Kim: starving people? Where?
Starvation in the North may impel change
The revelation last week by former US President Jimmy Carter that Kim Jong Il wants direct talks with South Korea's President, Lee Myung-bak, has stirred intense speculation about what the reclusive North Korean leader is up to now, and raised questions about how fragile Kim's government might actually be.
Carter told the Associated Press that although they are not prepared to apologize publicly North Korean leaders had privately told him they took responsibility and expressed deep regret for the sinking of the South Korean Navy gunboat Cheonan last April and an artillery attack on South Korea's Yeonpyeong in November that killed two. Nonetheless, it may be an indication of the desperation that the North faces although in the past such offers to negotiate end up being clothed in unacceptable conditions to the West and South Korean officials.
Since the Yeonpyeong shelling, the north has gone noticeably quiet, amid some conjecture that their Chinese masters told them to back off. But according to South Korean charities, the North, perennially facing food shortages, in the wake of a harsh winter may be facing the worst famine since the mid-1990s when it is thought that as many as 2 million people starved to death. Once again, people are reported to be foraging for rats and snakes, grass and weeds and tree bark in an effort to stave off starvation.
Carter was accompanied by three other retired politicians, Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, Mary Robinson of Ireland, and Gro Brundtland of Norway. Robinson told reporters after the trip that the North faces a desperate crisis. There are underground ripples, in addition to the Carter visit, that indicate there may be movement behind the scenes. The Chinese, without being specific, have called for reconciliation on the peninsula after a North Korean diplomat visited Beijing.
The country's inefficient command economy and lack of investment in agriculture have led to two decades of poor harvests and rendered the north one of the poorest countries on the planet. Now conditions appear to be worsening noticeably. Although word of the Jasmine Revolution in the Middle East appears to have permeated at least some of the society through the handful that have cell phones, the reports are that the people are so apathetic from starvation that thoughts of food have crowded out any thoughts of rebellion against one of the world's most repressive regimes.
In the South, the view of what is going on north of the 38th Parallel has metamorphosed since the days of the Sunshine Engagement policy enunciated by former President Kim Dae-jung. In particular, there is a widespread perception in the South Kim Jong-il has damaged his cause with South Korea by his embrace of the campaign to become a nuclear state, perhaps irreparably. The government of Lee Myung-bak has adopted a hard line toward the North.
Although there have been occasional reports published that Kim would consider abandoning his nuclear ambitions, if ever there was any validity to them, there is likely to be little now, with the dictator having seen the mess the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has on his hands after having abandoned his own nuclear program several years ago and now having no way to blackmail NATO into leaving him alone.
One wants to wonder if the world is not viewing a chastened state. Kim is watching the world as shadows projected on the wall by things passing in front of the firelight behind them and then presumably beginning to ascribe forms to these shadows. It has been reported, although without verification, that he remains so isolated in his 17 luxurious palace cocoons that subordinates never really reported to him just how bad the starvation of the mid-1990s was – although it is questionable if he had cared. The ailing leader, aged 70, is looking into the world through the prism of pseudo-reality. While Kim is allegedly a big fan of the Hollywood films, the ageing dictator is no better than a blind man in seeing the free world.
Kim may believe what he himself sees and experiences only. It is not an exaggeration, from my own government experience, to point out that none of the reform-minded apparatchiks around Kim, if there are any, dare to convince the dictator that he perceives only illusions, for fear that they will be killed. And certainly, during the famine years, the apparatchiks in charge didn't dare tell him how many people were dying of starvation.
The nuclear weapons program is a clear allusion to the external guarantee of regime survival. Just as his father, Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea, once rushed into an indigenous nuclear development based on an adaptation of Soviet models out of the fear of the collapse of his regime, Jong-il has spent decades sparring over what it would take to develop nuclear weapons in the wake of his father's sudden death in 1994. They have radicalized the small possibility, well-suited for the stability of the regime as well as for the contribution to its national security, that nuclear weapons would serve as a deterrent in the event of the 'imperialistic US's attack.' They're wrong.
While South Korean leaders have played pivotal roles in achieving the economic liberalization and political democratization in South Korea, the Kim dynasty in North Korea has failed to rescue its shattered regime from great peril since the internecine 1950-53 Korean War. The cave is no longer a haven for Jong-il and his heir apparent Jong-un, age 29, especially in the era of the Internet.
