Acquittal of India border guard in Bangladeshi girl’s killing rekindles human rights concerns

Felani Khatun’s body on border fence

 

Human rights experts in South Asia are alarmed by the acquittal last week of constable Amiya Ghosh by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) in the retrial of the Felani Khatun murder case.

The killing of the 15-year-old Bangladeshi girl more than four years ago by Indian border guards at the India-Bangladesh border sparked widespread outrage after a photograph showing Felani Khatun’s dead body hanging on a barbed wire fence was published internationally.

While Felani’s parents in Bangladesh have rejected the verdict by the BSF’s General Security Forces Court in Cooch Behar,  Amnesty India has decided to challenge the acquittal of the BSF man in the Indian Supreme Court.

Other human rights advocates are very concerned that the acquittal will send the wrong message to BSF soldiers guarding the over 2,000-kilometer long India-Bangladesh border, where border violence has been a serious issues over the past three decades.

Felani Khatun was shot dead on Jan. 7, 2011 while trying to cross the India-Bangladesh border to Bangladesh with her maternal uncle and father.

Members of the poor Bangladeshi family were living in New Delhi illegally. Felani herself had been working as a housemaid in the Indian capital.

As Felani’s marriage had been fixed in Bangladesh, the family decided to move back to Banarvita village in Kurigram district of the country. Without proper travel documents, they had no option but to cross the border illegally.

Snagged in wire

On the dawn of January 7, 2011, Felani’s father and uncle managed to crossed the barbed-wire fence of the border by using a ladder. But Felani’s clothes were entangled in the wire and as she struggled to free herself, she was shot.

Eyewitnesses had informed the media that the teenage girl was still alive while dangling on the barbed wire for nearly an hour.

Even after she breathed her last, her dead body was left dangling for the next four hours.

Later, BSF personnel took her body down from the fence. They then tied her hands and arms to a pole, much like an animal, and carried her off, eye witnesses said. Felani’s body was handed over to Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) personnel the next day.

The photograph of Felani’s bullet-ridden body hanging from the barbed wire was published in the global media, after which there was a unanimous call for justice.

Global pressure drove India to launch a probe in August 2013.

BSF found 181 Battalion Constable Amiya Ghosh responsible for Felani’s murder with his 5.56mm Insas rifle. After Amiya confessed to the crime, he was charged under Section 304 (unintentional killing) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 146 of the BSF Act.

The trial began at a BSF court on August 13, 2013, according to some media. But on September 6 that year, the same court cleared Ghosh of the murder charge.

This again led to ire from the victim’s family and rights activists of both countries. After Bangladesh expressed their dissatisfaction with the trial, a retrial was ordered.

Finally, on July 2, 2015, a special West Bengal Court of BSF upheld its previous verdict after hearing the revision trial.

Family still suffers

Nurul Islam, Felani’s father, rejected the verdict. “I did not get justice for my daughter,” he told Asia Times last week.

He pointed out that ever since losing Felani, his wife Jahanara Begum has not been the same. “We are still suffering without her (Felani),” said the father of two daughters and three sons excluding Felani.

Human rights groups are doing their best to get Islam and his family their justice.

On July 8, Amnesty India declared that it will file a motion with the Indian Supreme Court to challenge Ghosh’s acquittal. Sushanto Sarker, secretary of Amnesty India, said that the organization will file a petition as public interest litigation with the apex court on July 13.

Sarker said, “We are taking it to the honorable justice of the Supreme Court on humanitarian grounds. So hopefully, our efforts will be fruitful.”

ASM Nasiruddin Elan, Director of Bangladeshi human rights organization Odhikar pointed out that the acquittal of the BSF man can send the wrong message to Indian border guards. “If the verdict remains the way it is now, then we would have to say that Bangladeshis at the border areas are unsafe,” he told Asia Times. He is very concerned that this verdict may encourage more border violence.

More deaths

Killings at the border are continuing. Most recently, on the evening of July 5, a Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) team recovered the body of  Rubel Hossain, 23, from the Ichhamati river near the Bangladesh-India border in Debhata upazila of Satkhira. Hossain’s family claimed that he died due to torture by BSF personnel.

Rubel Hossain, along with his companions Kawsar Ali and Asadul, from Harhadda village had gone to work in a brick field. As they were crossing the Ichhamati back to Bangladesh, BSF arrested Kawsar.

