Massacre, memory and the wounds of 1965

Doubts and divisions emerge from symposium on the country’s notorious 1965 killings. Yet, there is still hope for reconciling a haunting past.

No one disputes the “National Symposium on the 1965 Tragedy” (Jakarta, 18-19 April 2016) was a historic milestone in Indonesia’s struggle to come to terms with its darkest history, the anti-communist bloodbath from late 1965. However, few can agree what to make of it, how to respond to the initiative, and what to expect from it. The event was full of ambiguities and contradictions that got lost in most reports and commentaries in international and English media.

                                     Read the book available in both English and Bahasa Indonesia

The event was jointly sponsored and organised by unlikely partners: military officers within the government and its strongest critics.  One lesson I took from being an invited speaker (the only one from outside Indonesia)  was that the Symposium manifested, more clearly than ever before, doubts, indecisiveness and divisions both within the country’s political elite, as well as among their critics and human rights activists over what to do with the haunting past, and how to move forward toward some kind of closure.

Notwithstanding the enigmas, the Symposium deserves congratulations for being the first national forum, broadcast live for the global audience, where elements from extremely diverse parties exchanged views. More importantly, there was a common commitment from each party to listen attentively to unpleasant views from other parties.

Exceptions to such novel civility existed. They were rare, including a minor and inconsequential incident, or another that requires further scrutiny. For instance, the audience jeered and interrupted when anti-communist poet Taufiq Ismail read sloganeering poetry about the communist cruelty. In opening the Symposium two retired generals made highly provocative remarks.

Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security Affairs, Luhut Panjaitan, declared in a loud and commanding voice that there was no way for his government to offer an apology to the victims of the 1965 massacre. He questioned the widely held view of the large number of victims of the massacre (between half to one million). Supporting his statement was his senior Sintong Panjaitan who spoke next. In contrast, to its reaction to poet Ismail, the audience held breath as the two former generals spoke and immediately launched a series of counter-statements.

Their statements flew in the face of the statement presented just minutes earlier by Lieutenant General (Ret) Agus Widjojo, chair of the advisory council for the Symposium. With admirable humility and open-mindedness, Widjojo invited all participants to speak frankly and truthfully, to be prepared to listen to differences and to work collaboratively to seek the best possible scenario that all victims deserve.

One of the most liberal minded officers among his rank, Widjojo was the key initiator of the Symposium. Another key person behind the Symposium, senior politician Sidarto Danusubroto, closed the event with extremely promising statements, in line with those of Widjojo at the outset.

But bad news makes good news. It was the statements from the two Panjaitans that most attracted reporters and commentators in the international media for many days that followed. Such reports suggest the Symposium was a complete sham, or one that was designed to fail. If so, why did the government bother to sponsor it in the first place? Black-and-white journalist reporting is ill-prepared to answer such a question.

As Luhut Panjaitan entered his car and was about to leave the venue, he softened his stance to activists who challenged his statement. He indicated a commitment to visiting the mass graves of the 1965 massacres. Days later, his position softened even further when the President instructed him to be more open to the issue. In less than a week, he said a formal state apology was under serious consideration.

Binary opposites of good versus bad was the dominant perspective at the height of the Cold War leading to the 1965 massacre. This legacy remains alive today and is not confined among international observers of Indonesia. Objection to the Symposium was made by those on the extreme right and left of Indonesia’s contemporary political spectrum.

A number of human rights activists and advocates for the 1965 victims criticised the Symposium. Some suspected it was a government ploy to whitewash and self-exonerate. Others called for a boycott, and called fellow activists traitors for attending.

At the other end of the political spectrum, an anti-communist militia organisation, Front Pancasila, denounced the symposium, calling it a communist event. They vowed to mobilise their mass supporters to disrupt the gathering. They did come to the heavily guarded venue, only to be quickly pushed away by the police after some brawls.

Internal sources told me that the army was very unhappy with the Symposium. Top officers reprimanded Luhut’s for opening the event, calling Agus Widjojo a communist (despite his being a son of a general killed by the left-leaning movement in 1965) and demanded the Symposium be cancelled. Some senior military officers scheduled to speak, including one on my panel, did not show up.

The bits and pieces of contradictory information available at the moment lead me to reread Luhut’s oscillating position. When opening the Symposium, I think Luhut spoke not so much to the audience in front of him, but to the military outside the venue as his target audience, restoring his questioned loyalty to the corps. He may be more concerned with his own career and reputation than the 1965 issue or how it can be resolved.

If forced, he would soften his stance quickly, and move into a safe zone under President Widodo’s more liberal policy. Likewise, if circumstances demand, he would work with human rights activists, but prefers that the latter to do the dirty and difficult work of collecting evidence of the crimes of the state.

This is to ensure that he would remain acceptable to those in opposition to the revelation of truth of the 1965 massacre, and all the consequences that might follow from such revelation.

Ariel Heryanto is Professor at the Australian National University’s School of Culture, History and Language. He was an invited speaker at the two-day symposium on Indonesia’s mass killings, “Dissecting the 1965 tragedy”. 

