Peeling back the layers of MALAYSIA’S PEKIDA, (Gangs and NGOs in Malaysian Politics) and Part 2, Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta through the years

The links between the underworld and politics in Malaysia have never been clearer.

A few years ago when I gave my first conference talk on Pekida, the intricate network of gangs and NGOs in Malaysian politics, I was very grateful to the organisers at ISEAS in Singapore for successfully gathering a mixed audience of 40 people.

For me, 40 people listening to an unknown French junior academic was like having a full house at a show featuring the prime minister dancing the French Cancan.

I was also lucky enough to have sparked the curiosity of dignitaries of the Malaysian Embassy who had the (dis-)courtesy of leaving before the end of the talk; to rush to the buffet or to avoid the subsequent discussion.

In that same vein, the reaction of some colleagues was very passionate, ranging from intellectual curiosity to harsh suspicion. I remember a Malaysian scholar, based in Singapore, asking how I could prove what I was saying? Can you show us “police reports?” he asked. Do you have “official proof?”

He also asked how could he, a Malaysian, believe me, “a French girl?” The debate quickly moved away from the usual scientific discussion on methodology or ethics. In the eye of that professor my university credentials had suddenly vanished, pushed down by his prejudices about my looks, my gender and my origin: a classic characteristic of empty argument that often emerges when emotions exhaust rational thought.

The fact is that the relationship between politicians and the underworld has always existed. Collusion between politicians and the underworld or connivance militancy in the Malay world is old news; excellent studies on similar phenomenon in neighboring Indonesia between figures called Preman, or gangsters, and politics have also been made.

Connivance militants are groups for which political activism, whether violent of pacific, is a business, a service rendered to politicians in exchange for money or advantages. The relationship is based on a solid and exclusive system of patronage and is a way to re-distribute a country’s resources to the political elite and their supporters.

Those benefiting from the “generosity’ of states that use connivance militants are not the lay members of these organisation, but their leaders. Members of these groups are often the disenfranchised, who join hoping to get their “share of the pie”, or are seduced by an organisation’s populist and often racist rhetoric.

Pekida has always been an open secret in Malaysia, but kept away from any scientific studies. I have not made a discovery, I just say out loud and clear, as clear as an academic can be, what was lying there, in the dust.

In fact, Pekida is like a good idea that appears on the edge of sleep that you don’t write down. The next morning you know it’s there, you know it could be important, but you can’t remember it.

Rumors surrounding the UMNO linked organisations are blurred, information is contradictory. Bringing the pieces of the puzzle together is tough and requires much work.

Essentially, Pekida should be seen as a brand used by numerous organisations registered as NGOs, and under other names, running cultural cum political activities with close links to political parties. Most of them are Malay NGOs supporting UMNO. But some of these groups are indeed multi-ethnic organisations operating for whoever pays the most.

I have always kept in mind the scepticism, to say the least, of my very dear colleague from that conference in Singapore. But here are a few recent developments that hopefully shed light on his emotional, rather than intellectual, turmoil.

In August 2013, when police sting OPS Cantas, or Operasi Cantas, was organised by the Malaysian government, politicians with suspected links to ‘gangster’ groups eluded the police. At the time, the interior minister assured the public that Pekida groups were not gangsters. The crackdown on gangs looked more like a cleansing of UMNO-linked Malay gangs’ Chinese and Indian competitors.

This re-organisation of the grey zone where politics and crime meets, and where connivance militants burgeon, took place as I was on the verge of finishing my PhD dissertation, events rubber stamping my entire argument.

In early 2015, when my first articles on Pekida were published by New Mandala, and republished across several news portals and blogs from every political persuasion, hundreds of comments were posted praising my work, sometimes with exaggeration. Others accused me of defamation, often falling into personal, sexist and racist comments or threats of deportation and death.

In a news interview, a Malay NGO leader offered to date me, rather than having an intellectual debate (I have not made my mind up yet). In another interview, the President of Pekida said I was confused. According to him, UMNO had no ties to Pekida and Pekida had no links to gangsterism. Others, on the contrary, felt empowered to join the debate, adding that former prime minuster Abdullah Badawi was Ayahanda, or ‘father’, of Pekida, but not of the gangster faction.

Over the past two months, in a magical twist, some Pekida affiliated leaders have now been re-cast in Yayasan Ayahanda Semalaysia (YAS); what is described as a ‘foundation’. These leaders have slowly gained new attention in the media, portraying themselves as legitimate political voices, including president Syed Husain.

Ayahanda is in fact one of the highest titles (after Paduka) given to leaders within several Malay NGOs including Pekida. These groups are like a pyramid with several branches and lines led by an Ayahanda who counts several members under him.

The successive declarations of YAS president Syed Husain reveal very clearly and unambiguously the nature of Pekida, its relationship with UMNO, and the entire patronage system.

Only yesterday, in the wave of accusations against Prime Minister Najib Razak, Syed Husain officially expressed YAS’s reluctance to keep supporting UMNO, and its intention to unite the more than “hundred Pekida splinters and over 3,000 Ayahanda”; including those “splinters” comprising individuals who have turned to “gangsterism” and who are “too egotistical” to work with.

