Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Drugs, Guns and War in Myanmar


















BANGKOK - Mounting tensions between Myanmar's military government and ethnic groups with which it has ceasefire agreements in the country's northern regions have spurred a surge in drug trafficking. Driven by militias' growing demand for weapons to counter anticipated government offensives, a narcotics fire-sale is raising concerns of greater instability along the borders of several neighboring countries, including China.

Myanmar's military regime has demanded that the insurgent groups with which it agreed ceasefires in the late 1980s and early 1990s hand over their arms to government control. A deadline set for the end of October has been allowed to pass and discussions between the military and two main ethnic armies, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (Eastern Shan State) (NDAA), are reportedly continuing.

Neither side appears willing to back down, prompting speculation that new fighting may be imminent. Under the government's proposed Border Guard Force plan, ethnic armies would be downsized into several battalions consisting of 326 men. Each would have a contingent of Myanmar army and non-commissioned officers and operate under the central command of the Myanmar Army. The junta has said it will provide weapons, equipment, uniforms and even salaries to the proposed units.

The generals have indicated that a handover of weapons, either through the border guard scheme or through forced surrender, is key to their plan to achieve national reconciliation by holding general elections next year. The political stakes for that plan are high. The junta has demonstrated a willingness to risk the ire of ally China through an assault in August on the Kokang ceasefire group, which caused a flood of refugees to stream across the border into neighboring China.

Both the Myanmar army and the Kokang have since reinforced their troops and appear to be preparing for further hostilities that security analysts predict could spill over into other insurgent-controlled territories. It's still unclear if Myanmar will risk its relations with Beijing by attacking the remaining and better armed ceasefire groups along the Myanmar-China border, a battle plan that has the potential to significantly destabilize southern China.

Under the government's plan, the ceasefire groups' political wings will be allowed to transform into political parties to contest the general elections. Ethnic leaders, however, say that handing over their armed forces to government control would entail relinquishing their bargaining power vis-a-vis a regime that frequently uses military force to press its demands. It would also mean handing over much of the apparatus that protects, produces and transports their narcotics trafficking operations.

Since a 1989 mutiny that broke up the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and spawned several ethnic armies in the north - including the UWSA, NDAA and the Kokang group - the drug trade has steadily expanded in the region. The military government has both permitted and profited from the groups' drug production and trafficking, despite official claims to lead an internationally assisted counter narcotics campaign and disingenuous pledges by several of the insurgent groups to be drug-free.

The ceasefire groups have plowed their profits into places such as Panghsang and Mong La along the Myanmar-China border, transforming them into boom towns. They have also invested in more legitimate businesses in central Myanmar, as well as in neighboring China and Thailand. For example, the UWSA's financial controller, Wei Xuegang, who is wanted for narcotics trafficking in the United States and Thailand, has built an extensive business empire in Myanmar around his Hong Pang Group.

Without firm autonomy agreements with the Myanmar government, a substantial portion of ceasefire groups' profits have gone towards the upkeep of their armies and the procurement of new weapons. According to security analysts, the UWSA has since its 1989 ceasefire agreement grown into the largest and best armed fighting force in Myanmar outside the government's army. The narco-trafficking militia consists of between 15,000 and 20,000 heavily armed foot soldiers.

Should negotiations over the border guard plan collapse and a renewed civil war break out in northern Myanmar, ethnic insurgents risk losing access to their extensive drug-financed business operations. According to Sai Khuensai Jaiyen of the Shan Herald Agency for News, an exile-run media organization that closely tracks the drug trade in Shan State, there are reports that Wei has started to sell parts of his business holdings and has suspended some of Hong Pang Group's operations in apparent preparation for hostilities. The company is involved, among other things, in lumber, agriculture, gas stations and department stores in the towns of Lashio, Mandalay and Yangon.

Security analysts and counter-narcotics officials in Thailand believe that, without access to funds from their business interests, insurgent groups like the UWSA will be forced to step up their narcotics production and trafficking activities. As nationalist Chinese Kuomintang general Duan Xiwen said in 1967 about fighting in Shan State: " ... to fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium" - and now methamphetamines.

Insurgent Patron

China has been the main patron of the ceasefire groups along its border since the CPB mutiny in 1989. The relationship, from Beijing's perspective, is a pragmatic one that ensures that China has leverage against Myanmar's generals with which to protect its large and growing economic and strategic interests in the country. China has provided development and economic assistance to the ceasefire groups, as well as advanced weapons and even some training in their usage. This has included 120mm and 130mm artillery and hand-held surface-to-air missiles.

