It is tempting to view a
submarine purchase primarily through a geopolitical lens, given the interest in
Southeast Asia’s trajectory in an era of great power rivalry. Thailand is of
particular interest because of its close and longstanding cultural affiliations
with China, its clear discomfort with US criticism since the 22 May 2014 coup
and its absence of territorial disputes with China. But in matters of Thai
defence spending and arms procurement, there are other forces — unrelated to
geopolitical alignment — that also need to be considered.
Many would see any submarine
purchase as the military junta taking advantage of its position to increase
defence spending. Historically, this is often correct. After the 2006 coup, the
military’s budget jumped 47 per cent.
This would suggest that the
2014 junta is the navy’s best chance to obtain the submarines it has been
proposing since the 1990s. It is waging a determined campaign to get the
submarine purchase over the line. In response to the cabinet decision to defer the
purchase, it released a nine page document explaining
the need for submarines. The document cites Thailand’s reliance on maritime
trade, significant maritime resources and the possession of subs by other ASEAN
nations as reasons why the submarine purchase should occur.
But the Thai military
can also be surprisingly tolerant of restraint in defence spending, especially
during tough economic times. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Thailand
was amongst the first to slash defence spending, which included cancelling a
planned F/A-18 Hornet procurement. It was also one of the last countries to
resume increasing its defence spending. One economic analysis some years later noted that
Thailand’s defence budgets had fallen ‘disproportionately due to the slowdown
in economic growth’.
And Thailand is facing a
difficult economic outlook. Its competiveness in its traditional export
strengths (such as rice) has been declining for some time, and it has suffered declining exports
for three successive years. Tourism revenue has slumped since the 2014 coup.
The economy is unlikely to grow by more than 3 per cent in 2015. This is
forcing the government to consider increasing taxes, even to the point
introducing a co-payment for the immensely popular 30 Baht health care
policy introduced originally by the previous Thaksin government.
Unfortunately for the navy,
financial conservatism will most likely affect its procurement proposals. The
Thai navy occupies a subordinate position within the Thai military hierarchy,
as the army has historically dominated Thailand’s military forces. The Thai
army also continues to be the service that controls key political and official
appointments. Many Thai prime ministers have been from the army, for example,
but none from the other services.
As a consequence, the Thai
navy has long struggled for resources and influence. This is partly due to the
strategic prioritisation of the army, but it is also due to the lasting effects
of inter-service rivalry and politicisation. In 1947 the Thai navy found itself
on the wrong side of a domestic political power
play. Navy elements had supported Pridi Phanomyong but were defeated by the
army supporting Phibun Songkram, who later became premier of Thailand.
Since then the navy has
experienced only brief periods of prominence, such as during the 1990s. In the
wake of the 1992 Black May massacre of protestors, the Thai army lost
significant standing. As a result, maritime force development, strategy and
priorities received an unusual degree of attention. The navy was allowed to
purchase an aircraft carrier, the Chakri Naruebet and a few fixed wing
strike aircraft. Plans for submarines and a further naval base were announced.
But the 1997 financial crisis largely ended this golden period of expansion.
If Thailand does proceed
with a Chinese submarine purchase, it would be sensible to keep in mind that
Thailand has bought a considerable volume of arms from China — including
frigates and patrol boats — over the years. The key factor here has been price.
This underscores another longstanding characteristic of Thai defence policy: a
presumption of ‘good enough’ in defence procurement. Thai defence objectives
are generally to provide an armed force capable of offering a deterrent, rather
than to develop a force with a significant capability edge.
Chinese submarines are not
necessarily a geopolitical concern. Some Thais have started to register the
tensions in the South China Sea as a long-term security issue, but most do not.
Thailand has no direct stake in this dispute. But the military junta’s
legitimacy is already wafer thin. It may be that the regime just considers the unpopular
submarine purchase to be burning precious political capital for little reason.
Greg Raymond is a research
associate at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian
National University. His PhD thesis on Thailand’s strategic culture is currently
under examination.
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