Indonesian peasant women concrete their own feet for 36 hours in front of Palace to save their farms and local environment from a cement factory

Cementing dissent in Indonesia

                   Female peasants protesting in front of the state palace

A dramatic demonstration in Jakarta that saw peasant women concrete their own feet for 36 hours to save their farms and local environment from a cement factory.

The accelerating rate of land and resource dispossession in post-authoritarian Indonesia has led to a number of confrontations between state and corporate authorities on one side and peasant communities on the other.

Many of these conflicts, though garnering much attention from sympathetic activists, remain localised. However, there are moments when peasants and their activist allies decide to scale up their direct action.

This can be seen in the recent protest of nine female peasants – famously known as the Kartinis – from Rembang regency in Central Java. After travelling over 500 kilometres to protest in front of the State Palace in Jakarta, they decided to cement their feet in opposition of the ongoing construction of a cement factory by the state-owned PT Semen Indonesia in their hometown.

The purpose was to halt the construction of the cement plant and have a dialogue with President Jokowi. It is a part of their longer-term strategy, stretching back to the early days of the plant’s construction in June, 2014. Approximately 680 days have passed since then.

According to Joko Prianto aka Prin, one of the protest coordinators, for almost two years protesting citizens have faced all sorts of threats and persecution from authorities, including being threatened by police and military officers as well as hired thugs. This time, they decided to voice their grievances directly in front of the State Palace because they felt that the government did not pay enough attention to their cause — in fact, the protest site is very near to the famous Kamisan human rights weekly demonstration held every Thursday.

The latest act was not their first demonstration in Jakarta. Last year, the citizens also staged a protest in front of the palace by making noise using alu and lesung – the traditional rice grinder and its mortar.

I had the privilege to observe and participate in the second day of this historic protest on Wednesday, 13 April. This session lasted until 5.50 pm, when the protesters decided to break the cement blocks off their feet.

Organisations whose representatives and activists were present included the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation (LBH Jakarta), the Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago (AMAN), the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), Migrant Care, the Indonesian Labour Union of Transportation-Struggle (SBTPI), the Confederation of All-Indonesia Workers’ Unions (KSPI), IndoPROGRESS, Perempuan Mahardhika, Jaringan Gusdurian, Politik Rakyat, and the National Student League for Democracy (LMND), among others.

Representatives from the National Human Rights Commissions (Komnas HAM) and the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) were also present. Despite their different emphases, these speakers essentially underlined similar points: the importance of peasant livelihoods, the rights of local communities as citizens, and environmental sustainability.

Two national MPs, Irma Chaniago from NasDem and Siti Mukaromah from the moderate Islamic PKB, were also present at the protest site and expressed their support for the protesters. On the first day of the protest, two high-ranking state officials, the President’s Executive Office Chief of Staff Teten Masduki and the Minister of State Secretary Pratikno also paid a visit to the protesters. Activists took this gesture with a grain of salt. Some even greeted it with suspicion. Considering the government’s continuing lack of attention to agrarian issues, such a critical stance is understandable.

But nothing is more powerful than the message from the protesters themselves, who reminded the establishment about the destruction that the cement plant will bring to their livelihood and the environment.

It is important to note however that despite all the excitement, the protesting crowd remained relatively small. Many of the sympathetic activists and middle-class allies, who knew about the protest from word of mouth and social media, know each other. Perhaps this is indicative of the lack of public awareness of the severity of agrarian problems in contemporary Indonesia.

This lack of public awareness notwithstanding, the acuteness of agrarian conflicts in post-authoritarian Indonesia has increased in the last seven years. According to the Consortium for Agrarian Reform’s (KPA) 2014 year-end report, during the second term of the Yudhoyono Presidency (2009-2014) agrarian conflicts involving peasant communities and state and corporate authorities had increased more than five times, from 89 cases in 2009 to 472 cases in 2014. These conflicts spanned across an area of more than 2.8 million hectares in 2014.

KPA also reports that throughout 2015, the first year of Jokowi’s presidency, there were at least 250 cases of agrarian conflicts in an area of 400,000 hectares. A series of working papers from another agrarian studies think-tank, Sajogyo Institute, also records different forms of multi-layered dispossession in numerous rural communities throughout Indonesia. This does not mean that success stories of peasant struggle are entirely absent. However, success stories remain few in number, and small and local in scale.

Given this bleak situation, the only logical collective response from Indonesian agrarian and peasant movements seems to be to build lower-class social movements and multi-sectoral alliances with other marginalised social forces. With the fragmentation and patronage that characterises Indonesian civil society, efforts to build such a movement are a Herculean task. But it is not totally impossible.

The courageous and exemplary action of the female peasants of Kendeng Mountains – the Kartinis – are an important step to revitalise peasants’ struggle for livelihood. While their small act of protest does not necessarily change the current situation, it at least keeps the struggle alive.

Iqra Anugrah is a PhD candidate in Political Science and Southeast Asian Studies at Northern Illinois University. He writes his dissertation on the politics of elite-peasant relations in post-authoritarian Indonesia. He is also an editor for IndoPROGRESS, an online journal connecting progressive scholars and activists in Indonesia.

