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A
“Russian-Chinese axis” will dominate the Middle East with Israel as its western
anchor: That scenario was floated June 15 in Russia Insider, a louche propaganda site
that often runs the work of fringe conspiracy theorists and the occasional
anti-Semite. But the author in this case was the venerable Giancarlo Elia
Valori, president of Huawei Technologies’ Italian division, a veteran of past
intelligence wars with a resume that reads like a Robert Ludlum
novel.
Writes Prof. Valori:
A
Russian/Israeli axis could redesign the Middle East. Currently the main powers
have neither father nor mother, and the replacement of the great powers by Iran
and Saudi Arabia will not last long because they are too small to be able to
create far-reaching strategic correlations. Hence the time has come for the
Middle East to be anchored to a global power, the Russian-Chinese axis, with
Israel acting as a regional counterweight.
I would be tempted to dismiss Valori’s thesis as pulp fiction,
except that I also raised the prospect of a “Pax Sinica”
in the Middle East, three years ago in this publication.
Israeli-Russian relations, to be sure, are quite good. Deft military
cooperation avoided problems between Russian forces in Syria and the Israeli
army. Israel tolerated the occasional Russian overflight in its territory and
Russia tolerated the occasional Israeli raid on Russia’s local allies, Iran and
Iran’s cat’s paw Hezbollah. There even has been some speculation by Israeli
officials that Russia might use its United
Nations Security Council veto against the French-led proposal to
impose a Palestinian State.
Tactical cooperation between Russia and Israel, though, is beside the
point: Where do Russian (and Chinese) long-range interests coincide with
Israeli interests? Prof. Valori writes of a redesign of the Middle East, and
that is not as far-fetched as it sounds.
The century-old design of the Middle East, namely the Sykes-Picot
agreement, is broken; America broke it by imposing majority (that is, Shia)
rule in Iraq in 2007. The Middle East requires a new design. Sykes-Picot, as I explained in
this space, set minorities to govern majorities: A Sunni minority in
Shia-majority Iraq and a Shia (Alawite) minority in Sunni-majority Syria. That
created a natural balance of power: Syrian Christians supported the Alawites
and Iraqi Christians supported Saddam Hussein. The oppressed majority knew
however nasty the minority regime might be, it could not undertake to kill them
all.
The moment that the Americans put the Shia in power in 2007, the Sunnis
concluded that they must fight to the death or be exterminated. The United
States occupation under Gen. Petraeus tried to co-opt the Sunnis through the
“Sunni Awakening,” and succeeded only in arming and funding the Sunnis for the
inevitable war to come. This broke out in 2011 and will continue indefinitely.
The remnants of the Bush Administration still claim that the 2007-2008 “surge”
achieved a military victory that the Obama Administration threw away. In other
words, what Bush and his advisors still consider their greatest accomplishment
was the cause of today’s devastation.
The artificial nation-states created by the British and French
imperialists cannot be restored, and their ruins are a cockpit for perpetual
civil as well as global terrorism. There is only one alternative to the
Sykes-Picot system of states, and that is the devolution of the Middle East on
the model of the former Yugoslavia, into ethnic and confessional enclaves that
separate the warring parties. The Yugoslav solution required extensive
population exchanges; it was messy and costly but better than the alternative.
A similar solution in the Middle East would be even messier, but better than
what we have now.
An independent Kurdistan would be the model for all such enclaves: the
Kurds have a thirty-year history of de facto self-governance in northern Iraq,
reliable ground forces, buoyant demographics, and the political will to emerge
as a nation. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of the Middle East
pivots on the fortunes of the Kurds, the paragon and exemplar of what a small
Muslim people can accomplish in the face of the crumbling state structures
around them.
Israel and Russia, coincidentally, are the only two powers now
supporting Kurdish independence, Israel explicitly and Russia somewhat more
cautiously. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu declared in a January 2014 speech that Israel “should
support the Kurdish aspiration for independence,” praising the Kurds as “a
nation of fighters [who] have proved political commitment and are worthy of
independence”. Netanyahu’s support for the Kurds has been reiterated since then
by other members of his cabinet.
Russia has expressed support for Kurdish independence through lower-level
officials, for example its consul in the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan.
This is by no means straightforward. As Paul Saunders,
a former advisor to the George W. Bush State Department, explained in a May
commentary in AI-Monitor, Russia has backed Kurdish aspirations when it suited
its own interests, and its recent expressions of support for the Kurds followed
the crisis in Russian-Turkish relations after Turkey’s downing of a Russian
fighter plane.
Russia has many reasons to keep the Kurds at arm’s length—the fact that
they are fighting Russia’s client Assad in Syria and might come to blows with
the Baghdad government—but it has one overarching reason to support them: Syria
cannot be stabilized without a division into ethnic and religious enclaves, and
Russia wants to stabilize Syria.