China's goodwill towards the ceasefire groups has been partly contingent on their agreement to curtail drug smuggling into and through China. Pressure from Chinese officials has been placed on ethnic insurgent leaders to prohibit the smuggling of
narcotics into China. Much of the drug trade to China consists of opium and heroin, which is becoming a growing problem seen in rising addiction rates in the country.
The ability of the UWSA, NDAA and other ceasefire groups to fight will be partially dependant on whether China permits them to maintain their known cross-border businesses and investments, as well as access to weapons and ammunition. Without the ability to generate income through these operations, ethnic insurgent leaders will be faced with the choice of either surrendering once their stocks of ammunition are depleted - as happened to the Kokang in August - or stepping up narcotics production and trafficking to raise funds and purchase arms and ammunition from dealers in Thailand and China.

The insurgent groups' main market for narcotics is Thailand. While heroin is still exported to the outside world via well-established and well-protected trafficking routes in Thailand, most of the methamphetamines produced are destined for Thai consumption. China, too, could soon be faced with an upsurge in narcotics smuggling, both to its growing addict population and through well-documented routes across its southern region out to Shanghai and Hong Kong. Myanmar remains China's main source of heroin.

Thai counter-narcotics officials are already claiming that the UWSA is engaged in a fire sale by cutting prices to quickly move its stores of narcotics to buy more weapons before hostilities with government forces begin in the approaching cool season. In August, the Thai army quietly revived an elite counter-narcotics force previously known as Task Force 399 and renamed as 151st Special Warfare Company.
Task Force 399, which was tasked with interdiction at the border and supported by US Special Forces personnel, was known previously for taking a proactive approach to interdicting drug traffickers including, some analysts of the drug trade say, pursuit across the border into Myanmar territory.

Over the past five months, there have been frequent reports in the Thai media about arrests of drug traffickers, disruption of smuggling gangs and seizures of large quantities of narcotics. The New York Times in an October 1 article cited Thai Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) figures that 1,268 kilograms of heroin had been seized between January and August this year, a huge increase on the 57 kilograms seized in the region last year.

Last week, the government announced plans for a new drug suppression force to combat trafficking in border provinces next to Myanmar. Thai Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban linked the creation of the new force to an increase in drug trafficking from Myanmar, according to media reports. The plan still needs government approval, but if enacted the new unit will by coordinated by the army's Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC).

Regional Reach

While the bulk of the drug trafficking ceasefire armies are stationed along the Myanmar-China border, the UWSA has also built up a substantial area along the Thai border, contiguous with Thailand's northern Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, through which much of its heroin and amphetamine trade now passes. Because the Myanmar army controls territory between the main UWSA units, each is largely self-sustaining through their narcotics trafficking. Maintaining the security of this area will be key for access to the Thai market.

Another key narcotics trade point is across the Mekong River into Laos. The NDAA operates at least one major trade point jointly with the UWSA at Sop Lwe on the Myanmar side of the river near the small Lao town of Xieng Kok in the northern Luang Nam Tha province, says a researcher familiar with the trade who recently visited the site. This route, stretching across the width of UWSA and NDAA-held territory along the China-Myanmar border, avoids the necessity of sending narcotics shipments south across government-held territory to reach the Thai border.

Observers of the regional drug trade have claimed that the UWSA and NDAA have established methamphetamine laboratories in Laos, an accusation that Lao officials have consistently denied. Trafficking routes, however, are much harder to deny. Thai counter-narcotics officials claim methamphetamines and heroin are smuggled through Laos to less well-patrolled points in northeastern Thailand, including Nong Khai, Mukdahan and Ubon Ratchathani provinces.

The ONCB reckons between three million and five million methamphetamine pills are smuggled into northeastern Thailand from Laos each year. In a sting operation in July, Thai police arrested two Lao men and a Thai woman in northeastern Udon Thani
province with 160,000 methamphetamine tablets worth as much as US$1.4 million when sold in Bangkok. Police allege one of the Lao men was an important trafficker in Laos with direct contact to Myanmar-linked drug labs.

An increase in production and trafficking in Myanmar could have far-reaching regional implications. In Vietnam, there has been in recent years an upsurge in trafficking of methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs smuggled through Laos and traced back to northeastern Myanmar. The drugs are known to be smuggled to the northern cities of Hanoi and Haiphong and down the length of country to Ho Chi Minh City, feeding a growing addiction problem. Demand has increased in Vietnam as its large population becomes more affluent. Cambodia and Malaysia have also seen an increase in narcotics trafficked from Myanmar.

The production and trafficking of narcotics has fueled a succession of insurgent groups in Myanmar's northeastern region since the 1950's and will continue to do so should fighting with the government resume. Better communications and more efficient trafficking routes and methods, as well as more easily produced synthetic drugs in mobile laboratories, have financed the growth of certain Myanmar insurgent groups. And as they prepare for new hostilities against the government, the region's narcotics problem seems set to grow.

