Hardly had the dust of the
executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran settled than there was a new
spat between Indonesia and Australia. Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry is now hard
on Canberra’s heels for an official “explanation” of the alleged bribery of human
traffickers turned back by Australian border officials. Relations between the
two neighbors have long been prone to crisis and the current standoff
represents another nadir.
Indonesia’s very
bullish, public demand for an explanation is unusual in its directness. It is
almost as if Jakarta is trying to give Canberra a taste of its own medicine,
given the latter’s “megaphone” diplomacy in the lead up of the executions of
the “Bali Nine” duo sometime ago.
The perennially
fragile relationship between the two countries can also be understood through
the concept of “high-context culture” and its opposite “low-context culture,”
first introduced by anthropologist Edward T. Hall in his 1976 book “Beyond
Culture.”
In general, a
low-context culture is more individualistic, allowing differences and diversity
in opinions among its members which in turn force them to develop better
communications skills to avoid conflict. It follows that a low-context culture
tends to see vigorous dialog as a means of problem solving.
By contrast, members
of a high-context culture tend to avoid explicit discussions, preferring
symbols and subtle gestures to convey meaning. A high-context culture likes to
preserve harmony and peace among its members through complex social etiquette.
This is an understandable ploy when arguments are often personalized.
However, no culture is
wholly high-context or its opposite; any culture can produce both high-context
and low-context behavior. Indonesia is predominantly high-context but, as its
recent badgering of Australia shows, it can also act in a low-context
mode. On the other hand, Australia is largely a low-context culture, as most
English-speaking countries are.
As a rule, a
high-context culture can turn out low-context behavior when extraordinary
intimacy between two parties develops or, more ominously, when sufficient
offense is perceived to have been committed by one party. Unfortunately, in the
context of Indonesia-Australia relations, the latter seems to be the case this
time. Jakarta acts as if all the necessary niceties have been deployed, but to
no avail, and hence it no longer troubles to observe the usual elaborate
etiquette with its southern neighbor.
Indonesia is currently
bent on showing its displeasure with Australia more openly. No longer
burdened by having to rationalize its behavior, Jakarta for example
deliberately excluded Australia from the recently approved list of 45 countries
whose passport-bearers can now enter the country without a visa.
Throughout the furor
over the alleged bribery of human traffickers, Indonesian officials have been
anything but diplomatic. Arrmanatha Nasir, the spokesman for the Indonesian
Foreign Ministry, couldn’t refrain from a jibe aimed at Australia, saying “My
point is this: countries that are parties to the convention on refugees have a
responsibility to ensure they believe in what they sign.” Though
Arrmanatha correctly denied he had specifically referred to Australia, it
was difficult to avoid such a conclusion since Australia is a signatory to the
UN Convention on Refugees, while Indonesia isn’t.
The divide between
high-context Indonesia and low-context Australia couldn’t be more evident than
throughout the row over the death penalty earlier this year. Both the
Australian government and media conducted a public campaign to have the
death sentences for Chan and Sukumaran commuted, which didn’t sit well at all
with Indonesia.
The options Australia
proposed of paying for their upkeep or alternatively carrying out an exchange
of prisoners were also openly discussed, much to Jakarta’s apparent
consternation. Indeed, Canberra’s offers might have been more palatable
to Jakarta if they had been made using less explicit language or not announced
publicly at all.
It is definitely time
that Canberra restructured its strategy towards Jakarta. Yet this needn’t
mean that everything has to be on Jakarta’s terms. While the delivery should
certainly be more suited to a high-context culture, total acquiescence to Indonesia
at the expense of Australian values hasn’t always yielded satisfactory results.
Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam’s meeting with president Suharto in 1974, during which he reportedly
lent support for the latter’s belief that Timor Leste should join Indonesia,
was a high-context act of appeasement, in the sense Whitlam placed the
relations between the two countries above other considerations. However, it put
Australia on the wrong side of history; and when Timor Leste seceded from
Indonesia in 1999, Indonesian nationalists conveniently forgot the 1974 tacit
support and even went as far as suggesting that Australia had vested interests
in seeing an independent Timor Leste.
An example of
engagement between two low-context cultures was perhaps Whitlam’s 1972 cable to
US president Richard Nixon, protesting against the “Christmas bombings” by US
forces of Hanoi and Haiphong, in Vietnam. The letter did strain relations
between Australia and the United States but it also produced some of the most
intense two-way discussions between the two allies.
One thing is clear: a
high-context culture such as Indonesia’s shouldn’t be treated as if it were
low-context, even with a seemingly down-to-earth informal president like Joko
Widodo.
Johannes Nugroho is a
writer from Surabaya.
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