Yesterday’s Beijing V-Day
parade addressed multiple
audiences. Among them, clearly—the U.S. Navy, the U.S. military writ
large and their regional allied and partner counterparts. After years of foreign
speculation and surprising
skepticism about an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), China has
for the first time officially revealed two variants: the DF-21D
and DF-26.
There were other hardware firsts, with DF-16
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and YJ-12
anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) also revealed for the first time
(the latter an air-launched missile on a display truck for parading purposes).
The DF-5B ICBM officially confirmed as a “MIRV-ed nuclear missile” (分导核导弹), with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles that can greatly
complicate its intercept by ballistic missile defenses. What makes these
displays particularly significant: all the missiles on parade are currently
in PLA service. That explains why China’s DF-41 ICBM
and YJ-18 ASCM
were nowhere to be found—they are not yet deployed. Otherwise, by raising
concerns without demonstrating credible capabilities, China would risk reaping
“the onus without the bonus.” A tremendous non-hardware-related announcement
provided greater context: Xi Jinping’s statement in his speech at the parade, “I announce
that China will reduce military personnel numbers by 300,000.” But
what is arguably most significant in hardware terms is that Beijing used this
high-profile occasion to reveal not one but two different ASBMs—both already
deployed by China’s Second Artillery Force (SAF).
There was nothing subtle about the parade or its showcasing of Chinese
military hardware. First, precise details of the weapons showcased and their
formations were available on
the Internet several days before the big event. Second, all major
missiles had large English-language designators stenciled in bright white—even
the most ophthalmologically challenged foreign observes could not possibly miss
the deterrent message.
The parade, together with official commentary, remains available on YouTube, and from behind
China’s Great Firewall for those who can’t access such foreign
social media. As official Chinese-language commentary streamed on the state
television channel CCTV-1, and sixteen DF-21D MRBMs rolled by in precise
formation on their transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), the missile was
described as an “assassin’s mace weapon” (杀手锏武器) with the ability to strike
“targets on water” (水面目标). The set of sixteen DF-21Ds was further described as the “Conventional
Missile Second Formation. DF-21D, road mobile anti ship ballistic missile, the
assassin’s mace for maritime asymmetric warfare” (常规导弹第二方队, DF21丁是打击舰船目标的路基弹道导弹, 是我军海上非对称作战的杀手锏武器). The DF-21Ds appeared to
have a longer, pointier nose cap than the DF-21C variants displayed in the
previous parade.
Official commentary states that the longer-range DF-26
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is “capable of nuclear and
conventional strike” (核常兼备). This dual-payload term is particularly interesting, and the
Janus-faced concept has clearly been contemplated by Chinese strategists and
technicians alike for some time. In September 2006, in Xiamen, China, at the
“10th Program for Science and National Security Studies Beijing Seminar on
International Security” conference, I remember an unattributed paper on “核常兼备” appearing mysteriously on
the publications table. That conference was co-sponsored by the Institute of
Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM), a reclusive organization
closely
affiliated with China’s nuclear-weapons industry.
Official commentary elaborated that the DF-26 is “capable of targeting
large- and medium-sized targets on water” (打击大中型水面目标). This “Guam Killer”
missile is credited with 3,000-4,000-km (1,800-2,500 mile) range, sufficient to
strike U.S. bases on Guam. The set of sixteen DF-26 missiles was further
described as the “Conventional-/Nuclear-capable formation. The DF-26 can
perform medium-to-long-range precision attack on both land and
large-to-medium-sized maritime targets. A new weapon for strategic deterrence”
(核常兼备导弹方队, 东26能对陆上重要目标和海上大中型舰船实施中远程精确打击, 是我军战略威慑力量体系中的新型武器).
