Nonproliferation zealots are making sure
nuclear weapons now proliferate only to totalitarian states.
Japan ought to become a
nuclear-weapons power as soon as possible. South Korea ought to begin a
nuclear-weapons program.
The North Korean state is a national
gulag. The regime is illegitimate, unstable and totalitarian—and a proliferator
of nuclear-weapons technology. It brings nothing to the world but misery,
widespread death to the Korean people, suffering and political instability.
Foolishly, the state is sustained by China, which thinks that it would be
better to sustain North Korea than to facilitate its collapse, which might lead
to a larger U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. But this thinking is
politically shortsighted: the collapse of the North Korean regime would allow
the Republic of Korea to absorb the North, thereby ending the entire reason U.S.
forces are on the Peninsula. American forces would likely leave Korea, not
grow, once the Pyongyang regime collapses.
Further, it was China that gave North
Korea many of the ballistic-missile technologies that it uses to threaten us
and our allies. China is not timidly and reluctantly standing with North Korea;
it is, as usual, actively contributing to the North Korean mess. China uses
North Korea to shove the United States away from Asia and keep Western
diplomacy off balance, defensive and uninitiated.
Nonproliferation zealots are making sure
nuclear weapons now proliferate only to totalitarian states. Despite much
rhetoric and sincere, well-intentioned efforts, the United States sat by as
North Korea developed its nuclear weapons. It is not too late to disabuse China
and North Korea of the idea that nuclear proliferation pays. Japan ought to
begin a sincere program to build deliverable nuclear weapons to show China that
China’s support to North Korea is counterproductive and strategically naive.
The Republic of Korea ought to begin a nuclear-weapons development program.
Since China would greatly oppose Japan
becoming a nuclear-weapons state, should Japan declare its intention to start a
nuclear-weapons program in response to these repeated, unjustified and deeply
threatening provocations by the Pyongyang regime, China might finally realize
that it is in its interest to facilitate the collapse of the totalitarian
regime in Pyongyang and allow the Seoul government to absorb the North. The
United States could reassure China that U.S. forces are in Korea only to defend
the South Koreans. And Japan could assure China that its program is entirely
defensive and would likely be suspended, should the North Korean regime
collapse and the peninsula become completely denuclearized. A Japanese
nuclear-weapons program would be entirely within Japan’s constitutional rights,
given the North Korean nuclear-weapons program.
The U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan is
made credible by the presence of U.S. forces in Japan (which is declining,
given our indebtedness and weakening of alliances), the presence of U.S. naval
forces in the region (which is being challenged by China) and a strong
commitment by the U.S. government (which is questioned these days). But if, of
course, North Korea successfully develops an intercontinental ballistic missile
and a compatible nuclear warhead that could be delivered to U.S. soil, then the
same threat to the U.S. nuclear umbrella that occurred in Europe will occur for
Japan and the Republic of Korea: North Korea might have the capability to
strike either with a nuclear weapon and then deter the United States from
retaliating with the threat of a North Korean nuclear weapon on top of an ICBM.
The North Korean ballistic missile program threatens the credibility of the
U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan and the Republic of Korea have every right—in
fact, a duty and a UN-protected right—to self-defense.
In short, there is no future and no other
solution to this regional problem other than the collapse of the Pyongyang
regime. There is no historical model through which a totalitarian state like
North Korea evolves. There is no confederation scenario that is possible with a
totalitarian state. Unlike authoritarian states, totalitarian states cannot
evolve; they implode. The best future—dissolution—should be something for China
to seek, trigger and help manage.
Since the initiation of a Japanese nuclear
weapons program would provoke China into concluding that North Korea is far
more trouble than it is worth as a buffer against U.S. forces in the South, the
people of North Korea would benefit the most, since they suffer daily. The goal
is to collapse the Pyongyang regime peacefully, much like the East German
regime collapsed. This is also the best means to effect true nuclear
counter-proliferation; without it, the world will have to live with one more
totalitarian nuclear state—a nuclear North Korea—forever.
If the Chinese played chess and not
tic-tac-toe on the Korean Peninsula, they would maneuver to collapse the northern
regime by first opening Chinese borders (like Hungary did to East Germany) and
then provide asylum to the Northern political leadership and general officer
corps and ask Seoul to assume economic and political responsibility for the
entire Korean people, in exchange for a nuclear-free (and U.S.-military-free)
Korean Peninsula. The Koreans (and Japanese) would jump at the deal. And the
Japanese nuclear-weapons program would end.
At present, the Chinese wrongly think that
they can tolerate the North’s antics and provocations, because they assume the
Kim Jong-un regime is not serious with its threats to start large-scale
conflict, and North Korea serves a purpose of keeping the Americans in the
South. The North acts out with these threats to secure its continuation and
appearance of legitimacy with the rest of the world, seeking a peace
treaty/agreement with the United States that will allow it to continue
unthreatened and deter Western designs for the Pyongyang regime’s collapse.
The Chinese government must
conclude that North Korea is far more of a strategic danger to China than a
unified and strategically neutral Korea under the governance of Seoul. A
Japanese and South Korean nuclear-weapons program would bring a geostrategic
situation clearly less favorable to China. At present, politicians in the West
are too timid to recommend such a step, and cling to shallow arguments that the
world should be rid of nuclear weapons—so that only rogue states will have
them.
James Van de Velde is Adjunct Faculty at the
National Intelligence University, the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies,
Johns Hopkins University and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at
Georgetown University. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the National Intelligence
University.
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