Are the United States and China Destined for War? Are
Washington and Beijing fated to repeat the mistakes Britain and Germany made a
century earlier?
But if it is unwise to dismiss the
possibility of war, it must surely be at least as misguided to fixate on the
prospect: the occurrence of a catastrophe does not preordain its repetition.
Concern
about an armed confrontation between the United States and China is growing.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has stated that the
United States should not be bound by the “One China” policy unless
as part of a grand bargain of sorts, whereby China reduces taxes on U.S.
exports, stops construction in the South China Sea, and cooperates more closely
to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Geng Shuang has warned that if that
policy “is compromised or disrupted, the sound and steady growth of the
China-U.S. relationship as well as bilateral cooperation in major fields would
be out of the question.” China recently flew a
conventional bomber over the South China Sea to reinforce its claim
to the “nine-dash line,” a demarcation that the United States claims is in
violation of international maritime law.
Growing strategic tensions offer a useful
occasion to revisit well-trodden terrain: are the United States and China fated
to repeat the mistakes Britain and Germany made a century earlier? Given
that the two countries account for roughly a third of the world’s output, a
fifth of its trade, and a quarter of its people, observers cannot pose the
question enough.
Merits of the Analogy:
No matter how forcefully the United States
and China may avow that they will devise an enlightened model of interaction,
they, too, are subject to structural dynamics dating back to ancient Greece.
Political scientist Graham Allison has encapsulated those
dynamics with his famous term “Thucydides’s trap,” which journalist David
Sanger defines as “that
deadly combination of calculation and emotion that…can turn healthy rivalry
into antagonism or worse.”
At least three sources of tension between
the two countries merit attention. First, as the following contrasts suggest,
it is hard to imagine a poorer foundation for the world’s most consequential
relationship:
- The United States is not yet 250 years
old; China’s history spans several millennia.
- The United States is undergoing
demographic shifts that could render non-Hispanic whites a minority by 2050;
China remains about 90 percent Han.
- The United States has two friendly
neighbors and two security moats, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; China has 14
neighbors, some of which are unstable, and most of which fear its regional
ambitions.
- The United States extols its values as
universal and seeks to spread them; China rejects such proselytizing as a form
of interference in other countries’ internal affairs.
- The United States seeks to advance the
postwar order; China asks why it should be beholden to a system that it played
so little role in constructing and molding.
Indeed, the only two self-evident
similarities between the two countries serve to reinforce the multiplicity and
complexity of their differences: both are convinced of their exceptionalism,
and both are inexperienced in sustaining world order with an approximate equal.
Another source of tension is China’s
self-perception: China considers itself not a rising power, but a returning
one. It is accustomed not only to having the world’s largest economy, but
also to being the center of an Asian-Pacific order in which its neighbors paid
it tribute. It accordingly believes that its contemporary resurgence, far from
disrupting world order, is merely redressing an historic aberration—Western
preeminence since the Industrial Revolution—and enabling China to transcend the
indignities it has suffered in recent centuries—including the Taiping Civil War
(1851-64), the collapse of the Qing Dynasty (1911), the Great Famine (1958-61),
and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).
A third source of tension involves the
scale of competition: where hostility between Britain and Germany threatened
merely European order, rivalry between the United States and China has
implications for world order. Henry Kissinger notes that the “case
of China is even more complicated [than that of Germany]. It is not an issue of
integrating a European-style nation-state but a full-fledged continental
power.” China is the world’s most populous country and possesses what will soon
be its largest economy.
Given the aforementioned sources of
tension, we should be grateful that the United States and China enjoy robust
economic ties. Two-way goods trade totaled approximately $600 billion last
year, and China holds approximately $1.2 trillion worth of U.S. debt, more than
any other country. Still, while economic interdependence can temper the
dynamics that push countries to war, only human intervention can furnish the
decisive restraint. In his (in)famous 1910 book The Great Illusion,
British journalist Norman Angell argued that war “is futile…as a means of
securing those moral or material ends which represent the needs of modern civilized
peoples.” He explained that were Germany to attack Britain, the former’s
credit would “collapse, and the only means of restoring it would be for Germany
to put an end to the chaos in England by putting an end to the condition which
had produced it.” “Germany’s [hypothetical] success in conquest,” concluded
Angell, would only evince “the complete economic futility of conquest.”
