US Navy ‘Growler’
“An information
technology-based war at sea is sudden, cruel and short…” was how the Chinese military characterized a
peer-to-peer naval conflict at sea in a public statement at the beginning of
the month during PLAN naval exercises. The exercises, occurring in the East
China Sea, were designed to increase the PLAN’s “assault intensity, precision,
stability and speed of troops amid heavy electromagnetic influences” or in
other words, electronic warfare. China and the United States are preparing and
force posturing to contest the electromagnetic spectrum in the South China Sea
and further north in the East China Sea.
One of the defining characteristics of
China’s actions in the South China Sea has been the construction of radar
installations across the majority of its artificial features in the region.According to CSIS’s Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, a variety of radar installations have been constructed
on Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef,
Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. The purpose of these installations will vary and
some will have dual uses—for instance a few of the radars on Fiery Cross and
Subi Reef will be used to facilitate air operations from the runways housed on
those features—but together, the facilities will significantly expand
the real-time domain awareness and ISR capabilities of the PLA over a large
portion of the South China Sea.
Publically, radar facilities appear to be less escalatory than anti-air missile
batteries, artillery or even runways in terms of the infrastructure installed
on the artificial features. They do somewhat support China’s officially stated intention
of using the features for search and rescue. But the reality is that they’re of
enormous use to the PLA and a pressing concern for other nations operating in
the region.
These dispersed radar systems extend the
PLA’s ISR capabilities throughout the South China Sea, and in combination with
China’s growing military and intelligence satellite network, will likely allow
better real-time tracking of vessels and other military assets in the region.
It should be noted that it also appears that satellite uplink equipment is also
being constructed on many of the features. What this allows is a more
sophisticated and reliable over-the-horizon targeting capability for China’s
growing arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles, extending a more credible
threat envelope of A2/AD coverage to moving targets—like aircraft carrier
strike groups.
The coordination of Chinese maritime
assets in the South China Sea, such as naval militia, will also benefit from
this increased domain awareness. These assets are being widely used
by the Central Government in both the East and South China Sea. When combined
with recent reports that China has begun to install
satellite uplinks to its growing Beidou-GPS system throughout its fishing
fleet—and very likely throughout its maritime militia—the ability for Beijing
to make sure that these ‘white hulls’ are where they need to be at the most
opportune time seems to be increasing.
These facilities might also allow the PLA
to conduct active jamming of other electronic sensors and radars in the region.
China already has a history of this activity in the South China Sea, with reports last year
that attempts were being made to jam the on-board equipment and disrupt the GPS
uplinks of American RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance aircraft.
If an action/reaction dynamic has also
started in terms of investment
and research into
more advanced EW techniques and technologies, it may have also begun on the
tactical level in the South China Sea. This was perhaps most obvious with the
deployment of four US Navy EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft to the
Philippines in June earlier this year.
The stated reason for their deployment was for “bilateral training missions,”
but the Growlers were likely also conducting reconnaissance and SIGNT
operations in the South China Sea.
Growlers also have the capability
to jam radars like those being installed on China’s artificial features. It’s
plausible that we’ll see a scenario developing that has US EW assets focusing
on China’s radar infrastructure across the South China Sea, with the PLA’s
burgeoning electronic attack and defence capability attempting to defend these
new electronic capabilities. More EW capabilities could be poured into the
region in an effort to control or disrupt domain awareness, a critical aspect
of coordinating military forces across the region for both sides. Increased EW
capabilities may also be a less obvious and less aggressive way for US forces
to support Southeast Asian allies in the region.
These types of operations will grow in the
future, particularly as the PLA’s radar infrastructure comes more fully online
and, as it appears, Chinese air force assets begin to operate more fully in the
region. The electronic spectrum, largely out of sight of the public eye, is
becoming an area of a growing action/reaction dynamic between China and the
United States in the South China Sea. This contest, if it grows and persists,
will only add to the underlying tensions and risks of escalation in the South
China Sea.
This first appeared in ASPI's The Strategist
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