The ASBMs’
Significance
China’s V-Day military parade has two major audiences: domestic and
foreign. With regard to foreign audiences, an important part of its purpose is
to reveal enough about Chinese capabilities to enhance deterrence and persuade
potential adversaries to—at a minimum—treat Beijing’s concerns with the utmost
care. To this end, Beijing showcased new weapon systems that have not been
displayed publicly before. Likely due to not only the historic weight of the
occasion, but also Xi’s need for tangible accomplishments to compensate for
recent economic problems and ongoing risks in that regard, China leaned
extra-far forward and displayed these armaments.
Mark Stokes of the Project 2049 Institute has offered further analysis,
suggesting that all missiles displayed are operational at specific basing
locations, and that China is keen to show them off for both internal and
external purposes:
“The six [SAF] formations [in the parade] were led by a corps deputy
leader-grade officer from each of the six SAF missile bases: Base 51 (DF-21D);
Base 52 (DF-15B and DF-16); Base 53 (DH-10A); Base 54 (DF-26); Base 55 (DF-5B);
and Base 56 (DF-31A). All these systems entered the operational inventory
between 2010 and 2013—or perhaps even earlier in the case of the DF-5B and
DF-31A, which was included in the 2009 parade. In 2009, representatives from
the brigades equipped with the particular missile system led the formations. So
it seems that China’s Central Military Commission wanted to raise the level of
representation and spread the glory around to each missile base. Additionally,
the parade gave some pretty good hints about which missile bases/brigades these
various missile systems are assigned to. So I’d give the PLA some credit for
progress in transparency.”
News of the DF-21D’s development has emerged over roughly two decades,
and it has been analyzed extensively in open-source publications. Inspired by a
continentalist desire to “use the land
to control the sea” (一陆之海), Beijing’s ASBM development was initially catalyzed by its inability
to respond adequately to what it decried as unacceptable U.S. intervention in
the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and what it misperceived as the intentional
bombing of its embassy in Belgrade by the United States during the Kosovo War
in 1999.
In developing the DF-21D, Chinese
engineers drew quite heavily on concepts and technologies from the U.S. MGM-31B
Pershing II theater
ballistic missile fitted with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRV).
The highly accurate, terminally maneuvering American missile was similar enough
to be highly useful for China’s purposes—although substantial modifications of
its control surfaces, sensor interface and other aspects were almost certainly
required to produce a missile capable of hitting a noncooperative moving
sea-surface target. As ASBM efforts progressed, in a not uncommon instance of
China being more transparent in Chinese, relevant
Chinese-language publications multiplied throughout the late 1990s, dipped in a
classic “bathtub-shaped” pattern from 2004 to 2006 at a critical point in ASBM
development and component testing, and rose sharply
thereafter as China headed towards initial
deployment in small numbers beginning in 2010.
According to its 2004 handbook, the SAF has
thought seriously about at least five ways to use ASBMs against U.S. carrier
strike groups, at least at the conceptual level:
– “Firepower harassment [strikes]” (火力袭扰), which involve hitting
“carrier battle groups.”
– “Frontal firepower deterrence” (前方火力慑阻), which involves firing
intimidation salvos in front of a CSG’s advance “to serve as a warning.”
– “Flank firepower expulsion” (翼侧火力驱赶), which combines interception of a CSG by PLAN forces with intimidation
salvos “launched toward the enemy carrier battle group opposite our relatively
threatened flank” designed to direct it away from the vulnerable areas where
China feels most threatened.
– “Concentrated fire assault” (集火突击), which entails targeting the
carrier as a center of flight operations:
“When many carrier-borne aircraft are used in continuous air strikes
against our coast, in order to halt the powerful air raids, the enemy’s core
carrier should be struck as with a ‘heavy hammer.’ The conventional missile
forces should be a select group carrying sensitive penetrating submunitions
and, using the ‘concentrated firepower assault’ method, a wide-coverage strike
against the enemy’s core carrier should be executed, striving to destroy the
enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control tower [island] and other easily
damaged and vital positions.”
