On Sept.20, 2014,
agents of the Shanghai State Security Bureau of the Ministry of State Security
first contacted me in a bid to recruit me as a spy, requesting I pass US state
secrets to them in exchange for cash payments, write reports mining my
“Washington DC social network” preferably “in the State Department and the
National Security Council” on contentious issues of US “government strategic
thinking.”
That began a
flirtation that lasted more than two years as I attempted to lure the Chinese
into committing themselves to my active recruitment as a spy.
This is not something to play with,
especially as Edward Snowden’s massive release of National Security Agency data
demonstrated. The US closely watches transmissions from suspicious foreign
nationals and in some cases can watch attempts to recruit spies even before
they’re recruited.
Between 2008 and 2011, the US
Justice Department arrested and prosecuted at least 57 people for espionage
working in the service of the Chinese passing classified information, sensitive
technology or trade secrets to intelligence agencies, state-sponsored academic
or ‘think tanks’, private individuals, or fake businesses in China, according
to the Associated Press. Most are now in federal prisons.
“In recent years, the Justice Department has handled an increasing number of
prosecutions involving sensitive American weapons technology, trade secrets and
other restricted information bound for China,” said Dean Boyd, a spokesman for
the Justice Department’s National Security Division. Some cases have involved
individuals operating on behalf of the Chinese government or intelligence. Many
others have involved private-sector businessmen, scientists, students, or
others collecting sensitive U.S. technology or data that is routed to China,
another source told me.
My first inclination, which turned
out to be wise, was to contact US spooks after the Chinese reached out to me.
Look no further for a reason than the case of Kevin Patrick Mallory, 60, a
contractor for the CIA and other U.S. government agencies, who was arrested
last week for “gathering and delivering defense information to aid a foreign
government” and “making material false statements” to the U.S. government,
according to his arrest affidavit filed in Virginia federal court last week. He
potentially faces the death penalty.
“The people who recruited Mallory
are the same people who tried to recruit you,” said Peter Mattis, an analyst
for the Jamestown Institute who specializes in the Chinese intelligence
services. “The Shanghai State Security Bureau of the MSS are particularly
aggressive towards recruiting Americans,” he said during several interviews in
recent days. “The MSS comes to people like you. You said no, a friend of mine
said no, but Mallory said yes. They have a high-volume model of casting a wide
net to see whoever they can reel in. If they get one in 10 or one in 20 to
bite, that works for them.”
“One of the things that I have been
struck by about a number of Chinese espionage cases is the emphasis on
maintaining a relationship,” said Mattis, the Chinese intelligence analyst. He
is the author of Analyzing the Chinese Military: A Review Essay and Resource
Guide on the People’s Liberation Army. “This comes up even before they get into
their interest in specific subjects or anything else. At the very least, a
“let’s keep the conversation going” kind of attitude in their emails. Not much
subtlety in all of this. But what are we expecting from people who probably
have lived inside China most of their lives with limited contact with
foreigners and limited contact with the business community that uses these
kinds of requests?”
One of those who apparently
established such a relationship was Mallory, who in March and April “visited
Shanghai to meet with an individual (hereinafter PRC1) who represented himself
to Mallory as working for a PRC think tank, the Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences (SASS),” wrote special agent Stephen Green of the FBI
Counterintelligence Division in a June 21 affidavit and arrest warrant for
Mallory filed in Virginia federal court.
“Since at least 2014, the FBI has assessed that the Shanghai State Security
Bureau (“SSSB”), a sub-component of the Ministry of State Security (“MSS”), has
a close relationship with SASS and uses SASS employees as spotters and
assessors,”
“FBI has further assessed that SSSB
intelligence officers have also used SASS affiliation as cover identities,”
wrote FBI special agent Green. “The MSS can be described as an institution
similar to the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (“0CIA”) combined under
one intelligence directorate responsible for counter-intelligence, foreign
intelligence, and political security,” said FBI counterintelligence division
agent Green.
On the day I received my first
message from Chinese intelligence agents from the Ministry of State Security,
they, of course, didn’t say they were Chinese spies. The note was from “Frank
Hu,” a “project assistant” from Shanghai Pacific & International Strategy
Consulting Co, saying he had found me on the Internet and was writing to “seek
potential cooperation opportunities.”
It sounded innocent enough, but it
raised red flags. His company, he said, “is a Shanghai-based consulting firm,
specializing in independent policy analysis and advisory services. We strive to
help our clients properly assess political dynamics, risks and opportunities in
countries and regions they operate in.”
Frank called me a
“renowned investigative journalist” who “has written lots of in-depth
investigative political reports.” Therefore, he said, “we wonder if you are
interested in becoming a part-time political consultant for us and using your
wide social network to provide us with insightful consultations. Look forward
to your reply. Regards Frank Shanghai Pacific & International Strategy
Consulting Co.”
The only online reference to the
company was an obscure one that linked back to two well-known Chinese
intelligence front groups – the “Chinese Peoples Friendship Association with
Foreign Countries” and the “Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,” (SASS), the
latter a known operations center for the MSS which was the formal cover for the
Chinese agents who paid Mallory $16,500 in cash which he attempted to smuggle
back into the United States in May.
Mr. “Frank Hu” and the “Shanghai
Pacific & International Strategy Consulting Co”, in fact, do not exist.
Who were these people? Why did they
contact me? I am a journalist who, while having written on Asian affairs for
more than two decades, doesn’t focus on China. So I responded that I would be
“most interested in hearing more details about how I could be useful for your
company’s services to see whether my own skills and expertise and areas of
knowledge would be a good fit.”
I wanted to fish to see how I could
identify who “Frank Hu” and his non-existent “Shanghai Pacific &
International Strategy Consulting Co.” actually were. Five days later, “Mr. Hu”
got back to me thanking me and saying one of their geographical priorities is
Asia, and asking for “authoritative and practical assessments from the US on
political and economic developments across Asia.
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