Indonesia - Golkar Party and the survival of oligarchy
Aburizal Bakrie now has considerable power to drive
interparty politics between Golkar and other political and economic forces
Aburizal has incurred huge political costs, including for his candidacy for Golkar’s chairmanship in 2010, for party financing during his five-year term, his failed presidential nomination and eventually for supporting the presidential candidacy of Prabowo Subianto in 2014. As a prominent businessman, he presumably seeks to regain his resources, power and luck heading into the 2019 general election.
Aburizal has incurred huge political costs, including for his candidacy for Golkar’s chairmanship in 2010, for party financing during his five-year term, his failed presidential nomination and eventually for supporting the presidential candidacy of Prabowo Subianto in 2014. As a prominent businessman, he presumably seeks to regain his resources, power and luck heading into the 2019 general election.
The Golkar Party’s
extraordinary congress, which ended late Monday, marks a new phase from the
institutional point of view: A return to democratic tradition, a change of
formal power, and importantly, a unified cohesive party, at least until 2019.
Setya Novanto left his main rival Ade Komarudin far behind, garnering 277
votes, while Ade received 173. The rest of the chairperson candidates captured
very few votes, ranging from only one vote to about 30 votes.
From the 554 total votes comprising provincial and regental chapters, the party’s affiliated organizations and the central executive committee, only 11 votes were invalid. Thus, Setya had legitimate power in leading the party based on his 50 percent plus votes.
Indeed, such intraparty democracy should be appreciated. Indonesia’s political parties exhibited pervasive personal influence through the party congresses prior to and following the 2014 presidential election. Exceptions are the Prosperous Justice Party ( PKS ) and the National Mandate Party ( PAN ).
The fairly open process at the congress in Bali enabled observers and the media to follow it closely, with intensive and live reports from in and around the congress hall. Despite the political dynamics, the chairmanship nomination, campaign and eventual election were organized transparently and professionally.
Regardless of the chairmanship race and its complexity, the last congress nevertheless basically proved the survival of oligarchies hijacking Golkar. There are two empirical notions explaining such oligarchy survival.
First, though the extraordinary congress apparently succeeded in its conflict resolution within the party by toning down all factions and awarding the party’s losers of the 2014 presidential election, Setya’s victory arguably strengthens the oligarchic networks within and around Golkar.
Besides the Freeport case enveloping Setya, which was notoriously referred to aspapa minta saham ( papa wants shares ), Setya tends to emerge as a skillful political broker linking the business tycoon’s interests with the ruling government.
In addition to his origin as a businessman rather than a political activist prior to aligning himself with Golkar, investigative reporting, including that by Tempo magazine shows Setya was the person behind various business projects allocated from Indonesia’s national budget.
His position as Golkar treasurer for almost two decades since 1998, especially under Aburizal Bakrie’s leadership in 2010-2015, explains his oligarchic networks, useful in seizing spoils of office for the party financing and for his political career.
Second, more importantly, the extraordinary congress showed a backlash from the prominent oligarch Aburizal. The congress eventually reinstalled the previously “forbidden” powerful body following the fall of Soeharto, namely, the board of patrons.
Not surprisingly, the floor agreed that the board should be led by Aburizal. It was Aburizal’s proteges, including the chairman of the congress’ steering committee Nurdin Halid and leaders of the provincial chapters that secured Aburizal’s new post.
The resurrection of the board of patrons and the acclamation for Aburizal as its chairman was among the results of the congress, the highest party forum.
Together with the central executive board led by Setya, Aburizal’s board of patrons can nominate candidates for both legislative and executive offices, especially for the presidential seat.
For decades, the board of patrons led by the authoritarian president Soeharto had veto power, to which all Golkar rank-and-file members and activists were obligated to adhere to. The body was terminated under Akbar Tanjung’s chairmanship, following the fall of the New Order in 1998, as part of attempts to renew Golkar.
Though the board of patrons resulting from the Bali extraordinary congress does not have authority to dissolve the central executive board and the elected party chairman like under Soeharto, the body arguably gives Aburizal considerable power to drive interparty politics between Golkar and other political and economic forces.
Aburizal has incurred huge political costs, including for his candidacy for Golkar’s chairmanship in 2010, for party financing during his five-year term, his failed presidential nomination and eventually for supporting the presidential candidacy of Prabowo Subianto in 2014. As a prominent businessman, he presumably seeks to regain his resources, power and luck heading into the 2019 general election.
The oligarchy survival or possibly revival generated from Golkar’s extraordinary congress confirms the thesis of the oligarchy raised scholars such as Jeffrey Winters, Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison.
The thesis argues that Indonesia’s reformasi project cannot be detached from the existence of oligarchs hijacking political parties.
Policy-making and the working of the political system are arguably driven by vested interests of such oligarchs for the sake of rent-seeking and spoils of office. Thus, it was not surprising when The Economist ranked Indonesia seventh in its new “crony capitalism” index issued this year.