While his conclusions were tragically
prescient—three empires and some 20 million people perished during World War
I—they did not prevent war. In view of that outcome, it is not surprising that
many contemporary observers caution against exaggerating the restraining
influence of economic ties between the United States and China. Some contend
that, while strong, those ties are more asymmetric, in America’s favor, than
notions such as “mutually assured economic destruction” would imply.
Colonel Mike Pietrucha contended last
November, for example, that “China is the disadvantaged partner in terms of
trade volumes, maritime geography, alliance structures, and the makeup of goods
exchanged.” More recently, journalist Keith Bradsher noted that Chinese
exports to the United States “represent about 4 percent of the Chinese economy;
American exports to China are only about two-thirds of 1 percent of the United
States economy.”
Such observations invite two questions.
First, are there circumstances in which the United States would conclude that
it could confront China militarily without incurring unacceptable economic
damage? Second, if there are, what triggers might introduce them? One of the
most eerie lessons of World War I is that seemingly routine, manageable events
can generate an escalatory spiral; no less than one of its leading historians,
Margaret MacMillan, notes that observers
“still cannot agree on why it happened.” One might object that we do, in fact,
know its cause: the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. MacMillan reminds us, however,
that “there had been many political assassinations in previous years,” none of
which “had led to a major crisis.” Why, then, did the archduke’s murder prove
catalytic? Political economist Richard Rosecrance explains that “‘little
things’—contingent features of the situation prevailing in Europe on the eve of
the First World War—were more responsible [for its outbreak] than enduring
structural characteristics of the European or international system….The Great
War was by no means inevitable, because there were so many contingencies that
might have gone another way.” One can imagine a range of tinderboxes in the
U.S.-China case: a Sino-Japanese clash in the
East China Sea, a Chinese declaration of a new
Air Defense Identification Zone, regime collapse in North Korea,
or a Taiwanese declaration of independence, to name but a few.
Deficiencies of the Analogy:
While there is much, then, to recommend
the analogy under review, observers should not overlearn the lessons. The late
historian Ernest May warned that “[w]hen resorting to an analogy,
[policymakers] tend to seize upon the first that comes to mind. They do not
search more widely. Nor do they pause to analyze the case, test its
fitness, or even ask in what ways it might be misleading.”
It is important to appreciate, for
example, that while Germany was an overt revisionist, China poses an
incremental, nuanced challenge to today’s world order. While it often derides
that system as an imposition, China has been its principal
beneficiary for the past four decades. Moreover, as fiercely
as it rails against U.S. interventionism, it would suffer from terminal U.S.
decline. Beyond absorbing over a fifth of Chinese exports, the United States
plays the decisive role in safeguarding the maritime commons through which
energy flows to China; incidentally, China’s dependence on crude oil from the
Middle East is projected to increase
through 2035.
While the United States and China are, and
increasingly will be, competitors in many arenas, they are not pure
antagonists; witness the impressive cooperation they have achieved on issues
ranging from macroeconomic stability to climate change. In the emerging
crucible of world order, meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific, the two countries have
demonstrated that they can think imaginatively to circumscribe their
competition: China’s neighbors have thus far increased their diplomatic and
military relations with the United States while boosting their trade and
investment ties with China.
It also bears noting that U.S. and Chinese
leaders communicate with each other regularly through a wide array of channels.
While their current conversations may not be as candid or substantive as one
might hope, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd reminds us that even
this limited dialogue improves significantly on that which existed in Europe a
century earlier: “The various governments of Europe,” he explains, pretended
that “their deep distrust of one another could be kept below the surface,
masked by secret undertakings, and somehow papered over by the blood lines
linking the Romanovs, the Hohenzollerns, and the House of Hanover.”
