American
fears that China could set up an air defence identification zone in disputed
seas offer a chance for a mutually beneficial agreement
China
wants the US to cease its provocative probes, while the US does not want China
to declare an air defence zone over the Spratlys.
On March 30, US deputy defence secretary Robert
Work publicly declared that the US had told China it would not recognise
“an exclusion zone in the South China Sea” and would view such a
move as “destabilising”. The Asia Times said the Pentagon was “trying to stop China”
from declaring an air defence zone in disputed seas. These seem almost fighting
words. In response, Yang Yujun, the spokesperson for China’s defence ministry,
said there was no need for such “gesticulation”.
What’s going on?
The US and China are
competing for dominance in the region amid conflicting sovereignty and maritime
claims by China and some Southeast Asian countries. The two powers hold
different perspectives on “freedom of navigation” and China’s November 2013
declaration of an air defence identification zone in the East China
Sea.
China weighs in on possible air defence zone in South
China Sea
Some journalists and US
pundits have been hyping a “what if” situation, as if to prepare for a clarion
call for US military action if China declares an air defence identification
zone in the South China Sea.
China has yet to declare
such a zone in the South China Sea and may not do so – especially one that
includes the disputed Spratly features. The US “survived” China’s declaration
of an air defence identification zone in the East China Sea with apparently
little effect on either country. The US said it would ignore that zone and
disregard any Chinese orders, although the Obama administration advised US
commercial airlines to comply with China’s demands out of concern for possible
“misunderstandings”.
The establishment of air defence identification zones
have always been unilateral and controversial
Non-recognition of such
zones is always an option. For example, China and Russia do not recognise
Japan’s.
The establishment and
implementation of air defence identification zones have always been unilateral
and controversial. There is no international legal basis for them or their
“rules” – except perhaps the general principles of self-defence and freedom of
overflight, and the former will always take precedence, for any country.
The US established the
precedent of an air defence identification zone and its rules – for itself and
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – after the second world war. It apparently
thinks all other nations’ zones should be based on its model. But being first
does not justify dictating the rules for all, especially in the absence of an
international agreement.
US sees new Chinese
activity around disputed South China Sea reef also claimed by Philippines
The US seems to have two
objections to a hypothetical Chinese zone in the South China Sea. If it is
modelled on China’s East China Sea zone, then it would include both military
and civilian aircraft, and its rules would apply to aircraft that are only transiting
the zone. According to US Secretary of State John Kerry, “the US does not
support efforts by any state to apply procedures of an air defence
identification zone to foreign aircraft not intending to enter its national
airspace. We urge China not to implement its threat to take action against
aircraft that do not identify themselves or obey orders from Beijing.” Japan
has a similar requirement for Taiwanese aircraft entering its zone, as do
Australia, Myanmar and Taiwan for foreign aircraft. To back up this position,
two unarmed but nuclear-capable US B-52 bombers flew into China’s new zone
without identifying themselves, clearly testing China’s reaction.
The US claims that it only
applies its rules of prior notification to enter its zones – or “recommendations”
to do so – to civilian aircraft, and that they only apply to aircraft destined
for US territorial airspace. In practice, however, the US monitors and often
intercepts with fighter jets both civilian and military aircraft that do not
follow the “recommendations” of identifying themselves and their destinations,
particularly Russian Bear bombers in the zones off Alaska.
In the
South and East China seas, an anti-China coalition is taking shape
China claims that its East
China Sea zone rules do not affect normal commercial traffic and or interfere
with freedom of overflight. This aspect certainly requires clarification and
reassurance. But, so far, China has not shown any hostile intent.
Some 55 airlines in 19
countries have complied with China’s zone rules. South Korea and Japan said its
airlines do not recognise the zone. But China has done nothing more than
monitor and observe foreign military aircraft flying unannounced in it –
following the same practice as the US and Japan.
An air defence
identification zone in the South China Sea may help China counter US and
potential Japanese aerial reconnaissance measures – long a bone of contention
between China and the US. The US has regularly sent EP3-E surveillance planes
and more recently Poseiden 8As along the coast of China to intercept
communications and monitor coastal and maritime military activities, including
submarine movements, averaging 400 such flights each year. The aircraft
sometimes “tickle” the Chinese military, generating responses which can then be
monitored for planning military attacks.
Other airborne activities
have been alleged to include interference with communications, jamming of
radar, and cyber attacks. These activities appear to involve far greater
interference with the communications and defence systems of China than any
traditional passive intelligence gathering conducted from outside national
territory. Indeed, China has alleged that these activities abuse the principle
of freedom of overflight.
First of all, air defence
identification zones covering parts of the South China Sea already exist – one
by Taiwan and one by the Philippines. So this would not necessarily be
something completely new.
There are several
possibilities. China may not declare such a zone. Ironically, whether it does
or not may depend on US behaviour. If the US continues its provocative
behaviour in China’s exclusive economic zone, Beijing may perceive an “aerial
threat” sufficient to declare an air defence identification zone. This is
rational and understandable.
China’s
top diplomat on the South China Sea, North Korea, Japan, the US and more
China could declare a zone
out to, say, 200 nautical miles off its South China Sea coast but not including
any disputed islands or maritime space, except the Paracels – which are
disputed between only China and Vietnam – and possibly Pratas Islands (which
are claimed and occupied by Taiwan). That would probably be grudgingly accepted
by most of its critics.
But a Chinese zone that
includes some disputed Spratly islands and their maritime space would be
politically problematic for all concerned. It would be a manifestation of the
worst fears of the US, Japan and Southeast Asian militaries that China wants to
control the South China Sea, including its air corridors and sea lanes. This
would, in their eyes, be tantamount to a threat to freedom of navigation and
may even be a red line for the US. Indeed, the US and others would probably
repeatedly and publicly violate it with military aircraft, embarrassing China’s
leadership. That is why China is unlikely to do so.
What would a compromise look
like? China wants the US to cease or at least cut back on its provocative
probes. The US does not want China to declare an air defence identification
zone over the Spratlys or further militarise its reclaimed features there. A
trade-off might be possible.
Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at
the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China
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