Air pollution globally kills more people than HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB combined

 

A recent public outcry in China, sparked by a damning documentary about air pollution, was based on well-founded fear. Of the 100 million people who viewed the film on the first day of its online release, 172,000 are likely to die each year from air pollution-related diseases, according to regional trends.

Worldwide, pollution kills twice as many people each year as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined, but aid policy has consistently neglected it as a health risk, donors and experts say. Air pollution alone killed seven million people in 2012, according to World Health Organization figures released last year, most of them in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) in the Asia Pacific region.***

In a self-critical report released late last month the World Bank acknowledged that it had treated air pollution as an afterthought, resulting in a dearth of analysis of the problem and spending on solutions.

“We now need to step up our game and adopt a more comprehensive approach to fixing air quality,” the authors wrote in Clean Air and Healthy Lungs. “If left unaddressed, these problems are expected to grow worse over time, as the world continues to urbanize at an unprecedented and challenging speed.”

A second report released last month by several organisations – including the Global Alliance on Health and Pollution, an international consortium of UN organisations, governments, development banks, NGOs and academics – also called for more funding towards reducing pollution.

“Rich countries, multilateral agencies and organisations have forgotten the crippling impacts of pollution and fail to make it a priority in their foreign assistance,” the authors wrote.

Housebound in China 

A dense haze obstructs visibility more often than not across China’s northern Hua Bei plain and two of its major river deltas. Fewer than 1 percent of the 500 largest cities in China meet WHO’s air quality guidelines. Anger over air pollution is a hot topic among China’s increasingly outspoken citizenry.  

“Half of the days in 2014, I had to confine my daughter to my home like a prisoner because the air quality in Beijing was so poor,” China’s well-known journalist Chai Jing said in Under the Dome, the independent documentary she released last month, which investigated the causes of China’s air pollution. The film was shared on the Chinese social media portal Weibo more than 580,000 times before officials ordered websites to delete it. 

Traditionally left to environmental experts to tackle, the fight against pollution is increasingly recognised as requiring attention from health and development specialists too. 

“Air pollution is the top environmental health risk and among the top modifiable health risks in the world,” said Professor Michael Brauer, a public health expert at the University of British Columbia in Canada and a member of the scientific advisory panel for the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, a consortium of governments and the UN Environment Program. “Air pollution has been under-funded and its health impacts under-appreciated.”

Pollution – especially outdoor or “ambient” air pollution – is also a major drag on economic performance and limits the opportunities of the poor, according to Ilmi Granoff, an environmental policy expert at the Overseas Development Institute, a London-based think tank. It causes premature death, illness, lost earnings and medical costs – all of which take their toll on both individual and national productivity.

“Donors need to get out of the siloed thinking of pollution as an environmental problem distinct from economic development and poverty reduction,” Granoff said. Pollution cleanup is indeed underfunded, he added, but pollution prevention is even more poorly prioritised: “It’s underfunded in much of the developed world, in aid, and in developing country priorities, so this isn’t just an aid problem.”

Mounting evidence 

Pollution kills in a variety of ways, according to relatively recent studies; air pollution is by far the most lethal form compared to soil and water pollution. 

Microscopic particulate matter (PM) suspended in polluted air is the chief culprit in these deaths: the smaller the particles’ size, the deeper they are able to penetrate into the lungs.  Particles of less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter (PM_2.5) are small enough to reach the alveoli, the deepest part of the lungs, and to enter the blood stream.  

From there, PM_2.5 causes inflammation and changes in heart rate, blood pressure, and blood clotting processes – the precursors to fatal stroke and heart disease.  PM_2.5 irritates and corrodes the alveoli, which impairs lung function – a major precursor to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. It also acts as a carcinogen.

Most research looks at long-term exposure to PM_2.5 but even studies looking at the hours immediately following bursts of especially high ambient PM_2.5 (in developed countries) show a corresponding spike in life-threatening heart attacks, heart arrhythmias and stroke.

Asia worst affected

The overwhelming majority – 70 percent – of global air pollution deaths occur in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia regions.  South Asia has eight of the top 10 and 33 of the top 50 cities with the worst PM concentrations in the world. Asia Sentinel

The structural reforms of Japan’s Abe government may not be what is needed to drag the economy out of its slump

The structural reforms of Japan’s Abe government may not be what is needed to drag the economy out of its slump.