By Brian McCartan, Bangkok-based freelance journalist.

Monday, November 2, 2009

Revisiting the Spin of Malaysia and Indonesia as ‘Moderate’ Muslim States
















It is now ‘moderate’ season once again when the leaders of the developed Western world are on the lookout for moderate Muslim states and leaders to engage in dialogue with as strategic, economic and political allies and partners. Needless to say, the leaders and governments of the Muslim world are equally pleased with this open invitation, particularly from the White House, and there are plenty of Muslim leaders and governments that are prepared to bend over backwards to accommodate the demands of the man who is currently residing in the White House too.

On top of that it ought to be noted that the honour of being anointed as a ‘moderate Muslim’ leader is something that most Muslim leaders today would wish for and cherish above all else, cognisant of the fact that such an anointment would be followed by a blanket support of their own domestic policies at home as well as lashings of economic, political and military support to boot. During the bad old days of the Bush administration, countries like Thailand and Australia were given the dubious honour of being seen as the closest allies of Washington in Asia.
Thailand was given the title of being America’s ‘no.1 non-NATO ally in ASEAN’; while Australia (or rather the Howard government) was dubbed America’s sheriff in Asia- a dubious recognition indeed that merely compounded the image that both
states were anti-Muslim and anti-Islam.

Now that the keys of the White House have changed hands and a new American President is scheduled to visit Indonesia in the near future, it would appear that the developed countries of the world are once again on the lookout for ‘moderate Muslim leaders’ to court and cajole. Straight off the bat Malaysia and Indonesia come to mind as the two prime candidates for the top slot of ‘most moderate’ Muslim state in Asia. (While the governments of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore et al must be cursing their luck for not having enough Muslims to make the rankings…)

But before we jump the gun, let us look at both countries - Malaysia and Indonesia - and ask ourselves if they deserve the coveted title of moderate Muslim state in the first place.

Indonesia, it has to be said, has suffered from bad press thanks to the Bali bombings and how the country was presented in the international media following the attacks of 2002. But it is sad and unfair to see how this country, which has had a long record of strife and violence, has not been given the recognition it deserves for its efforts in the long march to democracy and democratisation.

For a start, when talking about the long history of political violence in Indonesia, one needs to situate such discussion in the proper historical context and identify all the agents and actors involved. While it is true that Indonesia has a long record of political violence, let us not forget that much of that violence was sanctioned if not tacitly approved by the international community as well, who are just as guilty of condoning the rise of political gangsterism in Indonesia in the past. During the violent and bloody counter-communist putsch in 1965 for instance, it was well known that thousands of suspected Communists of the PKI and their sympathisers were summarily wiped out by right-wing religious elements of the Nahdatul Ulama, with the tacit support (or at least non-interference) of the West.

During the violent annexation of East Timor in 1974-75 it was also the governments of the West that turned a blind eye to the violence there on the grounds that East Timor might have become the new ‘Cuba in ASEAN’ and was thus seen as the ‘red threat’ to countries like Australia and ASEAN.

Yet despite three decades of violent and arbitrary dictatorship under Suharto and his generals, Indonesia has developed to become one of the few truly democratic countries in ASEAN today with a press that is freer than most of its neighbours. We should also remember that so many of the reformasi leaders who brought down the government of Suharto and his army were also former student activists who were themselves Islamlist activists and intellectuals, contrary to the stereotypical image of Islam as a religion that works hand in glove with totalitarian forms of governance.

Today Indonesia’s Islamic universities - including the ones I am proud to be associated with - are at the forefront of modern Islamic education and are producing the first Muslim scholars who have developed a rational, objective and critical understanding of religion per se. Yet almost none of these developments feature in the international media that continues instead to harp on the idea of Indonesia being the hotbed of radical Islamist terrorism.

Conversely next door in Malaysia we see a totally different framing of Islam altogether. Malaysia has been seen and cast as a moderate Muslim state and a model state for others to follow, notably by the international media whose own exposure to the living social realities of Malaysia may stop at the poolside of the 5-star hotels in Kuala Lumpur. Yet a quick survey of the country will give a very different picture of the state of normative Muslim praxis in Malaysia today: This is still the country where book banning is rife and where we have seen embarrassing contradictions such as the banning of the works of Karen Armstrong while the author herself was invited to speak at Islamic conferences in the capital. This is a country with a morality police that has become a law unto themselves; where feminist Muslim organisations like Sisters in Islam are constantly persecuted and demonised and where the space for Muslim thought, expression and social life has been shrinking since the 1970s.