 

Time to Get Tough With China - Nixon-Kissinger forty-five-year science experiment—an experiment that has failed

The United States’ approach to dealing with China from the Nixon-Kissinger era onwards resembles a forty-five-year science experiment—an experiment that has failed.

The underlying hypothesis was that an accommodating approach to the PRC would inevitably lead to a more liberal China that followed the established rules of the international system. It seemed so logical, as it was under that system that China would so handsomely benefit.

After four-plus decades, there is scant evidence this hypothesis is correct. In fact, the PRC’s relentless effort to create what might cheekily be called a “Greater South China Sea Co-Prosperity Sphere” belies any notion this view was ever correct. China’s island-building expansion across the South China Sea is just the latest evidence that most of the “experts” got China wrong.

Fortunately, the South China Sea is now properly getting attention. But the PRC’s objective is, at a minimum, regional hegemony. While the United States must hold the line in the region and make clear it won’t be bullied out of East Asia, the South China Sea problem will not be resolved in the South China Sea itself.

Rather, a successful approach must also involve simultaneously applying pressure elsewhere on the PRC—and particularly on the ruling elite in the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Ultimately, the United States must take the lead and develop a comprehensive strategy, similar in its broad scope to the strategy used to protect U.S. interests when dealing with the Soviet Union. Although it will be useful to involve other countries in this effort, there is no single country or combination of countries in Asia that by themselves can restrain the PRC. Like it or not, it’s up to the Americans, and an effort to hold the line might include the following components.

 

Establish That the United States Has Its Own Core Interests

Just as China demands respect for its “core interests”—as if stating them as a core interest automatically makes them unassailable—the United States should declare publicly and privately that it possesses its own core interests in Asia, and will defend them.

This requires more than just talk and furrowed-brow pronouncements of concern—or even of “grave concern.” U.S. forces need to maintain a constant, credible, and obvious presence on, below and above the South (and East) China Sea, regardless of cost.

 

Establish a Permanent, Serious Presence in the South China Sea

There should be no more half-hearted FONOPs broadcast in advance, as if seeking Chinese acquiescence. This sheepish approach has had minimal effect. The United States should broadly publicize and criticize Chinese military provocations. Don’t hush them up, always respond and be prepared to “bump back” when Chinese vessels use a favored method to impede U.S. ships.

Clarify and Strengthen U.S.-Japan Bonds

Solidly link U.S. and Japanese forces, with the “unsplittable” political linkage that comes with it. This linkage will present People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planners with their most difficult challenge. Neither the United States nor Japan can maintain its position in the Asia-Pacific without the other’s fullest support.

The United States and Japan should continue to better integrate their military capabilities, to include contingency planning, joint training and patrols, and interoperable command-and-control systems. Build camaraderie and interoperability along the lines of the U.S.-UK military relationship, back when bilateral relations were at their peak. A compelling reason for Japan to seek this interoperability is that, once China has the South China Sea “locked up,” the East China Sea is next.

Better alignment of U.S. forces and Japan Self-Defense Forces will also have a bracing effect on other regional nations that are nervously watching the PRC—and just as nervously watching whether the U.S. can and will still lead.

Although ASEAN will never take a unified stance toward PRC territorial aggression, it is possible to encourage a handful of ASEAN nations to do more. For those countries, doing more includes joining multilateral patrols and exercises in the South China Sea and surrounding waters. This, of course, requires convincing these nations that they will not be left hanging due to the United States once again displaying temerity and ambiguity about challenging PRC domination of the region.

 

Kill “Engagement for Engagement’s Sake”

The United States should restrict engagement with the PLA to what is professional and essential. The longstanding policy of engagement for engagement’s sake has not produced a less belligerent Chinese military, nor has it deterred the PRC. More to the point, it makes the United States appear to be a supplicant, clearly the more interested in developing military-to-military relations, and provides Beijing with a point of leverage where one need not exist. Pending sudden improvement in PRC behavior, the United States should withdraw the PRC’s invitation to the July 2016 RIMPAC exercise in Hawaii.

While “holding the line” in the South China Sea area is essential, pressure needs to be applied elsewhere via a number of different lines of effort.

 

Implement the Taiwan Relations Act as Originally Intended

The United States should make it clear that it backs Taiwan against any coerced change in the status quo. This means the United States should provide requested high-tech arms, and even submarines. The United States might even push Japan to sell its older subs to Taiwan, keying this to Chinese behavior towards both Japan and Taiwan.

This is not a change from the United States’s longstanding “One China” policy. Yes, the United States recognizes only one China—and a “One China” that looks like Taiwan would not be a bad thing. Taiwan is a priceless reminder that Chinese people can govern themselves in a consensual manner, and have a free press, a full range of individual liberties and a functioning legal system.

Taiwan belies the CPC’s claims that stability and prosperity in China requires repression. This argument recalls apartheid-era Afrikaners insisting that black Africans were a unique race that demanded a boot on the neck, and were happy to have it.

