In the Bay of Bengal, far removed from the mainland, lie the 572 islands of Andaman and
Nicobar, which form India’s southeast border. While the northernmost
part of the archipelago is only 22 nautical miles away from Myanmar, the
southernmost point, called the Indira Point, is a mere 90 nautical miles from
Indonesia. These islands dominate the Bay of Bengal and the Six Degree and Ten
Degree channels which more than 60,000 commercial vessels traverse each year.
Among the nine major bottlenecks that control entry to this region are
the Malacca Strait and the Six Degree Channel. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands
lie in this strategically important zone, meaning that India with its growing
naval capabilities could play a significant role in controlling access.
India’s
Navy chief, Admiral R K Dhowan recently acknowledged that the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands are a “very very important aspect” of India’s
security, acting as extended arms of the country. Dhowan said that India needed
to deploy naval assets to the islands for surveillance in important sea lines
of communication.
Yet over
the past 15 years successive governments have been slow to act, even after
having declared their intention of beefing up the security infrastructure on
the islands. A unified land, sea and air command was created more than a decade
ago, but the command still faces turf wars, funding issues, and glacial
decision making.
In the
meantime, other countries – notably China – have expanded their presence in the
region. Naval vessels camouflaged as fishing boats have been sighted, while
other ships make port visits to Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
The
inability of India’s civilian bureaucracy to recognize the geostrategic
importance of the islands is evident in the fact that the only radar station at
Port Blair is switched off every evening. When Malaysian authorities sought
information about the missing MH370 from India there was none to share.
Soon
after coming to power last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi brushed
aside environmental concerns and cleared a decade-old proposal to set up a
radar station on an island lying a few miles from Coco Islands, which Myanmar
has leased to China for the purpose of setting up a listening post. Reportedly,
infrastructure development on Coco Islands was completed in short order, and
besides a radar station the Chinese have also built an airstrip. In contrast,
India took ten years to decide to build a radar station on the nearby Narcondam
Islands.
Plans to
improve the infrastructure are welcome but the Modi government needs to
acknowledge the strategic importance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and push an
indifferent bureaucracy to faster decision-making. India could be using these
islands to project power into the region and signal China’s People’s Liberation
Army Navy about its readiness to counter any intervention.
Of the
572 islands that make up the Andaman and Nicobar group, only 37 are inhabited.
The absence of a human presence on hundreds of these islands has made them
vulnerable to narcotics smuggling, intrusion by foreign vessels, and other
incursions. The home ministry needs to seriously consider suggestions to
encourage migration from the mainland and open up some of these strategically
located uninhabited islands to tourism. That would give India a stronger
physical footprint and would help the country track the movement of vessels and
people.
The
northern islands are separated from the southern group by the Ten Degree
Channel, which is 80 nautical miles wide. Close watch needs to be kept over the
movement of ships and military vessels that pass through these waters.
Recognition
of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as strategic assets would ensure a change in
government policy. The slow pace of development and indifferent bureaucracy has
ensured that after several years an undersea cable link between India’s
mainland and the islands remains incomplete. Internet connectivity, even at the
naval base in the capital Port Blair, is reported to be erratic.
Road
building, airstrip construction, and even the building of jetties has been slow
or non-existent. More than a decade after the tsunami of 2004 an important road
that helps link North with South has still not been rebuilt.
Heavy
rainfall restricts building activity to six months a year and the distance from
mainland adds to the cost of construction as all material must be shipped to
the islands. Few companies are willing to work on the islands because of the
distance and cost. For some materials, importing from Indonesia would be far
cheaper and more cost effective than sending shipments from the Indian
mainland.
Surveillance
in the southern group of islands is a major challenge. The destruction of the
road by the tsunami has meant that the two groups of islands are linked only by
air and sea. Rather than expedite the work, the pace of development has been
caught up in red tape. The landing strip on Campbell Bay is only 1,000 meters
in length and plans to extend it have moved slowly. The runway in capital Port
Blair took more than three years to repair.
While
India wants to neutralize Chinese presence in the region, the decision-making
in New Delhi has been slow and lacking in focus. Efforts to strengthen India’s
military presence have not kept pace with Chinese activity. Modi’s outreach to
Japan, which has been added to Malabar,
hitherto a U.S.-India bilateral military exercise, signals a change in
direction by New Delhi, which has traditionally been very sensitive to Chinese
concerns.
Modi has
an opportunity to make Andaman and Nicobar Islands an important element of his “Act East Policy” of engaging
with countries in the region east of India. A policy of benign neglect
towards the islands should be transformed into something more robust, which
develops the island territories with an eye to India’s larger geopolitical
interests.
Sunil
Raman is a Delhi-based journalist and author. In the last two decades he has
worked with leading media organizations including the BBC World Service and The
Economic Times in Delhi, London and Bangalore.
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