Presidential
candidate and Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte. Photo: LYN RILLON
Rodrigo Duterte’s rise in
opinion polls ahead of presidential elections on 9 May represents potentially the
most serious crisis of Philippine democracy since ‘people power’ overthrew the
Marcos dictatorship 30 years ago. Julio C Teehankee and Mark R
Thompson outline why.
Nearly
two years ago in these pages, several New Mandala contributors
questioned Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo
Subianto’s commitment to democracy (or more specifically his threats
to undermine it). Prabowo, one of the most repressive high ranking generals in
the Suharto dictatorship, narrowly lost the July 2014 presidential elections in
Indonesia to Joko Widodo, who, although a disappointment to many of his
supporters, has not posed a significant threat to the country’s democratic institutions
as president.
Now it is
the Philippines turn to have a major neo-authoritarian presidential candidate.
Davao City Mayor Rodrigo
‘Digong’ Duterte, who the latest Pulse Asia
national opinion shows leading a field of four major presidential
candidates with about a third of the vote (which would translate into a
comfortable 5 million vote lead over his nearest rival in a multi-candidate
race), has shown little regard for the archipelago’s (often fragile) democratic
institutions. His coarse language and outrageous statements have recently
surfaced in the international media, notably his tacit approval for the use of
‘extrajudicial’ killings to ‘cleanse’ the country of criminals and drug lords
in three to six months, and, most notoriously, his recent casually
insensitive, misogynous remark concerning the rape and murder of a female
missionary in Davao.
He uses
his record as mayor of the once rough and tumble city of Davao in the southern
island of Mindanao as his calling card in the campaign. He claims he pacified
the once dangerous city after he went after drug gangs, murderers and other
criminals. He has shrugged off critics’ accusations that he used death squads
to achieve his goal, promising to implement his Davao model nationwide and
daring human rights activists to stand in his way. He has threatened to abolish
Congress and tame the courts if they do not prove cooperative with
his radical plans to implement peace and order.
In
another recent development, and according to the same electoral survey, Ferdinand
‘Bongbong’ R Marcos Jr, the son of the dictator Ferdinand E Marcos,
is now narrowly ahead in the race for the vice presidency, which is elected
separately in the Philippines, with victors often coming from different parties
than the president. This is an ominous sign, adding to the neo-authoritarian
danger facing the country as Marcos refuses to apologise for the crimes of his
father’s regime — both its human rights violations and economic plunder which
he flat-out denies.
From populism to neo-authoritarianism
Duterte’s unorthodox campaign style has captured the imagination of Filipino voters. His political back story runs parallel with the archetypical Filipino populist, ousted president Joseph “Erap” Estrada. Both come from middle-class families with minor political connections who found affinity with the poor at an early age. Both were expelled from Jesuit-run schools, and both started their careers as successful mayors: Erap during the Marcos era, Digong during the post-Marcos era. Both projected a “siga” (tough guy) image — Erap magnifying this persona in the movies and in the Metro Manila town (later city) of San Juan, and Digong crafting this image in the communist infiltrated and crime infested city of Davao.
Duterte’s unorthodox campaign style has captured the imagination of Filipino voters. His political back story runs parallel with the archetypical Filipino populist, ousted president Joseph “Erap” Estrada. Both come from middle-class families with minor political connections who found affinity with the poor at an early age. Both were expelled from Jesuit-run schools, and both started their careers as successful mayors: Erap during the Marcos era, Digong during the post-Marcos era. Both projected a “siga” (tough guy) image — Erap magnifying this persona in the movies and in the Metro Manila town (later city) of San Juan, and Digong crafting this image in the communist infiltrated and crime infested city of Davao.
Estrada,
however, managed to rise earlier from local to national politics: having been
elected Mayor of San Juan in the late 1960s shortly before martial law and then
to the Senate in 1987, as vice president in 1992, and as president in 1998.
