The
promise and pitfalls of Indonesia’s village law - It has the power to reduce poverty and foster development. But has
Indonesia’s much celebrated village law lived up to expectations?
In January 2014, Indonesia’s new law on villages (Law no 6/2014)
generated quite some excitement. Village heads were cheering in the People’s
Representative Council (DPR). The media was positive. National politicians and
presidential hopefuls were scuffling to capture the imagination of rural voters
ahead of the April general election by promising ever larger allocations of
grants to villages, under the slogan “Satu Desa, Satu M” (One
Village, One Billion [rupiah]).
The
Village Law represents one of the most significant pieces of legislation in
Indonesia’s ongoing efforts to shift power from Jakarta to its regions –
putting authority in the hands of more than 74,000 villages as part of a
decentralisation process that commenced in 2001.
The law
was long in the making – an initial draft was circulated ahead of the 2004
revision of the law on regional governance. The law’s development thus followed
the typical Indonesian pattern of policy-making described by Marcus Mietzner;
in the absence of strong executive leadership, various actors try out ideas in
public and eventually reach a compromise. In the case of the Village Law, this
meant combining the functions of a self-governing community with local
self-government.
Debates
around subnational governance in Indonesia have focused mainly on districts,
provinces, and their relationships with central agencies. To better understand
how democratisation and decentralisation impact village governance, community
life, and rural development, we have just completed a
major study on the issue.
Using
longitudinal data from 40 Indonesian villages included in the World Bank-funded
Local Level Institution study (LLI) we investigated the effects that prior
policy has had on village life and identified implications of the 2014 law on
village governance.
We found
that there is potential for the law to increase government responsiveness and
rural development — if it is combined with strong financial management systems,
new national institutional arrangements, and empowered citizens who can apply
pressure on village governments to work in the interests of communities.
During
the past two decades, state and community actors have enhanced local
problem-solving through mutually reinforcing efforts. In the first LLI study
(1996), the state dominated community life, but was simultaneously disconnected
from it, so that villagers often had to circumvent village government in their
efforts to build needed infrastructure, address emergencies (for example
drought, fires, and floods), and solve production problems (such as access to
credit, markets, and land).
Throughout
the turbulent times of the second LLI study (2001), when the Indonesia state
was grappling with the post-Suharto era and major political change, we saw
reactions against (earlier) heavy-handed state involvement —including high
levels of protests against corruption and the election of some reformist
village heads.
By the
third LLI study (2012), villagers were facing an environment with more readily
accessible state resources, some beneficial shifts in the broader political
economy, and empowered village-head positions, to which a more inclusive range
of candidates had been elected.
The
village law represents an opportunity to consolidate these fragile gains in
state–society cooperation. At the same time, it must also address weaknesses in
the decentralisation model by improving governance arrangements and shifting
resources to a level of government less captive to special interests.
So what
has been the result of the law’s introduction?
Funding
was the most controversial part of the law’s development. The law radically
increases funding for villages, in some cases more than 10-fold, and President
Joko Widodo has promised future increases in national budget funds transferred
directly to village accounts.
Under the
village law 30 per cent of the village grants provided by higher authorities
should be used for village government operations, and 70 per cent for
development. However, the law and implementing regulations do not adequately
regulate village financial management. The law’s provisions must be combined
with stronger accountability and governance arrangements, such as increasing
the capacity of districts to oversee and coordinate village activities, audit
village budgets, and design a simple and effective budget and information
management system.
We do not
know yet how village grants have been used, and whether they have contributed
to more corruption, prompted economic growth, or reduced poverty. The president
is impatient and has instructed his Executive Office to monitor the
implementation of the law closely and ensure that funds are used for national
priorities, which include developing rural areas.
At a
minimum, we have not seen an avalanche of petty corruption cases in villages –
there seem to be just enough of accountability arrangements to ensure that
funds are embezzled or used to finance local patronage. But anecdotal evidence
doesn’t tell a story of a great rural recovery – we are somewhere in-between.
The law
specifies several accountability mechanisms, including an empowered Village
Council, inclusive Village Assemblies, transparent information systems, clear
upwards reporting lines, skilled facilitators in every village. But as often is
the case in Indonesian law-making, these are weakly articulated and sometimes
undermined in implementing regulations.
Risk
monitoring and compliance will be critical during the early years of the law’s
implementation and will determine whether the government can manage corruption
and wastage risks. One core tension in the law’s implementation is the need to
balance stipulated financing with villages’ ability to use more funds
efficiently, as well as national and district governments’ capacities to
reallocate funds.
Indonesia’s
village law has the potential to reduce poverty and social inequality by
driving investment in community-identified productive infrastructure and
providing public services. These outcomes will become a reality only if there
is strong upward accountability for village governments that complements
pressure from empowered citizens to work in the interest of the community.
Reform and improved performance are a result not only of state policies but
also of villagers’ efforts—hence the importance of revitalising association
life and developing community capacity as part of the self-governing community
model introduced with the law.
The basic
premise of the law is that communities shall administer their villages
themselves, and is built on 15 years’ positive experiences of providing direct
block grants to communities through PNPM Mandiri. This entails the existence of
village authorities endowed with democratically constituted decision-making
bodies that possess a wide degree of autonomy. But self-management also
requires capacity, which varies greatly across the country.
To foster
responsive and accountable local government, interventions and policy reforms
are needed to support empowered and inclusive communities; the poorest and
marginalised must have a say in decisions and the distribution of development
funds at the community level. Strong and democratic village institutions are needed
that can carry out integrated, participatory planning; implement and oversee
development projects; and act as guardians for community priorities. The
village law is a move in the right direction, full of promise…and peril.
Hans Antlov is Technical Director at the
Knowledge Sector Initiative in Jakarta. Leni Dharmawan is an Independent
Consultant. Anna Wetterberg is a Social Science Research Analyst at RTI
International.
This
article is based on the authors’ recent publication in the Bulletin
of Indonesian Economic Studies.
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