India’s first prime
minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, also strived to ‘make in India’ by erecting high
protective barriers to trade. The policy completely ignored the interests of
the consumers who had to put up with inferior products and higher costs. India
departed from that unsustainable strategy in 1991. The new slogan should have a
different connotation not merely in terms of its tapestry but also real
content.
Today, making India an
important investment destination requires a systematic approach involving both policies
and institutions. The existing systems and processes must undergo significant
changes to remove structural rigidities, improve the quality of institutions
and infrastructure, and create a favourable climate for fostering technological
progress. The distributional coalitions deeply entrenched in the Indian
political system will not easily allow such changes. Union policymakers will
thus need a clear understanding of what needs to be done and must cooperate
with state-level governments to design strategies for this long journey.
The most important
intervention for the Indian government is to change the character and quality
of the country’s institutions. Indian labour laws, for example, have
constrained labour-intensive industrialisation and led to the declining
fortunes of labour-intensive industries like textile and leather. But as labour
becomes more expensive in China, India can reclaim some lost ground. The union
(central) government initiative to give a greater role to state governments is
the best way forward.
A critical component of
institutional restructuring is administrative reform. The Second Administrative
Reforms Commission has made some useful recommendations on governance and
economy which, limits the powers of the bureaucracy. Yet given the enormous
influence of the Indian bureaucracy, the status quo is likely to continue.
Virtually every regulatory system has been captured by retired bureaucrats. As
a result, competence has not always been the major criterion for government
appointments. Ensuring accountability, reward performance and making
competence-based appointments should be the key aims of bureaucratic reforms.
The union government has to
take the lead to reform all levels of India’s government. The licence raj
(licence rule), in particular, continues to pose impediments in various ways.
Every initiative from the union, state and local levels of government
requires numerous bureaucratic clearances, be it starting a business or
constructing a house.
India also has a significant
infrastructure deficit. Investment in a multitude of infrastructure projects —
equivalent to an estimated 8 per cent of GDP — has stalled for one reason or
another. These cobwebs need to be cleared. The land acquisition issue is stuck
in the political logjam. In the power sector, the major problem is the
disconnection between the policies relating to power generation and
distribution. On several occasions, the government has bailed out power
distribution companies, but political interference and ineffective regulation
have continued to paralyse the sector.
To address the
infrastructure deficit, the government needs to step up public investment in
infrastructure. The central’s government investment budget is worryingly small,
but the government has done well to accelerate capital expenditures in the
first quarter . Better revenue collection from indirect taxes may also enhance
investment spending. But the government must improve the model concession
agreements on public–private partnerships. Private investors desire for low
interest rates means that the fiscal deficit should be contained to avoid
crowding out in capital markets. With this in mind, increasing public
infrastructure investment means increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio.
But tax reform is a lengthy
process, not a big bang reform. In May 2015, the government passed the Goods
and Services Tax reform, which will introduce a consumption tax of 27 per cent
in 2016. While the tax reform promises much, compromises and distortions make
it unclear how much it will deliver.
Finally, the government
should address price controls, which continue to constrain allocative
efficiency and productivity. Even after 24 years of liberalisation, the prices
of many goods and services are determined through administered fiat rather than
the forces of supply and demand. These controls have distorted resource
allocations at the macro and micro levels and have proliferated subsidies. The
administered interest rate on provident funds places a floor on interest rates
— they cannot go lower. And the associated overvaluing of the exchange rate
hurts the export sector.
India cannot continue to
distort sugar cane prices while also increasing import duties on sugar to
protect the sugar lobby and upping the proportion ethanol blended in petrol. Subsidising
irrigated water results in the farmers adopting water-intensive crops even when
they are not appropriate and subsidising electricity results in depletion of
underground water that would otherwise be used for irrigation. Subsidising urea
results in the distorted consumption of fertilisers and soil salinity. The examples can be
multiplied.
‘Make in India’ will require
coordinated reform
and bi-partisan support at both the central and state level. This cannot be
achieved through a confrontational strategy. Opposition parties have nothing to
lose by opposing reform. But the ruling party has the responsibility to adopt a
conciliatory approach to build consensus. Without effort from both sides, ‘Make
in India’ reforms will not go far.
Govinda Rao is an emeritus
professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Dehli, a
non-resident senior fellow at the National Council of Applied Economic Research
and an advisor of the Takshashila Institution.
No comments:
Post a Comment