Later, a BSF patrol team chased Rubel in the river and ran him over with their speedboat, severely injuring him. Later, they picked him up on their boat and tortured him, before dumping him back in the river, causing him to die, according to local BGB  sources.

According to Odhikar, such deaths are not uncommon at the border as at least 23 Bangladeshis have reportedly died at the India-Bangladesh border at the hands of BSF personnel from January till June 2015. Also, during this time, at least 35 Bangladeshis were injured in similar border violence while 17 Bangladeshis were allegedly abducted by BSF.

According to Odhikar, between 2000-2014, some 1,035 Bangladeshis were killed by BSF, 919 were tortured, and 1,274 persons were abducted.

Most poor Bangladeshis living in the border areas try to make quick money by smuggling cattle from across the border. They are shot at by BSF while trying to cross the border.

“But there have been numerous cases during the past few years where Indian citizens and BSF personnel have crossed the border to Bangladesh and committed atrocities like killing, abduction etc,” said Elan.

When contacted by Asia Times, human rights activist Kirity Roy, who is also the secretary of West Bengal-based Banglar Manabadhikar Suraksha Mancha (MASUM), questioned the Felani murder case retrial procedure.

Roy wrote in an email, “We want to reaffirm our position on trying of security force personnel in regular courts of law (in open court, not a secret court so as to ambush justice) while an offense was committed by their men against one armed civilian, which does not fall under their official duty.”

He added that the BSF is infamous for human rights violations, as they regularly indulge in torture and extra judicial killings of Indian and Bangladeshi citizens at the eastern frontier.  “We have made hundreds of complaints of extrajudicial killings, torture and rape by BSF personnel to human rights institutions and interestingly, these were the incidents reported from very few police station areas; not representing the whole reality of nearly 2,000 kilometer border.” He also pointed out that majority of the victims of BSF are Indian citizenry and “not the so-called Bangladeshi intruders.”

He pointed out that there has been a slight decrease in the border violence since the March 2011 meeting between BGB chief Rafiqul Islam with his BSF counterpart Raman Srivastava, two months after the Felani murder. At the meeting, the BSF decided not to use lethal weapon at border areas.  “But we can see them violating their own norm since 2011,” said Roy.

Roy hoped to “attract the legal system of India for recourse.” “We want the impunity to stop,” he said.

With more such right activists in South Asia speaking against the Felani retrial verdict, Felani’s father Nurul Islam is still clinging on to the hope that his family will get the justice for Felani’s murder.

Syed Tashfin Chowdhury is a Dhaka, Bangladesh based freelance journalist and the editor of  Xtra, the weekend magazine of New Age, a leading English daily in Bangladesh.

 

Contesting Melanesia: The summit and dialogue

 

The recent 20th Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) summit made a landmark decision. The MSG leaders meeting in Honiara, Solomon Islands, granted the status of observer and associated memberships to the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) and five provinces of Indonesia, respectively. The MSG leaders describe the former as representing Melanesians living abroad whereas the latter represents the Melanesian population living in Papua, West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara.

The decision constitutes a historic moment as the MSG forum has expanded its outreach into a new area that it previously had never thought of: Indonesian Melanesia. The decision will not only lift up the discussion of Papua from activist level to the diplomatic level but also demonstrates the Melanesian wisdom that gives every member a proportionate share of the Melanesian collegiality and brotherhood. Hence the forum has envisioned the roadmap of Papuan peace building in the long run.

What would be the implications of the Melanesian contest on Papuan issues? Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama made it very clear when he addressed the summit. He stated that in dealing with Papua, the forum must engage Indonesia in a “positive and constructive manner” since Papua is under Indonesia’s jurisdiction. While the statement definitely confirmed the political status of Papua, it did not preclude any discussion about the humanitarian issues that the Papuans themselves tabled during the last two MSG summits. On the contrary, the position reaffirmed continuing dialogue between the MSG and Indonesia and reserved a guaranteed space for Papuans to have a genuine dialogue with Indonesia.

The space has been guaranteed as both Indonesia and ULMWP as Papuan representatives have been granted official status in the forum. Both may not be entirely satisfied with the MSG decisions as they had been seeking full membership. As we know, Indonesian diplomats have worked hard to ensure that the ULMWP would not get status in the forum. On the contrary, they proposed membership for the five provinces of Indonesia framed as Melanesian. Similarly, the ULMWP executives have put much effort into convincing Melanesian leaders to support its bid for full membership, referring to the case of the independent movement of New Caledonia (FLKNS) as a precedent.