Given the North's moribund economy and broken community, it is clear that Kim has failed. More concerned about perpetuating his regime than about the fate of his starving people, he can by no means resolve the worsening famine without massive relief from outside, as clearly evidenced in the period of the 'Arduous March' in the early 1990s in which so many died.
Yet, if Kim later decides to travel out of his cave to witness daylight and look upon the rapidly changing world, Seoul and Washington should remain ready to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive solution to Pyongyang's desire for advanced nuclear weapons. China, the Kim regime's closest ally, is keen to engage with the North Korean nuclear troubles. China's influence on North Korea is already set in stone, which means that no talks over the North Korean nukes can succeed without Beijing's full cooperation.
While the stalled six-party talks are still needed, the member states – in particular, South Korea, the United States and China – must find a way forward through diplomatic negotiations with North Korea. Unless these key states take for granted the possession of North Korean nuclear weapons, it is time for a triangle of Seoul, Washington and Beijing to smoke the phantom-like leader out of the impoverished cave.
By LEE, Byong-Chul senior fellow with the Institute for Peace and Cooperation in Seoul, South Korea.
Socialist reality or historical reality?
Although Chinese and foreign scholars say that as many as 36 to 45 million Chinese died in the great famine of 1959-1961, a massive new official history of the Communist Party says only 10 million died.
The missing 26 million-odd are the discrepancy between Socialist reality and historical reality.
The second volume of the party history, covering the period from 1949 to 1978, was published in Beijing in January and has gone on sale in Xinhua bookshops nationwide. The Propaganda Department has instructed party members and government officials to study the book and told propaganda outlets to spread the message through the media and television.
The history will become a compulsory text in schools – the official history of China. The two red volumes run to 988,000 characters in 1,074 pages. The authors are two dozen scholars from the party's research department, aided by experts from the Central Party School. Several editors died during the marathon writing and editing process, which took 16 years.
The history has 22 pages of photographs with the highlights of the period – including land reform, the establishment of collective farms, building steel mills, China's first car, the explosion of the atom bomb, the development of the Daqing oilfield, model workers Wang Jinxi and Lei Feng,China's entry to the United Nations and Mao Zedong meeting Richard Nixon.
It is a meticulous work of scholarship, with a wealth of detail and references. But it was written from the inside of the institution and within the ideology and guidelines set by party leaders. So readers will find little that challenges the official version of history that was previously published.
Critics say that it does not address the many lacunae during those traumatic 29 years, during which millions died for man-made causes, were exiled or imprisoned. They say it will be left to others to write the complete version of China's history.
The first volume, covering 1921 to 1949, was published in May 1991. One spring day in 1995, the staff of the research department were summoned to a meeting and told that, now they had completed volume one, the party's Central Committee wanted volume two and they must start on it.
The three decades are the most difficult and sensitive period of the 90 years since the party was set up in Shanghai in July 1921. In a meeting with American journalist Edgar Snow in December 1970, Chairman Mao described it as period of twists and turns, "like the shape of an S."
That was a profound understatement – the period includes the Korean War, vicious political campaigns against landlords, rich farmers and 'rightists', the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) that left millions dead.
"The history of the International Socialist movement teaches us that, while a party searches to build the Socialism suitable to its own country, there is no party which has not made mistakes," the book says in its conclusion. "The important issue is whether it can learn from its mistakes. The Chinese Communist Party has sincerely learnt from the experience of history, especially to improve its understanding of external regulations, corrected its mistakes and turned them into the right leadership.
"The public has great confidence in the party leadership in building Chinese socialism … while the party has committed serious mistakes, it has learnt from them and studied many things it did not understand or misunderstood before, in order to guide Chinese socialism forward."
The greatest proof of this, the history says, was the reform and open-door policies adopted since 1978, a great awakening of the party in the conditions of a new era.
"In this new revolution, Socialist China is gradually saying goodbye to poverty and backwardness, moving to progress and prosperity and implementing the great renaissance of the Chinese race," it said.
Scholars will find the book more valuable as a record of the party than a history of China. No one can question the diligence of the authors, who read tens of thousands of documents and consulted with more than 100 specialists. But they were writing not for the ideal of scholarship nor international recognition but their superiors. Their first draft was rejected by the Central Committee as too negative, so they had to make major revisions.