A long list of structural reforms have been identified for the “third arrow” of Japan’s Abenomics, from increasing women’s participation in the workforce to deregulating agriculture. But are they hitting the right targets?

Recent economic data has been mixed for the world’s third-biggest economy, despite the benefit of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, the first two arrows of Abenomics. On Wednesday, the Bank of Japan’s “tankan” survey of business sentiment showed confidence among big manufacturers falling below economist expectations, while industrial production data for February, released on Monday, showed a bigger decline than forecast.

“A recovery in consumer spending has been slow after last April’s sales tax hike and exports aren’t that strong yet,” Taro Saito, director of economic research at NLI Research Institute, told Bloomberg News. “[The] figure is a reminder that it may be too early to be very optimistic about the economy.”

Other recent data has also been weak, including zero consumer price inflation for February and the 11th straight monthly decline in household spending. The national economy expanded by an annualized 1.5 percent in the December quarter, emerging slowly from a technical recession in 2014.

Yet longer term, reviving Japan’s economic prospects in the face of a declining labor force and deflationary pressures will require enhancing productivity, which according to a McKinsey study now lags for labor as well as capital.

According to the consultancy, if Japan could double productivity growth, “with a sharp focus on increasing value added as well as reducing costs,” it could hike annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth to around 3 percent, increasing GDP by up to 30 percent above the current trajectory through to 2025, with a potential economic boost of $1.4 trillion.

McKinsey suggests firing a “fourth arrow” to accelerate labor and capital productivity growth, with measures such as fostering global integration, improving digitization, harnessing “big data,” restructuring industries, implementing merit-based pay and fostering both female talent and aging workers.

Should it do so, “Japan has a window of opportunity…to once again outpace the world in efficiency and quality, emerging as a global leader in fields such as advanced materials, 3D manufacturing, and the life sciences,” McKinsey said.

Fiscal, Monetary Fixes ‘Won’t Cut It’

Japan analyst Naomi Fink, chief executive of Europacifica Consulting, argues that stagnant “total factor productivity” (TFP) and unstable labor/capital shares of income are at the heart of the nation’s economic problems – and short-term fiscal and monetary adjustments simply “won’t cut it.”

According to Europacifica’s analysis, while Japan’s export-driven manufacturing sector has achieved “balanced” productivity growth, along with the information technology sector to a lesser extent, the services and non-IT sectors have fallen behind.

The worst performers in TFP growth from 1973 to 2008 included rice and wheat production, waste disposal, chemicals, electricity, real estate, coal, and petroleum products. By contrast, the best performers were in electronic data equipment, communications equipment, semiconductors, household electrical appliances, and electronic parts.

“The manufacturing sector is already efficient; it’s the services sector that needs to be improved,” Fink said.

“We see things like the privatization of Japan Post; that’s one small part, but the structure of the privatization isn’t such that the government cedes its exposure fully to market forces – it’s keeping a large portion and they don’t seem to be creating a level playing field. And that has implications for the insurance and financial sectors, in which productivity is exceptionally low.

“Also, I did some econometric studies on regulation and structural reform…and the striking result was that in non-manufacturing and services, when you decrease regulation it’s consistent with a rise in productivity. That’s not the case with manufacturing, where the coefficient is inverse.

“The long and short of it is if you start looking at special economic zones for manufacturing, they’re targeting many of the wrong industries, and they’re not putting enough emphasis on structural reform in the industries that really need it.”

According to Fink, the key to success is deregulating “low-productivity areas in the services sector,” while developing incentives for greater investment in non-IT and services sectors, as well as incentives for improved allocation of labor and female participation.

Risks abound “at almost every stage of policy” for Abenomics, including “unlikely but dangerous” tail risks of a blowout in inflation expectations and dumping of Japanese government bonds, to the “not so bad, but all too likely” risks of wages remaining stagnant, poor implementation of structural reforms and slow growth abroad.

Based on a “structural reform checklist,” Fink assigns the highest score of 86 percent to healthcare reform, followed by 57 percent for agriculture, technology innovation, and corporate governance changes and 43 percent for promotion of new start-ups.

But corporate tax reform and ‘Womenomics’ gain only 29 percent scores, followed by a lowly 14 percent for management of public funds, flexible working practices, and attracting overseas talent.

Overall, Fink gives Abenomics’ third arrow just a 40 percent probability of success, based on current performance.

“Is there evidence that the government grasps the underlying problem they are trying to solve? If the answer is ‘no’ then we cannot expect ‘Abenomics’ to succeed,” Fink warns.