Yet despite these contradictions, Malaysia is cast in a more positive light compared to Indonesia, when it is obvious to anyone who is familiar with the normative Muslim politics of both countries that the normative space for Muslims in Indonesia is infinitely much bigger. And in terms of the discursive as well as normative-cultural frontiers to Muslim life and praxis in both countries, it is equally clear that the space of Muslim life is still bigger in Indonesia compared to Malaysia. So what gives, and why is Indonesia constantly placed in the dock?

One can only conclude that the negative image of Indonesia has more to do with the selective memory of the Western media that cannot look beyond the historical fact of the Bali bombing to recognise the realities of Indonesia today. By appropriating Bali as a ‘tragedy for the West’ and positing it as an attack on Australians and other Westerners, the international media as well as the governments of the developed world have not only robbed the Indonesians of their right to grieve for their pain, but have also appropriated Indonesia’s identity and history in the process. By doing do, they are in peril of overlooking the recent developments in the country that has probably gone through the most expansive and deep democratic revolution ASEAN has seen in ages, and have denied themselves the possibility of working with a truly moderate and democratic ally. That is Indonesia’s loss as well, but the bigger loss will be borne by the governments of the Western world.
By Farish A. Noor

Sounds Familiar? Struggle with Race














SEOUL — On the evening of July 10, Bonogit Hussain, a 29-year-old Indian man, and Hahn Ji-seon, a female Korean friend, were riding a bus near Seoul when a man in the back began hurling racial and sexist slurs at them. The situation would be a familiar one to many Korean women who have dated or even — as in Ms. Hahn’s case — simply traveled in the company of a foreign man.

What was different this time, however, was that, once it was reported in the South Korean media, prosecutors sprang into action, charging the man they have identified only as a 31-year-old Mr. Park with contempt, the first time such charges had been applied to an alleged racist offense. Spurred by the case, which is pending in court, rival political parties in Parliament have begun drafting legislation that for the first time would provide a detailed definition of discrimination by race and ethnicity and impose criminal penalties.

For Mr. Hussain, subtle discrimination has been part of daily life for the two and half years he has lived here as a student and then research professor at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul. He says that, even in crowded subways, people tend not sit next to him. In June, he said, he fell asleep on a bus and when it reached the terminal, the driver woke him up by poking him in the thigh with his foot, an extremely offensive gesture in South Korea.

“Things got worse for me this time, because I was with a Korean woman,” Mr. Hussain said in an interview. “Whenever I’ve walked with Ms. Hahn or other Korean women, most of the time I felt hostilities, especially from middle-aged men.”
South Korea, a country where until recently people were taught to take pride in their nation’s “ethnic homogeneity” and where the words “skin color” and “peach” are synonymous, is struggling to embrace a new reality. In just the past seven years, the number of foreign residents has doubled, to 1.2 million, even as the country’s population of 48.7 million is expected to drop sharply in coming decades because of its low birth rate.

Many of the foreigners come here to toil at sea or on farms or in factories, providing cheap labor in jobs shunned by South Koreans. Southeast Asian women marry rural farmers who cannot find South Korean brides. People from English-speaking countries find jobs teaching English in a society obsessed with learning the language from native speakers.

For most South Koreans, globalization has largely meant increasing exports or going abroad to study. But now that it is also bringing an influx of foreigners into a society where 42 percent of respondents in a 2008 survey said they had never once spoken with a foreigner, South Koreans are learning to adjust — often uncomfortably. In a report issued Oct. 21, Amnesty International criticized discrimination in South Korea against migrant workers, who mostly are from poor Asian countries, citing sexual abuse, racial slurs, inadequate safety training and the mandatory disclosure of H.I.V. status, a requirement not imposed on South Koreans in the same jobs. Citing local news media and rights advocates, it said that following last year’s financial downturn, “incidents of xenophobia are on the rise.” Ms. Hahn said, “Even a friend of mine confided to me that when he sees a Korean woman walking with a foreign man, he feels as if his own mother betrayed him.”

In South Korea, a country repeatedly invaded and subjugated by its bigger neighbors, people’s racial outlooks have been colored by “pure-blood” nationalism as well as traditional patriarchal mores, said Seol Dong-hoon, a sociologist at Chonbuk National University.

Centuries ago, when Korean women who had been taken to China as war prizes and forced into sexual slavery managed to return home, their communities ostracized them as tainted. In the last century, Korean “comfort women,” who worked as sex slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army, faced a similar stigma. Later, women who sold sex to American G.I.’s in the years following the 1950-53 Korean War were despised even more. Their children were shunned as “twigi,” a term once reserved for animal hybrids, said Bae Gee-cheol, 53, whose mother was expelled from her family after she gave birth to him following her rape by an American soldier.

