dealing with China that its Asian allies would like to see. Score another for Beijing. Asia Sentinel

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in Papua




Jakarta/Brussels, 22 August 2011: A spike in violence in Indonesian Papua over the last two months underscores the urgency of exploring new ideas to address conflict there.

Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in Papua, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, juxtaposes the vision of a peaceful Papua produced by a conference in Jayapura in July with the reality of conflict in Puncak Jaya, one of the most remote districts.

“President Yudhoyono needs to move quickly to set up a long-delayed new Papua unit with a mandate to cover political as well as economic development issues”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Senior Adviser. “It’s not a guarantee that the situation will get better, but without a fresh approach from Jakarta, it will certainly get worse”.

Crisis Group notes that a series of “indicators” produced by the Papua Peace Conference on 5-7 July could serve as guidelines for public policy at a national and local level. For example, one indicator of a peaceful Papua would be that basic socio-cultural rights of indigenous Papuans are recognised and respected. A policy consequence might be to prepare booklets on customs of different ethnic groups that would be required reading for anyone assigned to Papua, including security forces.

Another indicator would be that perpetrators of state violence are brought to trial and sentenced in a way that gives Papuans a sense of justice. The policy prescription would be to ensure that soldiers or police responsible for gratuitous violence are given sentences commensurate with the crime, instead of slap-on-the-wrist punishments for disciplinary infractions.

The district of Puncak Jaya, wracked by insurgency, corruption and some of the worst poverty in Papua, exemplifies the challenge of finding solutions. There are many factors feeding the insurgency there including a sense of historical injustice, harsh actions by security forces and clan-based factionalism. But two common policy responses - more money and more troops (deployed for “community service”) - are not likely to bring about improvements.

This is where a new “Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua” (called UP4B after its Indonesian abbreviation), has the potential to be helpful. A draft decree creating the unit has been sitting on the Cabinet Secretary’s desk in Jakarta for the last three months, and some are beginning to wonder if it will ever come into being. Originally seen as a vehicle for economic “quick wins”, it evolved into a unit that, according to the latest draft, was also tasked with “developing the mechanism and substance of constructive communication between the government and representatives of the people of Papua and West Papua with a view toward resolving the the conflict”.

“At least the indicators provide some ideas on how to move forward”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, South East Asia Project Director. “The challenge now is to make tangible changes that Papuans themselves would regard as progress.”


Sunday, August 21, 2011

Jakarta party graft 'inevitable'



IN barely 12 months as Indonesia's Democratic Party treasurer, Muhammad Nazaruddin gouged 6.04 trillion rupiah ($679.3 million) out of government contracts, according to preliminary analysis by Indonesia's main counter-corruption agency, KPK.

Mr Nazaruddin operated 154 companies, many with his wife who remains abroad and is about to be red-listed as a KPK suspect, and was involved in 31 suspected corrupt contracts with government agencies.

Mr Nazaruddin hasn't confirmed such figures. Sulking in his cell at police Mobile Brigade headquarters after being brought back from Colombia a fortnight ago, he refuses to speak to KPK investigators.

In contrast to his tirades while on the run, and to the relief of most political colleagues, Mr Nazaruddin claims: "I have forgotten everything. (KPK) doesn't need to investigate me, just give me a sentence."

But he has said enough already to ensure his own conviction, wreck the 2014 presidential ambitions of former best friend Anas Urbaningrum, and further weaken party founder Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's credentials as a corruption-fighting president. (Mr Nazaruddin claims he paid the equivalent of $19m to fix Mr Anas's election as Democrat chairman last year; feeling that Mr Anas left him dangling when KPK bore down in May, "Nazar" turned ugly.)

At that point, though still only 32 and hardly known to voters outside his North Sumatra constituency, Mr Nazaruddin was one of the governing party's key executives.
During the two months he was mouthing off from abroad, Mr Nazaruddin insisted repeatedly that he looted ministerial contracts not for himself but for the party's benefit, and particularly for Mr Anas, its rising star.

Now all parties are trying to ignore the case's most significant lesson: the nature of Indonesian political financing makes political racketeering inevitable.
This week the national parliament begins a revision of electoral laws, but the draft contains no substantial funding reform.

Mas Achmad Santosa, from the Judicial Mafia Eradication Task Force, pointed out in a public call to Dr Yudhoyono that the Nazaruddin case goes to the heart of Indonesia's floridly corrupt political culture.

"The President must invite the leaders of political parties to conceive a way out that covers limits, restrictions, accountability and transparency for political funds, campaign funds, processes for arranging national and regional budgets, the selection of public officials and other such things," he urged.

Dr Yudhoyono has not responded, though yet again last week he proclaimed: "This is the moment to free Indonesia from corruption."

This was his Independence Day address to parliament, an institution that public opinion surveys consistently rate as one of the most corrupted.

But Marcus Mietzner, who is leading a study of Indonesian political funding for the US government development agency USAID, argues that the system itself guarantees corruption.

Funding demands on the main parties and on individual MPs are massive because the official funding system is completely broken, he says.

Party members' fees are negligible, most donations come illegally (because donors want to fund MPs or factions who will owe favours, not parties) and public funding is next-to-useless.

In 2009, a year marked by a huge surge in political spending as Dr Yudhoyono was voted back and a new parliament elected, public funding accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of the total, Dr Mietzner estimates.

In Australia, public funding accounts for about 20 per cent of political party expenditure, and in Germany 30 per cent.

"You have a combination of the collapse of the electoral funding system and an explosion in campaign costs," Dr Mietzner says. "The system is so dysfunctional, it justifies the parties doing whatever they do."

