Jihadism
in Southern Thailand: A Phantom Menace
Thailand’s Malay-Muslim
insurgency appears to some observers a potential seedbed for transnational
jihadism, but the separatist fronts do not share ideologies or objectives with
ISIS or al-Qaeda. The future is uncertain, and a resolution of the
conflict, based on political decentralisation, could help deter prospective
jihadist expansion in southernmost Thailand.
- What’s the issue? Media
reports and some observers suggest growing potential for Islamic State
(ISIS) activity in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. Crisis Group argues
that to date there is no evidence of jihadist inroads, partly because the
insurgents are nationalists who aim to create an independent state.
- Why does it matter? While
fears of jihadist activity are not irrational, they are, for now,
misplaced. But an endless and expanding conflict could create
opportunities for transnational jihadists to exploit.
- What should be done? There
needs to be a negotiated resolution of the conflict between the Thai
government and the separatist movement. A decentralised political system
could help address the principal grievances in the south while preserving
the unitary Thai state.
Executive Summary
The decline of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the advent of ISIS-linked
violence in South East Asia evince the possibility of a new era of
transnational jihadist terrorism in the region. Recurring albeit
unsubstantiated reports about ISIS activity in Thailand have prompted questions
about the vulnerability of the country’s Muslim-majority deep south and, in particular,
its longstanding Malay-Muslim insurgency to jihadist influence. To date, there
is no evidence of jihadists making inroads among the separatist fronts fighting
for what they see as liberation of their homeland, Patani. But the conflict and
a series of ISIS scares in Thailand are fanning fears of a new terrorist
threat. Such fears are not irrational, though are largely misplaced and should
not obscure the calamity of the insurgency and the need to end it. Direct talks
between insurgent leaders and the government are a priority; a decentralised
political system could help address the principal grievances in the south while
preserving the unitary Thai state.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS have exploited protracted conflicts across the Muslim
world to further their agendas, including in areas that are under the
sovereignty of capable states but where central government authority is weak.
During the ISIS era, transnational jihadism in South East Asia mostly has been
a “bottom-up” phenomenon with pre-existing militant groups (for instance in
Indonesia and the Philippines) proclaiming allegiance to ISIS. In these
countries, as well as Malaysia and Singapore, individuals and small groups
unaffiliated with a militant network have also sought to join ISIS or act in
its name.
Yet such patterns of involvement with ISIS or other jihadist groups to
date have not manifested themselves in southernmost Thailand. One reason is
that Thailand’s Malay-Muslim society is not a sympathetic milieu for
transnational jihadism; the country’s Muslim religious leaders, both
traditionalists and reformists, overwhelmingly reject the Salafi-jihadist
ideology espoused by ISIS and al-Qaeda. To be sure, this diminishes but does
not remove the risk of some Malay Muslims turning to jihadism. Motivations for
joining jihadist groups vary and frequently are not linked to ideology or
religious conviction. Jihadist propaganda could potentially sway some
individuals. However, those Malay Muslims motivated by desires for comradeship,
identity or devotion to a cause – not to mention grievances against the Thai
state – appear more likely to be absorbed by the Patani liberation movement,
given its roots in local society, than by transnational jihadist groups.
The Malay-Muslim insurgency is
distinguished by its parochialism.
·
Indeed, the Malay-Muslim insurgency is distinguished by its
parochialism. The militant organisation pursues national self-determination
over a specific territory, seeking to join, rather than destroy, the
international system. Patani-Malay militant leaders are antagonistic to ISIS
and similar groups and see their fronts as bulwarks against jihadist influence.
They say that allying with ISIS or al-Qaeda, or emulating signature tactics
such as suicide bombings and indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks, would cost
them a claim to international legitimacy, erode their local support and invite
hostile foreign intervention. Malaysia, contending with a domestic
ISIS-inspired threat, is not likely to tolerate such an association among the
Patani militant leadership in exile there.
This is not a reason for complacency. Continued stalemate, tactical
reversals, impatience with, or opposition to the slow-moving peace dialogue
process between Bangkok and some separatist fronts – or even broader
frustration with the prevailing strategy – could arguably encourage a splinter
group to employ extreme violence in a bid to gain leverage. The example, or
support, of jihadists might be attractive to militants disaffected with their
leaders.
But it is a reason to question some of the more alarmist voices. The
Patani liberation movement has a history of factionalism, and the main militant
front, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (Patani-Malay National
Revolutionary Front, BRN), is highly secretive, yet there are no clear
indications of acute generational or ideological divisions. Fears of jihadist
influence based primarily on the argument that “things can change” must be
weighed against evidence that there is no appetite among the leadership of
existing militant groups for affiliation with ISIS or like-minded groups.
Read the full report at https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/291-jihadism-southern-thailand-phantom-menace
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