 Despite their dissatisfaction, both Indonesia and Papua have been given a chance to talk to each other as equals. This is the first time ever in the MSG and Indonesia’s history that Papua will have a voice for itself at an international diplomatic forum. When the MSG leaders recognized Papua as a new political entity in the forum, they immediately put Papua on the Melanesian political map. Papua is no longer invisible. It does exist

.Indonesia, on the other hand, has also been given a chance to engage more deeply with the Melanesian brotherhood. The direct partnership with the MSG nations will greatly benefit Indonesia in developing its plan to promote Melanesian culture within Indonesian society and polity. The government has a plan to build a Melanesian Cultural Center in Kupang.

 If the plan goes ahead, it would contribute to promoting a stronger spirit of plurality and diversity, which has been undermined by those who promote otherwise. The decision would also be beneficial for Indonesian civil society organizations that promote dialogue between Jakarta and Papua, such as the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI), the Papua Peace Network, Jakarta-based NGOs, Papua-based NGOs, Papuan churches, etc. They should be able to use the MSG decision to encourage the Indonesian government to explore genuine dialogue with Papuans in a more neutral space within the MSG forum. Perhaps some parties in the national political circle would not appreciate the opportunity for dialogue as they have frequently expressed. These parties might harden their stance and ensure that the government of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo would not go near the dialogue offer.

But the chance is there and cannot be ignored. If both Indonesia and Papua retain their status, it is likely that the space for ongoing discussions between Papuan representatives and the Indonesian government is guaranteed. For Papuans, the MSG decision remains a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it made space for dialogue with Jakarta but on the other, it posed a new challenge for Papuans. The challenge is the two types of Melanesia that the MSG leaders declared.

If Papuans are not able to manage it properly, it is not impossible for it to be used for divide et impera (divide and rule) tactics in the future. Therefore, Papuan leaders will have to cultivate the decision and translate it into new strategies in incorporating a larger and more vibrant civic movement in Indonesia. The movement played an instrumental role, not only to promote awareness of the issue of Papua in Indonesian politics but it has also proved effective, for instance, to campaign for human rights for East Timor in the past. So it is a matter of strategies of engagement.

Budi Hernawan, research fellow at the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM) in Jakarta.

The geo–politics of Vietnam–US rapprochement

 

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong, is currently on an official visit to the United States. Later this year, President Obama is also expected to pay a return visit to Hanoi. The visits are among a series of notable events that mark the 20th anniversary of bilateral normalisation this year.

The development of bilateral ties between the two Cold War enemies over the past 20 years is impressive. The United States is currently Vietnam’s largest export market. In 2014, Vietnam’s US exports amounted to US$28.66 billion, accounting for almost one fifth of the country’s total exports. By 2014, the United States had also become the seventh largest foreign investor in Vietnam, with the stock of registered capital reaching more than US$10 billion. In terms of political and strategic ties, the two established a ‘comprehensive partnership’ in 2013.

One notable trend in bilateral relations is the increasing importance of geo–strategic drivers. To be sure, the growth of bilateral ties since normalisation in 1995 has always been shaped partly by strategic calculations on both sides. But before around 2010, it seemed to be largely driven by both economic and political factors, especially Vietnam’s wish to take advantage of US markets, capital and technologies to modernise the country’s economy, and a US agenda of promoting a more liberal and democratic Vietnam. Since about 2010, although economic motives remain relevant, the strategic drivers seem more important. This has mainly been due to an enhanced perception of the threats that a rising China poses to both countries’ strategic interests, especially in the South China Sea.

In the past, strategic considerations have pushed the two countries apart. In 1945–46, president Ho Chi Minh of the newly independent Vietnam repeatedly sent letters to then US president Harry Truman to seek Washington’s support in what he saw as an inevitable conflict between the newly–proclaimed republic and returning French colonialists.

In a letter to Truman on 16 February 1946, Ho wrote that Vietnam ‘is just beginning its building–up work. It needs security and freedom … [that] … can only be guaranteed by our independence from any colonial power, and our free cooperation with all other powers. It is with this firm conviction that we request of the United Sates as guardians and champions of World Justice to take a decisive step in support of our independence’.

But Ho’s call for US support went unanswered. During those formative years of the Cold War, French pressures coupled with the fear of the spread of communism into Southeast Asia seemed to be the key factors that accounted for US indifference to Ho’s requests. The fact that China was still embroiled in a civil war and had not yet emerged as a visible security threat to US interests further undermined the geo–strategic significance of an independent Vietnam in Washington’s eyes. Consequently, the two countries were pushed apart by Cold War tensions and later got embroiled in a long and bloody armed conflict.