Former President Jiang Zemin, his successor Hu Jintao and the man who will follow him, Xi Jinping were among more than 100 senior officials who gave comments and advice on the content. These high officials had contradictory views on different issues.
In total, the authors sent the history four times to the Central Committee for review and correction, which led to more revision and exhaustive discussion. Once the text was complete, they held meetings at which each writer had to account for every line he had written, to ensure that there were no mistakes.
One of the main authors, Zhang Qihua, former deputy director of the party research office, said the history had to be in step with the Central Committee, its documents, the speeches and ideas of party leaders and 'a resolution on certain questions' of party history passed by the committee in June 1981.
This resolution said that, while Mao made grave mistakes during the Cultural Revolution, his contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweighed his mistakes. "His merits are primary and errors secondary," it said.
Zhang said that the Central Committee had not approved the first draft, because it concentrated too much on the mistakes of the party. One example was the coverage of the 1966-76 period. While the book strongly criticized the Cultural Revolution, it also describes achievements in other fields, such as diplomacy, science and technology, agriculture and economy, during this period.
Shi Zhongquan, also a former deputy director of the party research department, said the book followed the 1981 resolution in evaluating Mao.
"We cannot put all the blame on Mao alone nor put them all on the moral quality of a single person. He was the principal leader but it was a collective leadership. The large amount of material in volume two shows that Mao paid great attention to overcoming the failures and problems of the party and people's living conditions. In his later years, after the second half of 1957, he could not analyze correctly many problems and in the Cultural Revolution confused truth and fiction and friends and enemies," Shi said.
Many people are disappointed with the book, saying that it was impossible to write history when the text had to be approved, line by line, by senior officials, and follow an ideology set in advance.
"Ever since the Xinhai revolution (of 1911), how much has history been distorted by political parties?" asked one Internet reader under a pen-name. "History should be written by scholars who are independent of parties and write in a fair and objective manner. That is history as it should be written. We have been given fragments of the truth for so many decades – this situation has to end."
"Before the party existed, there was history," wrote another Internet respondent who gave the name of Zhang. "The history of the party cannot replace the history of the country. Allegiance to a party cannot replace the reality of history. Gennady Zyuganov (the head of the Russian Communist Party) said that the lesson of the failure of his party was that it monopolized power, interests and truth. Are we writing another history of the Soviet Communist Party that monopolized history?"
Jin Zhong, editor of the Open Magazine of Hong Kong, was more scathing. "This history is a major step back in the thinking and theory of the party. It is very fake and self-serving."
"The figure of 10 million dead in the Great Famine was published by an official scholar in 1984. Since then, scholars in China and abroad have done a great deal of research, with a death toll of more than 30 million or even 40 million. This history avoids the issue. The attitude is that, since it was not the mistake of the current leadership, they can just leave it.
"It takes no account of an enormous amount of scholarship done in the last 30 years by expert, reasonable and responsible academics. It just says that 'they must be in line with the central leadership and consolidate the political power'. People should not bother to read it," he said. by Mark O'Neill Asia Sentinel
FOREIGN Minister Rudd will need all of his skills as he seeks to turn Australia's gaze westward to the Indian Ocean, even though we're the largest Indian Ocean state in terms of area of maritime jurisdiction.
This is nearly six million square kilometres, or about 80 per cent of the landmass of Australia, and much of its continental shelf is rich in hydrocarbon reserves. We've got offshore territories there with large and potentially rich exclusive economic zones. Highly valuable oil and gas developments are under way off our west coast.
Australia's Indian Ocean gateway city of Perth will host the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in October. The Indian Ocean region is where half the members of the Commonwealth are located and contains 40 per cent of humanity.
It's a huge energy and international trade maritime highway, particularly for the booming economies of Asia. It's where key geo-political differences may play out between the rising powers of India and China.
In a few years India will be the largest country in population and it has economic growth rates approaching China's. Africa contains almost one-third of the world's mineral reserves but attracts only 5 per cent of its extraction budget. The Persian Gulf region is rolling in petro-dollars with oil above $US100 a barrel.
The Indian Ocean is the great connector; it carries the vast bulk of trade between Europe and Asia and millions of barrels of oil to the energy-hungry Asian powers.
Australia derives more than 30 per cent of its oil from the Middle East, if Singapore figures are included, and that figure will soon rise.
We'll also remain tied by umbilical cords of trade to the Asian economic giants that are increasingly dependent on Middle East oil shipped over the Indian Ocean.