Even today, the North Korean authorities often force abortion on women who return home pregnant after going to China to find food, according to defectors and human rights groups. “When I travel with my husband, we avoid buses and subways,” said Jung Hye-sil, 42, who married a Pakistani man in 1994. “They glance at me as if I have done something incredible. There is a tendency here to control women and who they can date or marry, in the name of the nation.”

For many Koreans, the first encounter with non-Asians came during the Korean War, when American troops fought on the South Korean side. That experience has complicated South Koreans’ racial perceptions, Mr. Seol said. Today, the mix of envy and loathing of the West, especially of white Americans, is apparent in daily life.

The government and media obsess over each new report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to see how the country ranks against other developed economies. A hugely popular television program is “Chit Chat of Beautiful
Ladies” — a show where young, attractive, mostly Caucasian women who are fluent in Korean discuss South Korea. Yet, when South Koreans refer to Americans in private conversations, they nearly always attach the same suffix as when they talk about the
Japanese and Chinese, their historical masters: “nom,” which means “bastards.” Tammy Chu, 34, a Korean-born film director who was adopted by Americans and grew up in New York State, said she had been “scolded and yelled at” in Seoul subways for speaking in English and thus “not being Korean enough.” Then, she said, her applications for a job as an English teacher were rejected on the grounds that she was “not white enough.”

Ms. Hahn said that after the incident in the bus last July, her family was “turned upside down.” Her father and other relatives grilled her as to whether she was dating Mr. Hussain. But when a cousin recently married a German, “all my relatives envied her, as if her marriage was a boon to our family,” she said.

The Foreign Ministry supports an anti-discrimination law, said Kim Se-won, a ministry official. In 2007, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recommended that South Korea adopt such a law, deploring the widespread use of terms like “pure blood” and “mixed blood.” It urged public education to overcome the notionthat South Korea was “ethnically homogenous,” which, it said, “no longer corresponds to the actual situation.”

But a recent forum to discuss proposed legislation against racial discrimination turned into a shouting match when several critics who had networked through the Internet showed up. They charged that such a law would only encourage even more migrant workers to come to South Korea, pushing native workers out of jobs and creating crime-infested slums. They also said it was too difficult to define what was racially or culturally offensive.

“Our ethnic homogeneity is a blessing,” said one of the critics, Lee Sung-bok, a bricklayer who said his job was threatened by migrant workers. “If they keep flooding in, who can guarantee our country won’t be torn apart by ethnic war as in Sri Lanka?”
By CHOE SANG-HUN The New York Times

West Papua Report















November 2009
This is the 66th in a series of monthly reports that focus on developments affecting Papuans. This series is produced by the non-profit West Papua Advocacy Team (WPAT) drawing on media accounts, other NGO assessments, and analysis and reporting from sources within West Papua.

This report is co-published with the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) Back issues are posted online
http://etan.org/issues/wpapua/default.htm

The Indonesian Military (TNI) missed a legislatively imposed deadline to surrender to the civilian government its vast legal and illegal business empire, which includes sometimes rogue business operations in West Papua. Continued attacks on the U.S. gold mining firm Freeport McMoran raises questions about the efficacy of Indonesian security forces and the justice of arrests of Papuans months ago for the attacks. Papuans are pursuing a lawsuit against Freeport McMoran for environmental destruction and human rights violations. Papuan democratic activists face arrest and death threats. President Yudhoyono's new cabinet includes one Papuan and a General with a troubled record in West Papua. Violence targeting Papuans continues in the Central Highlands. HIV/AIDS is epidemic among Papuans due in large measure to the failure of the Indonesian Government to provide adequate health services to Papuans.

TAPOL's Carmel Budiardjo published a thoughtful essay that among other issues looks at prospect for a dialogue between the Indonesian CentralGovernment and Papuans.

Bali Updates













Om Swastiastu ...


The heat wave continues. So much so, that many visitors are finding it "too dam hot" to sunbathe. Also, on Bali's beaches, large waves are washing large stretches of Kuta beach back into the ocean.

Balis' rabies epidemic has now spread to five of the island's nine regencies/metropolitan areas; tourism officials challenge the claim of the Best Western Kuta Resort's General Manager who boasts he holds a recommendation letter that permits his hotel's operation; Governor Pastika sees Bali 's increasing crime rate as signs of too much of a good thing; there are reports of a new scam at Bali's airport; a Swedish woman says she was raped in Kuta; Bali businesses are upset about a ten-fold increases in the cost of ground water; a new mall development in downtown Denpasar gets the unwanted spotlight for breaking building codes and a failure to pay taxes; and sporadic rains in the midst of Bali's continuing drought brings flash floods and landslides to some corners of the island.

