At times of global instability, the places
where things remain calm stand out. That is the case with northeast Asia, the area
primarily comprised of China, Japan, parts of Russia and the two Koreas. Due to
the generosity of the Korean Economic Institute and Korea Foundation, I had the
chance recently to travel to Seoul to partake in multiple meetings with
government officials, journalists and other experts to learn about what is
happening in the region.
South Korea finds itself in an
interesting position. It relishes its role as a staunch U.S. ally,
yet it also feels compelled to play a dual game of being nice to both
Beijing and Washington. It was stressed during my visit that any attention
Park Geun-hye’s government pays to China should not be viewed as America
“losing” South Korea.
Most revealing, though, was hearing about
the knife’s edge on which northeast Asia rests today. Indeed, in talks with
prominent thinkers and practitioners, the issue that came up more than once
was that the relatively stable regional situation could change—and change
quickly—if a few scenarios go the wrong way. Part of the U.S. strategy for the rebalance should be first to understand
these flashpoints and then to prevent any rising tensions in northeast
Asia from leading to war.
So, what might cause Asia to fall off
the knife’s edge?
Chinese-Japanese relations. Beijing and Tokyo will not
become friends anytime soon. That has to do with history, but it also has to do with today’s
environment. Japan has significantly altered its post–World War II pacifist
stance, allowing Japanese military forces to partake in “collective self-defense” and join the
United States and other allies and partners in regional security maintenance.
China, on the other hand, continues to exert its authority—which it claims it
always had—over most of East Asia. Chinese, Japanese and American interests
differ on what is suitable for a regional security order in Asia. Mismanagement
in trying to align these views and interests could lead to a skirmish, which
should be avoided at all costs. The Chinese-Japanese relationship, then, ranks
alongside the Chinese-American relationship among the most important for global
stability.
The South China Sea. Perhaps the most famous of the potential
flashpoints in Asia, the South China Sea could certainly bring
instability to the area. Competing claims over islands and other territory in
the waters—including newly created islands—have led to greater shows of
military force and strong statements from many regional leaders. The United States
sees itself as a Pacific power and a security guarantor in the region;
therefore, Washington believes it can find a way to make China back off and
make many happy. Of course, China has a second-strike capability (not to mention
third- and fourth-strike, etc.), so overreaching uses of the military could
lead to a “dangerous contest of military might.” In
the meantime, proxy competition for and among regional states could be
expected—some is already taking place. Ensuring this does not get out of hand
now and in the future will keep the lid on this potential Pandora’s Box.
North Korea. While North Korea’s antics get a lot of
press, the real issue is what the country’s future holds. Will Kim Jong-un
consolidate his power, ensuring his regime’s success for decades to come? Will
North Korea build and acquire the technology it craves for self-defense and
aggression? Will it, over time, choose to reunite with South Korea? Or will the
regime collapse, causing a large-scale crisis? It’s this last scenario that
scares most northeast Asia watchers, and certainly South Korean leaders. China,
they assert, would get much more involved on the peninsula should North Korea
crumble, aiming to impose its will not only on the likely gangster-led fiefdoms in the north but also
keeping South Korea and the United States out. A Syria-like war could break out
in Korea, possibly pitting China and the United States against each other. South
Korea is doing all it can to ensure a collapse situation does not
happen, but only the North is truly in charge of its own fate.
What, then, can the United States do to
keep northeast Asia from the brink? First, it can follow South Korea’s model of
trustpolitik to build confidence among regional actors. The more
China, Japan, South Korea and others engage and understand one another, the
less likely that a flare-up will lead to a greater crisis. Second, the United
States should do all it can to bring China into the global order. Giving China
more weight in international institutions, so that it does not create something
like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank again, is vital. Making China
feel welcome as a top global power will lower the chances of it misbehaving.
Third, the United States
must work closely with Japan to ensure it uses its newfound military power
wisely and correctly. Bringing American and Japanese troops closer together
would be smart, as the United States could counsel Japan on the proper ways of
deploying troops in this new environment. Fourth, Washington should plan for a
more modern version of extended deterrence in the region.
Finally, the United States should reaffirm its commitment to regional allies.
Certain South Korean leaders felt the United States was absent in terms of its
action in the region—this, coming from a country where the U.S. military
directly works with South Korean military forces and has a large installation
in the middle of its capital city! Many South Korean leaders see America’s
“strategic patience” as doing nothing. That perception must be changed, also in
Japan, and even further south in the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and
Australia.
Northeast Asia remains secure, and the
hope is that it stays that way. Sadly, hope alone is not enough to sustain the
region's security. As America rebalances to Asia, even in the next
administration, maintaining the stability that northeast Asia delicately holds
now should be one Washington's primary strategy objectives.
Alex Ward is Associate Director of the
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he works on U.S. defense
policy, strategy, and military affairs
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