China derives 58 per cent of its imported oil from that region, a figure set to rise to 70 per cent by 2015. For India it is 73 per cent and Japan 85 per cent.
China feels vulnerable: in the event of rising tension, or even conflict, with India, the US or a combination of those two increasingly strategically like-minded powers, it could have its energy flows cut off.
Chinese strategic commentators liken India to a giant aircraft carrier jutting south into vital Indian Ocean sea lines.
Because of these perceived vulnerabilities and for commercial reasons, Beijing is developing strong relationships across the Indian Ocean. Some Indian analysts have likened these interests to a "string of pearls" bases. This is plain wrong. There are no Chinese bases in the Indian Ocean. But there are certainly Chinese interests, including some powerful ones in New Delhi's South Asian back yard.
India feels surrounded: its naval doctrine cites China's growing Indian Ocean capacity, including its submarine-launched ballistic missile capacity, as justification for India's nuclear triad of ballistic missile, plane and submarine delivered nuclear warheads.
Strategic competition in the Indian Ocean is good for nobody, least of all Australia. Our challenge is to find a way to shift the gears of this competition and turn it into strategic co-operation.
In the mid-1990s then foreign minister Gareth Evans pointed to the success of the Asia-Pacific powers in producing regional consensus through forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum. He argued that similar methods be applied to the Indian Ocean, suggesting this could be achieved by creating a community of co-operation in areas such as trade, then proceeding to address sensitive strategic concerns.
These efforts sank on the rock of antagonism between India and Pakistan and between the littoral powers and users of the Indian Ocean such as China and the US. But the body created exists to this day in the form of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Co-operation, although it has largely been ineffective.
The challenge is to make IOR-ARC a more inclusive and useful body. Australia has the opportunity; in September we'll take up the position of vice-chair of IOR-ARC, with India as chair. In two years Australia will become chair.We should approach India's friends, the US and Japan, to help persuade India that the IOR-ARC should embrace all littoral states, including Pakistan, and big external users such as China, the US and Japan. Only through a fully inclusive mechanism can competition be translated intoco-operation.
And there's no shortage of non-traditional security challenges for a body such as IOR-ARC, from people-smuggling, piracy and terrorism to illegal fishing.
Across the breadth of the Indian Ocean region, we find poverty, hunger, scarcity of water, acute environmental stress and all the political instability that goes with them. The region faces frequent natural disasters and extreme weather events.
Australia should increase its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. We should promote ideas for maritime security at IOR-ARC and make a greater effort to ensure that fisheries management arrangements in the Indian Ocean are effective.
We should also promote co-operative marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean (the least studied of the world's great oceans) and enhance the ability of the region to predict and mitigate the impact of natural disasters.
As Rudd takes on the challenge of the Indian Ocean to develop practical steps towards regional co-operation he should sit down with Evans, another man of intelligence and energy, and ask him what we can learn from the history of the previous failed attempt to create an Indian Ocean community.
By Sandy Gordon professor at the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australian National University, and Anthony Bergin director of research programs, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and co-author of Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean. “The Australian”
Few firms caught for bribery and illegal acts, researcher tells panel; fears for impact on development
Bribery, red tape and corruption have to be reduced before Thailand becomes non-competitive and unsuitable for many corporations, which would seek to invest elsewhere, a roundtable on corporate good governance concluded last week. Building a climate of good governance will take years and will also require the government to be less corrupt than it is.
Big multinational corporations with their own codes of conduct may claim they no longer bribe politicians or bureaucrats. But if the climate is such that it demands bribes or bribes are offered by their competitors, these corporations may lose out given the lack of a level playing field, warned a specialist in economic governance at the Thailand Development Research Institute.
Recent research revealed that out of the more than 200 cases of illegal practises by firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand from 1999-2010, those punished were just slightly over 5 per cent. Many of these cases involved fraud worth Bt3 billion-Bt4 billion, and given the low rate of punishment and fines, which on average amounts to Bt500,000-Bt1 million, it all seems worth the risk to break the law.
It's still legal for a government minister to endorse a contract with a bidding firm that is owned by the minister's son or daughter.The Nation, Bangkok
WASHINGTON: Think of Pakistan for a moment as the equivalent of Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt. Both countries have strong militaries and weak civilian governments. Both are nominally America’s partners in the war against al-Qaeda, but both chafe at US pressure. In each nation, the street is buzzing with talk of the nation’s shame and humiliation under American hegemony.