Apart from the oligarchy survival, the intraparty democracy exhibited in and ahead of the latest Golkar congress shows us a lesson learned — that such a “democratic” mechanism is not aimed at meritocratic and program-based outcomes.
The onset of congress was supposed to reconcile the Golkar factionalism. Although the reconciliation attempt benefitted Golkar as a political party, such reconciliation mechanism, unfortunately, had generated a business-as-usual outcome in Indonesian politics.
***
From the 554 total votes comprising provincial and regental chapters, the party’s affiliated organizations and the central executive committee, only 11 votes were invalid. Thus, Setya had legitimate power in leading the party based on his 50 percent plus votes.
Indeed, such intraparty democracy should be appreciated. Indonesia’s political parties exhibited pervasive personal influence through the party congresses prior to and following the 2014 presidential election. Exceptions are the Prosperous Justice Party ( PKS ) and the National Mandate Party ( PAN ).
The fairly open process at the congress in Bali enabled observers and the media to follow it closely, with intensive and live reports from in and around the congress hall. Despite the political dynamics, the chairmanship nomination, campaign and eventual election were organized transparently and professionally.
Regardless of the chairmanship race and its complexity, the last congress nevertheless basically proved the survival of oligarchies hijacking Golkar. There are two empirical notions explaining such oligarchy survival.
First, though the extraordinary congress apparently succeeded in its conflict resolution within the party by toning down all factions and awarding the party’s losers of the 2014 presidential election, Setya’s victory arguably strengthens the oligarchic networks within and around Golkar.
Besides the Freeport case enveloping Setya, which was notoriously referred to aspapa minta saham ( papa wants shares ), Setya tends to emerge as a skillful political broker linking the business tycoon’s interests with the ruling government.
In addition to his origin as a businessman rather than a political activist prior to aligning himself with Golkar, investigative reporting, including that by Tempo magazine shows Setya was the person behind various business projects allocated from Indonesia’s national budget.
His position as Golkar treasurer for almost two decades since 1998, especially under Aburizal Bakrie’s leadership in 2010-2015, explains his oligarchic networks, useful in seizing spoils of office for the party financing and for his political career.
Second, more importantly, the extraordinary congress showed a backlash from the prominent oligarch Aburizal. The congress eventually reinstalled the previously “forbidden” powerful body following the fall of Soeharto, namely, the board of patrons.
Not surprisingly, the floor agreed that the board should be led by Aburizal. It was Aburizal’s proteges, including the chairman of the congress’ steering committee Nurdin Halid and leaders of the provincial chapters that secured Aburizal’s new post.
The resurrection of the board of patrons and the acclamation for Aburizal as its chairman was among the results of the congress, the highest party forum.
Together with the central executive board led by Setya, Aburizal’s board of patrons can nominate candidates for both legislative and executive offices, especially for the presidential seat.
For decades, the board of patrons led by the authoritarian president Soeharto had veto power, to which all Golkar rank-and-file members and activists were obligated to adhere to. The body was terminated under Akbar Tanjung’s chairmanship, following the fall of the New Order in 1998, as part of attempts to renew Golkar.
Though the board of patrons resulting from the Bali extraordinary congress does not have authority to dissolve the central executive board and the elected party chairman like under Soeharto, the body arguably gives Aburizal considerable power to drive interparty politics between Golkar and other political and economic forces.
Aburizal has incurred huge political costs, including for his candidacy for Golkar’s chairmanship in 2010, for party financing during his five-year term, his failed presidential nomination and eventually for supporting the presidential candidacy of Prabowo Subianto in 2014. As a prominent businessman, he presumably seeks to regain his resources, power and luck heading into the 2019 general election.
The oligarchy survival or possibly revival generated from Golkar’s extraordinary congress confirms the thesis of the oligarchy raised scholars such as Jeffrey Winters, Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison.
The thesis argues that Indonesia’s reformasi project cannot be detached from the existence of oligarchs hijacking political parties.
Policy-making and the working of the political system are arguably driven by vested interests of such oligarchs for the sake of rent-seeking and spoils of office. Thus, it was not surprising when The Economist ranked Indonesia seventh in its new “crony capitalism” index issued this year.
Apart from the oligarchy survival, the intraparty democracy exhibited in and ahead of the latest Golkar congress shows us a lesson learned — that such a “democratic” mechanism is not aimed at meritocratic and program-based outcomes.
The onset of congress was supposed to reconcile the Golkar factionalism. Although the reconciliation attempt benefitted Golkar as a political party, such reconciliation mechanism, unfortunately, had generated a business-as-usual outcome in Indonesian politics.
***
The writer is a researcher with the Pol-Tracking
Institute and postgraduate student of Asia Pacific Studies at the Australian
National University, Canberra
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