Fortunately for Abe, with political incumbency until at least 2018 his administration still has time to improve its chances of success. The Diplomat

 

Taiwan’s Rash Decision - How Taiwan’s bid to join AIIB could potentially threaten its sovereignty

Taiwan’s Rash Decision to Join AIIB

How Taiwan’s bid to join AIIB could potentially threaten its sovereignty.

One year after the Sunflower Movement, hundreds of protestors again rallied in front of the Presidential Office on the night of March 31. This time the issue was not the questionable approval process of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in the Legislative Yuan, but the Ma administration’s unilateral announcement that Taiwan will join the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

On March 30, after Executive Yuan spokesperson Sun Lih-Chyun emphasized that the process of Taiwan’s joining in any international organization, including AIIB, would be transparent, the government unilaterally announced the decision to join AIIB through the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). The decision was made after a national security meeting held by President Ma on the same date. The government’s action was widely criticized; the Legislative Yuan passed a resolution that the application to join AIIB should be submitted directly through the bank’s preparatory office, not through TAO. But the Executive Yuan still submitted the letter of intent to TAO via Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, triggering the protests.

What are the implications of this action? First of all, the government set another example of “black box” policymaking by bypassing the supervision of the legislature. The Ma administration said its evaluation had been ongoing since last November, with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mainland Affairs Council, Central Bank, and Ministry of Economic Affairs all taking part. However, the Legislative Yuan was never consulted. In other countries considering joining the AIIB such as Australia, Austria and Japan, the governments tried to reach consensus in their cabinets (notably, these countries adopt or lean toward a Parliamentary system in which the executive and legislative branches are not separated). By contrast, Taiwan’s legislative branch, which is authorized by the Constitution to balance the executive branch in Taiwan’s government system, was never able to approve this application or review the evaluation reports and proposals. The legislature’s resolution to submit the letter of intent directly through AIIB’s preparatory office was also disregarded by the Ma Administration.

Secondly, the decision to join the AIIB taken by the Ma administration is essentially a concession to Beijing. China has long claimed Taiwan as part of its territory and the TAO observes this principle. Instead of applying directly through the preparatory office of AIIB, submitting through TAO indirectly admits that TAO can act as an agent of China on Taiwanese affairs, conceding Taiwan as a part of China. In the case of Taiwan’s World Trade Organization (WTO) application, the president assigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to submit the application directly. In the current case, AIIB is also a multilateral organization and the application should be able to follow a similar path. TAO had even said that dealing with Taiwan’s application to AIIB is not within its scope of responsibility. Therefore, this unnecessary action might compromise Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Furthermore, the specific name that Taiwan used in its application, a matter that of great concern to the Taiwanese people, has not been made public. This will reduce the people’s trust in their government. Most likely the public will not accept a name that will damage Taiwan’s sovereignty, especially after the 2014 local elections, in which the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) failed mainly due to public discontents with the consequences of Ma’s pro-China policies and concerns about the threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty posed by mainland China.

In the case of Asian Development Bank (ADB), even though ADB is led by the U.S. and Japan, Taiwan was still forced to change its membership name from the “Republic of China” to  “Taipei, China” in 1986 when the PRC joined. As China is leading AIIB, it is not possible for Taiwan to join as an independent country under the name of the Republic of China. The spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry, Hua Chunying, already said that Taiwan should avoid “problems like ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’” in applying to AIIB. Whether Taiwan can use “Chinese Taipei” (as it does in the Olympics and APEC) or the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” (the name used in the WTO) remains at the discretion of China. The result may seriously harm Taiwan’s sovereignty in the international community as well as Taiwanese confidence in the government.

Lastly, Taiwan’s investment may strengthen China’s diplomatic power, which could ultimately work against Taiwan. China has been known to utilize overseas investment and aid to motivate developing countries to act in favor of China (i.e. these countries are more reluctant to criticize China for human rights issues) by waiving compliance requirements or obligations. By joining the AIIB, Taiwan is helping the sole threat to its national security. Taiwan’s capital injection could be used to “buy” other countries’ cooperation in suppressing Taiwan’s self-governance. Meanwhile, as the Chinese government will have a strong influence on the awarding of infrastructure projects, Taiwanese businesses’ reliance on China could grow even further, enhancing China’s bargaining power over Taiwan in any economic or political negotiation.