That is what most worries Iran. Russia’s state monopoly Gazprom has
offered to develop Israel’s extensive natural gas resources, and some
pro-Iranian commentators worry that Russia has “sold out
Iran” for Israeli natural gas. That is beside the point: Iran
worries that Russia will sell out
its interest in Syria by cutting a deal with the United States over
a de facto division of the country, as Abbas Qaidaari wrote in AL-Monitor June
10. Qaidaari observes, “The divergence between Tehran and Moscow’s geostrategic
objectives in Syria, considering the price that each side needs to pay, is too
wide for them to be able to reach a comprehensive and long-term agreement on
collaboration. Moscow’s biggest objective is to maintain a dependent government
in Damascus and to keep access to port cities in the eastern Mediterranean for
its naval fleet. Iran needs Syria and access to its southern regions to
maintain its support for Lebanese Hezbollah. It is natural that if Russia
achieves its goals, it would see no reason to maintain the status quo, and this
is exactly what has concerned Iran ever since this game began.”
Russia has two interests in Syria. The first is to keep Assad in power
at least in some portion of Syria. The second is to suppress the Sunni
jihadists who dominate the opposition to Assad. Between 2,000
and 5,000 Russian Muslims presently are fighting for al-Qaeda or
ISIS in Syria. The spread of jihad cross the Black Sea to the Caucasus is
Russia’s greatest fear.
If Israel and Russia stand godfather to an independent Kurdistan, they
might indeed reshape the Middle East, as Prof. Valori suggested in his
provocative essay. America, by contrast, is paralyzed. A Kurdish state in Syria
and Iraq would be joined inevitably by the Kurdish-majority regions of
Southeastern Turkey. America cannot condone a threat to the territorial
integrity of a NATO member. In practice, of course, Washington could do so. The
right way to do it would be to encourage the Turks to conduct a referendum on
Kurdish independence on the model of the Saarland Referendum of 1955 (and do
the same for the disputed regions of Ukraine as well).
But Turkey never will agree to such a reasonable solution, and
Washington never will propose it. The American foreign policy establishment is
a football team trying to win a game while the stadium burns down around them.
There are 51 diplomats at the State Department who still believe that American
can incubate a moderate Sunni opposition in Syria to oppose the Assad regime.
Demographics is not destiny (a banal dictum attributed to the French
positivist Auguste Comte). As Heraclitus said, character is destiny, and
Turkey’s character is the problem. The Kurds have twice as many children as
ethnic Turks, so many that in one generation half of Turkey’s military age men
will speak Kurdish as a first language. Turkey today is wrestling with its
destiny. Its fate is sealed: it will become a minor Mediterranean power, a sort
of second-rate Spain or Italy, with a declining workforce, a weak currency, and
a reputation for political turmoil. But it has a choice to make concerning its
national character. Turkey could accept and adapt to the mediocrity of its
circumstances and live with its neighbors in peace and a modest degree of
prosperity, or it could rage against its fate and fail in grand style. Sadly,
the choice seems inevitable, and wrong. It will flair and flounder in pursuit
of an unattainable national grandeur, and its neighbors will have to sort it
out.
Iran remains Israel’s main strategic concern. It failed to dissuade the
United States from concluding a nuclear deal with Iran that empowers Iran, in
Jerusalem’s view. Russia and China could constrain Iran’s military ambitions,
and Israel in the future might look to Moscow and Beijing for help in this
regard.
Unlike Russia, China has every reason to avoid direct involvement in the
region: It lacks the regional knowledge that Russia gained during three
centuries of war with the Turks, it does not have the military capacity for
expeditionary forces on the ground, and it lacks the diplomatic and
intelligence capabilities to deal with the complexities of local politics. As
the dominant economic power on the Eurasian continent, though, China has the
means to uplift the economies of the region. As Prof. Valori writes, “Israel,
jointly with the Russian Federation, will be able to project globally. In the
future, there will be a place for Israel in the Chinese One-Belt, One-Road
Initiative in Central Asia, in India, even in Latin America and in some African
areas.”
China’s economic vision for the Eurasian continent is a long-range
affair and still rather abstract. More pressing are Chinese concerns about the
spread of Islamist terrorism into Asia. As Christina Lin
reported in Asia Times June 15, the Syrian civil war has become a magnet for
South and Southeast Asian Muslims, many of them already radicalized by
Saudi-financed religious schools in their region.
China already has its hands full with Uyghur terrorists in its
Muslim-majority Western province of Xinjiang. A “southern route” through
Thailand and Myanmar channels Uyghur terrorists in Southeast Asia. If the
Uyghurs were to link up with home-grown jihadists in Thailand, Indonesia and
Malaysia, Chinese security officials fear, the security problem might
metastasize.
This confluence of interests makes possible a Pax Sinica in the Middle
East. It would not be conceivable if American policy were not so utterly misguided.
Spengler
for Asia Times
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