 

Apply Meaningful Economic Pressure

It is long past time that the PRC follow its World Trade Organization commitments. Rather than continue to allow exceptions, the United States should insist on the simple—but apparently radical, by Washington standards—approach that China obey trade laws.

Also, the Americans might require the PRC to allow reciprocal treatment and market access for U.S. and foreign companies. China’s serial, decades-long record of hacking and intellectual property theft needs to be punished with real sanctions. There are many opportunities for punishing sanctions that would be effective.

The U.S. government’s recent harsh sanctions on Chinese electronics maker ZTE, for illegal dealings with Iran and other sanctioned countries, were a good example of what can be done. Still, it might have been more useful if these sanctions had been kept in place longer than two weeks before the United States backed down.

The United States might also apply pressure of the sort that will squeeze China’s ruling class by upsetting the money-making machine, centered on manufacturing and exports, that is the source of its power. Start taking thirty days to clear Chinese ships entering the United States, rightfully justified by the need to check carefully for counterfeits and unsafe products. Delayed cargo clearance and Lloyd’s of London raising insurance rates would potentially apply more pressure on PRC elites than the U.S. Air Force could dream of inflicting.

 

Use International Law to Challenge the PRC

The United States should energetically seek to bring territorial and other disputes to international forums for resolution—and support countries that do likewise. Further, in these legal forums, condemn and respond forcefully to the environmental damage foisted on the global commons by unbridled Chinese island building and its rapacious commercial fishing fleet.

This is helpful, but will not be decisive. International law has its limits, and the PRC will either ignore it or absorb whatever criticism ensues from unfavorable court rulings. In the PRC’s view, criticism is a small price to pay for gaining domination of the South China Sea and other useful territory.

Get Beyond Sophomoric Strategic Communication: Develop a Useful U.S. Narrative

In the absence of a clear national strategy for confronting the PRC’s bullying behavior and expansionism, it’s no surprise that what passes for U.S. strategic communication regarding the threat is not working. There is no “whole-of-government” communication approach to the threat, and a lack of useful synchronicity in messaging between the National Security Council, State Department and Department of Defense.

On this point, America should take bold action: it can tell the truth about the PRC.

Further, the United States can aggressively and unapologetically speak up for the system of rights, freedoms and accepted rules of international behavior that, in fact, has been largely responsible for the PRC’s development over the last forty years.

From senior U.S. officials down to the wide range of U.S. influencers, constantly challenge and expose false Chinese claims of the South China Sea being “historically Chinese” and transparently false statements of “non-militarization” of the islands. And go after China’s willful ecological destruction of the reefs and natural habitat of the South China Sea.

Exploit existing cultural exchanges and journalist programs to bring in emerging leaders, journalists and other influentials from like-minded nations in the Pacific to examine such topics as the likely future impact of PRC hegemony on the Asia-Pacific region.

These are simply a few strategies and tactics. There is much more that should be done. But the United States must quickly get beyond its often confusing, timorous statements suggesting “grave concern” from State Department spokesmen or other U.S. government officials. The United States must begin to speak firmly, clearly and consistently.

Meanwhile, in the existing vacuum, the Chinese position is heard repeatedly from multiple channels, as if playing on a loop. The PRC’s claims may be nonsense, but if they unchallenged or inconsistently opposed, the relentless claims tend to reinforce the Chinese position and create a sense of inevitability.

 

Stop Abetting—and Publicize—Corruption by China’s Elite

Public anger over corruption is probably what scares the Communist Party of China’s leadership the most. The CPC has outdone the old pre-1949 KMT in terms of corruption. One may be skeptical of President Xi’s selective efforts to punish corruption—until, perhaps, he arrests a relative. Regardless, the problem is too deep-seated in the nature of the Communist system for Xi to fix.

The United States should stop abetting the illegal capital outflows that constitute one of the biggest thefts in history. CPC efforts to suppress the recent Panama Papers reports that included evidence of leading CPC families’ involvement in secret offshore companies, and its harassment of the New York Times and Bloomberg several years ago for reporting ruling-class corruption, show how this issue frightens the Chinese leadership.

Expose ruling-class corruption—perhaps starting with the top fifty CPC leaders and their families—and trumpet it repeatedly and widely. The United States is aware of part of the problem, but it can uncover much more with proper effort. Simply requiring Chinese investors in the United States to prove their money was lawfully exported from the PRC would be useful.

For those already here, selectively place liens on real estate and finances. And suspend green cards, until the card holders provide a note from the PRC government verifying and explaining how the money to make their grand purchases was lawfully exported from China. This may resemble “Chicago politics,” but that is sometimes appropriate, and something the current U.S. administration is presumably familiar with.

The PRC routinely claims its actions are just a response to mistreatment (past and present) by foreigners. This is debatable, but CPC corruption is unquestionably a homegrown phenomenon that’s hard to blame on outsiders.

America must develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to stop PRC aggression. Until such a strategy is developed, though, it is imperative that the U.S. begin demonstrating real resolve, and impose meaningful costs on the PRC for its actions.