According to Taiwan’s Central Bank, the benefits to businesses from joining the ADB was only roughly$18.57 million per year from 2006 to 2012. Meanwhile, the total capital contribution of Taiwan is as high as $1.78 billion as of 2013, meaning approximately only a 1 percent return on investment. In the case of the AIIB, Taiwan has to face numerous risks — to its national security, constitutionality, and government-public relations — for possibly only minimal returns. Is this indeed a wise decision?

Ricky Yeh is an alumnus of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He formerly worked as an Economic Analyst at the Japan Center For International Finance and is currently employed as a business strategy consultant.

 

Why Washington Is Watching Modi's Moves in the Indian Ocean

 

India perfectly fits into the role U.S. envisages it playing in the Indian Ocean – that of a net security provider.

If you believe the hype, India is intensifying its ocean diplomacy to counter the growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-nation visit to Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and Mauritius in March has been seen in this light.

But that doesn’t explain what’s really happening. The power tectonics in the region are not between India and China, but are a result of Beijing hedging against Washington’s presence in the region. In the Indian Ocean, Delhi is increasingly aligning with the role that the U.S. wants it to play — that of a “net security provider.”

The Indian Ocean bears two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments, one-third of its bulk cargo, and half of its container traffic, and serves as a key trade route between East Asia and Europe. Both the U.S. and China have high commercial stakes here. While the U.S. hopes to secure its trade routes across the Indian Ocean, for China, now the world’s largest net oil importer, defending the Malacca Strait is a matter of economic necessity.

Beijing has always feared for the security of its energy imports. It also worries about its reliance on American patrols to protect the oil tanker routes out of the Persian Gulf. In China’s Defense White Paper, released in 2013, two major themes are “protecting national maritime rights and interests” and “armed forces providing reliable support for China’s interests overseas.”

Pursuing this aim, China has embarked on a major naval modernization effort. It has procured maritime weapons such as anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as submarines. Reports indicate that in late January, China’s Ministry of National Defense admitted that it could conduct escort missions of naval ships in the Indian Ocean.

Washington, preoccupied with the Middle East while trying to hone in on Southeast Asia, has responded by deploying an altered Nixonian policy, hoping to restore stability to the Indian Ocean without making any significant security investment itself.

India, with its central maritime position and proximity to the Malacca Strait, could be a perfect stabilizer in the region. As former U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel noted at the 2013 Shangri-La dialogue:

India’s role as a stabilizing power is of growing importance with the increase of trade and transit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The United States considers India’s efforts to enhance its military capabilities as a welcome contribution to security in the region.

Washington also strives to exert its influence in the region through a coalition of regional allies like Australia and Japan, and partners like India, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

India’s warming relations with Vietnam and effort towards enhancing political-military relations with Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar indirectly work toward American efforts to cement a coalition in the Indian Ocean region.

Modi used his recent visit to the countries of the region to promote closer defense ties with island countries. In addition to handing over to Mauritius an Indian built offshore patrol vessel and committing Indian surveillance aircraft to Seychelles, Modi also proposed that both Mauritius and Seychelles be added to a national security adviser-level “trilogue” between India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. The existing trilateral group carries out a variety of activities, including training drills, capacity building of maritime forces, regular joint exercises, and meetings of national security advisers.

These growing relationships, and India’s easier access to advanced military technology from around the globe, worry Beijing. India can readily import military technology from the United States. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) mentioned in its Blue Book, released in June 2013, that a “U.S.-India axis of relation” was additionally forming in the Indian Ocean.

To be sure, in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon clearly stated plans to deepen Washington’s strategic partnership with India through the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. Today, the United States has supplanted Russia as India’s largest defense provider.

But despite its strong relations with Washington, China still believes that India will continue to maintain strategic autonomy. An editorial in China’s Global Times brushed aside the perception of “China threat,” stating flatly that China and India were not engaged in a zero-sum game in the Indian Ocean. 

As two of the Indian Ocean’s biggest powers, India and China have plenty of room to build a dialogue concerning regional security.

As the geopolitical contest between the United States and China plays out, India will surely play a central role given its position at the tip of the Indian Ocean.

Jhinuk Chowdhury is an India based freelance journalist writing on South Asian affairs.

 

Malaysia Rejects Pardon for Jailed Opposition Leader

Anwar Ibrahim is running out of options.

Malaysia has rejected a petition seeking a royal pardon for imprisoned opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim.

The petition, filed by Anwar’s family on his behalf after his sodomy conviction was upheld by Malaysia’s highest court in February, was rejected by the pardons board. The board reportedly gave no explanation for the decision.

