The Sino–Japanese
relationship has hit its worst downturn since normalisation of
diplomatic ties. High-level dialogues, including summit talks, have been
suspended since the Japanese government nationalised the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
in September 2012 and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine in
December 2013. With its One Belt One Road strategy in 2013, Beijing launched
its own diplomatic offensive to improve ties with neighbouring states, resuming
intergovernmental contacts with Japan as well. But China has not shown any sign
of compromise on the history or the Senkaku/Diaoyu issues. Meanwhile, Japan is
moving toward its alliance relationship with the United States and has been
developing a new collective security regime. There remains a deep-rooted
mistrust between the two sides in both political and security areas.
It was against this backdrop
that Japanese firms began to leave China. Despite the political predicament,
its conditions in the labour market that have been the most important factor
affecting these developments in the economic relationship between the two
countries. Since large- and medium-sized corporations alike still yield profit
in the market, the withdrawal of Japanese firms from China does not indicate
dwindling business opportunities for all Japanese companies in the mainland.
Japanese firms entered China
ahead of other countries after Beijing’s reform and opening-up policy in the
late 1970s. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, by the end of 2012,
23,094 Japanese firms had set up in China. The current Chinese Ambassador to
Japan, Cheng Yonghua, evaluates these firms’ investment activities in China
highly, stating that
‘by May 2015 Japanese accumulated investment in China had reached US$100.4
billion, making it the first country to surpass US$100 billion’.
But recently circumstances
have changed for many Japanese firms, which have been in the Chinese mainland
market for nearly four decades. Annual Japanese investment in China has
decreased since 2012, when it peaked at US$7 billion. The amount in 2014 was
US$4.3 billion, 38.8 per cent lower than the previous year. The business model
in China has also started to change. Previously, foreign firms produced goods
in China using abundant and cheap local labour, and sold their products to
foreign markets. But increases in labour costs (particularly as a result of the
2008 labour contract law) have affected the profitability of firms seeking good
returns. A survey
conducted by Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO) shows that 83.9 per cent of Japanese firms
believe that wage increases are a significant problem for their business
activities in China.
On the other hand,
expectations for China as a consumer market have been rising steadily among
Japanese firms as Chinese purchasing power has increased dramatically in tandem
with its booming economy. In 2014 the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
raised its yearly evaluation of China from the fourth to third most promising
destination for business activities in the mid-term (approximately three years
in the future). Expectations for local market growth and current local market
size were the top two reasons for the high ranking. Income growth has
inevitably increased running costs, but at the same time, Japanese firms also
see such growth as a positive factor for market expansion.
So while the amount of new
investment from Japanese firms is decreasing, the Chinese market remains
attractive.
Regardless of the political
downturn, Japanese firms fare relatively well in the Chinese market. The
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry notes that the total amount of
sales by Japanese companies in China reached 36.4 trillion yen (approximately
US$300 billion) in 2013 (over 44 trillion yen if Hong Kong is included) only
one year after the nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
Japan’s core businesses are
gaining footholds in China. Sales volumes in 2013 for automobiles, data
communication and electronic industries were 9.4 trillion, 3.9 trillion and 2.2
trillion yen (approximately US$80 billion, US$30 billion and US$20 billion)
respectively. Japan’s multinational corporations, such as Toyota, Nissan,
Honda, Hitachi and Panasonic, sell products valued at more than 1 trillion yen
in this market, and they only expect that to grow.
Most importantly, Japanese
firms believe that the Chinese market will continue to expand, and they are
confident about generating profits there. In JETRO’s yearly survey in 2014,
64.1 per cent of Japanese firms replied that they expected profit from sales,
an increase from 60.7 per cent of firms on the year before.
The idea that all Japanese
firms are on the way out of China is a myth. For Japanese companies, China’s
role has changed from ‘the factory of the world’ to ‘the market of the world’,
as Chinese wages and consumption trend up.
China’s rise has forced
structural change within the international community, and with it a
deteriorating political and security relationship with Japan. Realists argue
that Sino–Japanese confrontation in the political and security realms will
likely adversely affect their economic ties as well. In contrast, liberalists
predict that mutual economic dependence between the two will eventually
contribute to stability in their political relationship.
It is true that the politics
of the bilateral relationship have not always been positive for Japanese firms
operating in China. Yet Sino–Japan relations are not easily described by either
the realist or liberalist paradigms. The relationship, characterised by ‘cold
politics, hot economics’, is an interesting case study in international
relations in an era of globalisation, the nature of which is unprecedented. For
now, confrontation in the political and security sphere continues to appear
compatible with deep interdependence in the economic sphere.
Rumi Aoyama is a professor
at the Research Institute of Current Chinese Affairs, Waseda University.
This article appeared in the
most recent edition of the East Asia Forum
Quarterly, ‘Japan-China relations‘.
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