In Egypt, this pressure cooker led to a revolution whose loudest slogan was “dignity.” The same upheaval could spread to Pakistan, and given the strength of Islamic extremism there, it would have devastating consequences. Meanwhile, the relationship between Islamabad and Washington becomes more poisonous by the week.
What’s behind this dysfunctional relationship, and what, if anything, can be done to repair it? Is there a way to encourage greater Pakistani independence and confidence without rupturing ties with the US?
International affairs are sometimes more like a playground fight than a gathering of diplomats in striped pants. Countries feel “disrespected” in the same way as kids on urban streets; they worry about “losing face,” they sometimes place national honor before pragmatic interests.
They talk past each other, as was the case for years between Mubarak and a string of US presidents. And then things blow up, and people wonder why it happened.
Here are four recent snapshots of the miscommunication that is the US-Pakistan relationship. Each suspects the other of bad faith, as these examples show, but the larger picture is one of persistent misunderstanding. Consider:
— Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, went to Washington last month to see CIA Director Leon Panetta and patch up a feud over the arrest of CIA contractor Raymond Davis and US drone attacks. Pasha lost face at home by coming to Washington, but the meeting seemed to go well. The day he left, the US launched a big drone attack in North Waziristan that a Pakistani intelligence official described as an “FU.”
— Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, traveled to Pakistan two weeks ago to try his hand at mending fences. On the way, he stopped in Afghanistan and got a hair-raising briefing about ISI connections with the Haqqani network—a Taliban faction that is America’s main adversary in eastern Afghanistan. During two news conferences, Mullen unloaded on the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis were miffed at being chastised in public.
— Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, the Pakistani army chief of staff, met last year with Richard Holbrooke, the late special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kiyani was carrying an underlined copy of Bob Woodward’s book “Obama’s Wars,” whose revelations included some sharp criticism of Pakistan by top US officials. “Mr. Ambassador, can you tell me how this happened?” demanded Kiyani.
— And then there are the drone attacks: In its frustration with Pakistan, the administration last year sharply increased its Predator strikes over North Waziristan. But a Pakistani military official says that in the 118 drone attacks they counted last year, only one al-Qaeda “high-value target” was killed. Meanwhile, the Pakistani public seethed at what it saw as a violation of sovereignty.
When you ask administration officials about the US-Pakistan relationship, people just shake their heads in exasperation. They see a country beginning to crumble at the seams.
Maybe Pakistan needs a popular revolution, like Egypt’s, where people demand a stronger role in determining their future. But it’s hard to see this working out to the advantage of anyone at this point, except perhaps Osama bin Laden. And it might put Pakistan’s nuclear weapons up for grabs.
One way to bolster Pakistani sovereignty, short of such an uprising, would be for Pakistan to take a stronger role in ending a Taliban insurgency that is driving Washington and Islamabad nuts. A Pakistani intelligence official outlined to me a “framework for negotiations.” The Pakistanis would demand of Taliban groups with which they have contact—and yes, that includes the Haqqani network—that they meet US requirements for a deal by rejecting al-Qaeda, halting fighting and accepting the Afghan constitution.
For Taliban groups that refuse this peace framework, says the Pakistani intelligence official, there will be “military therapy.”
There’s no way of knowing if the Pakistanis could deliver. But by putting them to the test—and granting their role in the region’s future—the US might at least speak to the national yearning for dignity and independence. This relationship doesn’t need a divorce but maybe a little separation—to break a potentially ruinous cycle of mutual disrespect. The Washington Post Writers Group. By David Ignatius
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s speeches often leave many Indonesians mystified, and the one he made shortly after a series of book bomb scares across the capital last month was no exception.
“To that group, [I say] if you don’t like me, don’t sacrifice the people. Don’t let them become victims,” he said on March 18, shortly after police discovered a fourth bomb sent to the house of a prominent music mogul.
To some, the president appeared presumptuous for assuming that he was the target, but Mufti Makaarim, executive director of the Institute for Defense, Security and Peace Studies, thinks that there is more to the remark than meets the eye.
“He knows that there are some people who benefit from religious violence and acts of terrorism. He senses that there are a few retired generals who would love to see him lose legitimacy to run this country,” he said. “For me the speech was clear. As vague and intriguing as it may seem to the rest of the nation, he was addressing military retirees.”