As The Diplomat reported previously, Anwar was found guilty of sodomizing his aide in what some have called a politically motivated charge aimed at eliminating the opposition leader as the chief threat to the ruling United Malaysia National Organization (UMNO) led by Prime Minister Najib Razak. Sodomy is illegal in Muslim-majority Malaysia, and it can lead to imprisonment for up to twenty years.

In addition to serving his prison term, the opposition leader was expected to lose his parliamentary seat and be unable to contest the country’s next election to be held by 2018 pending other legal options.

Some had worried that his imprisonment would undermine the opposition and play into the hands of UMNO, which scored its worst ever performance in 2013 polls, losing the popular vote but emerging victorious by winning more parliamentary seats. In an exclusive interview with The Diplomat, Sim Tze Tzin, the strategy director for Anwar’s party Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), had said that while the party and the opposition coalition were affected by Anwar’s imprisonment, other leaders and grassroots supporters would help sustain it moving forward.

While Anwar technically does have one last legal option and can file a judicial review with the Federal Court, his lawyers said no decision has been made on whether to pursue this course of action or not.

Anwar had initially risen within UMNO to become Malaysia’s deputy prime minister in the mid-1990s before falling out with the country’s then prime minister Mahathir Mohamad. Since then, he has spent several years in prison after being convicted of what many have called politically-motivated corruption and sodomy charges. Anwar’s lawyers had appealed a conviction last March against their client for sodomizing a male aide in 2008, but that appeal was rejected in February. The Diplomat

 

Will Russian use of Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay derail improving Hanoi-Washington ties?

Vietnam and Great Power Rivalries

Will Russian use of Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay derail improving Hanoi-Washington ties?

It all began with apparently innocuous activity reported in both the Russian and Vietnamese press citing the Russian Defense Ministry on January 4. According to the reports, Russian Air Force Il-78 Midas tanker planes were granted access last year to Vietnam’s aerodrome facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, located in the southern Vietnamese province of Khanh Hoa. The Il-78s enabled the refueling of Russian Tu-95 “Bear” strategic bombers, which coincided with intensified Russian military flights in the Asia-Pacific, including “Bear” sorties that circled the major U.S. military redoubt in Guam.

These flights, claimed to be a show of strength and for intelligence-gathering purposes, were deemed “provocative” in the eyes of Washington. A request was made to Hanoi “to ensure that Russia is not able to use its access to Cam Ranh Bay to conduct activities that could raise tensions in the region,” according to the U.S. State Department. Moscow rejected Washington’s concerns and defended its military ties with Vietnam.

Troubled Ties?

Some commentaries in the media had associated this Cam Ranh Bay issue with troubles brewing in U.S.-Vietnam relations. But this is not really the case.

Of course, it would have appeared strange for Hanoi to have failed to anticipate that such activities would not go unnoticed by Washington. Because Vietnam does not operate Illyushin-type military planes, those planes in Cam Ranh Bay with their distinct red star markings and the standard livery of the Russian Air Force would have been hard to miss.

But there has been a recent upsurge in bilateral relations between Vietnam and the U.S., in no small part driven by resurgent tensions with Beijing over the South China Sea disputes. Washington partially lifted its decades-long arms embargo on Vietnam, with talk within the establishment that there it might be completely lifted in the future. The U.S. also agreed to supply patrol boats as part of a broader plan to aid Hanoi in maritime security capacity-building. Vietnam was also reportedly keen on purchasing second-hand P-3 Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft.

Certainly, bilateral relations are far from perfect, given residual issues of contention, for example, persistent disquiet in Washington over Vietnam’s human rights record. Nevertheless, relations have been moving in a generally positive direction.

Vietnam’s Thinking

Hanoi does not view itself as having deviated from a long-avowed post-Cold War foreign policy that stresses certain key tenets, such as independence, no-alliances, and non-alignment.

This approach emphasizes both collaboration and struggle against domination and exclusion politics (vua hop tac, vua dau tranh). It is also premised on adapting to the post-Cold War geopolitical changes and to aid in its Renovation (doi moi) process. This means not just making new friends, but preserving traditional friendships as well. Longstanding ties with Russia count in the latter category.

Since 1991, Hanoi has been consistent with this principle of vua hop tac, vua dau tranh. This tendency stems from the fact that Vietnamese nationalists attack attempts to “sell” the country to foreign forces, and are sensitive to accusations that Vietnam is a client state of any particular Great Power. To this end, Hanoi has assiduously resisted external attempts to dictate its policymaking.

