Dealing with militarisation in Myanmar

 

From ribbons, to elections and ceasefire, what will change Myanmar’s long reliance on armed forces? 

A short time ago, if you can recall a time before the 8 November elections, staff from Myanmar’s Ministry of Health brought considerable focus to the role of the military in government through a black ribbon campaign.

They sought to raise awareness on the impending appointment of military officers, without formal medical training, to the ministry.

The campaign was an immediate success, particularly on social media, with a reported 40,000 ‘likes’ on Facebook in just three days. Its momentum led to a yellow ribbon campaign against military appointees to the judiciary, a red ribbon campaign for the Ministry of Energy, a blue campaign for electrical engineers, and a green campaign for education.

While this was not the first time Myanmar’s ruling party had sought to bring military personnel into government, the response represents one of the first open and peaceful campaigns against such moves in recent times. It also provides an excellent starting point for deeper examination of Myanmar’s culture of militarisation.

Before a military coup
For many, the most visible form of militarisation are the armed forces personnel who currently comprise 25 per cent of Myanmar’s Union and State parliaments — a product of the 2008 constitution that was put in place after a succession of military-based ruling bodies took power in 1962.

But Myanmar has always been a highly militarised country, even before outright military rule and the rise of ethnic insurgencies. In The Union of Burma, Hugh Tinker notes this could be seen as far back as 1959:

Burmans take pride in the military traditions of the past. Under the Kings the basis of society was not so much the village in which a man lived as the regiment to which he belonged…Up to quite recent years villages in upper Burma have been known as myin, cavalry, or thenat, musketeer (p 312).

In this sense, it comes as little surprise to observe the use of military strategies among communities themselves, typified by the use of landmines to protect their resources from the Tatmadaw and other Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO), militia and Border Guard Forces (BGF), as well as new businesses entering their areas.^[i] The level of militarisation among a population that has been in conflict for 60 years cannot be underestimated.

Another key part of this historical culture is a functioning network of patrons mostly consisting of the political elite with an available force of the population under arms.

An example of this is when King Thibaw, in 1185, failed to rally his armies from around Burma to protect Mandalay in time against the British. The remaining Royal armies and a network of rulers and commanders retained their arms and took to a form of guerrilla warfare. In response, the British military force was expanded to over 16,000 persons (as noted by Mary Callahan in her book Making enemies).

While, mostly excused as a way in dealing with dacoity, or banditry, the Burmese forces were essentially militia units of guerrilla freedom fighters funded by contemporary elites.

Post-independence to 1962
The patron-client basis of militarisation is also evident in the immediate period after World War II, in the interplay between military and political leaders for state dominance (see Callahan’s Making enemies). Militia played a role in conflict between central Burmese military control and ethnic aspirations for self-determination. There were also many local politicians and elites who used their positions to form their own militia (as noted by Callahan in Making enemies).

One notable example of this period are those members of the Burma National Army (BNA), headed by General Aung San, who chose not to take part in the post-independent army, but instead to become part of the para-military unit, The People’s Voluntary Organisation (PVO). Mostly described as a welfare organisation, the PVO was available to ensure that ruling authority was enforced locally.

And as Tinker notes in The Union of Burma:

It is also necessary that the present delegation of powers to semi-political, semi-private authorities shall be terminated. There are too many weapons in the hands of persons over whom the Government has only the loosest control, and too many bosses who can bring influence to bear upon the administration and society…Until the Government can command the uncertain loyalties of these ex-rebels, it will always be vulnerable (p 60).

It was a dramatic time, and by 1962 the Tatmadaw emerged as a central force in the country. Leading nationalist, U Nu, described this moment as a, “development period”, [for forming an army] “that went from being stooges…at the beck and call of this or that organisation into dependable custodians of the constitution.” (Quote from Tinker’s The Union of Burma.)

2010 elections
More recently, local militarised groups known as people’s militias were included in the 2008 constitution.^[ii] Their power mostly exists in networks extending among politicians, military, and businesses. These provide access to the formal or informal economy, or sometimes both.

As Callahan and Mark Duffield have shown, broad networks of patronage exist in Myanmar that have created a series of political accommodations for militia groups at sub-national levels, including, business concessions and other incentives. Most notable is the recent Global Witness report that reveals implicit relationships of business, government and ceasefire groups in the informal economy around the semi-precious stone, jade.

In the lead up to 2010 elections, militia were requested to make the transition to Border Guard Forces under a Tatmadaw command structure. While this led to various forms of accommodation between the government, Tatmadaw and militia, it also resulted in 15 elected Union and State/Region politicians with direct links to militia.

By Gregory Catchcart