We have an interview with the Dean of the Economics Faculty at Bali's Udayana University on the future the local economy.

The Balinale Film Festivals has come to a close. We've got pictures and details from the gala closing party.

There's also news of a smokers' rights conference coming to Bali in July 2010.

For your activities calendar: A rare violin and guitar recital at Ubud's Mozaic Restaurant on November 7th; an Indonesian gemstone exhibition in Gianyar from November 27, 2009 until January 14, 2010; and a showing of the environmental classic "The Age of Stupid" at the Bali International School November 12-13, 2009.

Bali's good for the soul. Reads how the rich and famous continue to flock to our shores for peace and answers to life's questions.

To get Bali news as it happens, follow me on Twitter.com at http://twitter.com/BaliUpdateEd


Om Çanti Çanti Çanti Om ...
J.M. Daniels - Bali Update
Bali Discovery Tours
For the full report go to: http://www.balidiscovery.com/update/update686.asp

Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea






INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT




Beijing/Brussels, 2 November 2009: China’s internal debate following North Korea’s most recent provocations was interpreted in some Western capitals as a sign that Beijing is finally getting tough with its neighbour.

Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines current Chinese policy toward Pyongyang in the wake of North Korea’s latest round of provocations, including missile launches, the withdrawal from the Six-Party-Talks, and the 25 May nuclear test. These events, together with succession worries, drew out an unusually public, and critical, discussion in China about its ties with North Korea.

The debate took place between those proposing a stronger line against North Korea (“strategists”) and others advocating the continuation of considerable political and economic cover for China’s traditional ally (“traditionalists”). Beijing ultimately supported a strongly worded UN Security Council presidential statement and a resolution mandating a substantial sanctions regime, albeit one focused on missile and defence programs that would not destabilise the North Korean regime.

“Those who read China’s endorsement of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 and its sanctions regime as a signal of a policy shift, underestimate Beijing’s aversion to being diplomatically isolated”, says Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Crisis Group’s North East Asia Project Director. “While Chinese policymakers have adjusted their assessments and prepared the landscape for possible future policy changes, the fundamental calculations underpinning Chinese policy remain the same”.

China prioritises stability over denuclearisation due to a vastly different perception than the U.S. and its allies of the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea. Beijing’s greatest worries are regime implosion, hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees streaming across the border, and the strategic consequences of a precipitous reunification with South Korea. It therefore continues to act in ways that shield Pyongyang from more punitive measures, including stronger economic sanctions.

Beijing’s strong reaction to the 2006 nuclear test taught it that a tough stance on denuclearisation only weakens bilateral relations and jeopardises stability. Beijing now handles the bilateral relationship and the nuclear issue separately. While strengthening its relationship with the DPRK, Beijing leaves the thornier nuclear issue to the U.S. It navigates effectively between the U.S. and DPRK, simultaneously improving relations with both.

“China does not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “But it is willing to go only so far in applying pressure, as it wants instability on its periphery even less”.

To listen to Daniel Pinkston, Crisis Group’s North East Asia Deputy Project Director, discussing the possibility of a breakthrough in the Six-Party-Talks, please click here for the podcast.http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6182&l=1

Sunday, November 1, 2009

Growth Despite Bloodshed? Intra-state Conflict in South-East Asia













Internal conflict poses one of the greatest obstacles to South-east Asian integration and regional development today. Daljit Singh claims that “for the near future, the main sources of South-East Asia’s insecurities will continue to lie not in its external environment but within South-East Asia itself”.This is demonstrated by the fact that most of the countries within the South-East Asia region are stricken by some form of internal strife. In fact, Singapore and Brunei alone can claim to be free of internal problems. While this article focuses on armed conflict, it is necessary to note that this is not the only form of internal strife affecting South-East Asia. Political instability, environmental hazards and racial divisions are among the many internal problems facing the countries in the region.

Moreover, the absence of armed inter-state conflicts in South-East Asia does not mean that the region is tension free. Territorial disputes and other forms of inter-state rivalry continue to hinder progress towards greater regional integration and development. Terrorism presents a challenge on both the internal and the regional front. While some of the non-state actors described in this article are considered to be terrorist groups, this article will be not be focusing on this label and will concentrate instead on their roles as separatist movements.

Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar and Indonesia are all affected by intra-state conflicts. These conflicts are long-standing and fall into the medium and low-intensity categories. In recent years, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos have witnessed sporadic outbreaks of violence carried out by non-state actors. However, these incidents have not escalated into full-scale conflict. Timor-Leste, the only country in South-East Asia which is not a member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), is still recovering from the 2006 security crisis and the attempted assassination of President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao in 2008.

