To
date, no sitting Japanese prime minister has ever visited prominent second
world war memorials dedicated to the Nanking Massacre
Stephen Nagy considers Japan's
need to cater to post-war domestic politics and its strategic positioning
On the 70th
anniversary of the end of the second world war in Asia, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe faces the conundrum of recognising Japan's past while explaining its
future in East Asia. This includes coming to terms with Japan's imperial past.
Abe's nationalist and conservative credentials make him the ideal candidate to
deliver both messages, which would strengthen Japan's regional reputation.
Besides, finally
dealing with the historical demons of its past would also benefit Japan. This
leads us to ask why he hesitates to engage in an act that would be positive for
Japan and the region.
Abe does not
have a monopoly in terms of not fully accounting for Japan's imperial past. To
date, no sitting Japanese prime minister has visited prominent second world war
memorials dedicated to the Nanking Massacre, comfort women or other war-related
issues. It is unlikely that Abe will take up President Xi Jinping's offer to
join the 70th anniversary commemoration events on September 3 in Beijing,
either.
This selective
historical amnesia is rooted in post-war political factions that were never
comfortable with the narrative that Japan was an aggressor state and that its
military behaviour, particularly in East Asia, was any different than other
nations at war.
Conservative
politicians like Abe receive considerable support from the Japan War-Bereaved
Families Association, an influential group that supports prime ministers and
politicians visiting controversial sites of commemoration, such as the Yasukuni
Shrine that honours senior military and political figures convicted of the most
serious war crimes. Acknowledging wartime atrocities and accepting that the war
conducted by imperial Japan was a war of aggression responsible for the death
of tens of millions would be political suicide.
In short,
domestic politics is tied to electing people who can mobilise conservative
voters. As the "Prince of the Nationalists", as some commentators
label him, Abe acts as a torch bearer for these views. Thus, as prime minister,
Abe has wedded himself to political support groups that make it nearly
impossible for him to acknowledge that past.
Furthermore, his
track record delegitimises any attempt to convey remorse. Instead of appearing
sincere, Abe's words and actions are seen as ideologically driven.
Abe's reticence
in this respect complicates relations between Korea, China and Japan. That
said, history - real, invented or constructed - is not the only factor
deterring reconciliation in the region. Geopolitics and domestic politics
within neighbouring countries also hamper relations.
For example, a
divided Korean Peninsula, with the North and South using nationalistic rhetoric
to consolidate their leadership and domestic politics, makes it unlikely that
even a more progressive, shared view of history will improve relations between
Japan and Korea. American military bases serve as a constant reminder that
Koreans need to be vigilant defenders of their sovereignty. Perceived weakness
on South Korea's part with regard to a softer and more conciliatory approach to
Japan strengthens the North's nationalist credentials and thus its national
security.
Reunification of
the Korean Peninsula under Seoul's leadership would not necessarily be
conducive to reconciliation, either. A unified, pro-US Korea would mean the
loss of a buffer state against US influence for China. It is hard to imagine
Beijing willing to tolerate anything but the status quo.
In this sense,
there may be tacit recognition on Abe's part that soured relations in northeast
Asia are a result of geopolitical competition and insecurities. In that line of
thinking, Abe's speech to the US Congress may have omitted apologies and
expressions of remorse to East Asia not just because it was the wrong venue,
but also out of the understanding that history is being used as a strategic
tool to weaken Japan, to maintain current divisions that act as a buffer
against US influence.
This wariness is
directed not only at American influence, either; a vibrant democratic, unified
Korean Peninsula, especially one that has been able to reconcile with Japan,
would not be a welcome neighbour.
The
instrumentalisation of history, war guilt and public shaming of Japan have all
significantly decreased sympathy for the Chinese arguments. According to the
2014 Genron poll of Japan-China relations, many Japanese feel that
anti-Japanese education and selective historical teachings about Japan and the
war have made and are making relations worse.
There is another
catalyst that makes Japanese politicians and people in general much less sympathetic
to China's interpretation of history, and less willing to apologise for past
wrongdoings during the imperial period. As China continues to have double-digit
military growth and engages in assertive behaviour in both the East and South
China seas, such as unilaterally declaring an air defence identification zone,
Japanese politicians, no matter how sincere and forthright about history, will
find it increasing difficult to garner public support for further apologies to
a state that is perceived as assertive, openly anti-Japanese and changing the
status quo.
Stephen R. Nagy is an associate
professor in the department of politics and international studies at
International Christian University in Tokyo
This
article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as Politics of
remorse
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