But 70 years later the regional geo–strategic landscape has changed profoundly. The two former enemies now have a deep interest in strengthening their ties to deal with new security challenges. The most important change is undoubtedly China’s rise. In the 1940s, a weak and divided China was barely a threat to Vietnam, even less so to Washington’s interests in the region. But now, while a stronger China in the South China Sea is a major source of concern in Hanoi, Washington is also irked by Beijing’s aggressive pursuit of a more dominant global posture that challenges US leadership.

As a result, US–Vietnam strategic cooperation has been strengthened in recent years. The first major step was a memorandum of understanding on defence relations signed in 2011. Other notable indications of bilateral strategic rapprochement include the US pledge in 2013 to provide $18 million for Vietnam to purchase patrol vessels, and its October 2014 decision to partially lift its ban on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam. In June 2015, the two countries announced a Joint Vision Statement to step up defence ties and add further substance to the comprehensive partnership. Despite these developments, current bilateral strategic cooperation is still modest and the room for future upgrades remains ample.

As such, the dynamics within the Vietnam–US–China strategic triangle are entering the third phase of a cycle. In the 1950s and 1960s, Vietnam and China joined hands against the US. In the 1970s and 1980s, China sided with the United States to contain Vietnam. Now, the tide has turned as the United States and Vietnam are strengthening their strategic ties in the face of a rising China.

As Lord Palmerston’s famous statement goes: ‘We have no permanent allies, we have no permanent enemies, we only have permanent interests’. Vietnam and the United States, like China, are just pursuing their interests. When interests change, ‘allies’ and ‘enemies’ may shift. China should not blame other countries for what it perceives as ‘hostile’ or ‘anti–China’ strategic developments in the region. As shown by its artificial island building in the Spratlys, it is China that has been the catalyst for all these strategic transformations, and China must be the one to remedy the increased tensions that have resulted from them.

In the meantime, as China’s assertiveness — especially in the South China Sea — shows no sign of abating in the foreseeable future, the rapprochement between Hanoi and Washington can be expected to continue apace, possibly to Beijing’s vexation.

Le Hong Hiep is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and a lecturer at the Faculty of International Relations, Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City.

Why is China's Stock Market Crashing?

 

Bad names, bad math or bad luck?

China’s stocks tumbled in recent weeks. Barely three weeks earlier, on June 12 (Friday), Shanghai Composite (SSEC) closed at 5166.35 points, the highest since January 18, 2008. Yet by the end of July 3, the SSEC shed 1481.99 points, losing almost 29 percent of its recent high and more than $2.8 trillion of value (i.e., 10 times of Greece’s annual GDP).

What is vexing for policymakers is that the Chinese stock markets ignored signals from the Chinese leaders and continued their downward fall. Following the 7.40 percent dive on Friday (June 26), the People’s Bank of China (the central bank of China) on Saturday responded by cutting its benchmark interest rates and the amount of reserves certain banks are required to hold. The central bank cut its one-year benchmark lending rate by a quarter of a percentage point to 4.85 percent and its one-year deposit rate by the same scale to 2 percent.

Moreover, Monday, June 29, was supposed to be an auspicious day when the ceremony for the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a China-led international bank, was held. But investors disregarded these strong signals and continued their selling. The SSEC lost 12 percent for the week, the worst weekly performance since the financial crisis.

As for why the Chinese stock markets are falling, there have been different theories. First, it has been discovered that the names of chairmen of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the regulator of China’s stock markets, are ominous. The man who was CSRC chairman for almost a decade, from December 2002 to October 2011, is named Shang Fulin, meaning the probability of China’s stock markets going up is zero. Shang’s successor is named Guo Shuqing, meaning losing all you have, and Guo’s successor is named Xiao Gang, meaning cutting it all.