The Impact of Internal Conflict

There can be no doubt that the economic impact of internal conflict is significant. Economic growth is inextricably linked with political stability. This is largely due to the fact that conflict and instability are a drain on national resources but also because they serve as a deterrent to foreign investors as well. Internal instability also hinders development because of the damage to infrastructure that results from armed conflict. An Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) report on the impact of internal conflict and terrorism on economic growth found that internal conflicts have a much greater negative growth influence than transnational terrorist events or external conflicts.The report also found that developing countries in Asia are much more likely to be affected by political violence than developed countries in the region.

Furthermore, intra-state conflict hinders progress towards greater regional integration. Plans for greater connectivity between countries cannot come to fruition when the political environment is destabilised by armed conflict. At the same time, intra-state conflicts can adversely affect integration due to the potential impact of such conflicts. There is an awareness that if countries take steps towards regional integration, such as inter-state transport links and energy grids, then any escalation in conflict could potentially disable an entire region, rather than just one country.

According to Ekaterina Stepanova, armed conflict provides a favourable environment for other forms of violence and may even cause them.This can be attributed to a number of factors. The first is that armed conflict often creates an environment in which institutions cease to function effectively. When this occurs, the rule of law is often the first to suffer.

Lawlessness in conflict stricken areas allows crime and more specifically violence to flourish. Conflicts can put a strain on the resources of the legal system and may create a legal backlog, increasing the time taken to bring criminals to justice. Slow legal processes could potentially lead citizens to seek justice by bypassing the judicial system. Increases in violence can also be ascribed to societal changes brought about by prolonged periods of conflict, especially in societies which have become militarised.

It is also important to bear in mind the humanitarian impact of internal conflict, in terms of death tolls, population displacement and the psychological effects for those affected by conflict. These are all factors which hinder development and pose an obstacle to peaceful conflict resolution.

Intra-state Conflict in South-East Asia

Thailand is beleaguered by a Muslim insurgency in the southern Pattani region. The number of violent incidents in the area escalated drama-tically in 2004. The insurgents are fighting for a Muslim homeland in the south of the country on the basis of their Malay ethnicity. More than 3000 people have been killed since January 2004.5 However, the effects of the conflict in southern Thailand have been overshadowed by the political instability that has prevailed in Bangkok over recent months. The continuing instability caused by supporters of the former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, has led to fears that political tensions could escalate into violence. According to The Economist, the Thai economy has been fairly resilient to date. There is, however, a risk of political tensions damaging the economy in future.

There has been fighting in Myanmar’s northeastern Kokang Province over recent weeks. The result has been the displacement of tens of thousands of people, mostly from the Shan tribe. The conflict was initiated by the Myanmar armed forces and signaled the breaking of a twenty-year-long ceasefire. The fighting came to an end when Myanmar fired into Chinese territory. Myanmar was swift to apologise but there can be no doubt that Myanmar-Chinese relations have been damaged. The armed forces also launched an offensive against the Karen National Union (KNU) in June, resulting in the displacement of 3000 people. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Kachin Independence Organisation, the Shan State Army (North) and the New Mon State Army retain the status of armed ethnic organisations despite being ceasefire organisations. They have refused to participate in the forthcoming elections in Myanmar and the ICG suggests that there is a risk, albeit a small one, that ceasefire groups may resume fighting if the elections prove to be a failure.

There has been much talk of Myanmar granting transit facilities to India and Bangladesh to improve connectivity between South and South-East Asia. The question has to be raised whether such projects are feasible in light of the ongoing insurgencies in many parts of the country. The wisdom of investing in infra-structure in a country riddled by conflict and which is likely to see an escalation in fighting in the run up to national elections next year, has to be questioned.
Fighting continues in the southern Philippines, with the government pushing hard for a resolution of the insurgency. Last month has seen an intensification of military operations in Mindanao. There are hopes that renewed efforts by the armed forces will end the insurgency but as yet an end to the fighting appears to be far off. The southern Philippines are home to a number of armed groups including the Abu Sayyaf rebels and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The latter have been fighting for independence since the 1960s. Mindanao is also home to a Maoist insurgency which began in 1969 with the formation of the New People’s Army (NPA), the military branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The NPA is believed to have around 5000 members. According to Vatikiotis, internal conflict in the Philippines has resulted in the creation of safe havens for international terrorists. Mindanao has almost certainly provided refuge for members of regional terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), although whether these groups have extra-regional links remains the subject of heated debate. This, perhaps, serves as an incentive for the international community to take a significant interest in the resolution of the conflict. American troops are currently deployed in the Philippines in order to support peace talks between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines. There have been reports that the American troops are involved in combat operations; however this has been categorically denied by the US embassy in Manila. While the conflicts have generally been contained within the Mindanao region, there have been a number of violent incidents in other parts of the Philippines, including Manila. Despite this, Malcolm Cook claims that economic growth in the Philippines in 2007 was not adversely affected by the aforementioned conflicts. The Philippines thus appears to be bucking the trend outlined by Gaibulloev and Sandler with regard to the economic impact of internal conflict.

