South Korea’s bid to indigenize missile defense will have important
ramifications for the U.S.-South Korea relationship.
South
Korea is going indigenous in its attempt to upgrade its missile defense
capabilities. In 2006, the country announced that it would create the Korean Air and Missile Defense
System (KAMD), an integrated air-land-sea structure for the detection and
destruction of incoming North Korean missiles, including nuclear
short-range ballistic missiles.
The hardware involved in KAMD
currently consists mostly of U.S. and Israeli platforms. The
U.S.-designed Patroit PAC-2 and 3, supported by the Israeli EL/M-2080 Green
Pine radar, make up the mainstay of the South Korean land-based anti-missile
arsenal. At sea, the Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROKN) Sejeong the
Great-class frigates and the Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin-class destroyers
are equipped with the U.S. SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles and AN/SPY-1 radar.
That
might change. Seoul is set to complement the seaborne SM-2 with an indigenously
designed and constructed missile. At the recent Seoul International Aerospace
and Defense Exhibition 2015, South Korean company LIG Nex1 stated that the
Korean Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile system (K-SAAM) is on track to be deployed
to the ROKN by 2018. According to Jane’s,
the 2.07 m long K-SAAM employs inertial mid-course guidance and a dual
microwave and imaging infrared seeker for terminal guidance. Much of the
details surrounding the weapon’s specifications are still classified.
The
K-SAAM is a medium-range missile designed as a Close-in Weapons System (CIWS).
As such, it would act as close protection for the ROKN warships that would be
involved in defending South Korea’s coastal cities from attack by North Korean
ballistic missiles and aircraft. K-SAAM is set to replace Raytheon’s Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), the current
system operated by the South Korean navy.
Another
new addition to KAMD is the land-based Cheolmae II surface-to-air missile
system. This weapon, which is set to enter service
with the South Korean military this year, will provide KAMD with an
indigenous land-based ballistic missile killer system and is set to complement
the currently operating PAC-2 and 3s. The Cheolmae II has been designed through
a cooperative venture between a consortium of South Korean companies (including
LIG Nex1 and Samsung Thales) and Russian Almaz-Antey.
According to GlobalSecurity,
the Cheolmae II has a maximum range of 40 km and can target aircraft and
missiles flying at altitudes under 15 km. Once it is launched into air on a
piston system, the missile’s rocket motor ignites and the missile is guided by
the radar. The missile can change direction quickly and has little chance of
being detected by the enemy because it gives off little flares. Equipped with
anti-electronic warfare capabilities, the missile system can keep functioning
despite electronic jamming maneuvers. The system is set to replace the aging
U.S.-built MIM-23 HAWKs currently in service.
Furthermore,
there are plans to develop an indigenous replacement for the Patriots. Based on
the Russian S-400, the Cheolmae 4-H system will
reportedly be capable of targeting ballistic missiles at ranges up to 150 km,
with a ceiling of 60 km. This represents a performance twice of that
of the Patriot system. If and when the Cheolmae-4 comes online, Seoul will be
able to field locally produced hardware at all of the so-called “three-tier
interception stages.”
Seoul’s
recent indigenous arms procurement spree has some important political
ramifications. Perhaps most crucially, the U.S. wants to deploy its own
advanced missile defense system to South Korea, the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense system (THAAD). This has been a deeply divisive issue in the
country, with left-leaning elements in
Korean politics calling for a definite denial of THAAD’s deployment.
A big concern is China’s negative reaction to
THAAD’s potential deployment. Beijing fears that the American system
might be aimed at China, as much as North Korea. An indigenously produced
missile shield could assuage Chinese fears while still providing effective
protection against North Korean missiles (although it could upset Washington, 8 Comments).
Another
important issue is the question of Operational Control (OPCON). 8 Comments, in wartime, the U.S. is to
assume operational command of the South Korean military in addition to the
28,000 U.S. troops deployed on the peninsula. The two states have agreed in principle
to transfer this responsibility to the South Korean military, conditional on
several criteria. As previously reported by the
Diplomat, this agreement calls “for the transfer of operational
control to be ‘conditions based,’ meaning the move has been postponed
indefinitely.”
One of
these conditions is that South Korea must have the capability to destroy
incoming North Korean missiles. While Washington would probably prefer to
deploy THAAD, the new South Korean platforms could do the trick. As OPCON is
almost equally as divisive as the THAAD-debate in Seoul, the deployment of the
K-SAAM, Cheolmae II and Cheolmae 4 will probably be a smart political move for
President Park Geun-hye’s government. Furthermore, the U.S. is tired of having
to pay for the defense of its rich allies.
Seems
like a win-win-win?
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