The point of the recommendations made herein is not to “bully” the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, there is something depressing about all this, as there has never been a country more welcomed and encouraged to become a responsible member of the world community. Nevertheless, it is past time to begin actively deterring the PRC from its increasingly brazen and dangerous actions.

By deterring China, the United States defends its interests and the free world’s interests in respect for the rule of law, and the notion that big nations cannot take by force what they want from little nations.

Conversely, by failing to deter China, America acquiesces to the belligerence of an authoritarian regime whose stated intent is regional domination. This failure will prove devastating for the United States’ friends and allies in Asia, and for America’s future regional and global prospects.

Grant Newsham is senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies. He is a retired U.S. Marine Colonel and a former U.S. diplomat. Kerry Gershaneck is a Senior Associate with Pacific Forum CSIS, an associate with the East-West Center, and a professor at a major Asian military academy. He is a former spokesperson for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and directed strategic communications operations in both the Asia-Pacific region and Southwest Asia.

The dangers presented by China’s hypersonic weapons build-up

                                                                   Chinese WU-14 hypersonic glide vehicle

Back just three years ago, in February of 2013, a high-ranking US naval official remarked that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was preparing to wage, if called upon, what he called “a short sharp war to destroy Japanese forces in the East China Sea …”

Capt. James Fanell, then deputy chief of staff intelligence and information operations for PACFLEET, made the remark in reference to training exercises being conducted by China when it came to Japanese holdings in the East China Sea. Such remarks took the press by storm, clearly a sign of the dangers presented by Beijing’s rapid military modernization as well as its constant saber-rattling over the Senkaku Islands.

But just like all strategic challenges, threats can evolve — and in the case of the broader Asia-Pacific, the region is a far more dangerous place than it was in 2013. Indeed, the amount of places that China is now challenging the status quo — in the East China Sea, once again pushing back against Taiwan and in multiple places within the South China Sea — is a troubling sign of not only Beijing’s reckless approach towards its neighbors, but further evidence of an unyielding quest to dominate the region all the way to the first and likely second-island chains.

So what would be the instruments used to wage such a short, sharp war in any of these above contested bodies of water if the unthinkable occurred? The most likely weapon of choice would be China’s much discussed anti-access/area-denial strategy (A2/AD). Such a strategy — loaded with various scores of cruise and ballistic missiles — would rain down on allied bases throughout the first island chain all the way to Guam as well as on any incoming US naval assets in the region and deploying to any possible combat zone China would conceivably want to wage war in. Various experts within the Pentagon that I have spoken to personally over the last several years worry Washington is not ready for the challenges presented by an asymmetric Chinese strategy that has been crafted to cause large losses of men and material very quickly or, what Beijing ultimately hopes for, an America deterred by the scale of the A2/AD threat that stands down — abandoning critical allies in the process. China hopes to win quickly … or simply not fight at all.

A mysterious weapon:

Unfortunately for Washington, China’s A2/AD strategy is about to become even more deadly — thanks to the growing sophistication of Beijing’s hypersonic weapons program, or in layman’s terms, missiles that can move 5 more times faster than the speed of sound (Mach 5+).

Such weapons are not exactly new and have been sought after by various nations like Russia as well as India for some time now. But with Beijing now having tested such systems on seven different occasions, America must now consider the possibility that in the next few years Washington and its allies will face considerable challenges in any sort of kinetic conflict with Beijing — a conflict that could see missiles moving at incredible speeds that will present tremendous problems for allied planners.

Up until recently, we have known little about the nature of China’s hypersonics program. Thanks to the great reporting of Bill Gertz at The Washington Free Beacon/Washington Times and others, we have been provided  a small window into the frequency and nature of Beijing’s efforts–efforts that seem to be on par or possibly even surpass current US efforts.

But while important press reports are certainly needed on this topic, deeper intellectual analysis has been missing. For example: what are the possible strategic plans for such weapons? What would they be able to do on the battlefield? How could they be used in combination with other Chinese weapons?

Lifting the veil:

Thanks to a new report in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief journal, two researchers at The Potomac Foundation have attempted to answer many of the deeper intellectual questions when it comes to China’s hypersonic weapons — and with some very frightening conclusions Asia hands will be pondering for sometime to come. (Note: I am also a fellow at The Potomac Foundation).

Authors Erika Solem and Karen Montague provide one of the strongest research studies of China’s hypersonic weapons programs to date. As the authors explain:

“China has conducted six DF-ZF tests [now seven] in the past year and a half. Although frequency does not determine test quality, it does demonstrate that China is dedicated to the successful development of this technology. Its 10th Research Institute (also known as the “Near Space Flight Vehicle Research Institute”), which is under the China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC) 1st Academy, is the sole entity responsible for the development of HGVs [hypersonic glide vehicle]. This unique concentration of the entirety of the program into the 10th Research Institute seems to have facilitated a remarkably quick development of China’s DF-ZF.”