Digong, on the other hand, spent most of his political career in Davao (except
for a short stint in Congress from 2001-2004). While Erap was viewed
suspiciously by elites but enjoyed tremendous popularity among poor voters,
Duterte’s electoral appeal has been strongest among upper- and middle-class
voters.
Duterte’s
calls for a federal
system draws on ‘anti-Imperial Manila’ sentiments, particularly in
Mindanao. Besides this strong regional base (which extends into parts of the
Visayas islands in the middle of the country) he strongly appeals to voters
within Manila itself where his calls for a brutal and immediate implementation
of a ‘law and order’ have resonated particularly well.
Given
that Duterte has his strongest base in the elite and the middle class, his
campaign is distinct from the pro-poor populism of Estrada and of one of his
current electoral rivals for the presidency Jejomar
‘Jojo’ Binay –who before becoming Vice President was
long-serving mayor of the Metro Manila city of Makati where he was noted for
his welfare measures directed at the disadvantaged. Duterte’s emerging neo-authoritarian
constituency was initially concentrated among the elite, and middle
class and only recently has moved down the social ladder. Duterte is the
candidate of the wealthy, newly rich, well off, and the modestly successful
(including taxi drivers, small shopkeepers and overseas Filipino workers
abroad).
The end of the EDSA ‘people power’ regime
Duterte’s rise in the polls has to do with frustration and anger with the limits of the reformist agenda of the Aquino administration, but more generally with the “yellow” good governance pledged regimes stretching back to Fidel Ramos and Corazon Aquino. But this dissatisfaction is different than the kind Estrada tapped into in 1998 (after the presidency of Fidel V Ramos, when, like under the Aquino administration, growth rates were high but poverty was not substantially reduced). It is also different to incumbent vice president Binay’s attempts to mobilise voters during this presidential election with welfare appeals to the poor. Duterte’s rise is not a reaction by the dispossessed, the losers of “exclusive” growth, but rather it is symptomatic of the anxieties about criminality, rampant smuggling and government corruption of those now marginally better off after a couple of decades of solid economic growth.
Duterte’s rise in the polls has to do with frustration and anger with the limits of the reformist agenda of the Aquino administration, but more generally with the “yellow” good governance pledged regimes stretching back to Fidel Ramos and Corazon Aquino. But this dissatisfaction is different than the kind Estrada tapped into in 1998 (after the presidency of Fidel V Ramos, when, like under the Aquino administration, growth rates were high but poverty was not substantially reduced). It is also different to incumbent vice president Binay’s attempts to mobilise voters during this presidential election with welfare appeals to the poor. Duterte’s rise is not a reaction by the dispossessed, the losers of “exclusive” growth, but rather it is symptomatic of the anxieties about criminality, rampant smuggling and government corruption of those now marginally better off after a couple of decades of solid economic growth.
Like
Prabowo, Duterte appeals to the longing of the better off in Philippine society
for the reimposition of discipline in the spirit of the dictator, whose most
famous slogan was ‘Sa ikauunlad ang bayan, disciplina ang kailangen’ (in
order to make progress, the country requires discipline). This also reflects
Lee Kuan Yew’s infamous words to Filipino business people in a visit to the
country in the early 1990s: ‘the Philippines needs more discipline than
democracy.’
Duterte’s
rise in opinion polls represents potentially the most serious
crisis of Philippine democracy since ‘people power’ overthrew the
Marcos dictatorship 30 years ago. The enormous powers of the Philippine
presidency and Duterte’s record of close ties to the military in Davao (and his
promise to raise military salaries) make ‘the punisher’s’ threats to implement
the Davao model nationwide, killing criminals without asking questions and
pushing aside democratic insitutions and due process if they stand in the way
only too credible.
Julio C Teehankee is Full Professor of
Political Science and International Studies and Dean of the College of Liberal
Arts at De La Salle University. He is also the Executive Secretary of the Asian
Political and International Studies Association (APISA).
Mark R Thompson is acting head and Professor
of Politics of the Department of Asian and International Studies and director
of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, both of the City University of Hong Kong.
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