Ideally,
ASEAN should mediate disputes between its members and China over the South
China Sea. The grouping not only failed in this but is not even providing
moral support to its member states. Its silence on the historic Hague ruling
rejecting China’s claims over the sea at a recent meeting in Laos only proves
this. As China pressures ASEAN members like Cambodia to
veto decisions which could affect its national interests, the group
will have to adopt alternative decision-making mechanisms in the
politico-security realm or risk losing its voice in the Asian strategic
table.
For almost four decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has stood as an exemplary model of regional integration in the
developing world. It facilitated the transformation of a chaotic, rancorous and
insecure post-colonial region into a stable, prosperous and increasingly
self-confident one.
No wonder then, from West to South and Northeast Asia, peace-seeking
nations have enviously sought to emulate Southeast Asia’s commendable efforts
at creating a ‘security community’, where member states have largely abandoned
the use or threat of force to settle intra-regional disputes.
While South Asian countries, under the banner of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), are yet to consolidate their
skeletal regional economic integration, West and Northeast Asia are still
caught in a game-of-thrones-like security dilemma.
In the Middle East’s balkanized security architecture, diversity
continues to breed conflict. Wealthy Arab monarchies have coalesced under
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), while the Arab League tenuously pays lip
service to Nasserite pan-Arabism with little actual accomplishments on the
ground.
Meanwhile, the Turks, Persians, and Israelis have had to pursue a
separate path, with some joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Turkey)
while others like Iran
are contemplating membership in the Sino-Russia-dominated Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Israel, in turn, has largely relied on its ‘special
relationship’ with America, with no institutionalized dialogue with
neighboring states.
In contrast, the ASEAN has brought together a highly diverse collection
of countries, ranging from communist Vietnam to democratic Indonesia and
absolute monarchy of Brunei. It also counts among its members the world’s
richest (Singapore) and poorest (Myanmar) nations.
The ASEAN is also evolving
from a Free Trade Area into a Common Market, combining both elements of a
Customs Union as well as European Union-like cross-border labor mobility. Yet,
these undeniable gains are in jeopardy.
Adaptation and innovation is key to sustained regional integration, but
the ASEAN has desperately struggled to forge internal coherence and any measure
of geopolitical relevance when it comes to the 21st century’s
greatest potential flashpoint, the South China Sea.
During the latest ASEAN Foreign
Ministers Meeting in Laos, regional states even failed to
mention the Philippines’ landmark legal victory against China, with some member
states expressing greater affinity with Beijing rather than some of their
besieged regional peers. The ASEAN will either have to get its act together, or
wither into utter strategic impertinence.
A lonely
journey
The
Philippines’ arbitration case was both born out of the ASEAN’s fecklessness as
well as China’s maritime assertiveness. In 2012, Manila
witnessed in sheer horror China’s de facto occupation of the
Scarborough Shoal, which lies just above 100 nautical miles from Philippine
shores but more than 600 nautical miles off the nearest (naturally-formed)
Chinese coastline.
That same year, the ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Cambodia, couldn’t
even agree to mention the South China Sea disputes in their regional
pronouncements. For the first time in its history, ASEAN foreign ministers
couldn’t even issue a joint communiqué.
Bereft of regional support, and facing domestic pressure, Philippine
President Benigno Aquino realized that legal warfare was perhaps the only
viable option to pursue. His country lacked any independent military
capability, while America equivocated on its mutual defense treaty with the
Philippines.
Over the next four years, the Philippines built up a historic legal case
against China, which culminated in an almost ‘clean
sweep’ victory. Yet, throughout this period, it hardly received any
assistance or even an explicit statement of diplomatic support from the ASEAN.
Vietnam, which is said to have encouraged the Philippines to adopt a legal
offensive, sat back and refused to join along.
In the end, however, the Philippines not only overcame jurisdictional
hurdles – when the court rejected China’s self-exemption arguments —
but also managed to win a favorable verdict on almost all of its arguments
against China.
By skillfully packaging its arguments as a matter of maritime
entitlements and sovereign rights, the Philippines eschewed territorial
claim arguments, which transcend the UNCLOS’ mandate.
Contrary to false
information spread by certain circles, the verdict has clear legal
implications not only for the Philippines and China, but also for the ASEAN and
beyond.
Feckless
integration
First of
all, the arbitration body, which oversaw the compulsory arbitration case, was
constituted (in accordance to Art. 287,
Annex VII) under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the
law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS). Its verdict (in accordance to Art. 296 and Art. 11,
Annex VII) is final and binding.
As responsible members of the international community, ASEAN members are
expected to respect the verdict and call for compliance by parties concerned.
Moreover, the arbitral
tribunal flatly rejected China’s “historic rights” claim over almost
the entire South China Sea, while censuring Beijing’s massive island-building
activities in the Spratlys. It also rejected China’s claim that there are
naturally formed islands in the area.
These have clear implications for other ASEAN littoral states such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have been at the receiving
end of increasingly assertive Chinese fishing activities and
para-military patrols across the area.
Yet, recent statements by the ASEAN and its key member countries
completely omitted any mention of a landmark ruling by a legal body formed under
the United Nations vis-à-vis the South China Sea disputes. Ideally, there was
no need for the Philippines to file the arbitration case, provided the ASEAN
effectively mediated the disputes between its members and China.
Having failed to accomplish that basic task, the ASEAN is now failing to
even provide moral support to its member states facing off a giant adversary
well within their 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
It has been 14 years since the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct
of Parties in the South China Sea, but the ASEAN has not only fallen way short
of ensuring respect for the declaration, but also failed to craft a rudimentary
blue print of a Code of Conduct among disputing parties.
Meanwhile, China has been transforming facts on the ground on a daily
basis.
For four decades, the regional body has relied on a
consensus-and-consultation-based decision-making procedure, which facilitated
confidence-building and trust among member states. But its emphasis on
unanimity has undermined regional decision-making on major geopolitical
concerns, since it misguidedly gives every single member a de facto veto
power.
As a result, external powers like China have tried to coax and cajole
highly dependent ASEAN countries to toe their line.
As eminent Singaporean diplomat Barry Desker rightfully
laments, “As China exerts its influence on ASEAN members to prevent
any decisions which could affect its preference for bilateral negotiations, it
will be increasingly difficult to reach an ASEAN consensus.”
The ASEAN will either have to adopt alternative decision-making
mechanisms in the politico-security realm — whether it is the “ASEAN Minus X”
formula or Qualified Majority (QM) voting — or risk losing its already-marginal
voice in the Asian strategic table.
Otherwise, individual ASEAN members will either consider capitulation
(to China) or invite external powers like America and Japan to join the fray,
setting the stage for great power conflict.
What is at stake here is not only a bunch of rocks and atolls in the
high seas, but also decades of peace and prosperity in Asia.
Richard Javad Heydarian teaches political science
at De La Salle University, and formerly served a policy adviser at the
Philippine House of Representatives (2009-2015). The Manila
Bulletin, a leading national daily, has described him as one of the
Philippines’ “foremost foreign policy and economic analysts.”
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