Connecting the Dots
Two other incidents that took place shortly after that speech seemed to crystallize what Yudhoyono meant.
On March 20, a little-known Islamic political analyst named Wachiduddin received thunderous applause from an audience of 500 veiled women and bearded men at a talk show organized by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a hard-line group that seeks the formation of an Islamic caliphate.
Wachiduddin on that day said that it was important for hard-line Muslim activists to establish ties with warmongers and military officials. Excerpts and video recordings of the show have been circulating online since.
“Gaining support from ahlul quwwah [bearers of military might] in a revolution is a method exemplified by the great prophet, Muhammad,” he said. “The prophet and his disciples once convened with ahlul quwwahs throughout Mecca, asking them to convert to Islam and join his holy struggle.”
Muhammad eventually gained the support of Sa’ad bin Muaz, a prominent seventh-century warlord from Medina, Saudi Arabia, the self-proclaimed expert added. “Muslim activists [in Indonesia] must visit these generals. We must convince them that Islam is the only system blessed by Allah. Generals must become the 21st century Sa’ad bin Muaz,” Wachiduddin said.
On March 22, two days after the speech, Al Jazeera reported that “senior retired generals” were supporting the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and other hard-liners to incite religious violence and overthrow Yudhoyono.
The report included an interview with retired Army Chief Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, a staunch government critic who acknowledged his support for the groups that he said aimed to topple Yudhoyono in a “revolution.”
Coming Out
Besides Tyasno, there are more military men backing the hard-liners, according to Chep Hernawan, head of the Islamic Reform Movement (Garis). In an interview with the Jakarta Globe, he identified them as retired Maj. Gen. Muchdi Purwoprandjono, former commander of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus); retired Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen, former commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad); and retired Gen. Fahrul Razi, a former deputy chief of staff.
Chep said several meetings had already taken place since January between the ex-generals and conservative Muslim leaders to discuss their plans.
“We’re united by the Ahmadiyah issue, since these retired generals have also lost faith in how the president is managing the country. They are Muslims too and know very well that Yudhoyono’s hesitance in banning Ahmadiyah could spark public anger, particularly from Muslims,” Chep said.
He was referring to the minority sect deemed deviant by mainstream Muslims that has faced increasing persecution over the years, including from the state.
Islamic People’s Forum (FUI) secretary general Muhammad Al Khaththath had also acknowledged its movement to seek the dissolution of the sect was supported by retired generals but refused to divulge details into what sort of arrangements the hard-liners had with the generals.
‘Awan Merah’
A source inside the military retiree circle told the Jakarta Globe that the hard-liners had benefited financially as well as politically from the relationship.
“These generals always finance pesantrens [Islamic religious boarding school] and madrasahs [Islamic schools] owned by hard-line figures. Their houses are always visited by hard-line groups and some return with plenty of donations,” the source said on condition of anonymity.
“In return they pledge allegiance and consider these generals as their patrons. [Hard-liners] are often exploited for a certain political gain.”
But the source said that the retired generals had a more sinister plot. “The other retirees are calling their actions ‘Awan Merah’ [Red Cloud], short for ‘Aksi Purnawirawan Militer Berdarah’ [Bloody Actions of Military Retirees],” he told the Globe.
“Their aim was to create another religious conflict like the ones in Ambon [North Maluku] or Poso [Central Sulawesi]. But this time, they want it to be close to the capital. It is likely that their target would be Kuningan or Parung.”
Around 2,000 followers of the Ahmadiyah faith live in Manis Lor village in Kuningan district, West Java, making it the largest Ahmadi community in Indonesia. An attack on the community occurs almost every year.
Parung, a small town about halfway between Jakarta and Bogor, is home to an Ahmadiyah center. It was last attacked in 2008.
“Other retirees are not too sure about their strategies. Toppling a president is not that easy,” the source said. “But what these generals have in common is that they all hate SBY, they’re devout Muslims or what some would describe as ‘green generals,’ they have close ties with hard-liners and in the past they had their hands dirty in cases of religious violence.”
Mufti of the IDSPS said the retired generals were discontented with Yudhoyono because he had failed to provide enough political positions for members of his former corps.
Only two retired generals sit in Yudhoyono’s administration: State Secretary Sudi Silalahi and Deputy Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsuddin.