For instance, in the 1990s, then Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thanh insisted: “Cam Ranh Bay is a Vietnamese base, and has nothing to do with the Soviets,” and that other actors, including the United States, could access this base if they were willing to normalize relations with Vietnam. Nguyen’s words were meant to be a response to Moscow’s attempt to turn the bay into its military foothold in Southeast Asia.

Broader, Deeper Engagement

News about the Russian Il-78s is nothing new, although media reports tend to link it to the ongoing Ukraine crisis. But the tanker planes’ presence can be seen as part of a broader arrangement under which Moscow enjoys access to Vietnam’s military facilities in Cam Ranh Bay including arguably the most crucial of all, the naval base.

But Moscow is no stranger to that. Under a 25-year agreement signed in 1979, the Soviet Navy Pacific Fleet stationed its 922nd Logistics Center and maintained a warship flotilla in Cam Ranh Bay. Since having withdrawn its last forces from the garrison in May 2002, for almost a decade Russia’s military presence receded from the Asia-Pacific, especially as Moscow became more focused on Europe.

Now, Russia is keen to revive its access to Cam Ranh Bay, with its prized deep-water anchorages and most strategically of all, direct access into the South China Sea. The fact that it was at different times under the control of both Cold War superpowers, first the United States and then the Soviet Union, attests to Cam Ranh’s enduring geostrategic importance. The bay is certainly an ideal stopover point for Russian warships sailing to and from the Russian Far East and Gulf of Aden. It would be analogous to the Syrian port in Tartus, to which the Russian Navy Mediterranean task force has had regular access.

In fact, Russia’s interest in reviving access to the Cam Ranh Bay precedes the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. The events in Crimea and subsequent tensions in Europe merely catalyzed Russia’s “eastward” glance into the Asia-Pacific and gave greater salience to the bay. Earlier deals with Vietnam, for example the sale of Kilo-class submarines in 2009, had a role to play. During the numerous high-level defense interactions that took place in 2012-2013, Russia and Vietnam agreed on the broad modalities regarding Cam Ranh Bay. In exchange for granting Russian warships greater access, Vietnam would receive Moscow’s assistance in developing the infrastructure in the bay, including those for Hanoi’s Kilo fleet and more significantly perhaps, a major servicing center for foreign civilian and military vessels. Subsequent bilateral agreements did not deviate from this arrangement.

In 2013-2014, as the Ukraine crisis brewed, some within the Russian establishment – including prominent lawmakers – spoke of the reopening of Russia’s naval base in Cam Ranh Bay as part of Moscow’s grand plans to enhance its global military footprint. The Russian press even reported about the possibility of opening a Russian Navy sustainment center in the bay. However, the issue of restoring a Russian base in Cam Ranh Bay was not raised by either side.

It would at any rate have been impossible to do so, given Hanoi’s avowed post-Cold War foreign policy. Apparently keen to squash any speculation about Cam Ranh Bay being reinstated as a foreign military base, Vietnamese officials repeatedly emphasized that all countries are welcome to assist in developing the bay’s infrastructure. They also reiterated that Cam Ranh Bay is not intended to be a military port, but an international ship servicing and repair hub that is open to all foreign civilian and military users.

Less than two months before the Il-78 report, on November 25 during a visit to Russia by Nguyen Phu Trong, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, an inter-governmental agreement was inked that allows simplified access procedures for Russian warships visiting Vietnam’s Cam Ranh naval base. Under this agreement, Russian vessels approaching the port need only notify the latter authorities for entry. Permission for entry would be granted automatically.

A ‘China-Russia Axis’ in the Asia-Pacific?

Tracing back these developments, it is evident that Cam Ranh Bay features prominently within Moscow’s new global military strategy. Russia’s interest in returning to the bay preceded the Ukraine crisis, which merely gave greater impetus to Moscow’s push for access. Without that crisis, Russia’s actions would not have generated quite the same concerns.

But with Russia’s growing military assertiveness in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, ostensibly targeting the U.S. and its allies, there are reasons to worry. Moreover, Russian tanker flights staged out of Cam Ranh Bay can be interpreted as a violation of Vietnam’s principle of not giving other countries permission to maintain military bases or to use its soil to carry out military activities against other countries. Because Hanoi has yet to offer any clear explanation about this, Washington must be left wondering whether Vietnam has been consistent with its policy and whether it favors Russia over other partners, including the U.S., with whom ties have strengthened in recent times.