Of course, there is no clear evidence to back up this theory. During Shang Fulin’s tenure, for instance, China’s stock markets went on a roller-coaster ride. On December 27, 2002, the day he assumed the position, the SSEC was at 1382.97. The index increased incrementally to 1777.52 on April 6, 2004 and then declined to 1080.87 on October 28, 2005. Then the stocks entered a bull market. In the subsequent two years, the SSEC passed the 2000-point mark (on November 20, 2006),  the 3000-point mark (on February 26, 2007), the 4000-point mark (on May 9, 2007), the 5000-point mark (on August 23, 2007), and the 6000-point mark (on October 15, 2007), reaching an all-time high of 6092.06 on October 16, 2007. Then the index took a nose dive all the way to 1706.70 on November 4, 2008. On October 31, 2011, the last day of Shang as the chairman of the CSRC, the SSEC finished at 2468.25. Compared to the points of his first day on December 27, 2002, this was an increase of 1085.28 points (about 44 percent). Guo Shuqing did not fare so well. In his 15-month tenure, the SSEC lost 189.85 points (8.3 percent). But since Xiao Gang took it over, the SSEC went up from 2240.02 on March 18, 2013 to its current level of 3686.92 on July 3, 2015, a healthy growth of 39.2 percent.

Nevertheless, those who lost their shirts in the last three weeks continue to blame Xiao Gang for the free-fall. They found out that Xiao was bad at math. According to an interview with Ms Wu Xiaoli of Phoenix TV in Hong Kong on March 17, 2012, Xiao confessed that he did well in Chinese literature but poorly in math in his national university entrance exams. Rumors have it that Xiao could not comprehend what was the five-day moving average when some of his subordinates suggested that the CSRC pump funds to stabilize the SSEC at that level. Of course, stabilizing the stock market is not simply a mathematical problem. Nobel laureates in mathematics would not necessarily be more equipped to solve this problem.

Some blame foreign speculators. They strongly believe that big foreign banks and institutional investors had been shorting Chinese stocks. Interestingly, the Global Times, a state-run newspaper that tends to look for the evil consequences of external forces, came out to dispel the rumor by stating that “foreign capital has only a small part of the Chinese stock market” and that “large-scale short selling by foreign investors in the Chinese stock market has not appeared and is an unlikely scenario.”

Apparently, the volatility of the stock markets has become a political issue but political intervention has not been effective. It is likely that Chinese leaders will find ways to boost the confidence in the Chinese stock markets. But it could very well backfire if they do not handle the issue well. It is true that the CCP regime is rich in resources and has a tremendous capacity to influence the direction of the Chinese stock market. But once the market is going against the wishes of the government, the credibility of the government will be lost. The Diplomat

 

Thailand’s thieves in uniform

 

The ties between the military and monarchy are robbing the country of freedom and democracy.

With all the turmoil in Thailand today, it is interesting to observe that one so-called ‘revered’ institution, the monarchy, has not come out to stop the chaos.

Thai royalists and the royal household often surreptitiously inform the local and foreign media that the King has no political power. But a quick glance at the current constitution reveals the opposite is true.

Junta chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha stated last May, after he successfully seized power from a democratically-elected government, that the constitution was abrogated; that is except all the articles relating to the monarch and the lese majeste law.

That is to say, the laws concerning the power of the king, his welfare and his protection were left intact and enforceable. These are wide-ranging.

For example section three of the constitution states that:

The sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as Head of State shall exercise such power through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

But this is like saying the car belongs to the people but only the king can drive it. Or, the people own the gun but only the king can pull the trigger. In both cases, the people have to perform the maintenance and upkeep of the car and gun.

Section eight of the constitution states that:

The King shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship and shall not be violated. No person shall expose the King to any sort of accusation or action.

This section means the Thai King is like God and no one can speak against the King even if he commits robbery, blatant lies, mayhem or murder.

Section 10 places the King as the Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces, while section 11 gives the King the right to create titles and confer decorations.

This all goes some way to explain why today in Thailand we do not have just one dictator, but two.

There is a symbiotic relationship between the monarchy and the military, which has been going on for the past six decades. Every time there is a coup, while the generals may change, the monarchy always remained intact. Because of this we can only blame Thailand’s current ongoing troubles on the very top; the monarchy. This is the main characteristic of Thai society and politics which never changes.

On Friday, 19 June, Thai police arrested 14 students who had been protesting against the ruling junta, in defiance of a ban on public gatherings. These are young university students who are brave and full of democratic spirit. They want nothing except the right to express themselves freely on issues affecting their lives and future. They are now confined to a filthy and crowded jail in Bangkok.

The students took part in peaceful rallies calling for an end to military rule under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). The army commander-in-chief, General Udomdej Seetabutr, publicly accused the 14 student activists of being backed by anti-government groups and claimed their actions could lead to disturbances and violence.