While the conflicts in the Indonesian province of Sulawesi and the Maluku Islands have died down, there continue to be occasional outbreaks of communal violence. Moreover, the Free Papua Movement’s (OPM) battle for independence continues in West Papua. Last year (2008) saw increasing reports of religious tensions in the province. An influx of Muslim migrants from the rest of Indonesia was believed to be the cause of these tensions, which occurred between the Muslim and Christian communities. There has been a sharp increase in the number of violent incidents in the province in 2009. According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s Conflict Barometer 2008, the Sulawesi and Maluku conflicts are level-two conflicts while the Papua conflict is a level-three conflict. This puts it in the medium-intensity category. The HIIK states that level-three conflicts are crises, which they define as being “a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents.” Level-two conflicts are defined as being manifest conflicts. These are essentially non-violent but involve “the use of measures that are located in the stage preliminary to violent force.”There were also political tensions in Aceh earlier this year, despite the 2005 ceasefire. These tensions arose in the period prior to the 2009 parliamentary and legislative elections. The situation did not escalate into full-scale conflict but there were outbreaks of violence including the shooting of members of the
Aceh Transitional Committee. The situation in the province remains fragile and the possibility of renewed armed conflict persists.

Despite the terrorist attacks in Jakarta in July and the tensions outlined above, the Indonesian economy has also been showing signs of resilience. The Economist predicts the GDP will grow by more than four per cent this year despite the global financial crisis. It therefore appears that the major South-East Asian economies are less affected by internal conflict than what the theory suggests.

Timor-Leste, which is aspiring to become a member of the ASEAN, continues to suffer political instability. Despite the presence of the the United Nations Integrated Mission for Timor-Leste (UNMIT) the risk of a return to violence remains. In June 2009 members of the Timor-Leste Defence Force purportedly turned their weapons on the United Nations Police Force (UNPOL) officers after a disagreement regarding the handling of a clash between two martial arts groups in Maliana.13 Such incidents seriously impede Timor-Leste’s progress towards stability. The regional impact of violence in Timor-Leste is, however, limited as the country is not a major player on the South-East Asian economic and political scenes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it seems clear that intra-state conflict has had a significant, although not crippling, effect on the South-East Asia region. Interestingly, according to K. Kesavapany of the ISEAS, political instability did not have a major impact on growth rates in the region. However, while the economic repercussions have not been as marked as they have been in other regions plagued by internal strife, there can be no doubt that growth is being restricted by intra-state conflict. Moreover the money spent on combating separatists and rebuilding infrastructure that has been destroyed during fighting could be used for development. The region will fail to fulfil its economic potential until the various manifestations of internal strife are addressed. There can be no doubt that progress towards regional integration within South-East Asia and with the rest of Asia has also been hampered by intra-state conflict. Greater integration and connectivity will only be possible when the region has stabilised.

Vatikiotis argues that armed conflict in South-East Asia has “complicated moves to reform military and civil society institutions” and is “a drag on democratic development”. This is almost certainly the general trend. However, it is worth noting that there are countries which do not suffer internal conflict, which are not strictly democratic; and there are democratic countries which are plagued by civil conflict, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. It must therefore be noted that while internal conflict may serve to hinder democracy in some cases this is not the rule in South-East Asia. Vatikiotis adds that the lawlessness prevailing as a consequence of internal conflict in South-East Asia allows criminal activities, such as smuggling and gun-running, to flourish while permitting corruption and organised crime to continue unchecked.15 This is in keeping with Stepanova’s claim that armed conflict breeds non-conflict related violence.

It is clear that the impact of internal conflict is multi-faceted. South-East Asia, however, seems to be coping relatively well with the challenges that it faces on this front. This does not mean that the countries within the region can become complacent. The dangers posed by intra-state conflict are very real and effective conflict resolution would greatly aid progress towards regional development and economic integration.

By Anna Louise Strachan Visiting Researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (South-East Asia Research Programme), New Delhi. Her research interests include internal
conflict, electoral issues, minority politics and the UN approach to peacekeeping.