Washington is keen to secure greater access to Cam Ranh Bay as part of its strategic rebalance to Asia, given the simmering tensions over maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. It is plausible that Washington might perceive Beijing as the beneficiary if the Cam Ranh Bay becomes a catalyst that jeopardizes U.S.-Vietnam relations and compels the U.S. to pivot away from the region. When one looks back at not just recent moves but also past developments in Sino-Russian relations, a rather interesting picture emerges.

Both China and Russia have common interests in a multi-polar world order, as exemplified in the several joint declarations they have signed since the 1990s. This strategic convergence was lent greater salience following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the U.S., and the subsequent American military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Sino-Russian vision of a multi-polar world order is obliquely referring to the perceived U.S. global hegemony.

Escalating tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine provide an ideal pretext for broader and deeper Sino-Russian collaboration. The $400 billion gas deal signed in May 2014 demonstrates China’s willingness to assist Moscow at a challenging time, just as the West is trying to isolate Russia over Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia has encouraged China to play a significant role in developing the Russian Far East. Despite nagging concerns over China’s infringements of its military-technological intellectual property rights, Moscow has pushed to enhance defense-industrial cooperation with Beijing, including offering up some of its latest armaments.

Russia’s growing presence in the Asia Pacific, including the “Bear” flights off Guam, seems designed to send Washington two related messages. First, Washington should not meddle in Russia’s interests in Europe, particularly eastern Ukraine and the former Commonwealth of Independent States. Second, if the Americans continue with their actions, including intensified NATO military activities in Europe, Russia can respond by using the Asia-Pacific as a backdoor to exercise its own form of gunboat diplomacy.

Although there are no official agreement between Moscow and Beijing on Russia’s potential role in the South China Sea crisis, it may still serve the interests of both countries to target American interests in this sensitive area. The Chinese do not yet have the requisite force projection capabilities to venture this far out into the Western Pacific, and the People’s Liberation Army has only just begun preparations to develop this. Russian “Bear” flights circling Guam may well have been welcomed by Beijing, at a time of intensified U.S. military activities, including P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol flights in the South China Sea, close to China’s strategic naval base in Hainan.

Fallout

The Cam Ranh Bay saga merely exposes the complexity that Great Power rivalries bring to this volatile region. Vietnam may be in a tricky spot. Certainly, those in Washington who believe that Russia’s military use of Cam Ranh Bay constitutes a security challenge will continue to press Hanoi to cease this access. But Washington’s threat that it will not fully lift the arms embargo on Vietnam, for instance, has dubious utility and would not happen for three reasons.

First, even if Washington decides to maintain the partial arms embargo, Vietnam has alternatives. In recent years, Vietnam has been strengthening defense links with Israel and other European countries keen to sell it weapons. And Hanoi has since acquired some of their offerings. Second, more so than in the past, Washington as a whole increasingly values its relationship with Hanoi. Hence, the controversy of Russia’s tanker flights from Cam Ranh Bay, Washington has been at pains to emphasize, does not put a strain on U.S.-Vietnam relations. Finally, Hanoi can still count on the support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which it is a member, in case of political and economic reprisals by Washington.

Vietnam certainly needs the U.S. to serve as a counterweight to a rising China. Yet at the same time, the reality is that the U.S. is not Vietnam’s only option. Today, Hanoi enjoys a firmer footing in its diplomatic, economic and security relationships with counterparts worldwide. It has at its disposal a wider range of strategic options to safeguard and promote its national interests.

Business as Usual?

For a smallish country that finds itself caught up in Great Power politics, a well-conceived, principled foreign policy approach will help Vietnam look after its national interests. The foreign policy principle of vua hop tac, vua dau tranh is a pragmatic approach that instructs Hanoi not to put all its eggs into one basket. The diversification of relationships, power instruments and strategies is a requisite. A principled foreign policy stance means that not only must Vietnam not favor one external power favored over another, but there is no opportunity for any of these actors to dictate its direction. From Hanoi’s perspective, Washington is in no position to prevent Vietnam from offering Russia access to Vietnamese military facilities. This is because Russia is not the only user: The U.S. military and other external actors – particularly the Indian Navy which has been a regular visitor to Vietnam’s bases – benefit from this inclusive arrangement too.