And why would China seek such quick development and deployment of such a weapon? Fear of current and possible future US missile defenses in the region:

“China’s primary goal for the HGV is to have it travel fast enough while making use of the HGV’s unique flight characteristics to evade BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) systems. China has expressed its frustration with deployed US BMD in the Western Pacific for over a decade due to the perception that such a system would degrade China’s limited nuclear deterrent … Most of China’s HGV tests have attempted to travel distances up to 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles) and have been launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Shanxi province. The intended distance of these tests is a strong indicator that China is either less advanced in its HGV development than the United States or is focused on addressing regional threats. If China successfully designs an operational short-range HGV, it will have a better chance of delivering successful missile strikes against its regional adversaries. Given China’s strategic focus on regional security issues—particularly on developing the ability to defeat Taiwan militarily—a shorter-range HGV addresses China’s more immediate needs.”

Indeed, when it comes to negation of important missile defense investments, the above mirrors an interview I conducted back in 2014 with experts from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). When I asked them about the utility of US missiles defenses against hypersonic weapons they explained:

“Defensive missiles have very limited time and a finite amount of energy available to position themselves to intercept an incoming offensive missile. Like most guided weapons they constantly compute and re-compute the point in space where they will intercept the incoming missile and fly toward that point. If the incoming missile is truly a ballistic missile, then its trajectory is essentially fixed and the interceptor will not need to maneuver much because the calculated intercept point will be quite stable. However, if the incoming missile can maneuver, the interceptor will need to maneuver as well. Given the high speeds and short timelines involved, hypersonic glide vehicles have the potential to make defensive missiles less effective than they might be against non-maneuvering targets.”

And from there it just gets even more worrisome for US forces and their allies. According to Solem and Montague:

“One major application of a hypersonic glide vehicle could be to deliver a “decapitating strike,” which is an attack on an adversary’s command-and-control centers. An example would be to strike the US’s military bases in Asia, hoping to render American forces vulnerable and incapable of an immediate retaliatory response. If conducted successfully, this approach causes an opponent to be unable to retaliate with its own weapons. Some aspects of Chinese strategy already emphasize these tactics, for example, network attacks to paralyze an opponent’s communications at the outset of a conflict. The DF-ZF could provide “hard” kill capability against hardened infrastructure or leadership facilities to complement cyber-attack “soft kills” against infrastructure.”

Dangerous times for America and vital allies — especially in a crisis:

Besides other applications, such as use as a platform for a nuclear weapons strike, China’s possible use of hypersonic weapons as it relates to its A2/AD strategy becomes quite clear through the above research conducted by Solem and Montague. It is widely surmised that there is a strong likelihood Beijing would use devastating ‘saturation strikes’ in any war with America and its allies. Using a combination of cruise and ballistic weapons fired from land, air and sea allied forces could be in for a rough time defending against the sheer amount of Chinese volleys being fired. However, adding in hypersonic strikes, moving at such speed that at present seems quite challenging to defend against, Beijing would gain a clear advantage in such a conflict. When combined with cyber attacks on command and control nodes and other asymmetric strikes, US and allied efforts to launch a successful counter strike could be severely compromised — with Beijing possible winning a short and very sharp conflict thanks to the edge gained by hypersonic weapons.

The future is now:

Thankfully, Washington and its allies do have options on the table for dealing with hypersonic weapons. Experts at CSBA back in 2014 explained that “options for bolstering defenses include the electromagnetic railgun and directed-energy technologies currently under development.” Also, they noted that additional “countermeasures include using jammers or other electronic countermeasure techniques to deny targeting data to the attacker or to confuse the hypersonic glide vehicle’s own sensors as it attempts to hit its target” could be helpful.

However, common sense would suggest an even better idea: making sure Washington is further ahead in the research and deployment of such weapons–ensuring Beijing is also confronted with all of the above potential challenges as well.

Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) is a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest as well as at The Potomac Foundation and author of the new monograph The Tao of A2/AD: China’s Rationale for the Creation of Anti-Access

 

How China is building the future in sub-Saharan Africa – and why the US needs to rethink its approach

China’s role in Congo’s economic and infrastructural development shows the nature and reach of its global aspirations, whereas America’s focus on political institutions and humanitarian goals is proving less attractive than actual jobs and growth

While much is made of China’s expanding footprint in Asia, the reach of its global aspirations can be seen in Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo reveals the complex dynamics of China’s interaction with the continent, and the inability of the US to balance it.

The fundamental reason for this state of affairs is that American and Chinese foreign-policy priorities in sub-Saharan Africa, of which Congo is a part, diverge considerably.

According to a 2013 study conducted by the US Government Accountability Office, America’s goals include building democracy, promoting development, supporting commerce and strengthening security. Beijing, by contrast, emphasises its mission of establishing closer ties with African countries. Its principles of engagement include seeking mutual benefit, and not interfering in the domestic affairs of African countries.

Beijing’s pivot towards Africa

While economic engagement features on the agendas of both nations, the US’ democracy-building efforts differ markedly from China’s stance. In Congo – as, actually, anywhere else in the developing world – states prefer the pursuit of economic interest over being pursued by others over democracy and human rights.

