Trump’s temptations for war in Asia - if he fails, unlike in
Italy or Thailand, he has recourse to an old trick in the bag of any emperor:
prime a large clash that will bring the nation together in fear of the enemy
The first challenge for President-elect Donald Trump will clearly be to
reunite the country, which is terribly scarred and split asunder after a long
and viscious campaign. He needs to reach out to those he has so far mocked and
insulted, and make them feel he will represent them anyway.
Yes, he
was elected by the “deplorables” (the estranged white boys and girls who made
too many mistakes in their lives and want a second chance), but he must also
get in touch with the other “deplorables” (the minorities, recent immigrants,
gay people, single mothers, liberals). The other “deplorables” must feel at
some point represented by him; otherwise the country will be very hard to rule.
This is
what happened with his two “predecessors” in Italy and Thailand, Silvio
Berlusconi and Thaksin Shinawatra. They were elected by a majority of the
country, but tried and failed to unite the rest of the country. It happened for
complex and different reasons in each country, but these precedents tell us
that Trump’s hardest task begins today, by speaking to his opponents. And yet
if he fails, unlike in Italy or Thailand, he has recourse to an old trick in
the bag of any emperor: prime a large clash that will bring the nation together
in fear of the enemy.
Certainly,
Trump must also get his economic priorities in order. Does he really want to
move back from the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Asia and leave this space
open for China to establish its own FTA in the region? This is economics and
global strategy intertwined. Again, he may be successful in turning the US
economy around, or he could fail, but in either case his foreign policy toward
China may go on just the same. If the US economy is stronger, Trump may want to
confront what he has named as its biggest and most unfair competitor; if he
fails to improve the economy, he may look to China as a scapegoat.
Then on
the general foreign agenda, judging from his official statements, he wants to
make China an official currency manipulator, thus slap punitive trade sanctions
against it. He doesn’t care for Europe, the European currency, nor its economic
and political integration or disintegration. He admires Russian president
Vladimir Putin. Of course, anything can change. The man is volatile and perhaps
whimsical, but he is also a businessman and known to flip-flop, as he did many
times in the past. But why should we ignore what he said? Isn’t this the one
big thing many newspapers did wrong—not believing that he would do what he said
he would do? In this case, beat both Republican and Democratic establishments.
After
all, his foreign policy seems pretty simple and linear, unlike Hillary
Clinton’s plan. Her plan was to support failing Europe (almost a lost cause),
confront Russia and super-pivot to Asia. Each of these three fronts is very
complicated, and likely to fail in influencing the other two. In comparison,
Trump takes it easy: abandon Europe to its fate, cut a deal with Putin, and get
his support in Asia, where he might make China an offer it can’t refuse. We
don’t know what the offer would be, but as a plan it is pretty linear—although
even dealing with China alone won’t be easy. But aligning with Russia against
China, just as Nixon aligned with China against Russia in 1971, could help turn
the tables.
Of
course, we know even less about what China might do in this case, because it is
two “ifs” removed: if Trump wants a showdown with China, and if China reacts or
buckles. But another way to look at Trump’s plan on China is that it is
basically the same as Hillary’s without the distractions of Europe and with the
support of Russia. This substantial consistency makes it more likely.
We don’t
know if China is preparing for it. The official reactions have been so far
muted, and arguing that Trump will want to do business with China and Beijing
is ready for that. This is possibly right. But in case they are wrong, it is
worth looking also at the political situation in China presently.
Asia is
emerging into a new balance of power. As a recent report by the Carnegie
Endowment argued,
it is impossible to think in the short- and medium-term that either the US or
China could keep a dominant position in East Asia.
Countries
of middling power (like Japan and India) or with great ambition (like Vietnam)
have reluctantly accepted the dominance of American in the region. However, it
is very unlikely that they will tomorrow or in the short term accept the
dominance of China in the region. After all, America gained its role in Asia by
defeating Japan in World War II, through the war in Korea and the long and
exhausting Vietnam War in the 1970’s. Besides, America kept peace and stability
in part of Asia during the Cold War, while triggering Asian development since
the late 80s with the globalization it led.
Conversely,
China has a very different record in the region. It performed badly during its
wars in Korea and Vietnam, was basically beaten by the Japanese during the
invasion, and tied its own development to American protection and support in
the past 30 years. It won only a brief border war with India in 1962, but that
left the Indians deeply hurt in their pride and not won over by China’s force.
Moreover, unlike Vietnam or Japan, India was never part of the Chinese sphere
of influence and the war brought this large country for the first time directly
in contact and competition with China.
While now
Japan and Vietnam feel they don’t want to go back under China’s wing, the
Indians, who have never been under China’s wing, don’t want to become a Chinese
vassal. This predicament is all very difficult without taking into
consideration the presence of Russia. Russia knows very well that if China were
to become the regional hegemon, its control of Siberia could be weakened, and
therefore it dreads this possibility.
Years
ago, I detailed China’s
geographical difficulties. However, on the other hand, it is
impossible to rule out the growing weight the Chinese economy has on the
region. Infrastructure, trade, and industrial development all are increasingly
connected to China’s own growth and development. It is objectively reshaping
the political geography of the region and neither the US nor any other regional
power has the resources to replace Chinese investment or market potentials. But
it is not unilateral: each country under the protection of the United States
and with growing economic trade relationships with China also engages in
multilateral connections with all its regional neighbors.
A big
intricate picture is emerging, similar to that of continental Europe in the
mid-19th century, but because of the size of the countries and the number of
countries in Asia, the 19th century complications are exacerbated, they are on
steroids.
A complex
web of ties could be put in order with bilateral agreements led by China and
United States. However, this could be difficult because many countries are not
simply dependent on China or the United States, but they also have complex
relations with other countries in the region.
This
won’t necessarily be negative. It could create positive competition in the
region in which each country competes with one another. But it could also mean
that vindictive rivalries could emerge, pushing toward wars or conflicts. Many have
a lot to lose in conflicts and war, but if economies were to slow and social
chaos were to emerge, the temptation for a fast resolution of complex issues
could grow more tempting.
For its
part, if China doesn’t want to become the passive object of others’ plans it
needs to make a lot of changes externally, as it is already doing by warming up
to neighbors like the Philippines or Malaysia, and internally. Its
state-dominated economy and its opaque political structure are two major
liabilities. Whatever Trump’s plans, Beijing should act fast.
No comments:
Post a Comment