WHAT
is the best design for a tax amnesty? Some object to them all, since they
reward those who have broken the law. Others argue that maximising revenue
should be the goal. The OECD nods at both philosophies, suggesting that an
amnesty should cost the tax-dodger less than if he were caught by the
authorities, but more than if he had been compliant from the start. Few,
however, would recommend the approach Indonesia is taking.
The
government estimates that rich Indonesians have perhaps $900 billion stashed
overseas. To entice some of that money home, it wants to offer an amnesty.
Parliament, which reconvened this week, is due to take up a bill soon. People
who have hidden assets abroad will face no criminal prosecution or penalties,
other than a flat fee of between 1% and 6% of the value of the assets in
question, depending on how quickly they declare their stash and whether they
repatriate it. (The 1% is for those who bring their money home immediately; 6%
for those who take more than nine months to admit to hiding assets and keep
them abroad.) Yet even 6% is a bargain compared with Indonesia’s top tax rate
of 30%. Scofflaws should see the amnesty as an invitation “to invest their
money for Indonesia’s development,” says Indonesia’s finance minister, Bambang
Brodjonegoro (pictured). Indonesia’s government projects $8 billion-15 billion
in revenue from the scheme.
That
Indonesia has a revenue-collection problem is beyond dispute. Only some 27m of
the country’s 255m people are registered for tax and in 2014 only 900,000 of
these paid what they owed. Last year Indonesia took in just 82% of the tax
revenue it had set out to collect. Its tax-to-GDP ratio is around 10%, compared
with 13-15% for its South-East Asian neighbours. Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s
president, says he wants to raise that to 16%. Indonesia’s constitution caps
budget deficits at 3%, and most governments fear to get close to the cap, since
missing revenue targets requires real and immediate cuts to spending.
But by
taking $10 billion or so now, the government could be leaving ten times that
amount on the table. Starting next year most jurisdictions where Indonesians
are presumed to keep their hidden wealth, including Singapore, Hong Kong,
Switzerland and Mauritius, have agreed to share information on foreign
account-holders with their home governments as a matter of course, under an
OECD scheme known as the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Applying Indonesia’s
normal tax rates to a conservative estimate of the money to be revealed by the
CRS could yield well over $100 billion, before penalties, which Indonesia
levies at 2% of the tax due a month.
The leniency
is puzzling. Indonesia could levy a 25% tariff on offshore funds, and their
owners would still come out ahead. Nicholas Shaxson of the Tax Justice Network
deems it “very likely that powerful people in Indonesia have engineered this to
make sure they’re not exposed and not subject to penalties.” But expediency is
another possible explanation: Mr Brodjonegoro says that if the government waits
for the CRS to take effect, “The benefit in terms of tax revenue will only
start in 2019, the end of this administration.”
The Economist
No comments:
Post a Comment