These declarations show that the link between patronage, Malay NGOS and UMNO is so strong that internal UMNO politics and successive crises (like in 1998) directly impact on the nebulous organisation.

Secondly, the support of the organisation to the party would seem to be important enough, or made to be believed so, that its loss could jeopardise UMNO’s constituencies.

Thirdly, the leader of YAS clearly reaffirmed the underworld link of Malay NGOs “turned to gangsterism” and the existence of leaders “too egotistical” who have created their own groups, almost totally independent of the mere organisation.

Moreover, Syed Husain gives a hint of the numbers of members that could be counted in this nebula: indeed each Ayahanda may have a dozen to hundreds of followers. The YAS president has spoken about 3,000 splinter leaders.

Finally, the fact that Syed Husain reveals this information in the press is a very transparent indicator of the level of impunity that have be gained by Ayah, or ‘Bosses’, in the last decade.

The leadership of connivance militant groups used to remain discreet. But in a context where ruling politicians are feeling threatened by growing demands for transparency, connivance militant groups have become key political actors.

In an illusory democracy like Malaysia, the primary strategy of politicians on the verge of losing power is to tighten up the public sphere and silence oppositional voices within or outside their party rank. To do so, it is necessary to create a climate of fear that justifies the maintenance of authoritarian laws that are indeed used as a tool for political repression and the control of the masses.

This climate of fear is being instigated by images and rumors of religious, ethnic or political violence, orchestrated by connivance groups. The problem is what happens when the potential perpetrators of violence, like the disenfranchised youth who join these groups hoping for a social and economical lift, cannot be controlled anymore.

The Low Yat Plaza events in July were a smallscale show of what these youth are capable of if their despair is not addressed by proper political and social reforms. And what happens if connivance militancy continues to be an essential part of local politics.

George Orwell, in his novel 1984, imagines a country “Oceania” where propaganda is ran by the Ministry of Truth and where three slogans of the ruling party read “War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength”.

In Politok, where politics runs amok in Malaysia, sodomy is a weapon of massive repression, corruption is synonymous with donation, patronage is a gage of transparency and bosses run the show.

Shall we dance?

Sophie Lemière is a political anthropologist at the European University Institute in Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in Political Sciences from Sciences-Po (France) and is on a comparative journey between Malaysia and Tunisia where she continues to do fieldwork. She is the editor of Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People.

PART TWO

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta through the years

Reconstructing the history of Pekida and its network’s is a hard task. No historical account of the organisation has been found, and every attempt to locate official records has been an arduous mission. This article relies primarily on oral history (rarely shared with outsiders). The historical accounts collected are a reflection of members’ perception of the organisation’s history, and thus differs from one individual to another. In this context, every individual story, every piece of published document either from archives, administrative papers, newspapers articles or a few lines in an academic publication brings new pieces to the construction of the overall puzzle. Interestingly, the more one looks at these pieces, the more one may feel as if they are staring at different parts of many different puzzles. The challenge is thus to create a coherent image, made up of pieces different in origin. Despite these efforts, the puzzle is still incomplete and missing pieces are each of them an ocean of possible interpretations. So the last step is about connecting the dots, filling the blanks, imagining the colours and shape of the missing pieces towards re-constructing the image of an untold story.

History of PEKIDA

The only official account of the creation of Pekida can be found in the archive of the Asian Almanac (a Singapore based journal focusing on Asian affairs since 1963). According to this source, Pekida emerged in 1978 when Tentera Sabillullah (the Holy Army), an alleged religious criminal organisation, was dissolved. The members reformed into two separate organisations: Persatuan Angkatan Sabilullah (P.A.S/Association of Holy Forces) and Pekida. Government authorities dissolved P.A.S a decade later when the group was conveniently accused of being a terrorist organisation linked to the well-known Islamist party – the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), collateral damage of the government’s attempt to discredit the Islamic political party.

Most members are not aware of this official date (1978) and instead carry with them the many versions of Pekida’s creation. For some, the origins of Pekida go back “to the time of the prophet” or are the heritage of the walisongo^[i] in preparation for the return of Imam Mahdi^[ii]. But the story shared by most members is the version in which Pekida was created in the aftermath of the violent events of May 1969 as a way to prevent a repeat and when all else fails, to protect the Malays in the event of another racial riot.

This narrative of Pekida’s history by its members bears four elements: the temporality, the secrecy, the exclusivity and the ultimate mission. Pekida would be an organisation entrenched in the history of the Malay world and a heritage of the Malay community that has transcended time; created by “warriors”, and “heroes” joining the group is like an act of bravery; the organisation has transcend generations and maintain its existence and activity in secrecy whatever its form or its name or umbrella; finally Pekida exists to defend Islam and the Malays, as a member would say “It is for Allah, and Allah’s will”.

While yet another popular narrative is that the evolution of the organisation has followed the political path of the country where the defence and safety of the Malays has become a necessity, reinforced by the events of May 1969. Despite the differences found in the narratives of the history of the organisation, they tend to have the same message: Pekida is, and was, needed.