Finally, observers should not go too far
in dismissing the role that economic interdependence, even if imbalanced, could
play in constraining U.S.-China rivalry. While it has become nearly axiomatic
to claim that integration did not prevent war a century ago, political
scientists Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu explain that that conclusion
mistakenly treats prewar Europe as a single unit of analysis. By instead
deconstructing it into two clusters, they reach three
compelling conclusions:
First, the turn of the century saw a
series of intense crises among the interdependent states of Western Europe that
nevertheless did not result in open warfare. Second, despite these growing
tensions among the Western powers, the fighting in 1914 actually began among
the less interdependent powers of Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Third, during the
same period in which the highly interdependent European powers were generally
able to resolve their crises without resorting to war, the less interdependent
powers were typically unable to do so.
One could argue, as such, that World War I
actually validates the judgment that greater economic interdependence reduces
the likelihood of war; Gartzke and Lupu demonstrate, after all, that Europe was
not nearly as integrated as is commonly believed. International relations
scholar Amitav Acharya corroborates their
assessment: “European economic interdependence in 1914 was narrow and regional;
today’s interdependence is broader, deeper, and global in scope.
Intra-Asian interdependence today is based not only on trade…but also on
production networks, finance, and investments.” Focusing specifically on the
United States and China, economic ties are sufficiently strong that, according to the
Brookings Institution’s Thomas Wright, one has to “look back to the period
before World War I for cases of such levels of interdependence between great
power competitors.”
Additionally, the present gap in aggregate
power between the United States and China means that the former has a longer
window in which to fashion an accommodation with the latter than Britain had
with Germany. Japan analyst Robert Dujarric notes that while Kaiser Wilhelm II had to
confront “a powerful Social-Democratic movement,” “the socio-political fabric
of Germany was vastly stronger than that of the People’s Republic.” It
was also “demographically dynamic”; had “two continental associates, the
Habsburg and Ottoman empires”; and “was the most advanced country on the
planet” in numerous fields.
China faces enormous internal challenges,
beginning with separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang as well as Taiwan’s
longstanding quest for independence. With a growing middle class finding its
voice, and with information technology becoming more pervasive, the leadership
has been expressing increasing concern about threats to the Communist Party’s
authority, and President Xi Jinping is cracking down ever more aggressively on
media outlets and civil society.
China also plans to absorb some 250 million
people—equal to roughly four-fifths of the U.S. population—into urban areas by
2025, a Herculean undertaking that will compound resource shortages and
environmental degradation in cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. The chief
engineer of the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning conceded this month
that “China’s emissions of all types of air pollutants and carbon dioxide are
the largest in the world.” Water pollution is arguably an even greater
long-term challenge: as of early 2014, half of China’s rivers were contaminated
and three-fifths of its groundwater was unfit for drinking.
With the world’s lowest fertility
rate (1.05), China also has a grim demographic outlook. Its
working-age population is shrinking while its elderly population is exploding:
“By 2055,” according to one
projection, “China’s elderly population will exceed the elderly population of
all of North America, Europe, and Japan combined.” These realities have
significant implications for an economy that is already under significant
strain: China is making a painful switch to a more consumption-oriented growth
model, and with a debt of over $28 trillion, its “debt-to-GDP ratio stands at over
280 percent, exceeding that of many advanced economies and all developing
economies for which data is available.”
China’s external difficulties are no less
formidable. Whether one considers the danger of nuclear escalation between
India and Pakistan or North Korea’s increasing atomic brinkmanship, it inhabits
an Asian-Pacific region that is fraught with geopolitical risk. To satiate its
burgeoning appetite for vital commodities, moreover, China will have to
strengthen its footholds in an ever-growing number of politically unstable
countries; Venezuela’s accelerating national crisis exemplifies the risks
inherent in such an undertaking. Finally, despite its professed commitment to
achieving a “peaceful rise,” China has few reliable allies—a deficiency that
will grow more crippling if, as Anne-Marie Slaughter predicts, power in
the 21st century will increasingly revolve around connectivity and networks.
A Policy Question:
Both the merits and the deficiencies
outlined above point to the same policy question: how, if at all, can leading
powers and rising ones discern each other’s strategic intentions? On January 1,
1907, Sir Eyre Crowe, an official with Britain’s Foreign Office, sent a
memorandum to the country’s foreign secretary in which he proposed two
hypotheses for Germany’s rapid modernization: either that it was “definitely
aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendency, threatening the
independence of her neighbors and ultimately the existence of England”; or
that, absent “any such clear-cut ambition,” it was merely “seeking to promote
her foreign commerce, spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope
of her national energies, and create fresh German interests all over the world
wherever and whenever a peaceful opportunity offers.” Crowe was unable to
decide which hypothesis he found more persuasive (though, crucially, he deemed
the answer immaterial; it was the fact of Germany’s naval expansion that
concerned him, not the intentionality behind it).