Additionally, General Udomdej Seetabutr, indicated that a charge of lese majeste may be leveled against them, because these students may have received support from anti-monarchy elements as well.

It is against the international norm that the Thai Army is designed to protect only the monarchy as opposed to protecting the country and the people. It is now becoming clearer and clearer that Thailand is being governed by two types of thieves in uniforms.

The first, the King, wears his uniform with pride. As head of state, he often wears decorative pins and trappings, occasionally also donning uniforms similar to characters in an ancient Ramayana play, with ceremonial headgear to top it all off.

The first thief is only concerned about their stability and vast wealth, under the control of secretive investment arm, Crown Property Bureau. They intend to prolong their continued status quo and privileges and entitlement for generations to come.

The second thieves in uniform are the generals, who benefit from their collusion with the monarchy. Each top general has benefited from the yearly military budget and allocations for arms purchases. The top brass stands to benefit millions and millions of dollars or bahts in terms of commission.

And now the generals are joined by the rank and file. Under ‘Article 44’, which gives unlimited power to the junta, the military can do just about anything they please, from searching anyone’s house or person without a warrant, to jailing anyone on any minor charge.

Many lower-ranking soldiers are behaving like hooligans extorting money from street vendors and retailers in open daylight with impunity.

Unless the Thai people unite and demand the reorganisation of these two institutions from the ground up, the chance of realising a true democracy, is next to nothing. And if something doesn’t happen soon, the people and Thailand will forever remain robbed.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai military junta in July 2014. EDITOR’S UPDATE: The Military Court on Tuesday ruled that the students should be released from jail. However, they still face trial and a possible seven-year sentence for their peaceful protest against the ruling junta. 

On China, The Lady has no choice

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to China last month created a frenzy of global media interest. The big question was about the apparent contradiction between her defiant resistance to this country’s former military regime and the repressive policies of China’s government.

Many wondered whether Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would comment on sensitive human rights issues under the noses of her Communist hosts. The long-term imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo, a fellow Nobel laureate, had some speculating that Myanmar’s icon of democracy would wade into China’s difficult domestic politics.

Yet the point of this visit was something else entirely: showcasing the overwhelming pragmatism of both sides. Whatever Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s misgivings about China’s internal management, she has become far too savvy a political operator to let that interfere with her changing stature on the global stage.

In the lead-up to this year’s election she is being courted aggressively by almost everyone, and it is understandable that the Chinese have sought to charm her into their embrace. The visit programs for such figures are always handled carefully to minimise the possibility of surprises.

But it is surprising that one of the conclusions from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s first China visit is about estrangement. Some have even sounded the death knell for strong relations between China and Myanmar. Surely this is premature.

Relations between the two countries will never be simple. With more than 2 million Chinese citizens and former Chinese citizens living in Myanmar, there is much at stake for both sides. Billions of dollars from China have been invested in Myanmar’s cities, and in the country’s transport, mining and energy infrastructure.

This means that when we start to look for fragility in relations between the two countries we need to begin by comparing it closely with other situations.

The fact is that no other country has China’s firm reach into almost all corners of Myanmar society.

That’s not all: No other country comes close in terms of cultural, economic or strategic heft, and no others have committed so heavily to securing their own Myanmar interests.

This is why Daw Aung San Suu Kyu’s visit to China matters so much. After this year’s highly anticipated election, there is every reason to expect that the Chinese will quickly adjust to any new political arrangements. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s familiarisation tour is one example of what that means.

Her visit to China also fits a pattern that we saw a few years ago. When President U Thein Sein, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Speaker Thura U Shwe Mann and so many other senior figures from the former State Peace and Development Council began their foreign forays in the early reform years, they did so with the goal of better understanding the complexities of the global order.

When they travelled to Europe and the United States I expect the learning went in all directions. Certainly the Myanmar delegations had a chance to see New York, Paris and London with their own eyes, and to better understand the context in which opposition to their military regime had flourished.

Those foreign politicians, officials and journalists who interacted with them could also test their prejudices about Myanmar’s former military men. In such a hesitant process it will always take time for new appreciations to emerge.

In the same way, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Beijing foray will have helped to allay some basic concerns, and bolstered the chance for Chinese influence to be maintained if the National League for Democracy ever controls Nay Pyi Taw’s levers of power.

Being wooed by the Chinese government will also give her a renewed sense that her old allies in the Western democracies are only one part of the story. For now, Myanmar, no matter who is in government, will be grappling with the need to broaden and deepen all of its foreign relations.

