The coming decades will
present significant intergenerational policy challenges and opportunities for
economies throughout Asia. The re-emergence of Asia as a centre of global
economic activity, rapid demographic change, environmental pressures and technological
advances are to name just a few. These things will put pressure on
the fiscal sustainability of regional economies and will have significant
implications for future economic prosperity throughout the region. The policy
actions taken or missed today will have a significant bearing on future
outcomes.
It is not surprising that
governments, development agencies and most economists focus on income growth
along an optimal growth path when discussing sustainability. But do we need to
assume optimal income growth to assess sustainability? Sustainable development
is not the same thing as optimal growth. Sustainable development simply
requires that intergenerational wellbeing will not decline. Critically, high
growth rates as traditionally measured could be harmful to intergenerational
wellbeing where growth undermines the productive base.
GDP growth does not
necessarily indicate growth in wealth. For example, recent GDP growth in
Cambodia has at times been accompanied by declines in inclusive wealth — a
pattern seen in many countries in the region at various times over the past 25
years including Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Papua
New Guinea. This has obvious implications for sustainable development policy,
as growth is of little value if its fruits are fleeting.
Just as consumption is
defined comprehensively to include all non-market goods and services that
provide wellbeing, the productive base must be equally comprehensive and
include all forms of capital that provide these goods and services. Measuring
all these forms of capital and their social values would allow them to be
aggregated into a single measure of wealth, referred to as inclusive or
comprehensive wealth.
How do these ideas affect
assessment of economic policy strategies in our region?
For one thing, there needs
to be less emphasis on GDP and other measures of national income and
more emphasis on national wealth: on measures of the
current flow of production rather than measures of the stock of
capital and other assets that make up the productive base. Without measuring
how the comprehensive wealth of a country changes over time, we cannot evaluate
if economic development is sustainable. Thinking in these terms makes clear
that growth cannot proceed at the expense of environmental degradation across
the region. It means that the challenge of climate change will have to be dealt
with.
For
another, the forces at work in most of the major regional economies
will put additional pressure on the fiscal sustainability and on the institutions
that have contributed greatly to economic performance to date. These things are
often taken for granted but will have significant implications for future
economic prosperity throughout the region.
The Asian century will see
rapid demographic change. The ageing of populations throughout the region and
changing community expectations over the delivery of public goods will see
increased demand for health and aged care. The fiscal policy response to
these changes is yet to be figured out.
How countries, such as China, transition to high-income status will also be
crucial. Policy frameworks that help facilitate industrial upgrading,
innovation and investment in human capital will be important to drive
productivity and avoid the so called middle income trap.
These are the issues with
which the latest issue of East Asia Forum Quarterly (EAFQ) deals.
In our lead essay from EAFQ this
week, Alan Auerbach points out that many countries — especially more advanced
industrial countries, which are already struggling with high debt levels after
the global financial crisis — also confront substantial and largely unrelated
fiscal challenges over the longer term. Japan and the United States have
worrisome short term fiscal problems, and their longer term fiscal prognosis is
worse on all the measures on which they can be assessed, Auerbach observes.
The longer term structural
fiscal challenge can be significantly attributed to demographic change, the
rising cost of age-related social insurance and other spending programs. This
challenge is currently intense for mature industrial economies in Europe as
well as Japan and Korea in the region, but in a couple of decades China will
face a similar problem.
The global financial crisis,
says Auerbach, ‘left nearly all advanced economies with substantially higher
debt-to-GDP ratios and in many cases with lingering economic weakness that
further complicates short-term efforts at fiscal consolidation. But the
longer-term challenges these countries face are in many cases related much more
to the future fiscal challenge of growing primary deficits,
associated with the cost of providing pensions and health care in the face of
growing old-age dependency ratios, and not simply reducing overall debt’.
Australia’s government
produces an Intergenerational Report every five years to adjust the policy
horizon to take account of some of these longer-term challenges but that has
become a politicised process in recent times and needs to have independent
stature.
On all these fronts, the
appropriate frame for policy development needs to take into account
intergenerational considerations, and success judged not simply on GDP levels
or growth today but rather on the sustainability of living standards and social
product for the next generation.
Peter Drysdale is editor of
the East Asia Forum.
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