India still has the world’s
largest concentration of poor people, with more than 840 million living on less
than US$2 a day and 400 million on less than US$1.25 a day.
By 2050, with the world’s largest population, India will face multiple
challenges around urbanisation, infrastructure, jobs, drinking water, and
food for its citizens. Its size and rising middle-class power has led many to
highlight its role in powering the Asian century. It is also embraced, in
Washington, Tokyo and Canberra, as a strategic hedge against China’s growing
power.
Unless its poor can be
included in the process of growth, India’s transition through the middle-income
trap will remain a dream. If India is to emerge from lower-income country
status and catch up with its BRICS counterparts, it will have to throw off the
shackles of outdated development strategies and a culture of bureaucratic
inertia.
Located in the right place
and at the right time, how can India thrive, alongside its giant Asian
neighbour? What opportunities does China offer India and what opportunities
will the rise of India offer China? India is bound to a low per capita growth
trajectory unless it can lift its annual growth rate by at least 2 to 3
percentage points. Is China a threat to India’s regaining its growth momentum,
or does it offer a way out of continuing economic fragility?
The marked slowdown of
growth in both China and India in the past few years does not qualify the
outlook for China’s and India’s dominance of Asia’s economic and strategic
weight. Yet, as Alok Sheel argues,
their current growth trajectories suggest both need new strategies for
cushioning the impact of the global slowdown. Their current strategies are
unsustainable if the drop in demand in advanced economies is permanent, and
that might well be the case.
‘Both economies need
rebalancing’, says Sheel. ‘China needs to reduce its reliance on foreign demand
and domestic investment while increasing domestic consumption. This is what it
seems to be consciously seeking to do’, he continues, ‘unlike China, the Indian
economy needs to invest more,especially in infrastructure, while also improving
the ease of doing business … This would involve shifting public expenditure
away from consumption towards plugging growing infrastructure gaps and
improving the environment for private investment’. To do this also involves
following Prime Minister Modi’s leadership in engaging more deeply
internationally.
Re-calibrating China’s and
India’s development strategies in this way will, of course, drive their two
economies more closely together, not put political or economic distance between
them. China needs to invest outwards, and is positioned to be a significant
source of investment funding and infrastructure for countries in its
neighbourhood, such as India. India needs to lift its competitiveness across
manufacturing and other sectors by opening to international trade and
investment, and position itself to play a much larger role in regional value
chain production networks.
The force and potential of
the growing weight in the India–China partnership continues to befuddle analysts
in Washington, Tokyo and Canberra. The pace and scale of bilateral trade and
investment growth between China and India has been impressive and it is bound
to more than match that of India’s other Asian partnerships in the decades
immediately ahead given their proximity and economic complementarity.
The inexorable force of
India’s and China’s demographic dynamics and growing market size will drive
these changes and India’s deeper integration into Asia with China. It will do
this by leveraging the two countries’ divergent demographics and their trade
and geographic proximity.
In this week’s lead essay, Hugh White examines
an alternative conception of China’s and India’s strategic interaction, through
the prism of a wider ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategic system, posing the question of
how India might play into that to limit China’s strategic weight.
White observes that Prime
Minister Modi has encouraged leaders in Washington, Tokyo and Canberra to
believe that he shares and wants to help promote their vision of Asia’s
strategic trajectory through that prism. ‘But it is equally probable that India
will play little role in the power politics of East Asia’, he argues. And if it
does, it will pursue Indian interests, which may differ substantially from
America’s, Japan’s or Australia’s.
There is little doubt, White
argues, that India will acquire the strategic weight to function as a great
power in an Indo-Pacific strategic system alongside China, America and Japan.
Demographics alone assures its place among the world’s big three economies.
India will also remain the preeminent great power in the sub-continental
strategic system of which it is the natural centre. But will it function as a
great power in a broader strategic system that also encompasses East Asia?
‘Those who assert the
existence of a functioning “Indo-Pacific” region think so. But promoting the
region as a policy concept risks assuming what needs to be proved’, White
concludes.
If India stands aloof from
East Asian power politics, and China does not challenge India west of Sumatra,
then these two regions could continue, as they long have, to function as
separate strategic systems. And proponents of the Indo-Pacific idea, which has
gained fashion around the notion that India will be compliant in playing an
assigned role in the Western Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean, might need to
reconsider what is going on on the ground across Asia, not only in the oceans
that surround it.
Peter Drysdale is Editor of
the East Asia Forum.
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