This is understandable: states are inherently conservative in defending their sovereignty. But what is more interesting is that the Congolese people themselves exemplify the general African preference for Chinese economic investment over American humanitarian aid and calls to strengthen democracy.

As Jacob Kushner argues in an article published in The American Interest, it is “clear that the Congolese admire the Chinese model founded upon private enterprise and non-interference in their domestic politics”. It is not that Africans are apathetic to the necessity of democratic structures: no people are, no matter what their governments say. Rather, it is that political norms sound hollow when economic and infrastructural development is woefully inadequate in meeting basic material needs.

The Congolese prioritise economics over politics for obvious reasons. The country is among the poorest in the world, with per capita income standing at a mere US$380 in 2014 and the poverty rate towering at 63 per cent in 2012. It was ranked 176 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index last year.

However, it is actually a rich country with poor people. Two-thirds the size of the European Union, it has 80 million hectares of arable land and contains more than 1,100 identified minerals and precious metals.

Within resource-abundant Africa, it is home to the biggest reserves of precious ores, including diamonds, gold, cassiterite, copper and cobalt (of which Congo houses the largest reserves). The country’s estimated mineral wealth is a staggering US$24 trillion – equivalent to the combined GDP of the United States and Europe! No wonder the World Bank believes Congo has the potential to become one of the richest countries on the continent and a driver of African growth.

What s required is an economic model that will work for the country.

Applying what is known as the Hausmann Rodrik Velasco methodology to Congo, the four main “binding constraints” that are specific to its economic environment are: government failures; lack of finance; lack of energy infrastructure; and lack of transport infrastructure.

The World Bank believes the investment needed in Congo is one of the highest in Africa. The bank has supported a study that comprises a prioritisation framework for infrastructure, and has placed the scope of investment needs at some US$5 billion a year.

Experts argue that no two developing countries will face the exact same set of constraints, and attempting to categorise them in that way will be unproductive.

This is where China makes a crucial difference. Its Congo policy is targeted specifically at developing infrastructure, in keeping with the Harvard economists’ methodology. By contrast, US policy appears to be one-size-fits-all, and relatively less tailored to the specific needs of Congo.

Roads, schools and hospitals built by the Chinese have transformed the country’s economic prospects. Indeed, Congo has posted a respectable annual average economic growth rate of close to 8 per cent since 2010, well above the average for sub-Saharan Africa.

Today, China is going as far as setting up local operations in Congo to export commodities back to its own industrial sector. China reaps the lion’s share of dividends from the partnership, but the Congolese, too, benefit. For example, Congo’s inability to cut and finish the diamonds for which it is famous was a drag on development.

US strategy remains caught up in a political time warp even in the face of Chinese advances

Congo is a part of the Chinese strategy of economic development. China does not possess sufficient strategic resources to fuel its industries. Hence, it has been procuring them abroad, locking up supplies by encouraging state-owned enterprises and private companies to strike exclusive mining deals worldwide.

China already has a monopoly over rare earth elements, which are key ingredients for most hi-tech manufactured goods, including cars, television sets and mobile phones. Congo is one of the few places that boast a dependable supply of these elements. This is a source of the synergy between Chinese and Congolese interests.

By contrast, US strategy remains caught up in a political time warp even in the face of Chinese advances. US aid has gone largely into the improvement of health care and other humanitarian areas while China speeds ahead with helping Congo’s infrastructure development.

Not only does American economic coyness impinge on countries such as Congo, but it also touches on American interests themselves. For example, the Chinese locking up of oil resources in Africa may affect US energy security because Beijing would have the ability to take these oil sources off the world market and use them exclusively for its own industrial development.

The truth is that the US cannot afford to ignore China in Africa any more than in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.

While Sino-US rivalry is not as acute as was hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war scramble for Africa, today’s rivalry is real. As in the Middle East, the Chinese are making incremental gains in Africa even as the Americans are challenged to maintain the strategic status quo, which is to their advantage.

In the Asia-Pacific, of course, the Chinese are closing in rapidly. The establishment of the Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank against Washington’s wishes is a case in point.

Congo exemplifies the need for America to refocus its diplomatic attention to Africa, with a strong emphasis on economic and infrastructural development, in order to balance China’s global ambitions.

Eric Mboma is the CEO of Standard Bank Group, Democratic Republic of Congo and a Harvard Kennedy School alumnus.

 

That Sykes-Picot Deal – dismembering the Turkey’s Ottoman Empire

Map of Sykes–Picot Agreement showing Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria and Western Persia, and areas of control and influence agreed between the British and the French. Royal Geographical Society, 1910-15. Signed by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, 8 May 1916. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

A day in May 2016 will mark the centenary of the famous, or notorious, Sykes-Picot agreement – but what day is the subject of some disagreement. The Encyclopedia Britannica says the agreement dates from May 9, 1916.

Putting the fine detail to one side, the fact remains that during the First World War the so-called Triple Alliance (Britain, France and Imperial Russia), fighting the German-Austro-Hungarian-Turkish alliance, conspired together to dismember Turkey’s Ottoman Empire at the first opportunity. Discussions began in November 1915, and the final agreement took its name from its negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and François Georges-Picot of France.