While there is anxiety about the Chinese role in the Kokang conflict, and their meddling in other areas, there remains an understanding that the two countries need to work together closely.

The alternative could be a return to the fraught relations of decades past. People in Myanmar have not forgotten how the Chinese government exported Communist rebellion beyond its southern border right up to the 1980s.

That rebellion still echoes across the mountains where its remnants seek to extract what they can from the ongoing peace negotiations.

Given that traumatic history, if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is to lead Myanmar successfully she has no choice about whether to do business with China. The bottom line is that China is not surrendering its influence in Myanmar any time soon, and to pretend otherwise is to miss a momentous geostrategic frontline of the decades to come.

This is a story with global ramifications that goes far beyond the lightning rod of human rights concerns. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will need to be on her toes as she learns to manage such delicate relations.

Nicholas Farrelly is director of the Australian National University’s Myanmar Research Centre. This column was published by The Myanmar Times on Monday, 6 July 2015

India’s Controversial Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act

The Army claims the AFSPA is needed to handle insurgencies. Critics cite many abuses.

Recent events in India’s restive Northeast have turned the spotlight yet again on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), a controversial piece of legislation that confers vast powers on the armed forces deployed in “disturbed areas” of the country.

On March 27, the Indian government declared as “disturbed areas” 12 districts in Arunachal Pradesh bordering Assam and imposed the AFSPA on them, only to revoke it in early May. Then in late May, the government of Tripura revoked AFSPA, 18 years after it was first imposed in this state. A few days later, on June 4, militants ambushed a convoy of the Indian Army’s 6 Dogra Regiment in Manipur. The attack, which left 18 soldiers dead and eleven injured, is among the deadliest militant strikes on the Army in over three decades in this troubled state.

Heated debate on AFSPA has been raging since. What has it achieved in “disturbed areas,” where it is in effect? Should it remain in force, be revoked, or at least revised?

AFSPA’s imposition in Arunachal was bitterly criticized as the federal government had not consulted the state government before declaring it a “disturbed area.” It drew attention to the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a “disturbed area” and the rather arbitrary manner in which AFSPA is being imposed in the country.

AFSPA’s subsequent revocation here and in Tripura raised hopes of its withdrawal from other “disturbed areas” too. Those hopes were quickly dashed following the ambush in Manipur. As an official in India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) told The Diplomat, “The situation in the Northeast remains turbulent and merits AFSPA being kept in place there.”

According to Pradip Phanjoubam, editor of Imphal Free Press and Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla,the ambush “will feed official paranoia and prolong” AFSPA’s enforcement in the Northeast and Kashmir.

Drawing from a draconian ordinance the British colonial rulers used during the Quit India Movement of 1942, the Indian Parliament enacted AFSPA in September 1958 in the context of the nascent Naga insurgency.

AFSPA grants the army, central police forces, and state police personnel in “disturbed areas” “certain special powers,” including the right to shoot to kill, to raid houses, and destroy any property that is “likely” to be used by insurgents, and “to arrest without warrant” even on “reasonable suspicion” a person who has committed or even “about to commit a cognizable offence.”

Besides conferring extensive powers on the armed forces, AFSPA provides them immunity from prosecution. “No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central government against any person” who has acted under this legislation, it says.

Imposed first on the Naga Hills in 1958, AFSPA, an emergency law, was to be in force for a year. Almost six decades thereon, it remains in effect not just in these hills but in “disturbed areas” across all seven northeastern states. Since July 1990, it has been in force in the Kashmir Valley too.

Effectiveness

If the aim of AFSPA was to restore normalcy in disturbed areas, it has failed, say its critics. Despite the extraordinary powers vested in their hands by AFSPA, the armed forces have not been able to quell India’s insurgencies, a human rights activist based in Imphal in Manipur told The Diplomat. The area over which its writ runs has expanded significantly and armed struggles and insurgent groups have proliferated in the Northeast.

This is a “facetious” argument, Lt Gen (retd) Raj Kadyan, a former vice-chief of army staff, told The Diplomat, pointing out that in a democracy, “solving an insurgency” is not the task of the army. What and army can do and has done in the Indian context, he said, is “to keep the insurgency down to a level where the civil administration can carry out its functions. And “for that to be achieved AFSPA is essential,” he stressed.