And they don't seem to want to change. Previous parliaments actually made public funding, and the takeover by "sponsors" and the parties' crooked fundraisers, far worse. At the outset in 1999, each vote earned qualifying parties 1000 rupiah, but by 2009 the rate had dropped to 108 rupiah - allowing for inflation, a reduction over a decade of 95 per cent.

As a consequence, parties lean heavily on their own MPs, who are required to donate 40-50 per cent of their salaries straight to the party. They in turn put themselves at the disposal of "sponsors" outside the parliament, and fixers inside such as Mr Nazaruddin. ‘The Australian’


Saturday, August 20, 2011

China’s currency



The yuan is flowing beyond China’s borders—and back again






THE helicopter buzzed to and fro, hour after hour, high above Hong Kong’s shining harbour and glistening skyscrapers, a bright red advertising banner trailing behind. What unmissable opportunity was it selling? Government bonds, that’s what, yielding as little as 0.6%.

The bonds were issued on August 17th by China’s Ministry of Finance in its own currency, the yuan. That would not normally be a banner-waving event. But what made this sale notable was its size—20 billion yuan ($3.1 billion)—and its buyers: offshore investors in Hong Kong. It represents by far the biggest issue of “dim sum” bonds, securities denominated in the currency of mainland China, but sold in Hong Kong, where people like to eat dumplings, pork buns and other tasty morsels known as dim sum. It therefore marks another step in the globalisation of the redback.

The first such bond was sold by China Development Bank in 2007. The bank has since been followed by more than 80 other issuers, including the World Bank, a Russian bank, McDonald’s, Volkswagen and a casino operator.

Despite these headline-grabbing offerings, the dim-sum market has remained true to its name: “delicious but limited”, as Tony Wang of Bank of China put it at a conference organised by the Centre for Financial Regulation and Economic Development (CFRED). Bond sales have remained bite-sized and quick to digest, with a typical maturity of two or three years. By the end of June, there were 4.7 yuan in Hong Kong deposits for every one yuan of dim-sum debt (valued at its issue price). That is why the finance ministry’s 20 billion yuan offering got everybody’s rotors beating.

No way home

This week’s bond issue will not be the government’s last, according to Li Keqiang, a Chinese vice-premier destined to succeed Wen Jiabao next year as prime minister. In a speech in Hong Kong on the day of the sale, he said that non-financial Chinese firms would be allowed to raise yuan offshore, a privilege previously reserved for mainland banks.

That will expand the menu somewhat. But the biggest deterrent to offshore borrowing is the difficulty of getting the money back onshore again. China’s government remains deeply ambivalent about the redback’s role in cross-border investment.

Chinese companies can now buy foreign ones with yuan; foreign firms can invest yuan raised offshore in their operations on the mainland. But both transactions are subject to government approval.

In the early days of dim-sum issuance, approval took only a month or two, a sign the government wanted the market to succeed. But because China’s authorities now worry that capital inflows will stoke an overheated economy, they have tightened up: one company that raised yuan in Hong Kong at the start of this year is still waiting to bring them across the border.

Mr Li’s speech may signal a softening of attitude. China already allows some “qualified” foreign investors to buy mainland securities, subject to a quota. These investments are settled in dollars. Now, Mr Li said, it will allow such investors to sink up to 20 billion of offshore yuan into China’s stockmarket too. That will give foreigners another reason to hold redbacks.

China’s government has no such ambivalence about the redback’s role in international trade. In 2009 it allowed firms in China’s most dynamic provinces to trade goods in yuan; this week Mr Li extended this right to the whole country. The currency was used to settle 600 billion yuan-worth of cross-border commerce in the second quarter of this year, up from less than 50 billion a year before (see chart 1). But that still represents only 7% of China’s total trade and 2% of the world’s.

Its role also remains lopsided. Of the trade settled in yuan in the first quarter of this year, 94% was foreign goods sold to China, not Chinese goods sold abroad. In other words, yuan flow out not in.

Yu Yongding, of the China Society of World Economics, argues that this outflow of redbacks is paradoxically tying China ever more tightly to the dollar. In the past, Chinese importers settled more of their trade in dollars. This dollar outflow relieved some of the upward pressure on the yuan’s exchange rate. Insofar as yuan settlement replaces this dollar outflow with a yuan outflow, it erodes one of China’s few channels for easing the pressure on its currency. To keep the yuan down, the central bank will end up adding more dollars to its stockpile, not fewer.

Foreigners will be keen to acquire yuan, and reluctant to part with it, for as long as they think it is artificially cheap. That perception was only reinforced by China’s external surplus of $69.6 billion in the second quarter, a big jump from the previous three months. That may have prompted China’s central bank to let the yuan rise to a rate of 6.4 redbacks to one green.

The government is also making diplomatic efforts on behalf of the redback. It is nudging countries such as Venezuela to pay in yuan. Indeed, in June yuan payments from the mainland to Hong Kong fell short of payments in the other direction, contributing to a conspicuous slowdown in offshore deposits. But that may reflect the Chinese regulator’s decision to tighten up on triangular trade transactions, in which Chinese importers paid yuan to an intermediary, who then paid the foreign supplier in dollars.

A pause in the breakneck growth of yuan deposits may be a relief to some. These deposits are not particularly profitable for Hong Kong banks, because they are struggling to find anyone to lend them to. In June, outstanding loans amounted to only 11 billion yuan, giving banks a yuan loan-to-deposit ratio of just 2%.

Hong Kong is keen to embrace its role as China’s offshore financial laboratory. But the experiment is not without side-effects. The helicopter buzzing back and forth across the skyline represents the financial centre’s more yuan-denominated future. But it was a relief when a rainstorm forced it to take a break. The Economist