Yes, Indonesia’s mass Islamic organisations are tolerant and democrats.
But no, that doesn’t mean their culture can be exported to counter extremism.
Can the solution to Islamic
extremism be found in the importation of a more tolerant and democratic culture
to the Middle East? This is the question at the heart of recent discussions in
the pages of The New York Times, The Huffington Post, and The Boston Globe about Islam Nusantara
(Islam of the archipelago).
Islam
Nusantara is the name given to the theology of the world’s largest Islamic
organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) of Indonesia. NU supports democracy, is
largely tolerant of religious minorities, and does not seek state
implementation of Islamic law. Promoters of Islam Nusantara argue that
exporting this aspect of Indonesian Islamic culture can provide the antidote to
the disease of Islamic extremism and militant jihadism plaguing the Muslim
world.
It’s an
instinctively appealing idea. It’s also wrong. The idea that Indonesian culture
can be exported is a fiction born of a threefold misunderstanding about NU, the
barriers to strengthening democratic values in the Middle East, and the origins
of Islamic State (IS).
The term
Islam Nusantara was coined in the early 2000s to refer to NU’s theological mix
of Sunni Islam, Sufism, and local religious practices like the veneration of
the nine saints of Java (the Walisongo). These practices are born out of
the structure of NU.
NU is a
coalition of Islamic preachers and prominent Javanese families that came
together in 1926 to oppose the influence of Islamic modernism, the movement
from Egypt launched by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad
Rasyid Ridha to strengthen Muslims through the promotion of science and a
return to the foundational sources of Islam. Instead of reforming Islam, NU
seeks to retain its mix of classical Islamic jurisprudence, Sufism, and local
traditions rooted in the pilgrimage sites of Java.
Today
NU’s opponent is still Islamic modernism as well as its distant cousin, Salafi
jihadism. And despite what proponents of Islam Nusantara say, NU’s tolerance is
selective.
Its
tolerance of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and Confucians stands in stark
contrast to its longstanding intolerance of Ahmadi Muslims
and communists.
The reason for this discrepancy is that Christians and the other accepted
minorities have been important allies for NU in its struggle against Islamic
modernism, while communists and Ahmadis are seen as a threat to NU and the
Indonesian nation.
Certainly
it is important to counter the idea that Islam and IS are the same. And it is
true that NU’s tolerant culture has been crucial for the success of Indonesian
democracy. But exporting a partial aspect of Javanese traditionalist Islam
without the institutional, familiar, or local structure that supports it is
unlikely to have much influence. This is indeed why NU has not spread beyond
Indonesia in the 90 years since it was founded.
NU’s
beliefs are compatible with democracy. But as survey researchers have long
known (and reported repeatedly here,
here and here),
so are the views of most of the world’s Muslims. The barriers to democracy in
the Muslim world are political and economic, not cultural.
IS was
born in the same conditions in which the Taliban and Hamas were born, in places
where there is no meaningful political representation or political order. The
prolonged civil war in Syria and failed reconstruction of Iraq created a power
vacuum that IS filled.
By
contrast to the situation in Iraq and Syria, an environment of sustained political
engagement provided the context in which the political aspects of Islam
Nusantara were developed.
In the
1920s NU’s religious theology was accompanied by a political vision for an
international Caliphate and Islamic state. But Indonesia provides strong
evidence that if you allow Islamic organisations to participate in the
political process they will moderate
their demands and become part of the system rather than seek to
overthrow it.
Over the
course of the 20th and early 21st centuries, Indonesian Islamic organisations
like NU that have participated in crafting the policies of the state have
implicitly or explicitly moderated their views.
Their
leaders have shifted from being pan-Islamists who seek a global Caliphate, to
Indonesian Islamists who aim to create an Indonesian Islamic State, to
Indonesian Muslim pluralists who actively work with other religious and
ideological groups and promise to safeguard their rights, to post-Islamists who
view Islam as complementary to other ways of organising politics and society.
They have moderated through participation.
While
there are exceptions to this trend, most notably the “new Islamists” who
generate dramatic headlines but possess little
electoral or social influence, the overall trend toward moderation
is clear — include Islamists in the political process, and over time their
ideologies and tactics will moderate toward support for democracy. This is the
opposite of what has happened in Iraq and Syria, where despots with foreign
backing have coopted Islamists or actively oppressed them.
The idea
of exporting a more tolerant culture is a prime example of what the
anthropologist Mahmood
Mamdani calls “culture talk”; the predilection to define Islamic
cultures according to their ‘essential’ characteristics in order to sort good
Muslims from bad Muslims rather than discussing the specific conditions under
which extremist movements emerge. It is a shallow and escapist way of thinking
about the problem of Islamic extremism.
An
example may help illustrate the problem of culture talk. What if we turned the
logic of exporting culture around? Since Britain has almost zero gun violence,
and the United States has an epidemic of gun violence, perhaps the problem
could be solved by importing British culture to the United States?
Such a
solution may be appealing at first glance, but it’s a fanciful way of thinking
about a problem that would be better addressed through normal policies. In the
case of IS, that means supporting more representative political institutions
and equitable economies, and reducing support for militarism in the Middle
East.
Jeremy
Menchik is assistant professor in the Pardee School of Global
Studies at Boston University. His book Islam and
Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism, is
forthcoming from Cambridge University Press.
The perennial challenge for the Indonesian security forces, of course, is that disrupting potential attacks and making arrests does not directly get at the ideology of ISIS, which is the source of its support in the first place. Without addressing that root problem, the existence of sympathizers and the prevalence of social media always risks giving rise to new ISIS-inspired attacks, and law enforcement officials may not be able to prevent all of them. After all, the sobering reality in combating terrorism is that law enforcement officials need to be right all the time to keep the country safe, while militants only need to be right once to spread fear necessary to achieve their political ends.
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