– “Information assault” (信息攻击), which entails attacking the carrier strike group’s command and
control system electromagnetically to disable it:
“Directed against the enemy’s command and control system or weak links
in the Aegis system, conventional missiles carrying antiradiation submunitions
or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) submunitions can be used when enemy radar is
being used and their command systems are working, with antiradiation
submunitions striking radar stations and EMP submunitions paralyzing the
enemy’s command and control system.”
Obviously, the above suggests tremendous potential for dangerous
misunderstanding and escalation!
According to the Pentagon’s 2015 annual PLA report, the CSS-5 Mod 5
(DF-21D) ASBM China has “fielded” in small numbers “gives the PLA
the capability to attack ships in the western Pacific Ocean” “within
900 nm [1,667 km] of the Chinese coastline.”
While much additional research is still needed, the DF-21D has already
received detailed coverage. I, for one, was so interested that I published a
book on it: Chinese
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic
Implications. The more-recently-developed DF-26, by contrast,
has received far less coverage thus far. It is long overdue for greater
attention in the open-source analytical community.
None of this tells us how China’s ASBMs would perform in the unfortunate
event of conflict. First, it remains unclear how well China would be able to
target the DF-26, particularly towards the far end of its range. By parading
the DF-21D and DF-26, Beijing is indicating that the missiles themselves have
been tested carefully and accepted into military service as operational
hardware. The reconnaissance strike complex that supports them, by contrast,
remains a work in progress. But it is clearly being developed rapidly, with new
satellites of multiple types devoted to remote sensing and other relevant
missions being launched frequently. On August 27, for instance, China launched
the Yaogan-27 remote
sensing satellite. In fact, well over twenty-seven Yaogan satellites have been lofted,
with some number of designators covering three-satellite triplets apparently
optimized for triangulating surface ship location in a manner akin to that of
the U.S. Naval
Ocean Surveillance System. Open-source analysts are still waiting
for evidence of China testing an ASBM comprehensively against a noncooperative
moving maritime target.
Second, even if China’s ASBMs are completely functional at all stages of
their “kill chain,” they could still be defeated completely by foreign
countermeasures. Pointing out that the United States has significant
countermeasures against China’s ASBM and other missiles, Harry Kazianis
describes the DF-21D as more likely to be “a great
complicator” than a “game changer.”
Supporting
China’s New Hardware
Looking forward, China’s new ASBMs are only as effective as the PLA’s
ability to actually use them, in conjunction with related systems. With his
unprecedented emphasis on ensuring that China’s military will be able to—if
necessary—fight and win as its Party masters deem necessary, Xi is working to improve
its ability to use newly acquired hardware effectively under realistic
conditions. Achieving the necessary enhancement of command, control and
integration requires major organizational reform—hence Xi’s announcement that
300,000 troops (likely mostly ground forces) need to be cut.
This will be the fourth round of PLA downsizing and restructuring,
following previous efforts in 1985, 1997 and 2002. Each iteration enhanced
effectiveness while freeing resources for further development. Yet ground force
dominance was left largely untouched; changing that is now prioritized. The
outline of reforms now under discussion was outlined in the Third Plenum “Decision to
Deepen Reforms” in November 2013—the first time military reform had
its own section in such a document, and articulated at a conference Xi held
that December.
How might PLA restructuring play out in practice? Clarion calls
for major change in official PLA media to make it clear that
military leaders must prepare to implement reforms expeditiously, but
characteristically lack specifics as to where that will take the military. A less
authoritative but analytically logical article in Duowei News
predicts that reforms will be announced and implemented vigorously after the
military parade. It suggests that the PLA will be restructured top-to-bottom to
achieve some of the benefits of a U.S.-style military organization, and that
China’s current Seven Military Regions will be consolidated and reconfigured
considerably. The ground forces will be downsized further and receive their own
headquarters to become a subordinate service, while the Navy and Air Force will
be expanded. The SAF, which controls land-based Chinese ballistic missiles,
including its DF-21D and DF-26 ASBMs, will certainly not suffer any demotion in
the process.
Andrew Erickson is
an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College.
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