Drawing attention to AFSPA’s successful role in Nagaland, for instance, Kadyan, who saw the Naga insurgency through its various stages, recalled that without the “protective umbrella of AFSPA” the ceasefire which came into effect on August 1, 1997 would not have been possible. It was only after the armed forces had “captured six rebel ‘Ministers’ that they were brought to their knees.” This paved the way for the truce, which has survived to date.

AFSPA’s critics view the legislation differently and hold it responsible for the spiraling violence in areas it is in force. The “sweeping powers” it vests in the hands of the armed forces and especially the protection it gives them from prosecution “encourages soldiers to kill, raid and rape,” the Manipuri activist argued, drawing attention to “grave human rights violations” that AFSPA has “enabled.”

In an insurgency situation it is difficult for soldiers to differentiate between sympathizer and insurgent. Hence, “aberrations do occur,” Kadyan said. But 98 per cent of the allegations are false, he maintained, adding that if soldiers are to face the civilian courts for every allegation, they will be preoccupied with running to the courts rather than fighting insurgents.

While admitting that some instances of civilian deaths at the hands of the security forces are the result of “genuine mistakes” by soldiers “in the heat of an operation,” the Manipuri activist pointed out that this does not apply to rapes. “How can rapes fall under the category of acts done in the line of duty, requiring legal protection of the state?” she asked.

Dismissing criticism that AFSPA protects offenders, the MHA official pointed out that legal proceedings are possible if the central government sanctions it.

But such sanction has never come. Of the 38 requests to sanction a prosecution under AFSPA that the Ministry of Defense received between 1991 and 2015, permission was denied in 30 cases and the decision is pending in eight, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar informed Parliament recently.

Naked Protest

Over the years, demands for justice in extra-judicial killings and rapes – such as the torture, rape, and murder in 2004 of 34-year-old Thangjam Manorama by soldiers of the Assam Rifles – have triggered dramatic protests and snowballed into mass campaigns. Irom Sharmila, for instance, has been on a hunger strike since 2000 to press for AFSPA’s repeal. On July 14, 2004 a dozen naked women protested in front of the Assam Rifles headquarters at Kangla Fort, Imphal, daring the soldiers to come out and rape them.

The wave of protests in 2004 forced the then United Progressive Alliance government to set up the Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee in 2005 to review AFSPA and make recommendations. Describing AFSPA as “a symbol of oppression, an object of hate and an instrument of discrimination and high-handedness,” the Reddy Committee suggested it be repealed.

However, no steps were taken  to repeal or reform AFSPA.

The military is opposed to AFSPA’s withdrawal. Explaining its position, Kadyan pointed out that the Army gets called in to support the civil administration “only when the situation is not normal” and “in such abnormal circumstances, abnormal provisions have to be made.” “Soldiers need legal cover [that AFSPA provides] to operate in these circumstances,” he argued.

While the army has been vocal in its opposition to AFSPA’s lifting in the Northeast and Kashmir, sections of the political establishment too are keen to keep it in place and blame the armed forces for opposing AFSPA’s repeal. With AFSPA in force, state governments can avoid taking responsibility for their own administrative failures. Besides, “disturbed areas” are eligible for more funds from the central government.

While activists want AFSPA to be repealed in toto, there is a section of informed opinion that is calling for revising it at least, especially the clause that extends immunity to the armed forces.  Phanjoubam, for instance, says that “AFSPA can be clubbed with the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), a civil law, so that the Army can function but without the AFSPA’s impunity clause,” a suggestion made by the Jeevan Reddy Committee.

Political commentator Siddharth Varadarajan writes that instead of criminal proceedings against soldiers requiring official permission, blocking of prosecution could be made possible only on official action. He suggests that Section 6 of AFSPA could be amended to read: “No prosecution … shall be instituted against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act where the Central government provides reasons in writing and the competent court upholds the legal validity of these reasons.” “Such a provision” he argues, “would prevent good officers from being prosecuted for killings which result from acts of good faith while allowing the bad apples to be prosecuted for their crimes. The government would still have the right to intervene on behalf of a soldier who has committed an illegal act. But this would require a Minister to take personal responsibility for a decision….

The possibility of AFSPA being even reformed seems bleak at the moment. The present Bharatiya Janata Party-led government is stridently opposed to any dilution in the law.

As Sanjoy Hazarika, a member of the Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee, wrote: “how many more deaths, how many more naked protests, how many more hunger strikes, how many more committees, how many more editorials and articles and broadcasts before AFSPA goes?”

Dr. Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore, India. She writes on South Asian political and security issues