U.S. observers similarly struggle to
divine China’s goals. Some contend that China will continue to focus on
fulfilling domestic imperatives; others, that it will try to displace the
United States as the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific, but will not contest
U.S. preeminence globally; others, that it will attempt to achieve and sustain
strategic parity with the United States; and, yet others, that it will seek to
become the world’s preeminent power. If the two countries’ strategic aims and
decision-making processes were completely transparent, one would expect their
relationship to evolve in accordance with objective realities: for example, the
balance in their power-projection capabilities. The less their
national-security establishments understand each other’s thinking, however, the
more likely it is that the United States and China will formulate policy toward
each other on the basis of misguided conjectures, as opposed to considered
judgments.
Concluding Thoughts:
It is hard to imagine a war between the
United States and China, at least if one’s conception of that phenomenon
involves large-scale troop deployments and mass casualties. They both have
nuclear weapons, whose unrivaled destructive power provides a powerful
disincentive against contemplating confrontation, let alone provoking it.
Unlike Britain and Germany, moreover, the two countries are separated by vast
expanses of land and bodies of water; physical distance reduces strategic
friction. And, as James Fallows noted recently, they
“have become so intertwined economically, and so constructively collaborative
in a range of scientific, environmental, academic, and even diplomatic spheres,
that almost any measure that would ‘punish’ China would necessarily also damage
the United States.”
Still, it would be imprudent to deduce
from the seeming impossibility of a U.S.-China war that one cannot occur.
Policymakers should consider the suggestion that the
“most troubling similarity between 1914 and now is complacency”: “Too many
people…believed that because Britain and Germany were each other’s biggest
trading partners after America and there was therefore no economic logic behind
the conflict, war would not happen.”
But if it is unwise to dismiss the
possibility of war, it must surely be at least as misguided to fixate on the
prospect: the occurrence of a catastrophe does not preordain its repetition.
Still, the United States and China will have to make reciprocal sacrifices if
they are to establish a foundation for long-term stability in their
relationship. As the world’s preeminent power, the former must recognize the
strategic and moral imperatives of accommodating the latter’s resurgence. More
concretely, it needs someone to serve as a contemporary incarnation of Lord
Thomas Sanderson; having just stepped down as permanent under secretary of
state in Britain’s Foreign Office, Sanderson penned a rebuttal to
Sir Crowe: “It was inevitable,” he explained, “that a nation [Germany] flushed
with success which had been obtained at the cost of great sacrifices, should be
somewhat arrogant and over-eager, impatient to realize various long-suppressed
aspirations, and to claim full recognition of its new position.” In addition to
advocating for greater Chinese representation within longstanding postwar
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the United States should
welcome and assist in the development of Chinese-led initiatives such as “One
Belt, One Road.”
But the quest for mutual accommodation, by
definition, cannot be a unilateral undertaking. Given the unprecedented
rapidity and scope of its ascent, China has a pressing responsibility to assure
the world that it seeks to preserve order, not overturn it. It must also
recognize that, unlike in centuries past, when its neighbors readily deferred
to its authority, it now contends with several other strong, proud powers,
including Japan, South Korea, and India; they will not quietly acquiesce to its
strategic preferences.
As for the presumption that U.S. and
Chinese leaders are incapable of transcending humankind’s innate belligerence,
Angell has advice that they would do well to heed. In his June 12, 1935 Nobel
Peace Prize address, he conceded that it
might be impossible to:
“change human nature”—I don’t indeed know
what the phrase means. But you can certainly change human behavior, which
is what matters, as the whole panorama of history shows….The more it is true to
say that certain impulses, like those of certain forms of nationalism, are
destructive, the greater is the obligation to subject them to the direction of
conscious intelligence and of social organization. But it can only be done if
we believe that it can be done.
Ali Wyne
is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security and a security fellow with the
Truman National Security Project.
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