“The aim is to topple Yudhoyono through de-legitimization of his rule, to show that civilian-controlled government is failing and that we should go back to military rule,” he told the Globe. “That has happened during the administrations of [former presidents] [B.J.] Habibie and Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid].”
Mutual Interests
Muchdi, the retired major general, has confirmed that he has close relationships with hard-line Muslim figures. “I have friends from almost every Muslim organization and yes, some of them are radicals,” he told the Globe.
He was cautious, however, about revealing the extent of those ties with radicals. “All I can say is that these [hard-liners] don’t have a political vehicle to channel their aspirations. They just want their voices heard by the government,” he said.
“I don’t agree with violence and every Muslim organization that I have talked to feels the same way. There is not a single political party that can facilitate their needs, that is why some rogue elements within the organizations feel frustrated and do [violent] things.”
Muchdi, the former head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) who was controversially acquitted in 2009 of the murder of rights activist Munir Said Thalib, has also been cited as a senior adviser of FUI publication Suara Islam and of Media Dakwah, a publication tied to the Indonesian Islam Propagation Council (DDII).
Although he is open about opposing the existence of the Ahmadiyah, he denied playing a part in religious violence.
“After the cases in Cikeusik [Banten] and Temanggung happened, text messages began circulating saying that me and Tyasno Sudarto were behind the melees,” he said, referring to a mob attack on Ahmadis in Banten that left three sect members dead and the violent riot in the West Java town after a blasphemy trial.
“To me, rumors like that happen almost on a daily basis. Some issues we have to fight back but some I chose to ignore. I don’t know why, but people see me as a hard-line Muslim myself.”
A long time critic of Yudhoyono, Tyasno has been participating in various rallies and activities to oust the president. His disapproval for his former classmate in the military academy had led him to form an unlikely bond with radical Muslims, secular nationalists and other groups frustrated with the sitting administration.
In March 2010, Tyasno joined hard-line Muslim activists in an event organized by HTI to denounce the growing economic influence of the United States in Indonesia.
The retired Army chief did little to hide his alliance with hard-line groups during the interview with Al Jazeera.
“We work together to enlighten each other. Our angle is different. They fight in the name of Islam, we use national politics. But we have a common goal, which is change. We want to save our country, not destroy it. The revolution should be peaceful, not anarchist or bloody,” he said.
Al Jazeera cited a Web site that detailed a proposed cabinet line-up for the so-called Islamic government — which included Tyasno — drafted by FUI’s Al Khaththath, himself a member of the HTI and former chairman.
Like Muchdi, Kivlan denied sponsoring religious violence and suggested Muslim groups channel their resentment toward the Ahmadiyah in a court of law.
“For me, the solution is simple. Launch a legal action [against the sect]. The same with Ahmadiyah, if they feel intimidated, report it. Don’t take this problem to the street … let the court decide. Only then will all problems be solved,” he told reporters after his name circulated as a mastermind of attacks against members of the sect.
Old Ties
But despite the denials, it is hard not to question how hardliners have continued to enjoy impunity without the presence of political support from powerful figures.
In February, hard-line groups began demanding that Yudhoyono step down unless he issued a decree banning the Ahmadiyah, just days after the president announced plans to disband organizations that used violence to further their goals.
“The fact that the government is reluctant to dissolve hard-line groups suggests that these organizations have support from powerful people. He wouldn’t even touch HTI, which is clearly trying to establish an Islamic state and replace our national ideology. That’s treason,” human rights activist and noted military critic Usman Hamid told the Globe.
In 1965, the military began establishing close ties with Muslim groups in order to fight communists. It is widely estimated that close to a million people were killed in an ensuing witch hunt for Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) supporters.
During the Suharto regime, the military maintained the relationships, including with former elements of the Darul Islam and the Islamic Troops of Indonesia (TII), which launched a widespread rebellion during the Sukarno era in a failed attempt to establish a theocracy.
The military allegedly capitalized on the relationships during the final days of Suharto’s 32-year regime by inciting hatred toward the Chinese ethnic minority through rumors that they had caused the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. A widespread riot occurred in May 1998, targeting Chinese businesses and homes.
After the fall of Suharto, the ethnic violence spread throughout the islands of Java, Borneo, Sulawesi and the Malukus.