What was the Sykes-Picot agreement? In essence it was an understanding to carve up the vast areas of the Middle East then under the control of the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence – some to be under their direct rule, some to be administered by Arab governments but subject to British or French tutelage.

But oh, perfidious Albion! For at precisely the time that Britain and France, with Russian connivance, were planning the dismemberment and redistribution of the Ottoman Empire, Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, was in correspondence with Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, concerning the future political status of the Ottoman territories. In short, it was a classic double-cross. The Arab world was seeking its independence from the Turkish-ruled Ottoman Empire, and in the exchange of letters Britain proposed a deal. If the Arabs, led by Hussein bin Ali, rose against Turkey – which together with Germany was fighting Britain and its allies – Britain agreed to recognize Arab independence after the war “in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sharif of Mecca”.

Of course, when the Arab revolt duly began with British military and financial support on June 10, 1916 – the campaign master-minded by T E Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) – nothing was known by the Arabs about the Sykes-Picot agreement, nor its plan to slice up the Middle East and share it out between Britain and France.

When Lawrence learned of Sykes-Picot he was furious. He drove the Arabs he led into a desperate race to capture Damascus and declare an independent Arab state before the British Army could get there. That manoeuvre failed, and after Damascus was captured by combined British and Arab forces, Britain insisted that Sykes-Picot was to prevail over promises to bin Ali.
Lawrence’s guilt about the broken promises to the Arabs led him to reject all honors, give up his rank, and join the Royal Air Force in 1922 under an assumed name, as an aircraftman second class.

As events transpired, not only were Britain’s promises to bin Ali a dead letter, but so too were the details of the Sykes-Picot agreement, for it never came to fruition as originally conceived. It was revised on a number of occasions. For example, the borders of the newly-founded Republic of Turkey were settled by the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, concluded after the Allied powers lost the war in Asia Minor. And at the San Remo Conference of the League of Nations in 1920, it was only the underlying strategy, not the detail, of Sykes-Picot that was set in place. The significance of San Remo is that the Sykes-Picot agreement ceased to be a secret deal between two imperial powers, but its basic premise became the internationally approved and endorsed foundation of governance in the Middle East.

The Sykes-Picot agreement did not quite envisage the Mandate system, established by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but the underlying presumptions of the Mandate and the agreement are in accord. Article 22 referred to territories which, after the war, were no longer under their previous ruler, but whose peoples were not considered “able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”. The article called for the governance of such peoples to be “entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility”.

The process of establishing the Mandates consisted of two phases: the formal removal of sovereignty from the state previously controlling the territory, and the transfer of mandatory powers to an “advanced nation”. It was under these Sykes-Picot inspired provisions that in July 1922 the huge area then designated as Palestine passed into the control of Great Britain, which was charged with establishing a national home for the Jewish people therein. Fifty-one member countries – the entire League of Nations – unanimously declared on July 24, 1922: “…recognition has been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.”

It had been agreed in the Cairo Conference of March 1921, convened by Britain’s Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, that Transjordan would be added to Britain’s Palestine mandate on condition that the Jewish national home provisions would not apply there. Britain presented this done deal to the League and so, just two months after granting Britain the Palestine mandate, the League of Nations consented to Britain declaring that the provisions for setting up a Jewish national home would not apply to the area east of the Jordan River. Consequently three-quarters of the territory included in the Mandate eventually became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The subsequent history of the British Mandate is well-known. Britain failed to reconcile Arab leaders to its commitment under the Mandate, opposition flared into open revolt, armed clashes between Arabs and Jews proliferated, and British troops were pulled further and further in what amounted to open warfare against both sides. Under pressure Britain virtually reneged on its Mandate commitment. Far from facilitating a Jewish national home. the White Papers of 1930 and 1939 restricted immigration and the acquisition of land by Jews. On November 29, 1947 the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution to partition Palestine . Britain announced the termination of its Mandate, to take effect on May 15, 1948. On May 14 the State of Israel was proclaimed.

A strange symbiosis seems to exist between the Sykes-Picot agreement and Israel’s Independence Day, even as regards the exact anniversary of each event. For Israel’s Independence Day, which occurred on Iyyar 5 according to the Hebrew calendar, shifts around the common calendar year by year. In 2016 it will be celebrated not on May 14, but on May 16 – within touching distance of the Sykes-Picot centenary, whichever of its dates one happens to favour.

By Neville Teller

Neville Teller is the author of "The Search for Détente; Israel and Palestine 2012-2014" (2014) and writes the blog "A Mid-East Journal". He is also a long-time dramatist, writer and abridger for BBC radio and for the UK audiobook industry. Born in London and educated at Owen's School and St Edmund Hall, Oxford, he is a past chairman of the Society of Authors' Broadcasting Committee, and of the Contributors' Committee of the Audiobook Publishing Association. He was made an MBE in the Queen's Birthday Honours, 2006 "for services to broadcasting and to drama."