In the long run, exercising exclusivity and partiality towards foreign access to its military bases will risk setting a dangerous precedent for Vietnam. It is already in a tenuous position amidst the ongoing Great Power rivalries and simmering tensions in the South China Sea. Moreover, back-pedaling from or doing anything antithetical to its post-Cold War foreign policy would deal a blow to Vietnam’s standing within ASEAN. This is especially true given that the regional bloc subscribes to a set of norms known as the “ASEAN Way,” one of which has been the principle of non-interference. Washington could find itself doing more harm than good if it tries to enter this minefield.

If it wants to remain being seen as an independent actor on the world stage, Vietnam will have to adhere faithfully to its post-Cold War foreign policy principles. It will be in the interest of Hanoi to re-emphasize to the international community that Cam Ranh Bay is open to diverse external users, civilian and military. U.S. grumbling notwithstanding, for Vietnam the Cam Ranh Bay situation is just business as usual.

Nhina Le is a Research Associate at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in the United States. Koh Swee Lean Collin is an Associate Research Fellow at the Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. 

 

Ominous Verdict Expected Over Jakarta School Case

Bantleman, Tjiong

International school could face closure over specious rape case

Today, April 2, a court in Jakarta is due to deliver what is expected to be an ominous verdict on the case of two personnel from the Jakarta Intercultural School, the city’s most prestigious for expatriate children, on suspect charges they had sodomized children repeatedly in school quarters.

The case, against a Canadian-born administrator, Neil Bantleman, and Ferdinant Tjiong, a teaching assistant, is almost universally regarded as specious. It has sent shudders through the expatriate community because of the malleability of the South Jakarta district court, considered one of the most corrupt in a corrupt court system. There are fears that the school, which hosts 2,400 students and 270 teachers, could be closed as the result of a US$125 million lawsuit filed by the parent of one of the children who allegedly was raped.

The school’s main campus, opened 60 years ago as the Jakarta International School, now stands on some of Jakarta’s most valuable real estate. Unnamed interests in Jakarta are said to covet the 49 acres of property that the school’s three campuses sit on in the event that it is closed as a result of the lawsuit.

Sources in the expatriate community say they are almost certain that the two will be given sentences ranging up to 12 years in prison. In December, four janitors who allegedly molested children were given eight years in prison and a fifth, a woman, was given seven years. A sixth janitor was said to have committed suicide in police custody although many believe he was beaten to death. That is despite the fact that parents have unequivocally backed both the teachers and the janitors and medical authorities say the rapes never took place. 

The evidence is considered so baseless as to be fanciful and defense attorneys say it is connected to the lawsuit. “The judges must consider a US$125 million lawsuit filed by the mother of one of the boys as motive for dragging the teachers into this criminal case,” according to the defense statement, delivered in mid-March.

The unnamed woman who brought the case alleged that her five-year-old son had contracted herpes from the encounter. However, upon examination by medical personnel there was no evidence that the child had herpes and the mother refused to allow further tests.

The case is built on police allegations that the defendants had a “magic stone” that they could pluck out of the sky that supposedly prevented the children from feeling pain during the assaults. The police, however, have never come up with a drug resembling the so-called stone’s existence. The authorities also allege that the assaults took place in a “secret room” that has never been found.

The mother of one alleged victim charged that the rapes had taken in a room that was used for filing cabinet storage, and in which the administration staff gathered.  However, the room was demolished during renovations that took place before the supposed offenses ever took place. One child alleged he was raped multiple times in an open, heavily populated block with glass walls where such an act would be virtually impossible without being seen, and other children said there was a secret underground dungeon at the school. 

The court has imposed a news blackout and also barred even consular officials from the court.

The case has drawn international criticism on charges that the confessions were beaten out of the janitors, who later recanted their statements. US Ambassador Robert O. Blake, in a statement issued last year on the convictions of the janitors, called on the Indonesian government to investigate the allegations of torture. The Canadian and Australian embassies have also issued statements critical of the charges.

“We have been watching this case with great interest,” Blake said. “The protection and welfare of children is of utmost importance to educators, law enforcement, to all of us, and all allegations of abuse must be taken seriously. However, we note with concern that the investigative proceedings of both this case, and the accusations against the JIS teachers, raise serious questions about the standards of evidence applied.”

The evidence trail calls up the tragedy of the specious McMartin preschool trial in California in the 1980s, in which six years of criminal proceedings ended with an acquittal on the basis that the case stemmed from prosecutors coaching the allegedly molested children.  Asia Sentinel