The roots of legitimacy

The origins of Pekida are a set of stories members relate discreetly, lowering their voice as if they are revealing the secret of their organisation. The oral transmission of this history and shared stories are important for the group. It is a way to establish solidarity and group values. These stories are at the core of the group’s cohesion and give legitimacy to its action whether legal or illegal, violent or non-violent. The legitimacy of Pekida’s action lays in arguments that echo of “Ketuanan Melayu” – Malay supremacy – propaganda. The ethnonationalist rhetoric embedded in a subjective interpretation of the country’s political and demographic history could be summed up in three concepts: Origins: “Malays are the original inhabitants of the soil”; Resistance “Malays must resist the Chinese, the Indians and the non-Muslims” and Sovereignty: “Malays must remain the rulers of the country”. These political myths added to the narrative of the organisation’s history and its “sacred” and “heroic” dimensions, are demagogical tools serving many purposes: recruitment, group cohesion and violence legitimation. The coherence of Pekida’s gangs, despite their nebulous character, resides in the sacred and/or legitimate aspect of their existence. Both notions either the “realisation of Allah’s design”, or the “protection of the Malays”, are taken as justification for the use of violent means. In that vein, illegal activities become a way to sustain the movement for its greater achievement.

Pekida-kini

Today, Pekida – an NGO – is a Malay organisation with a religious agenda shaped by dakwah^[iii]and Islamic education. It does not have a website anymore but mostly Facebook pages. The organisation’s former website^[iv]used to show that the official branch of Pekida runs very few activities and apparently does not belong to any coalition to which Islamist or Muslims NGOs are usually linked;^[v] and that is until Pekida became a component of the Himpunan movement, an anti-apostasy movement lead by Mohammed “Cikgu” Azmi [vi] in 2012. Nevertheless, Pekida as an NGO has several chapters spread nationally and its activities are actively promoted by members via the social media platform of Facebook. On these pages the NGO is often “confusingly” referred to as Pekida or “Tiga Line”, or “The Three Lines” without making any real distinction.

A real confusion exists regarding the nature of Pekida and its shadowy activities. As explained, the NGO is in fact an umbrella for a nationwide network. Pekida is a complex and loose network of discreet NGOs created by gangs for which political militancy is a business. Pekida is indeed a generic name used to describe this network, but in reality the name “Pekida” is the name of one of those numerous NGOs created by this network to offer political support, legalise parts of their activities.

Two colours, red and white, are used to differentiate the underground arms of Pekida from the official (the NGO arm of Pekida). The “white line” is indeed the legal face of an underground and illegal network called 36 (or 30-6) or the “red line”.  The “white line” arm symbolises a focus towards religious activities while the “red” arm symbolises a focus towards “society, business and politics”. This particular arm is involved in politics. It is difficult to determine which was created first, the NGO or the gangs. The gangs may have existed prior to 1978, under another form or name, or alternatively members of the NGOs may have oriented their network towards entrepreneurial opportunities offered by the development of the NGO’s network and its activities.

The red line was founded by a silat [vii] master from Kedah. His name holds a sacred dimension for members and out of respect they refrain from stating his name in full – especially not in front of outsiders. For that reason most members call him only by his monogram: PLB. His full name is no secret since pictures and articles based on unverified sources are circulated and available on the Internet; and the belated PLB has his own Facebook page.

In 2006, PLB passed away before being able to designate his successor. The highest ranked “tiga line leaders” all claimed the right of inheriting PLB’s position. In the absence of consensus, the leadership was split and various branches were then created. Since the split of the organisation, many have claimed the exclusive leadership of the “36”, or have created their own chapters by renaming their branch; and each branch may include hundreds of groups.

This relabelling was accompanied by an expansion of groups and collaboration between them. According to a former leader of the 36s – now a founder of his own branch – the organisation counts 6 million members: an optimistic figure implying that nearly one-fifth of Malaysian citizens (and almost half of Malaysian Muslims) are Pekida members. It is not possible to get a clear estimation of the membership of an underground organisation, but it should be noted that in almost every city and town visited in Malaysia (except Borneo) I was able to locate, identify or was informed of the presence of local members. The existence of Tiga Line and its new chapters are an open secret.

Continued in Part 3, “Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta beyond stereotypes.” Part 1 can be read HERE.

Sophie Lemière is the Jean Monnet Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in Comparative Politics from Sciences-Po (France). She is the author of Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People.

[i] The Wali Songos are the first of nine missionaries who brought Islam to Java. They are today considered as Saints.

[ii] Imam Mahdi the prophesied redeemer of Islam, who upon Christ’s return, aid him in cleansing the world of evil and uniting humanity.

[iii] Religious propagation.

[iv] Pekida.org. At the time of writing this piece, ehe website contained only one page but another website was accessed http://www.pekida.org/portal/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&ceid=7 explaining the organisation’s activities more in detail. Since then the website has disappeared.

[v] The anti-ISA movement, or the Islamist NGOs coalitions against apostasy in Islam like Pembela Islam or ACCIN.

[vi] President and founder of TERAS

[vii] A type of Malay martial art.

By Sophie Lemiere