Indonesian politicians are
preparing for the 2019 presidential and legislative elections. A high barrier
to entry has shaped the coming presidential election into a two-horse race. As
the two separate elections will be held on the same day, this has affected the
way each party is approaching coalition building.
The 2019 presidential election in
Indonesia is approaching, scheduled for 17 April next year, and political
parties or political coalitions have to register their preferred pair of
candidates to the General Election Committee between 4 and 10 August 2018. Only
those with 20 percent of parliamentary seats or 25 percent of popular votes can
nominate a pair of candidates.
This high barrier to entry for the
presidential race has forced the smaller parties to gravitate towards either
the incumbent, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) or Prabowo Subianto – seemingly
Jokowi’s one and only potential opponent in Indonesia’s coming presidential
election.
A Fraught Coalition
The coming race is not only a
presidential but also a legislative contest taking place at the same time. As
indicated by the dynamic in the recently concluded Indonesian regional
elections, the legislative elections for the national assembly loom in
importance as the seats will form the basis to determine each party’s standing
in the subsequent elections in 2024.
Take for example, the Democratic
Party of Struggle’s (PDI-P) approach in the elections. Its leader, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, personally decided to nominate only party cadres and insisted the
party be the leader of the coalition despite it being aware the move might cost
it votes. By leading a small coalition, whilst campaigning for local candidates,
PDI-P is able to campaign for the
re-election of President Joko Widodo.
PDI-P isn’t the only party operating
with an eye on the big prize next year. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) too
changed its tactics. Instead of focusing on winning in key areas, PKS honoured
its coalition with
Gerindra Party. In the recent regional election, Gerindra and PKS formed a
coalition in five pivotal provinces, including West Java and North Sumatra.
They limited themselves to these
constituencies even though they might have wished to contest more seats but
found it was difficult to work together sometimes. The PKS and Gerindra
coalition at the regional election has given impetus to the #ChangePresident2019
movement to unseat Jokowi in 2019.
In exchange for PKS loyalty,
Gerindra has reportedly signed a written agreement
with the Islamist party to endorse Prabowo as the presidential candidate, but
PKS has to be consulted when selecting the vice-president candidate. This is of
course merely a gentlemen’s agreement.
Prabowo’s Dilemma
This, nevertheless, has made
selecting a running mate more difficult for Prabowo. PKS has insisted Prabowo’s
running mate to be from one of the nine PKS cadres
proposed by the party, including Salim Segaf Al Jufri, the Chairman of the PKS
Advisory Council.
Earlier this year, Prabowo has
announced his intention to contest. But, interestingly the announcement was
made with some reluctance. It
appears that his nominations were largely a result of party pressure. Sandiaga
Uno, deputy governor of Jakarta and Prabowo’s strategist, posited that
Prabowo’s lack of ambition was due to his age, as he is approaching 67. After
losing the race three times and mobilising significant resources, Prabowo is
keen just to be the kingmaker.
For Gerindra, however, the
nomination of Prabowo, as of now, is non-negotiable. Having Prabowo contesting
the presidential election, no matter the result, will be a big boost for the
party at the concurrent legislative election. This is also probably the reason
for many parties, including PKS, to be really persistent in having their own
cadre to run with Prabowo in the next presidential race.
Demise of the Third Axis
The possibility of a third axis
driven by the Democrat Party (PD) – the Yudhoyonos’ camp – is now highly
unlikely, because Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, former president and the patron of
PD, has declared his support for Prabowo in the
presidential race. The more important stake for him is for the Yudhoyono
dynasty to be preserved. As such, PD can neither align with the Jokowi camp nor
Prabowo’s.
Also out is the option of leading
its own coalition of parties, depending on whether Yudhoyono’s son, Agus H.
Yudhoyono, will be able to secure a vice president position or an important
ministerial position. As declared by the senior Yudhoyono in a press conference on
25 July, despite good relations between him and Jokowi, it is difficult for PD
to be in the same coalition with PDI-P. One of the reasons is the rift between
Yudhoyono and Megawati dating back to when he defeated Megawati in the 2004
presidential election.
Nonetheless, it is difficult for
Yudhoyono to pressure Prabowo to accept his son, Agus, as his running mate, so
long as PKS is not agreeable with the proposition. Yudhoyono is building a closer relation with
the National Mandate Party (PAN), another player in the coalition that might be
willing to support Agus’ vice-presidential candidacy.
For Prabowo, PD is a balancing force
when dealing with PKS that has been breathing down his neck. Indeed, managing a
coalition of equals, comprising parties with relatively similar percentage of
parliamentary seats, is more precarious compared to Jokowi’s
coalition that centered on PDI-P and the Functional Party (Golkar).
The Coming Divisive Race
A coalition of PDI-P and seven
parties has nominated Jokowi as the presidential candidate. It is likely that
to strengthen his Islamist credentials that has been under attack after
the 2017 regional election Jokowi will select a non-partisan vice president with a
wide Islamist-based support. During the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election the
issue of religion was successfully worked up by the opposition as a stick to
beat Jokowi’s camp. This strategy is likely to be redeployed by the opposition
to win the presidential race.
In the recently concluded regional
election, Prabowo made obvious efforts to deepen emotional ties with popular
Islamic clerics including Rizieq Shihab, Abdul
Somad, and local Islamic figures throughout Indonesia such as Tengku Zulkarnain
from North Sumatra. There is a real danger these moves to secure political
support through religion will divide the country and be detrimental to
Indonesia’s democracy in the long run.
Unfortunately, division in Indonesia
based on religious interpretation is an ongoing and seemingly irreversible
trend. Largely mobilised by the opposition, Prabowo has positioned his
coalition for the next election in the name of keumatan or the legitimate representation
of Indonesian Muslims against Jokowi and PDI-P both of whom are painted as
anti-Islam.
By Emirza Adi Syailendra*
*Emirza Adi Syailendra is a Senior Analyst
with the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. This is part
of an RSIS series on Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election
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