Witnesses detected a similar pattern in the seemingly separate conflicts and reported the presence of unidentified men provoking an attack on other religious groups. “What we are seeing today is a re-establishment of old ties. There is a good chance that similar conflicts would occur again,” Usman said.
In a recent interview with the Globe, Mahmudi Haryono, alias Yusuf, a former terrorism convict who once participated in religious violence in Poso, said that the best possible way to disrupt national stability in Indonesia would be to incite another violent religious conflict.
“There are thousands of us who ‘graduated’ from Moro, Poso and Ambon. This is a time of peace so most of us just carry on with our daily lives. But when there is another conflict, they would leave their job and everything they have and fight. A lot of people that I know feel that way,” he said.
“I realized, even back then, that the jihadist movement has been exploited by political power to destabilize the government. But blind faith and the notion that Muslims are under attack can prompt radical Muslims to do just about anything.” By Nivell Rayda Jakarta Globe
Decision stuns US, the front-runner because of its intensive efforts to woo India's defense establishment
India used to be a proud leader of the old Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), standing notionally between the US and Soviet blocs, but always tilting towards Moscow.
It is therefore both apt and heartening to hear today reports that the government is taking a truly NAM-style route on an $11bn contract for fighter jets by rejecting bids from both America's Lockheed Martin F-16s and Boeing F-18s and Russia's MiG-35s.
This is a diplomatically brave decision that most observers never expected after India signed its nuclear power deal with the US in 2008. Numerous US officials from President Barack Obama downwards have lobbied hard for the $11bn multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) contract, indicating that it was expected as a nuclear thank-you.
What seemed most likely therefore was that Lockheed or Boeing would be included – even though, as India knows, its supplies are unreliable – until the end of the process. Then the US would not give up until it had driven other bidders out of the contest.
The US offerings however did not match up to required standards during flight testing – nor did the MiGs. The F-18 failed tests in the cold and high Himalayas of Ladakh, and the F-16, flown by Pakistan, is long in the tooth. The Griffin fighter from Saab of Sweden has also been rejected.
The contest is now between Typhoon jets (above) from the four-nation EADS Eurofighter consortium (Germany, Spain, UK and Italy) and Rafale from Dassault of France. India's MoD is believed to have been impressed with the Typhoon, while the IAF has strong links with Dassault, whose Mirage fighters have been successfully in service in India since the early 1980s and are now being upgraded.
Rejection of the US companies therefore shows a degree of sophisticated detached decision-making from the Ministry of Defence's minister, A.K.Antony. Together with his senior acquisition officials, he seems determined to clear a logjam of pending defence contracts, and to do so in a way that shows rare integrity in a country that has become internationally infamous for widespread corruption. The "clean" record of Antony, and of at least some of his top officials, is important because there are bound to be allegations of corruption, especially since there was a scandal in the early 1980s over the Mirage deal.
Curiously the US ambassador to India, Timothy Roemer, chose today to announce his resignation – "for personal, professional and family considerations". That is being widely interpreted as a reaction to the loss of the MRCA contract, as well as the failure of the India-US nuclear deal to generate increased defence co-operation between the two countries, plus nuclear power plant contracts for US companies.
However, I am told that Roemer's resignation has been expected for some weeks because, as a senior Democratic politician, he is returning to the US to work on Obama's re-election campaign. If that is so, it was surely silly to announce the departure today.
Billion $ sops
In any case the defence industry expects sops to be announced for the US very soon, notably a $5bn order for ten Boeing C-17 heavy-lift transport aircraft with an additional order for a further six aircraft, both being placed through the negotiated government-to-government foreign military sales (FMS) route without competitive tenders. Lockheed is also expected to receive further negotiated orders for its C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, six of which are already contracted. Russia might be disappointed that its MiGs have been rejected, but it already has substantial orders for current and future jet fighters.
Despite the personal and political angle for his departure, Roemer cannot have helped America's cause when he was reported recently by WikiLeaks saying the India's aerospace industry was "two to three decades behind the US and other western countries", adding that Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL), the government's aircraft manufacturing company, was "untested and suspect" as a partner for advanced aircraft. All that is true but it must have upset HAL and the defence establishment.
However, to come back to my main point, the decisions do show an unexpected independence from US influence that had not been expected when the nuclear deal was struck. It has not been a good year so far for India with all the current corruption scandals, but this indicates that, in international diplomacy, it is keeping the US firmly in its place.
John Elliott for Asia Sentinel
